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Notes on translations
All quotations from Sartre are provided in English in the main text 
with the original French being given in the corresponding footnotes, 
which use the same abbreviation followed by an F. These footnotes 
are placed directly after the reference, in order to distinguish them 
from the footnotes that contain additional information. In most 
cases, I follow the most recent English translation. Translations 
are sometimes amended in order to correct errors or avoid 
inconsistencies. Some texts, namely, the working notes on Nausea 
published in Oeuvres Romanesques, the interview with Carrière and 
Empédocle, have never been translated into English. References to 
these works are to the French and the translations are my own. 
The interview with Fretz, on the other hand, has, to the best of my 
knowledge, never appeared in French, it was originally published in 
Dutch and later translated into English.
Preface
This dissertation examines the notions of subjectivity and selfhood 
that are developed by Jean-Paul Sartre throughout his work. The 
guiding thread of this analysis is the claim Sartre makes in many 
of his works that the Self is “a thing among things”. His thoughts 
concerning selfhood change and evolve throughout his career, and I 
aim to uncover the nuances of these developments.
The background of this research is the critical reception of 
Sartre’s philosophy. Sartre received much criticism from both his 
contemporaries and the succeeding generations of philosophers, and 
the focus of this criticism often concerns the role of subjectivity in 
his thought. Sartre is accused of defending an outdated view of the 
Subject – a being which has a perspective on and/or agency in the 
world. His critics thought he granted too much power and autonomy 
to human subjectivity. In spite of such earlier criticisms of his work, 
in more recent years Sartre’s ideas concerning subjectivity have – 
alongside those of other phenomenologists – become a source of 
inspiration for analytic philosophers of mind. In debates in which 
human subjectivity has often been dismissed and reduced to mere 
physical activity of the brain, a more subject-oriented approach that 
draws on Sartre’s work has afforded many authors a fresh perspective. 
Nevertheless, these scholars have little regard for the role of this 
notion within the framework of Sartre’s own thought, and they do 
not pay due attention to the criticisms Sartre’s work received in 
earlier discussions of his work. 
Thus, both the earlier criticism and the more recent analytic reception 
of Sartre’s work are concerned with his conception of subjectivity. 
Subjectivity, in turn, is directly related to the topic of selfhood. A 
subjective being is usually regarded as something that has a certain 
degree of unity and individuality. In other words, it has a Self. What 
makes one Subject different from another? Why can I say that I 
am the same person throughout my life, while I am at the same 
time constantly changing? How does a Subject experience itself ? 
The answer to these and other related questions are all central to the 
topic of selfhood.
For reasons that are soon to be addressed, my aim is neither to 
acquit Sartre from the charges made against him by his critics nor 
to discredit the reception of his thought in the philosophy of mind. 
Rather, against the background of Sartre’s contemporary status, my 
aim is to provide an in-depth study of one of the most important 
aspects of his philosophy. The Sartre revealed by my research is a 
thinker who aims to critique many of the traditional notions of 
subjectivity by rethinking them from within a largely subjective 
framework. For Sartre, the Self is ultimately a thing and hence 
an object, more than it is a Subject. Furthermore, I will address a 
dimension of selfhood that is often overlooked by Sartre scholarship 
although it is very influential in contemporary debates: that of the 
narrative identity of the Self. This has to do with the stories we 
tell ourselves and others about our lives and how these influence 
our sense of selfhood. Our life-stories involve both subjective and 
objective dimensions, as they require a narrator as well as a narrative, 
hence it is, as we will see, a point where two of the central topics of 
Sartre’s thought meet.
1
1Introduction
The primary focus of this dissertation will be the work of Sartre 
himself. Before delving into this, however, it is necessary to address 
the themes and context of Sartre’s works. We will begin with a 
thematic introduction that gives a general overview of the topic of 
subjectivity and selfhood. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
criticism his work has received and its more recent positive reception, 
which will allow us to properly understand the status of Sartre’s 
philosophy within the contemporary philosophical landscape. We 
will end this chapter with some methodological remarks concerning 
this dissertation.
1. Subjectivity and Selfhood
Let us begin with the theme of subjectivity and selfhood. In this 
thematic introduction, we will refrain from using a lot of technical 
vocabulary and will avoid naming thinkers who have discussed this 
theme, save for a few who represent classic positions. We will turn 
to Sartre only at the end of this section. Instead, I will focus on what 
is at stake in this philosophical debate.
A subjective being is a being which has a perspective on and/or agency 
in the world. The things in this world are objects, and most people 
would agree that they have at least a certain degree of objectivity, 
that is, a way in which they are that does not depend on a subjective 
being’s relationship towards them. To give a simple example, we agree 
that there are trees in a park. This is a matter of objectivity: these 
objects exist in the world outside, regardless of what we think about 
them, how we perceive them, how we feel about them or how we 
interact with them. Some people may perceive the park to be lovely, 
others may find it haunting. A colour-blind person would have a 
slightly different image of the trees than someone with full colour 
vision would, etc. Everyone has a different subjective experience of 
the objects at hand. Everyone has a different worldview which may 
or may not overlap with that of others. It is because of this that we 
say that a journalist or a scientist may strive for objectivity, in the 
sense that they try to suppress their own opinions on things and 
describe them as objectively as possible. This is, however, a matter of 
objective knowledge. When we speak of objectivity here, we do not 
refer to knowledge but to being. We take objectivity to mean that a 
thing exists as an object. 
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The same thing goes for subjectivity. When we speak of subjectivity, 
we do not mean subjective knowledge but rather the being that has 
(or, in the case of some theories, is) the perspective which makes this 
knowledge possible. It is also important to note that subjectivity is 
more than a perspective on the world that approximates to some 
degree how things really are: many aspects of things only exist 
because of subjectivity, namely the meanings we give to things. 
A well-known example of this is love. One could say that love is 
nothing but a chemical reaction in the brain that that facilitates 
the reproduction of the species at the individual level. Of course, 
this does not do justice to what it is like to feel love. Another 
dimension of subjectivity is agency. Having a subjective view on the 
world allows a subjective being to perform actions in light of the 
meanings it perceives. In other words, a subject is autonomous to a 
certain degree. Even if one completely denies any form of free will, a 
subjective being will still behave as if it is autonomous and perceives 
its actions as such. 
As already noted, most people would agree to some kind of distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity, but, at the same time, many 
would disagree where the exact distinction lies and how much 
importance one ought to assign to either subjectivity or objectivity. 
This may lead to two extreme positions. On the one hand there is 
reductionism, which tries to reduce subjectivity to objectivity. People 
who adhere to this position claim that subjective experience is not 
real, and that love is, for example, indeed nothing other than a physical 
reaction in our brains. This is a form of reductionism that would 
reduce the subject to physical nature, but it must be made clear that 
in this context reductionism is an umbrella-term that can refer to 
any sort of position that fully reduces subjectivity to something else. 
One could just as easily imagine someone saying that love is nothing 
more than a word or nothing more than a disguised relation of power. 
While such statements may be considered true objectively speaking, 
they do not do justice to our experience of love. A reductionist view 
reduces everything that is meaningful to something that can be fully 
comprehended without taking what it feels like to love into account. 
This could in turn lead to positions in which subjectivity is disdained 
altogether. One could imagine all kinds of dystopian examples of 
this. You declare your love to someone, and this person asks whether 
you could provide a recent chemical analysis of your brain to prove 
this. Or, to give another example: a certain patch of land may have 
some kind of symbolic or even sacred value to some people, but soil 
samples have proven that it is in fact not different from earth found 
elsewhere and can therefore be repurposed. Although these are of 
course extreme examples, one can see that disregarding subjectivity 
does not do justice to the full extent of human reality. To disregard 
subjectivity is to fail to do justice to many of the aspects that we 
deem crucial to our existence. 
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The other extreme, however, would be to disregard objectivity. This 
boils down to privileging and isolating subjectivity. Such positions 
are known by many names, which may or may not refer to different 
ways in which subjectivity is overstated. Sometimes, it is simply called 
subjectivism, sometimes it is referred to pejoratively as idealism. It 
can also appear under the banner of Cartesianism, named after René 
Descartes. His philosophy is the most famous case of the tendency 
to privilege and isolate the subject. In his effort to find a secure basis 
for human knowledge, Descartes first put everything in doubt, in 
this way he came to recognize that the only thing that could not 
be doubted was the fact that he was doubting (Descartes 1996). As 
doubting is a form of thinking, Descartes articulated his discovery 
with the now famous formulation cogito ergo sum – I think, therefore 
I am. The subjective cogito became the foundation of knowledge, and 
he subsequently divided the subjective mind and the objective body 
into two different substances, the res cogitans and the res extensa. This 
produces a mind-body dualism which further isolates the subjective 
from the objective realm. Subjectivity as a thinking thing is regarded 
to be a literal thing of another other kind than objects – as opposed to 
being simply the activity of having a perspective. Descartes ushered 
in an era in which such a Subject became the “official doctrine” of 
most philosophers.1 I use the term Subject with a capital S to denote 
such accounts of subjectivity, that is, accounts in which the subject is 
overstated, privileged and isolated. Another aspect of such accounts 
is that subjectivity is regarded as an indivisible whole, as we will soon 
see. 
Let us first discuss why such accounts are widely viewed as 
problematic. Because subjectivity is regarded to be something 
completely detached from objectivity, it is difficult if not impossible 
to bridge the gap between the two. This could lead to solipsism, 
which is the idea that only a single subjectivity exists, or the slightly 
less extreme position called idealism in which only subjectivity exists. 
Such positions have problems creating any form of objectivity or 
intersubjectivity that relates to a shared world. In other words, while 
reductionism cannot do justice to the different ways we perceive the 
world, subjectivism cannot do justice to the ways our perceptions 
of the world are the same, making it difficult to relate to other 
people’s views. Furthermore, it could lead to an overstatement of 
the autonomy of Subject. Although, as has already been mentioned, 
autonomy and subjectivity are inherently related, we as subjective 
beings are still influenced by the objective world around us in our 
decisions. If we filter out this factor, freedom becomes abstract, 
random and gratuitous. 
1 This phrasing is found in Gilbert Ryle’s influential critique of Cartesianism in The 
Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949, 1). 
INTRODUCTION
4 5
Because of the problems concerned with the Subject, much of 20th 
century philosophy can be characterized as an attack on traditional 
notions of subjectivity. In many different ways, philosophers have 
opposed the crude divide between Subject and object and have 
decentred the traditional Subject as the focal point of philosophical 
inquiry. Although many authors refer to the cogito and Cartesianism, 
no univocal definition of what this doctrine entails can be given. 
Slavoj Žižek describes it as a spectre: ‘A spectre is haunting Western 
academia… …the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic 
powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spectre’ 
(Žižek 1999, 1). It is precisely spectral, in the sense that we can give 
a general outline of ideas related to the Cartesian subject, but we 
cannot give a precise account of it. The various different criticisms 
of the Subject all boil down to a position in which the Subject is 
not privileged, not isolated, not fully autonomous. Instead, such 
accounts strive for a more balanced relation between subjectivity 
and objectivity.
This bring us to the second part of our thematic distinction: selfhood. 
If our subjectivity is not a substance, then we need a way to account 
for the unity and individuality of subjective beings. What makes 
one subjective being different from someone else? Why do we see 
ourselves as being the same person throughout our lifetimes even 
though we are constantly changing? How does a subjective being 
experience itself ? The answer to these and other related questions 
are all related to a more fundamental question: What is the Self of 
subjective being?
Just like questions concerning subjectivity and objectivity, the 
question of selfhood can be answered in two diametrically opposed 
ways. The first one is the one we have discussed, is simply positing 
that a subjective being is characterized by selfhood, because it is a 
substantive Subject. The other position would be to deny that there 
is such a thing as a Self altogether, to claim that a subjective being 
has in fact no unity and individuality, a position famously defended 
by David Hume (Hume 2007, 164-171). This would not do justice to 
experiences of selfhood which are an integral part of our subjectivity. 
Furthermore, it would make it difficult to hold people accountable 
for their actions. If I commit a crime today, then I could only be 
judged guilty tomorrow if I am considered to be the same person. 
A theory of selfhood seems crucial for how we function as persons 
and as a society. 
An important conceptual distinction in this dissertation is that 
between subjective and objective selfhood. The question of the Self 
can be approached both subjectively and objectively. It is addressed 
subjectively if we ask the following kind of questions: How do we 
experience our own selfhood? In what manner do we experience 
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ourselves as the same being over time? To what degree do we 
experience ourselves as the agents of our actions? All these questions 
boil down to our own subjective perspective on our own subjectivity 
and have hence to do with what is often called Self-consciousness. 
If the Self is regarded objectively, then it is understood as an 
object of attribution. We attribute a lot of qualities to ourselves, 
for example, that we are a certain haircut, height, nationality and 
age. While these are attributes of subjective beings, they are more 
or less objective. They do not necessarily have to do with how we 
experience ourselves, but relate more to how others may see us. 
This bring us to another important way in which the themes of 
subjectivity and selfhood relate to each other. As subjective beings 
we not only encounter objects, but also other subjective beings. The 
problem of intersubjectivity is a whole philosophical debate in itself 
but one can at least say that at its core is the idea that we do not 
have access to the subjective point of view of another person. We can 
nevertheless perceive them in a certain kind of objective manner as 
they exist within the world. Thus, everyone has both a subjective and 
objective side to them. This objective side of a subjective being can 
be regarded as another way of describing the objective Self. In short, 
we can offer both a subjective and objective account of what makes 
a subjective being itself.2 
In recent decades, there has been a conception of selfhood defended 
by thinkers from all corners of the philosophical world, namely that 
of narrative identity.3 Although their approaches may differ in detail 
and emphasis, central to each is the idea that the Self has to do with 
stories. It is through the stories that we tell about ourselves and others 
that we create the Self. The interesting thing about such theories in 
light of our concern is that storytelling has both a subjective and an 
objective side to it. Stories require narrators in the form of subjective 
beings, and they are rooted in the meanings we assign to the world 
around us. Hence, they are clearly subjective. On the other hand, 
however, stories also have an objective dimension. Once it is more 
widely known, a story can take on a life of its own and may continue 
to exist in the world even after the original narrator is long gone. 
Furthermore, the stories we tell about ourselves are rooted in events 
that also take place in the objective world. The place we are born, 
for example, is something that exists in the world, and our birth is 
something that happened in this world. Nevertheless, how we view 
our place of birth within our life story may differ in respect to the 
subjective position we take towards it. We may view it positively as 
2 This distinction is sometimes equated to William James’ terminological distinction 
between the subjective I, on the one hand, and the objective Me, on the other (James 
1983, 378-379).
3 For examples of well-known defenders of a narrative view of selfhood, see: (Dennett 
1992, MacIntyre 1981, Ricoeur 1992, Schechtmann 1997, Taylor 1989).
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our home or negatively as a place from which we needed to escape. 
In any case, stories occupy an interesting place, they exist as a kind 
of intersection between the subjective and objective Although they 
are not physical entities, few would doubt that they exist in some 
way and as such prove to be a midpoint between a Cartesian and a 
reductionist view of selfhood. 
Although this brief introduction cannot do justice to centuries of 
philosophical debates, it still allows us to get a preliminary grasp 
of the problems at stake. To sum up, the philosophical theme of 
subjectivity and selfhood is about how things in the world are and 
how we as beings with a perspective on these things relate to them. 
Subjectivity gives rises to the question concerning the manner in 
which the being which is or has this perspective is. What makes 
it the same over time and what distinguishes it from other beings 
of the same nature? In other words, what makes a subjective being 
itself?   
Another dimension needs to be added to the foregoing thematic 
introduction, one which we have not discussed, because it is largely 
specific to Sartre’s thought. This is the dimension of negativity. 
Although the dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity cover that 
which exists, there are also a lot of things which do not exist but 
nevertheless play a central role in reality. One can think about fictions, 
empty rooms and absent friends even though these are all examples 
of the absence of objects or subjects and hence of nothingness. This 
dimension of negativity also plays a central role in selfhood. For 
example, we need not only view our identity in terms of what we are, 
but also in terms of what we no longer are. We can focus on the life-
goals we have not yet achieved, or the person who no longer want 
to be. In short, in order to properly address the theme, we need to 
account for nothingness as well as being. 
This Sartre-specific dimension of our theme brings us to the 
central claim of this dissertation: Sartre is a thinker who argues 
against a traditional notion of the Subject from the point of view of 
subjectivity itself. Although his methods are very much in line with 
more traditional Cartesian approaches, the results of his analyses 
suggest a much more minimal account of subjectivity. His focus on 
negativity is one of the features of his philosophy that allows him 
to provide such an account. This minimal account of subjectivity in 
turn allows him to argue against traditional notions of subjective 
selfhood, to place a strong emphasis on both the objective and the 
narrative Self, and to argue for a Self that can be regarded as a thing 
among things. 
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2. Criticism and Positive Reception
As already noted, before turning to Sartre’s views on subjectivity 
and selfhood, we will first look at the reception of his philosophy. 
It may seem that this is putting the cart before the horse, that it 
would be more obvious to first discuss Sartre’s philosophy and then 
the various strains of its reception. We shall not do this however, 
precisely because of the nature of the criticism his work has received. 
If much 20th century philosophy can indeed be characterized as the 
critique of traditional notions of subjectivity, then it is all the more 
interesting that one of the most well-known thinkers of that era was 
scrutinized for his views on the matter. The fact that his views were 
greeted as outdated has had a detrimental effect on the image of 
Sartre that has been cultivated by the philosophical community. To 
cite the words of John Gerassi in the aptly titled Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Hated Conscience of His Century:
No intellectual, no writer, no man is more hated by 
academics and newsfolk, by eggheads and politicians on 
both sides of the Atlantic than Jean-Paul Sartre. Nor 
is this new: Sartre has been hated by them for half a 
century (Gerassi 1989, 30).
Sartre’s status as a public intellectual rose dramatically after the 
Second World War, and with this increasing fame came increasing 
criticism. In a 1965 interview, he complains about this himself: 
[D]o you know why I’m really considered “scandalous”? 
It’s because, ever since 1945, the press has made a point 
of describing me as dead and done for. Every paper has 
said the same thing, and so the rumor has spread. They 
haven’t stopped announcing my death since I started 
writing; haven’t stopped saying I was played out, in my 
grave (IPB 70).
The controversy surrounding the figure of Sartre, both as a person 
and as a philosopher, has had a lasting impact on his reception. 
Thus, in order to get a clear picture of Sartre’s philosophy, it will be 
helpful to deal with these critics at the outset: we will first discuss 
the criticism Sartre received from communist circles, then that 
which he received from contemporary philosophers and, finally, that 
which he received from subsequent generations of thinkers within 
the continental tradition. 
Afterwards, we will discuss two important tendencies in the 
contemporary reception of Sartre’s philosophy. The first consists of 
those who argue that the criticism Sartre received is largely invalid, 
and that Sartre should be understood as someone who does not 
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attribute a privileged position to the Subject and whose philosophy 
is, upon careful inspection, much closer to that of his critics than 
they would care to admit. The second tendency is the reception of 
Sartre’s philosophy within (analytical) philosophy of mind. Sartre is 
adopted by certain philosophers working within this field in order to 
combat the predominance of reductionism, which characteristically 
takes the form of a reduction of subjectivity to physical natural. We 
will first give a more historical overview of the reception of Sartre in 
the analytical tradition and then focus on the use of his ideas in the 
contemporary crossover between phenomenology, on the one hand, 
and philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, on the other. 
The importance of discussing these various aspects of Sartre’s 
reception is that they all have to do with the themes of subjectivity and 
selfhood. Examining his reception history helps us to gain a better 
understanding of Sartre’s philosophy – and a better understanding 
of Sartre’s philosophy will ultimately help us to gain a better 
understanding of the role his philosophy can play in contemporary 
debates, a topic to which we will turn in the concluding chapter. 
While Sartre attracted a great deal of criticism, not all of this criticism 
takes the form of detailed philosophical treatises – it can also be 
found in newspaper articles, interviews, letters and suchlike. Given 
this diverse assortment, it is not worthwhile to devote attention to 
every piece of criticism. What is offered here instead is a general 
assessment of the most notable critical perspectives. We cannot 
claim to provide an exhaustive account, but it will be sufficiently 
comprehensive to discuss the most important ones. These criticisms 
will be divided into three separate categories: those of the communist 
writers who took aim at Sartre in the period directly after the War, 
those made by contemporary philosophers, and those made by later 
generations of philosophers.
The communists
The first wave of criticism came from intellectuals affiliated with 
communism. In the years following the publication of Being and 
Nothingness, there were numerous attacks directed at Sartre.4 These 
were usually attempts to discredit Sartre politically, accusing his 
existentialism of leading to political quietism by using obscure and 
irrational language to draw youth away from political action (Lefebre 
1945; 1946). These political attacks also struck a philosophical 
register, leading to commentaries on Being and Nothingness such as 
that of Lefebvre (1946), Mougin (1947), Kanapa (1947) and Lukács 
(1948).
4 For a detailed overview of the attacks, see: (Poster 1975, 109-160) & (Drake 
2010, 69-94).
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The charge of idealism was one of the favourite strategies of Sartre’s 
communist critics. Both Lefebvre and Mougin argued that Sartre’s 
ontology, like Marxism, aimed to overcome the dualism between 
idealism and materialism, but failed to grasp the material side of 
things because of his subjective approach (Mougin 1947). Lefebvre 
called it a bastard compromise (Lefebvre1946, 224-225). Mougin 
further argued that Sartre’s philosophy entailed a double idealism 
(Mougin 1947, 118): a subjective idealism, because he only accounted 
for reality through the subjective point of view, and an objective 
idealism because the being of objects were given in essence to the 
subject. Lukács thought overcoming the dualism between idealism 
and materialism was an impossible task and that the vain attempt to 
do so only seemed appealing because idealism was philosophically 
problematic and materialism was deemed dangerous by bourgeois 
society (Lukács 1948, 18-19). The way in which the term “idealism” 
is being used in this context, which was not discussed in the previous 
section, is to refer to a tendency to replace an analysis of concrete 
and complex situations with abstract idealized concepts, and this is 
something of which Sartre is also accused by the communists.
Sartre’s account of freedom was also reproached by many for being 
too abstract (Caillois 1944, 5; Gaillard 1947, 110; Kanapa 1947, 84). 
Because we are fully free, we have no criteria for making choices 
anymore (Lefebvre1946, 62-63). Lukács recognized that some 
Marxists underestimated individual freedom, but also stressed 
that Sartre’s account of freedom went too far and choices became 
arbitrary because they have no social and historical context (Lukács 
1948, 106).
This leads us to another accusation, namely that Sartre’s ideas are 
too individualistic and cannot account for the social dimension of 
human existence. Lefebvre argued that it could only account for 
individual possibilities, not social ones (Lefebvre1945). Lukács 
attributed this specifically to Sartre’s use of the phenomenological 
method (1948, 108). This individualism in turn also limited Sartre’s 
notion of freedom, as we do not really have the freedom to influence 
others and participate in social relations (Poster 1975, 124). Like the 
lack of a social dimension, Sartre’s account of freedom was also seen 
as failing to take history into account (Garaudy 1947, 14; Lukács 
1948, 108). Because one is always free, one is also free from the past. 
Sartre cannot account for how the past shapes us, and how we can 
make history and build a better future. 
Thus, while the attack on Sartre was primarily politically motivated, 
roughly four underlying philosophical accusations can be discerned, 
all of which have to do with the nature of subjectivity: idealism, an 
overly abstract and detached notion of freedom, and the inability 
to do justice to social relations and to account for history. These 
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accusations are interrelated: because Sartre failed to take history 
into account, he opted for idealism, a position that is only possible 
in untroubled times (Lukács 1948, 18-19). This type of reasoning 
can be considered circular however, as failing to take history into 
account leads to idealism, which leads to abstract freedom, which in 
turn causes Sartre to fail to take history into account.5 
The contemporaries
Sartre was also attacked by the communists because he was influenced 
by Martin Heidegger (WE 155). It is Heidegger, however, who can 
be regarded as the first critic of Sartre from within  the continental 
tradition. He addresses Sartre’s existentialism in his “Letter on 
Humanism” published in 1947. Although Heidegger was initially 
positive about Being and Nothingness,6 in this letter he voices his 
concerns: 
Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism in 
this way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement 
he is taking existentia and essentia according to their 
metaphysical meaning, which from Plato’s time on has 
said that essentia precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this 
statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement 
remains a metaphysical statement. With it he stays with 
metaphysics in oblivion of the truth of Being (Heidegger 
1993, 232).
Heidegger’s main problem with Sartre is that his philosophy is rooted 
in traditional metaphysics. He famously argued that metaphysics was 
concerned with beings rather than the Being of those beings. Instead 
of searching for Being, metaphysicians tried to determine which 
being was the most fundamental. This is also called “ontotheology”: 
‘one may understand this “core” of ontotheology to consist in the 
metaphysical quest for (or presupposition of ) a unifying reason 
or ground’ (Van der Heiden 2014, vii). For Sartre this unifying 
reason would be man, as he argued that his philosophy is a form of 
humanism: ‘Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or 
is itself made to be the ground of one (Heidegger 1993, 225). Thus, 
one could say that the criticism that Heidegger gives us is twofold: 
Sartre’s thought is rooted in traditional metaphysics, and it takes 
man to be the unifying ground of his metaphysical system. 
5 Sartre defended himself against these critics in a small article in the communist 
newspaper Action called “What is Existentialism?” and in the lecture Existentialism 
is a humanism. To the charge of political quietism he responded that existentialism is 
a philosophy of action, effort, combat and solidarity (WE 160).  
6 For a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s changing stance towards Sartre, see: 
(Safranski 1998, 348) 
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One of the most detailed discussion of Sartre’s thought can be 
found in Herbert Marcuse’s “Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s L’être et le néant”, which was published in 1948. In it, we find 
a theme that haunts almost all the criticism we will discuss: the role 
of René Descartes. Like Descartes, philosophers during the Second 
World War saw the system of values of their civilization collapse, 
and were in need for answers: ‘Once again, thought finds itself in 
the Cartesian situation and asks for the one certain and evident 
truth which may make it still possible to live’ (Marcuse 1948, 309). 
Existentialism finds its one certain truth in a similar manner: ‘Like 
Descartes, this philosophy finds the foundation in the self-certainty 
of the Cogito, in the consciousness of the Ego’ (Marcuse, 1948, 309). 
Furthermore, he claims that ‘Sartre’s concept of the free subject is a 
reinterpretation of Descartes’ Cogito’ (Marcuse 1948, 311). Sartre is 
once again attacked for being too idealistic and metaphysical, but 
now not because of the inherent fault of metaphysics, but on the 
ground of denying the historical circumstances of his own thought:
Sartre’s existential analysis is a strictly philosophical 
one in the sense that it abstracts from the historical 
factors which constitute the empirical concreteness: 
the latter merely illustrates Sartre’s metaphysical and 
meta-historical conceptions. In so far as Existentialism 
is a philosophical doctrine, it remains an idealistic 
doctrine: it hypostatizes specific historical conditions 
of human existence into ontological and metaphysical 
characteristics. Existentialism thus becomes part of 
the very ideology which it attacks, and its radicalism is 
illusory (Marcuse 1948, 11).
Although Marcuse is critical towards Sartre’s existentialism, he 
does see some revolutionary potential in its movement towards 
the concrete circumstances of freedom: ‘concrete human existence’ 
described ‘in terms of what it has actually become: a “thing” in a 
reified world’ (Marcuse 1948, 312). Marcuse ultimately thinks that 
Sartre fails to fulfil this potential. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty attacked Sartre in his 1955 book 
Adventures of the Dialectic. Although the scope of this book is mainly 
political, the political theories of Sartre are rooted in his philosophy. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre cannot think concrete political 
and historical circumstances: ‘The question is to know whether, as 
Sartre says, there are only men and things or whether there is also 
the interworld, which we call history, symbolism, truth-to-be-made’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1973, 200). Sartre’s philosophical dichotomy can 
be traced back to the Cartesian roots of his thought, as Merleau-
Ponty stresses in the following quote:
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What continues to distinguish Sartre from Marxism, 
even in recent times, is therefore his philosophy of 
the cogito. Men are mentally attached to history. The 
cogito perseveres in its claim to be everything that we 
are, taking as its own even our situation before others 
(Merleau-Ponty 1973, 158-159).
Sartre’s philosophy is rooted in consciousness, and it is the cogito 
that gives the world its meaning and not the world that gives 
meaning to consciousness. We can only think about our social and 
political circumstances from our point of view and cannot grant 
these circumstances any agency themselves. At least, that is how 
Merleau-Ponty sketches Sartre’s thought. Sartre was defended 
from Merleau-Ponty’s criticism by Simone de Beauvoir in her essay 
“Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism” (De Beauvoir 1998).7 
The next major critic is Claude Levi-Strauss, who devoted a chapter 
to this topic in The Savage Mind in 1962. This work differs from 
the aforementioned ones because Levi-Strauss primarily discusses 
Sartre’s Marx-inspired Critique of Dialectical Reason and not his 
earlier existentialist works. Although this work contains much less 
Cartesian terminology, Levi-Strauss still criticizes Sartre along 
these lines:
He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly 
self-evident truths of introspection never emerges from 
them. […] Sartre in fact becomes the prisoner of his 
Cogito: Descartes made it possible to attain universality, 
but conditionally on remaining psychological and 
individual; by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre merely 
exchanges one prison for another (Levi-Strauss 1966, 
249).
The “sociologizing” that Levi-Strauss describes concerns the project 
of the Critique, which deals with groups, societies and history rather 
than the traditional topics usually associated with the cogito, such as 
truth and subjectivity. The remainder of Levi-Strauss’ criticism has 
to do the things Sartre writes about anthropology and the study of 
other cultures, which is too detailed to discuss here.
The subsequent generations
The philosophical generation that followed Sartre’s in France is 
associated with labels such as post-structuralism, deconstruction 
7 The relationship between Sartre, De Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty is much more 
intricate than we can devote attention to here. For a more detailed discussion of the 
topic, see: (Stewart 1998) & (Bernasconi 2006).
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and postmodernism.8 These philosophers are associated with a 
decentring of the human subject. It is impossible to pinpoint the 
exact moment at which the generation of Sartre was succeeded 
by this generation. Sartre published books until the seventies and 
engaged in discussions with this generation. One could say that 
the publication of Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things in 1966 
marked a decisive moment on account of its anti-humanism: 
‘man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its 
end’ (Foucault 2005, 422). Foucault himself traced the watershed 
moment in French philosophy to a divergence between Sartre and 
Jacques Lacan (Foucault 2000, 251). Both thinkers thought that the 
idea of the unconscious was irreconcilable with that of a Subject. 
Whereas Sartre concluded from this that the unconscious had to 
be jettisoned, Lacan reached the opposite conclusion: the Subject 
had to go. Lacan himself, however, was not as critical of Sartre as 
others and refers to his work positively (Lacan 1988, 215; 1998, 84).9 
Foucault mainly criticized Sartre for his focus on the Subject as that 
which gives meaning to the world (Foucault 2000, 247-248).10 He 
also criticizes his notion of selfhood:
I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre 
avoids the idea of the self as something that is given 
to us, but through the moral notion of authenticity, he 
turns back to the idea that we have to be ourselves – to 
be truly our true self (Foucault 1994, 262). 
A more detailed criticism of Sartre from this group of thinkers can 
be found in Jacques Derrida’s 1968 lecture “The ends of man”. He 
too criticizes the role of the subjectivity in Sartre’s philosophy. He 
repeats many of the criticisms that we have already encountered. He 
characterizes Sartre’s philosophy in the following way: ‘Everything 
takes place as though the sign “man” had no origin, no historical, 
cultural, linguistic limit, not even a metaphysical limit’ (Derrida 
1969, 35). He reproaches Sartre for claiming that the unity of Being 
is grounded in the human project, and he also mentions Heidegger’s 
criticism and reiterates the claim that Sartre’s philosophy is an 
ontotheology (Derrida 1969, 36). In a later interview, Derrida was 
even more negative, stating that the influence of Sartre on him was 
‘nefarious and catastrophic’ (Derrida 1995, 122).
8 For a more detailed account of this generation of philosophers in relation to Sartre, 
see: (Churchill & Reynolds 2013, 218-222).
9 Interestingly, Sartre himself says that he was friends with Lacan, who was also his 
therapist: ‘I went to see a shrink, a young guy then with whom I have been good 
friends ever since, Jacques Lacan’ (IG 63). He has also stated that he did not really 
know Lacan’s work (OTF 217). 
10 Sartre himself was in turn a fierce critic of Foucault, whom he mainly criticized for 
not having an account of History – an argument that has also, as we have seen, been 
raised against Sartre himself (RTS 110).
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The power of subjective beings is also criticized by Jean-François 
Lyotard, who in the ironically named essay “A Success of Sartre’s” 
states: ‘To put it bluntly, I did not like the air of capability his 
writings exuded’ (Lyotard 1986, xi). The remainder of his criticism 
is primarily related to writing and language. He argues that the 
titular success of Sartre is to be found in his later studies of writers, 
‘in which the subject is defeated by words’ (Lyotard 1986, xxii). 
In his view, language also has power over the Subject and cannot 
be used by the Subject in a fully autonomous way. Nevertheless, 
Lyotard thinks that there are two Sartres, the one known through 
his popular writings, and another who is ‘withdrawn into himself, 
secret, captivated by failure, unknown and never managing to 
recognize himself in the words that came to him or, rather, failed to’ 
(Lyotard 1986, xxii). Undoubtedly Lyotard found this hidden figure 
much more interesting and philosophically successful than the more 
wellknown Sartre.
One notable exception to this generation’s disdain for Sartre is Gilles 
Deleuze. In his essay “He was my teacher”, written in 1964, he speaks 
highly of both Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(Deleuze 2004, 79). Nevertheless, he also states that ‘[w]e speak of 
Sartre as though he belonged to a bygone era’ (Deleuze 2004, 79). 
Thus, Sartre’s demise in popularity in philosophical circles and the 
generational break in French philosophy is confirmed by Deleuze. 
Furthermore, although he speaks highly of Sartre’s main works, he 
does criticize his appropriation of humanism in Existentialism is a 
humanism (Dosse 2010, 94-95)
In the years since, Sartre’s popularity within the continental 
philosophical tradition has faded. One can name but a few examples 
of his work being discussed, for instance, by Ricoeur (1981), Nancy 
(1993, 96-105) and Bourdieu (1996). 
In recent years, however, a new school of philosophy has directed its 
attention towards Sartre and, more broadly, at phenomenology in 
general. New schools of speculative realism, such as object-oriented 
ontology, want to move away from both the subjective orientation of 
phenomenology as well as the criticism of metaphysics prevalent in 
20th-century continental philosophy. Thinkers associated with such 
movements generally want to return to a speculative metaphysics, yet 
without ontotheology. Instead, they opt for a “flat” ontology in which 
every particular aspect of reality is thought of as a thing. Harman, 
an object-oriented ontologist, revives one of the oldest arguments 
against Sartre when he says that Sartre’s notion of intentionality 
‘is not enough to rescue phenomenology from idealism’ and calls it 
the ‘basic prejudice of phenomenology’ (Harman 2005, 25). Tom 
Sparrow makes a similar criticism when he says that Sartre’s realism 
is a realism in name only. Although Sartre states that subjects and 
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objects exist independently from one another, ‘[t]he evidence for this 
independence […] is neither forthcoming nor pursued by Sartre’ 
(Sparrow 2014, 70).
Thus, although Sartre has received much criticism throughout the 
years, all such criticism has focused on the role of the Subject in his 
thought, whether it is in the charge of idealism (the idea that objects 
do not exist independently of subjectivity), granting the Subject too 
much power and autonomy, or depending too much on a specific 
subjectivist thinker of the past – Descartes. The charge of being 
too metaphysical also has to do with subjectivity, as ultimately his 
metaphysics is said to be grounded in subjectivity.
Apart from Sartre’s role in the work of other continental philosophers, 
there has been a steady stream of commentaries on his work which 
are much more positive in tone. As already mentioned, there are 
two trends in Sartre’s reception that are worth highlighting in light 
of our interests. On the one hand, we have those who argue that 
Sartre’s philosophy is actually not so very different from that of 
some of his critics. The other main current is comprised of those 
who implement ideas from Sartre’s work in debates in the analytic 
philosophy of mind.  
The new Sartre
In the last couple of decades, there have been many scholars who 
have argued that the gap between Sartre and the generation of 
philosophers that followed him is not as wide as it was perceived 
in their time. Under the banner of ‘the new Sartre,’ a termed coined 
by Christina Howells, they argue that in Sartre, we also find a 
decentring of the subject much akin to that of post-structuralism, 
deconstruction and postmodernism (Howells 1992, 1). The most 
detailed study in this strand of scholarship is Nik Farrell Fox’s The 
New Sartre: Explorations in Postmodernism. In his introduction, he 
states the following: 
I argue that Sartre’s idea of a contingent, non-essential 
subject (which he argues for consistently throughout his 
work) has much in common with, and indeed prefigures, 
the decentred subject theorized by post-structuralists 
and postmodernists (Fox 2007, 7).
The idea that Sartre’s notion of the Subject is not as classical as his 
critics made it out to be is the guiding thread for many scholars. 
This often leads to a more positive comparison to philosophers such 
as Foucault (Fox 2007), Derrida (Gardner 1983, Martinot 2006, 
Howells 2007) and Lacan (Borch-Jacobsen 1989, Charbonneau 
1999, Gardner 1983, Leguil 2012, Tolini & Muller 2015, Van 
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Haute 1989). Although such comparisons place Sartre closer to 
his critics, and often identify him as a progenitor, it nevertheless 
remains difficult to equate Sartre’s philosophy with those of his later 
opponents. As Fox puts it:
Sartre’s philosophy can be situated in a transitional space 
that straddles the divide and creates a sometimes uneasy 
tension between a postmodern sense of despair, plurality, 
fragmentation and indeterminacy and a modernist 
longing for comprehension, meaning, constructivism 
and totality (Fox 2007, 4). 
Fox draws on an interview with Roland Barthes, who was one of 
the first who argued for this view of Sartre’s philosophy as a sort of 
crossroads between two eras in philosophy, which can roughly be 
called the modern and the postmodern (Barthes 1976). This idea 
is reminiscent of that of Lyotard, but while the latter links each of 
the “two Sartres” to definitive works in a fairly exclusive manner, 
Fox ultimately argues that in all his works, Sartre shifts between 
his two faces. In his conclusion he states: 
In this book, I have sketched a picture in which two 
Sartres emerge alongside one another: the Old Sartre 
– aggressive and totalistic, Cartesian and classical, 
modernist and Marxist, an optimist and grand-thinker 
– and a New postmodern Sartre who is changing 
and plural, aestheticized and splintered, aporetic and 
anarchistic, a pessimist and arch-deconstructionist. 
Like two pugilists in a boxing ring, they shadow one 
another, join together, clash, contend and struggle for 
primacy within individual texts and in his work taken as 
a whole. However, as I have presented it, there is no clear 
resolution or victorious end to this fight but an ongoing 
agonism of differences and emphases that rise and fall as 
Sartre’s critical perspective shifts (Fox 2007, 149).
Aside from its focus on the Subject, Fox’s book also examines social 
and political aspects of Sartre’s work which we will not address here, 
because it would entail straying too far from our topic. When it 
comes to subjectivity and selfhood, we hope to shed some light in 
this dissertation on how the two sides of Sartre’s philosophy are 
evident throughout his oeuvre. 
Analytic reception
Although the reception of Sartre in analytic philosophy has surged 
in recent years, it can be traced back to an essay by Alfred Ayer from 
1945. While he often speaks jestingly about Sartre’s philosophy, his 
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depiction is quite fair. He places a good deal of emphasis on the 
conception of time in Being and Nothingness, although he readily 
admits that he does not fully understand it. Furthermore, concerning 
Sartre’s discussion of nothingness, he states: ‘Psychologically, indeed, 
I think that Sartre’s analyses are often very penetrating. But the 
logical and metaphysical structure in which he has enveloped them 
in this part of his work, does not seem to me sound’ (Ayer 1945, 
19). It is interesting to note that Ayer, whose own work is rooted 
in logical-positivism, attacks Sartre for his metaphysics. This, as we 
have already discussed, is of the same cast as the criticisms made 
by Heidegger, who was himself famously targeted by the logical-
positivists (Carnap 1932). 
Although there has been a constant stream of introductory 
literature on Sartre in the Anglophone world since the publication 
of Being and Nothingness, his positive introduction within analytic 
philosophy is much more recent. One of the landmarks in the 
general introduction of phenomenology into analytic philosophy 
of mind is Hubert Dreyfus’ 1972 book What Computers Can’t Do, 
in which he draws insights from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
(Dreyfus 1972). Nevertheless, Dreyfus is very negative about Sartre, 
supposedly agreeing with Heidegger that Being and Nothingness 
is ‘muck’ (Magee 1987, 275). Furthermore, he says that the book 
is ‘a brilliant misunderstanding of [Heidegger’s] Being and Time’ 
and ‘you have to be a kind of genius like Sartre to take a book like 
Being and Time, which was anti-Cartesian through and through, 
and rewrite it as if it was a Cartesian book’ (Dreyfus 2007, 34:56-
35:10). This is an interesting sentiment because it echoes the many 
criticisms concerning Cartesianism that were mentioned in the 
last section. Cartesianism has also been one of the main targets of 
analytic philosophy. Perhaps the most famous example is Gilbert 
Ryle arguing against ‘Descartes’ Myth’, which is the idea that there 
is both a mental and physical plane (Ryle 1949, 1). A more recent 
example can be found in Daniel Dennett’s rejection of the idea that 
there is a place in the brain where consciousness “happens”, which 
he refers to pejoratively as the ‘Cartesian theater’ (Dennett 1991, 
107). 
Such criticism of Cartesianism has led to a development within 
analytic philosophy that moves in the opposite direction, namely, 
reducing everything to the physical plane. This form of reductionism 
is called naturalism, as it aims to reduce all subjectivity to the world 
as it is described by the natural sciences (and hence to “objectivity”). 
As Dan Zahavi argues, ‘naturalism is seen by many as the default 
metaphysical position. If you don’t subscribe to naturalism you must 
be subscribing to some form of Cartesian substance dualism’ (Zahavi 
2009, 3). To counter this rising trend of naturalism, many turn to the 
phenomenological tradition to find a view of subjectivity and related 
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themes that avoids Cartesianism without falling into the snares of 
naturalism. Over the last few decades, there have been many notable 
publications that embody this tendency (Smith & Thomasson 
2005, Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, Gallagher & Schmicking 2009). 
One could also point to the aptly titled journal Phenomenology & 
the Cognitive Sciences as an important channel for this current of 
thought. 
Despite Dreyfus’ early hostility to Sartre’s contribution, in recent 
decades he has come to be regarded as just as important as the other 
phenomenologists to whom these analytic philosophers have turned. 
Gregory McCulloch, in Using Sartre: An analytical introduction to 
early Sartrean themes published in 1994, explicitly introduces Sartre 
as an anti-Cartesian thinker:
The Cartesian idea that the mind is a thing in the head 
(material or not) is alive and kicking in the analytical 
tradition, and my guiding assumption is that Sartre’s 
anti-Cartesian views deserve more attention than they 
are wont to receive from philosophers in this tradition 
(McCulloch 1994, ix).
Although Sartre’s ideas play a role in many debates, they are 
especially prevalent in those concerning subjectivity, self-
consciousness and selfhood. Kathleen Wider, in her book The Bodily 
Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 
published in 1997, states in her introduction: ‘In particular I am 
interested in exploring the meaning and use Sartre makes of his 
fundamental claim about consciousness: ‘that all consciousness is, by 
its very nature, self-consciousness’ (Wider 1997, 1). A more recent 
publication, Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and contemporary 
philosophy of mind, emphasizes this dimension of Sartre’s philosophy 
even more by adopting a Sartrean notion related to this theme as its 
title (Miguens, Preyer & Morando 2016).
The minimal and narrative Self
The biggest player to advocate a Sartrean view in the debate 
concerning selfhood is the aforementioned Zahavi. Many scholars 
who operate within the analytic reception of phenomenology defend 
the idea of a ‘minimal self ’ (Gallagher 2000, 14). This is an umbrella 
term that encompasses multiple notions of subjective selfhood. 
The need for such notions stems from the limitations of scientific 
naturalism:
[S]tudies employing self-related processing approach 
self-experience through the self-attribution of mental 
and physical features, and thereby focus on the self as 
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an object of attribution and not the self as the knowing 
subject and agent. To invoke James’ classic distinction, this 
paradigm targets the ‘Me’ – the self as known through 
its physical and mental attributes – and not the ‘I’ – the 
self as subjective knower and agent (Christoff, Cosmelli, 
Legrand & Thompson 2011, 104).
By focusing on the world through a lens of objectivity, it is difficult 
if not impossible to say something about the Self as it is experienced 
subjectively. The idea of minimal selfhood is thus based on an 
irreducible remainder that eludes naturalistic accounts: ‘Even if all 
of the unessential features of self are stripped away, we still have an 
intuition that there is a basic, immediate, or primitive ‘something’ 
that we are willing to call a self ’ (Gallagher 2000, 15). This has to 
do with a sense of agency and ownership: we sense that we are the 
thinker of our thoughts and agent of our actions. 
It is here that Zahavi’s Sartrean notion of Self comes into play. 
He defends what he calls the ‘experiential self ’ (Zahavi 2010, 
56). He elaborates on this notion in many texts. The article “The 
Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications”, for example, opens 
with no less than three quotes from Sartre – one concerning the 
notion of the “prereflective cogito”, and two concerning “prereflective 
self-consciousness”. Furthermore, he draws on Sartre’s notion of 
“ipseity” (Zahavi 2010, 58). Although we will not provide a detailed 
examination of how his notion of the experiential Self relates to 
Sartre’s theories. It suffices to cite the following claim: ‘the self is 
defined as the very subjectivity of experience, and is not taken to be 
something that exists independently of, or in separation from, the 
experiential flow’ (Zahavi 2010, 60). 
The minimal experiential Self does not account for the full spectrum 
of selfhood, but needs to be supplemented by narrative selfhood in 
order to account for full-fledged personhood. According to Zahavi, 
‘narrative personhood presupposes experiential selfhood’ as ‘[o]
nly a being with a first-person perspective could consider her own 
aims, ideals, and aspirations as her own and tell a story about them’ 
(Gallagher & Zahavi 2008, 205). Interestingly, in another influential 
article on narrative selfhood, Galen Strawson’s Against Narrativity 
Sartre’s Nausea is given as an example of a position that opposes some 
forms of narrative identity in his novel Nausea (Strawson 2004). 
Thus, Sartre plays an interesting role in current debates on selfhood 
in analytic philosophy of mind. His theories of subjective selfhood, 
in particular, have been taken up, although the scope is (often 
explicitly) limited to Being and Nothingness and, more sporadically, 
The Transcendence of the Ego. Although this focus seems to be justified 
by the context of the debates within which Sartre’s ideas are being 
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deployed, the criticisms Sartre received for his views on subjectivity 
have not been taken into account. The charges of Cartesianism are 
not really discussed. This appears problematic because Zahavi draws 
heavily on the (at least terminologically) Cartesian notion of the 
“prereflective cogito”. Nevertheless, he does state that the experiential 
Self should not be understood ‘as some kind of Cartesian-style 
mental residuum, that is, as some kind of self-enclosed and self-
sufficient interiority’ (Zahavi 2007, 189).
We will return to the topic of Sartre’s reception in the concluding 
chapter. For now, this exposition has allowed us to see that the topic 
of subjectivity and selfhood is central to Sartre’s philosophy and that, 
depending on the context of assessment, it is therefore the source of 
both the interest in and irritation with his work. 
3. Method
Let us now turn to the methodological aspects of this dissertation. 
This study of places considerable emphasis on the exegetical study 
of the writings of Sartre, thereby providing a conceptual analysis of 
the notions he articulates and develops insofar as these concern our 
topic. We will draw from a wide range of works relevant to the topic, 
including many of the posthumously published ones.11 In order to 
properly contextualize these, references to biographical details and 
Sartre’s relationship to other thinkers are provided in footnotes and 
in the introductory remarks of each chapter. 
The structure of this work
With the exception of the conclusion, the chapters of this work all 
have a similar structure. Each one deals with a period of Sartre’s 
work. This division is mainly heuristic because I agree with Sartre’s 
own assessment of the absence of sharp breaks within his oeuvre: ‘I 
think that there is more continuity in thought. I do not believe that 
there is a break. There are naturally changes in one’s thinking; one 
can deviate; one can go from the one extreme to the other; but the 
idea of a break […] seems to me to be mistaken’ (IF 225). Instead 
of such discontinuity, evolution and development can be identified 
within and across these periods. 12
11 Our main concern is the study of subjectivity and selfhood. The fact that we take 
the posthumously published works into account means that we will not provide an 
historical account of the criticism of Sartre’s philosophy, as many of the works we 
will discuss were simply not available then.
12 Something we will aim to avoid is the tendency to read of Sartre’s work through the 
lens of other periods. Too often the ideas of Sartre’s supposedly “main” existentialist 
period are pasted onto the works of other periods, especially those preceding Being 
and Nothingness. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the fact that older 
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The first chapter covers the period up until the Second World War.13 
We will mainly discuss Sartre’s discovery of phenomenology in the 
mid-thirties. We will not examine his youthful writings in much 
detail, though “Empedoclé” will be discussed because it elucidates 
the views presented in Nausea.14  
The second chapter focuses on the works ranging from the war until 
the mid-50’s.15 The War Diaries are discussed in both chapters, as 
they reflect back upon his previous writing and discuss what Sartre 
is writing at that time and plans to develop further. Furthermore, in 
these diaries Sartre also explicitly states that his views concerning 
selfhood have changed during the Second World War, which 
provides a strong case for dividing the first two periods.16 
The last period marks the works ranging from the late 50s until 
his death.17 The division between this last period and the preceding 
English versions of The Transcendence of the Ego were given the subtitle “An 
existentialist theory of consciousness” instead of the proper one, “A sketch for a 
phenomenological description”. The original work was published in 1936, whereas 
Sartre did not adopt the label “existentialism” for his philosophy until 1945. 
13 The works we will be focusing on from this period are listed below in the order in 
which they are published. For those published posthumously, the years in which they 
were written are given instead and italicized.
 1926 Empedoclé
 1936 The Imagination
 1937 The Transcendence of the Ego
 1938 Nausea (including working notes published in Oeuvres Romanesques)
 1939 Intentionality
 1939 Sketch for a Theory of Emotions
 1940 The Imaginary
 1939/41 War Diaries
14 For a more detailed discussion of the works of Sartre’s youth, see: (De Coorebyter 
2005).
15 The works we will be focusing on from this period are listed below in the order in 
which they are published. For those published posthumously, the years in which they 
were written are given instead and italicized.
 1939/41 War Diaries
 1943 Being and Nothingness
 1944 What is Existentialism?
 1946 Existentialism is a Humanism
 1946 Baudelaire
 1947 What is Literature?
 1947/48 Notebooks for an Ethics
 1948 Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self
 1952 Saint Genet
16 Concerning the reasons for his changed views on selfhood, Sartre claims the 
following: ‘It’s the war and Heidegger which put me on the right path’ (WD 324).
17 The works we will be focusing on from this period are listed below in the order in 
which they were published. For those which would be published posthumously, the 
years in which they were written are given instead and italicized.
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ones is much more intricate. In general, it is marked by a change 
in vocabulary, with the primarily phenomenological terms giving 
way to a Hegelian-Marxist frame of reference. The reasons for this 
change are manifold and have to do with Sartre’s shifting political 
views, the criticism he received regarding his earlier works and the 
continuing influence of the philosophers closest to him, such as De 
Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty.18 
This division into three periods marks the general course of this 
dissertation. Each chapter follows the same bipartite structure. The 
first part of each chapter deals with subjectivity, objectivity and 
negativity. These themes are not, however, always discussed in that 
precise order, rather the approach Sartre himself uses in a specific 
period determines the way in which the first parts of each chapter 
takes shape. The second part of each chapter is centred around the 
topic of selfhood. Each of these parts has three sections, following 
the triad that was discussed in the thematic introduction: subjective, 
objective and narrative selfhood.
The results of the investigations into the different periods of Sartre’s 
work will be compared in the concluding chapter in order to draw 
more general insights concerning Sartre’s theories of subjectivity 
and selfhood. As already noted, the concluding chapter will also 
allow us to return to the topics discussed in this introduction and 
hence to re-examine the different critiques and appropriations of 
his philosophy in order to show the relevance of his theories for 
contemporary philosophical concerns. 
 1957 Search for a Method
 1960 Critique of Dialectical Reason (Including the posthumously published second 
volume)
 1964 Marxism & Subjectivity
 1966 Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal
 1969 The Itinerary of a Thought
 1971 The Family Idiot (Volume 1-4)
 1971 On The Idiot of the Family
 1972 The Family Idiot (Volume 5)
 1975 Interview with M. Rybalka & O. Pucciani
 1976 Interview with L. Fretz
18 For an in-depth analysis of the politic aspects of this period, see: (Poster 1975). 
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Overview
The final part of this introduction provides a more detailed 
overview of the chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 1 will address 
the first period of Sartre’s work and begins with a section on the 
notion of intentionality. Although he discovers this notion in the 
writings of Husserl, he gives his own original interpretation of it. 
We will also devote some attention to Sartre’s interpretation of 
the phenomenological method. In the next section, we will discuss 
Sartre’s notion of things, focusing mainly on the famous section in 
Nausea in which the protagonist is sitting on a park bench staring 
at the root of a tree. After this, we will devote a section to Sartre’s 
theories concerning imaginary objects. Although this theme is 
not directly relevant to his theories of selfhood from this period, 
it will emerge that the question of whether or not the Self is an 
imaginary construct plays an important role throughout his work. 
In the second part of the first chapter, we will first devote a section to 
the first part of The Transcendence of the Ego, where Sartre shows that 
there is no Self that “inhabits” consciousness, but that consciousness 
is itself individuated. We will also discuss his criticism of the cogito 
in this section. In the second section, the second part of the same 
work will be discussed with a focus on how the Self as an object 
relates to consciousness. In the last part, we will focus on two notions 
which are detrimental for Sartre’s theories about narrative selfhood, 
namely, that of adventure and that of the biographical illusion as he 
presents them in Nausea and the War Diaries respectively.  
Chapter 2 will begin with a section on the being of things and 
Sartre’s realist epistemology in Being and Nothingness. We will also 
discuss the methodology of phenomenological ontology that Sartre 
adopts in this work. In the second section, we will discuss the notion 
of nothingness, focusing both on non-real objects, which he calls 
“negatities”, and their ontological origin in the being of consciousness. 
In the last section of the first part, we will turn towards freedom 
and investigate how freedom is always given through a project in a 
situation.
The second part will begin with a section on self-consciousness, 
and the notions of the prereflective cogito and ipseity in Being and 
Nothingness, the article “Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of 
Self ” and the War Diaries. Although Sartre holds on to the idea that 
there is no inhabitant of consciousness, he does change his views 
about whether consciousness is personal rather than impersonal. The 
second section will address the objective Self as something that is 
posited in relation to our goals and ends, focusing mainly on the 
War Diaries. Next, we will once again turn to Being and Nothingness 
in order to examine how both bad faith and the presence of others 
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has an objectifying effect on us. Finally, we will devote a section 
to the notion of the original choice, examining how this notion 
is developed in Being and Nothingness through the method of 
existential psychoanalysis. We will also briefly discuss how this 
method is applied in some of the biographies written by Sartre. In 
the last part of this section, we will address the humanism of Sartre’s 
Existentialism is a humanism in light of this notion. 
Chapter 3 will begin with a section on praxis and totalisation, 
showing how people have a practical relation to their surroundings, 
as described by Sartre in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. We will 
also devote some attention to the progressive-regressive method as 
developed in the Search for a Method. In the second section, we will 
turn to Sartre’s conception of things by exploring the notion of the 
practico-inert, which is also developed in the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. This work will also be the main focus of the third section, in 
which we will discuss group-formation and History. 
In the second part, we will first turn to a lecture entitled “Marxism 
& Subjectivity” and some relevant interviews in order to explore 
the notions of interiorization and lived experience, which are 
notions Sartre was developing at that time to describe subjectivity. 
In the second section, we will examine The Family Idiot and some 
interviews relating to this work in order to show how Sartre revisits 
his position in The Transcendence of the Ego and readdresses the 
question of whether the Self is an imaginary construct – something 
he denies in this period of his work. Finally, we will turn to Sartre’s 
ideas concerning narrative identity and the return of the notion 
of adventure in the lecture entitled “Kierkegaard: The Singular 
Universal” and in the posthumously published unfinished second 
part of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. 
In the concluding chapter we will begin by presenting our findings, 
focusing first on the development and continuity of Sartre’s ideas 
concerning subjectivity and objectivity and then turning, with the 
same intention, to his ideas on subjective, objective and narrative 
selfhood. In the second section we will devote some attention to 
the criticism of Sartre’s work, to the idea of the “new Sartre” and, in 
the last part of this section, to the analytic reception of his thought. 
The final section will offer a general conclusion about the nature of 
Sartre’s thought in light of our enquiry.
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Chapter 1 
Subjectivity Without Self
The following quotation was chosen as the epigraph of this 
dissertation: ‘It is not in some hiding-place that we will discover 
ourselves; it is on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a 
thing among things, a human among humans’ (I 4)19. This citation 
is to be found in the earliest text Sartre wrote after he discovered 
phenomenology. The article in question is “Intentionality: A 
Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology”, which was written 
in 1934 but not published until 1947. This article foreshadows 
themes that will recur throughout the entirety of Sartre’s oeuvre. 
The most salient of these being the idea of omitting the Self from 
consciousness and plunging it into the world. In this chapter we 
will see how Sartre first works out this theme in the works leading 
up to the Second World War. His reasoning is motivated by two 
major ideas. The first is the notion of intentionality, which Sartre 
radicalizes and turns against some of Husserl’s own views. In his 
War Diaries¸ Sartre called this process the exhaustion of Husserl’s 
philosophy, by which he meant ‘to reflect within its perspectives, and 
create my own private ideas at its expense, until I plunge into a blind 
alley’ (WD 183-184)20.  The second central idea of Sartre’s thought 
is that of contingency, the idea that there are no ultimate reasons 
why reality is the way it is and that, rather than being discovered, a 
lot of the structure of reality is imposed upon it by us.
In this period Sartre was not yet a famous public intellectual, and 
his philosophy lacked the social and political dimension of his later 
work. The period from his discovery of phenomenology to the 
Second World War saw Sartre plagued by depression and mescaline-
induced hallucinations, which meant he was primarily concerned 
with his own private life (De Beauvoir 1962, 208-220).21
19 ‘Ce n’est pas dans je ne sais quelle retraite que nous nous découvrirons : c’est sur la 
route, dans la ville, au milieu de la foule, chose parmi les choses, homme parmi les 
hommes’ (IF 89).
20 ‘épuiser une philosophe c’est réfléchir dans ses perspectives, me faire des idées 
personnelles à ses dépens jusqu’à que je tombe dans un cul-de-sac’ (WDF 226).
21 Sartre would later say that the advent of the Second World War brought an end to 
his depression: ‘I think what was happening was that my depression, which was 
a personal depression, caused, I insist, by the fact that I was dreading my life as a 
teacher, writing in off hours, like sneaking to write, was suddenly being put into a 
wider context, one in which I would be facing fascism, we all would’ (IG 91). 
26 27
We will begin our discussion with the nature of subjective experience 
and its relation to objects, themes which are both centred around the 
notion of intentionality. We will see how Sartre alters the traditional 
relationship between subject and object by making subjectivity itself 
a kind of relation, rather than something which relates. Furthermore, 
we will see what objects themselves are apart from subjectivity and 
how real objects differ from imaginary ones. 
After the intentional structure of subjectivity is made clear, we will 
see how this structure does not depend on a subjective Self. It is 
capable of uniting itself through the objects of which it is aware. I 
will use the metaphor of the chain of consciousness to show how 
this process works, and how it is used to criticize traditional notions 
of subjective selfhood, such as the Cartesian cogito. 
The subjective Self is expelled from consciousness, which means the 
Self as object is reserved a bigger role in accounting for our identity. 
We will examine the nature of this objective Self, focusing on how 
it is imposed upon consciousness through reflection. We will see 
how this Self becomes a virtual locus of unity, an abstract centre of 
reflected experiences that we use to interpret our past actions. We 
will also devote attention to the question of whether this Self as 
object is real or imaginary and to the reason why this locus of unity 
is needed.
Finally we will turn to the question of narrative selfhood. If the Self 
as object is a virtual locus of the unity of reflected experiences, then 
one must still explain why some experiences are more important 
to our identity than others. This becomes clear when we look at 
the three related notions of adventure, perfect moments and the 
biographical illusion. 
Part I 
Consciousness Without Content
1. Intentionality
‘All consciousness is consciousness of something’ (I 5)22. This motto 
is repeated by Sartre in almost every philosophical work up to and 
including Being and Nothingness (IMN 129, TE 6, IMY 11, BN 7, 
WD 232). According to Sartre, this idea is ‘the essential principle of 
phenomenology’, and it would become the leading idea in Sartre’s 
philosophy for a decade (TE 6).23 Although he discovers the idea 
in Husserl’s philosophy, most agree that Sartre misunderstood 
22 ‘Toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose’ (IF 88).
23 ‘le principe essentiel de la phénoménologie’ (TEF 100).
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Husserl’s notion.24 The root of this misunderstanding is that Sartre 
took Husserl for a realist. Realism must be understood here as the 
philosophical position that states that the objects we experience exist 
outside of our relation to them and are hence not merely subjective.25 
The quest for a new form of realism, one that steers between idealism 
and representative realism, was one of Sartre’s main motives in the 
early stages of his philosophical career, and he found the key to 
achieving this in phenomenology and its notion of intentionality: 
‘nothing can be more unjust than to call phenomenologists ‘idealists’. 
Indeed, it has been centuries since philosophy has given evidence of 
such a realist trend. Phenomenologists have immersed man back in 
the world’ (TE 29)26.27 We will first discuss how Sartre’s conception 
of phenomenology can be seen to immerse us in the world. 
Empty consciousness
In the “Intentionality” article Sartre beings by outlining the 
position he seeks to overcome. He calls this ‘digestive philosophy’ in 
reference to the idea that to know something or to be conscious of 
something it somehow needs to enter the mind (I 3)28. From such 
a perspective, all objects are nothing but ‘a certain assemblage of 
“contents of consciousness”’ (I 4)29. We find him criticizing similar 
ideas throughout this period. In The Imagination, Sartre talks about 
‘thingism’, treating the contents of consciousness as if they are of the 
same nature as the things in the outside world, and ‘immanentism’, 
24 Sartre would later come to realize that he was mistaken: ‘I took Husserl for a 
realist, which he is not’ (IRP 25). The exact nature of Husserl’s position has 
been hotly debated among scholars. For a discussion of this, see: (Zahavi 
2003). For a more in-depth discussion of Sartre’s discovery of Husserl, see: 
(Stawarska 2013).
25 It is important to note that Sartre is not consistent in his use of the term 
realism. Sometimes he uses it to refer to forms of indirect realism or 
representationalism, which he criticizes throughout his works. He also 
criticizes naïve realism (IMN 192-193). In the years before his death, he 
described his early realism as follows: ‘the idea that the world existed as I saw 
it and that the objects I perceived were real. […] [I]n order to be a realist, one 
had to have both an idea of the world and an idea of consciousness’ (IRP 10).
26 ‘rien n’est plus injuste que d’appeler les phénoménologues des idéalistes. Il y a des 
siècles, au contraire, qu’on n’avait senti dans la philosophie un courant aussi réaliste. 
Il sont replongé l’homme dans le monde’ (TEF 131).
27 Sartre would later, in 1969, describe this philosophical project in the following 
manner: ‘to provide a philosophical foundation for realism. Which in my opinion is 
possible today, and which I have tried to do all my life. In other words, how to give 
man both his autonomy and his reality among real objects, avoiding idealism without 
lapsing into a mechanistic materialism’ (IT 36-37).
28 ‘philosophie digestive’ (IF 87).
29 ‘Un certain assemblage de « contenus de conscience »’ (IF 87).
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the idea that objects are immanent to consciousness (IMN 6, 130)30. 
In The Imaginary he criticizes the ‘illusion of immanence’, which he 
explains as  the idea that there are two worlds: one on the inside and 
one on the outside (IMY 5)31. The one on the inside contains small 
imitations of the things in the outside world. These erroneous types 
of reasoning differ in details – some posit an outside world, some 
reduce everything to consciousness – but they are all characterized 
by the same fundamental error: the contents of consciousness are 
understood to be literally within consciousness. Even seemingly 
opposed positions can fall prey to this error: representational 
realists think that there are representations of objects inside our 
consciousness; (Berkeleyan) idealists maintain that there is nothing 
beyond subjective experience. According to Sartre, virtually all 
philosophers commit to some form of digestive philosophy, and he 
lists examples ranging from ancient philosophers to psychologists 
from his own time (IMN 6-76). All philosophers, that is, until 
Husserl:
Against the digestive philosophy […] Husserl 
persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in 
consciousness. You see this tree, to be sure. But you see 
it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst 
of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles 
from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into 
your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as 
consciousness (I 4)32.
If we perceive a tree, then the tree does not in any way enter our 
consciousness. Consciousness has no inside. It is not a thing, but 
a movement, a flight outside itself. If we follow Sartre’s reasoning 
strictly, then we should probably expand the general definition of 
consciousness referred to earlier so that it reads: “all consciousness 
is nothing but consciousness of something outside of consciousness.” 
Consciousness is itself empty, it is nothing other than consciousness 
of an object. It is nothing but a movement outside itself, which 
should not be understood in any way spatially, as consciousness is 
characterized by not being in any way like a thing, but as always 
being related to a thing. Even in the case of reflection, when the 
object is another conscious act, it is not inside the current conscious 
act. Sartre uses the term consciousness to refer to a single experience 
30 ‘chosisme’, ‘immanentisme’ (IMNF 5, 144).
31 ‘illusion d’immanence’ (IMYF 17).
32 ‘Contre la philosophie digestive […] Husserl ne se lasse pas d’affirmer qu’on ne peut 
pas dissoudre les choses dans la conscience. Vous voyez cet arbre-ci, soit. Mais vous 
le voyez à l’endroit même où il est : a bord de la route, a milieu de la poussière, seul 
et tordu sous la chaleur, à vingt lieues de la côte méditerranéenne. Il ne saurait entrer 
dans votre conscience, car il n’est pas de même nature qu’elle’. (IF 87).
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(IMN 129, IMY 3). The idea that consciousness is nothing other 
than consciousness of its object does not mean that the object exists 
precisely as it appears. Sartre immediately qualifies the previous 
citation with the following remark:
But Husserl is not a realist: this tree on its bit of parched 
earth is not an absolute that would subsequently enter 
into communication with me. Consciousness and the 
world are given at one stroke: essentially external to 
consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially 
relative to consciousness (I 4)33.
Husserl is not an indirect or representational realist, which is a position 
that can be categorized as a digestive philosophy because it assumes 
that a representation enters consciousness. If the representation is to 
be accurate, then there needs to be something absolute – a definitive 
set of qualities that make up the tree. This, however, is not the case: 
although the things in the world are out there, the way in which 
they appear has to do with our consciousness. If our consciousness 
did not have something to do with the way things appear, we would 
not be able to account for the different ways people see the world. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the predispositions that make 
our consciousness relate to the world in a certain way are somehow 
in our consciousness. These predispositions cause the objects in the 
world to appear in a certain way, but the ways in which the world 
appears remain on the side of the world: 
It is things which abruptly unveil themselves to us as 
hateful, sympathetic, horrible, lovable. Being dreadful is 
a property of this Japanese mask: an inexhaustible and 
irreducible property that constitutes its very nature – 
and not the sum of our subjective reactions to a piece of 
sculptured wood (I 5)34. 
Thus, it is because of our consciousness that a mask can be dreadful, 
but this remains a property of the mask itself. As Sartre concludes: 
‘Husserl has restored to things their horror and their charm. He 
has restored to us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, 
hostile, dangerous, and with its havens of mercy and love’ (I 5)35. 
33 ‘Mais Husserl n’est point réaliste : cet arbre sur son bout de terre craquelé, il n’en fait 
pas un absolu qui enterait, par après, en communication avec nous. La conscience 
et le monde sont donnés d’un même coup : extérieur par essence à la conscience, le 
monde est, par essence, relative à elle.’ (IF 88).
34 ‘Ce sont les choses qui se dévoilent soudain à nous comme haïssables, sympathiques, 
horribles, aimables. C’est une propriété  de ce masque japonais que d’être terrible, 
une inépuisable, irréductible propriété qui constitue sa nature même, – et non la 
somme de nos réactions subjectives à un morceau de bois sculpté.’ (IF 89).
35 ‘Husserl a réinstallé l’horreur et le charme dans les choses. Il nous a restitué le monde 
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By emptying out consciousness, all facets of reality have to take 
place in the world outside and cannot be understood merely to take 
place in our consciousness. Hence, qualities which are traditionally 
thought to be subjective are genuine qualities of things in the world 
in Sartre’s view. 
Sartre refrains from using any technical vocabulary in the article, 
which is not even three pages long. He merely professes his 
admiration for how Husserl’s notion of intentionality delivers us 
from a philosophical tendency to focus too much on the Subject, 
rather than on the world around us. He will provide a more technical 
analysis a few years later in The Imagination.
The phenomenological method
Sartre starts his chapter on Husserl in The Imagination work 
with a description of what the phenomenological method 
entails. Phenomenology is contrasted with psychology, which 
is understood as a natural scientific approach to the imagination 
that, like any other empirical science, ‘implies a spontaneous 
realism’ (IMN 125)36. Phenomenology, by contrast, brackets this 
positing of existence in what is termed the “phenomenological 
reduction.” This reduction is carried out in order to identify the 
essential structures that constitute our conscious experience. 
However, ‘the essential structures of transcendental consciousness 
do not disappear when this consciousness imprisons itself in the 
world. Thus the main acquisitions of phenomenology will remain 
valid for the psychologist mutatis mutandis’ (IMN 126)37. The 
structures the phenomenologist discovers after the reduction are 
the same structures our consciousness had before the reduction. 
The reduction is thus a methodological tool with which to study 
consciousness, one which can be used to uncover valid statements 
about it. Phenomenology is a necessary precursor to psychology, 
for it is in phenomenology that concepts such as consciousness and 
imagination are defined and such basic conceptions of the field of 
investigation are prerequisites of experimentation (IMY 127)38. One 
of the discoveries made by Husserl after the reduction is the essential 
structure of all consciousness:
des artistes et des prophètes : effrayant, hostile, dangereux, avec des havres de grâce 
et d’amour (IF 89). 
36 ‘implique un réalisme spontané’ (IMNF 139).
37 ‘les structures essentielles de la conscience transcendantale ne disparaissant 
pas lorsque cette conscience s’emprisonne dans le monde.  Ainsi les principales 
acquisitions de la phénoménologie resteront valables pour le psychologue, mutatis 
mutandis (IMNF 140).’
38 Sartre describes the kind of experimental set-up which is nowadays also known as 
‘front-loading phenomenology’. See: (Gallagher 2003, 85-99).
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Intentionality–this is the essential structure of all 
consciousness. There naturally follows a radical 
distinction between consciousness and that of which there 
is consciousness. The object of consciousness whatever 
it is (save in the case of reflective consciousness) is in 
principle outside of consciousness; it is transcendent. 
This distinction, to which Husserl returns without 
tiring, has as a goal the fighting of the errors of a certain 
immanentism that wants to constitute the world from 
contents of consciousness (for example the idealism 
of Berkeley). Without a doubt there are contents of 
consciousness, but these contents are not the object of 
consciousness. Through them intentionality aims at the 
object that, itself, is the correlate of consciousness but is 
not of consciousness (IMN 129-130)39.
Sartre’s description of intentionality pits phenomenology against 
any kind of philosophy that constitutes the world from the contents 
of consciousness. It must be noted that “transcendent” in this context 
means transcending the conscious act. Sartre seems to be repeating 
the main ideas from “Intentionality” here in a less poetic fashion. 
There he called the opponent digestive philosophy, here he calls it 
immanentism. Sartre even goes on to use the same example of the 
tree, stating that ‘Husserl begins by putting the tree outside of us’ 
(IMN 130)40.
Thus, the phenomenological reduction bracketed our natural belief 
about the existence of things in the external world. But even when 
we suspend this belief, we discover that consciousness has an 
essentially intentional structure and relates to objects outside of 
itself. It becomes clear again that Sartre has a realist interpretation of 
intentionality: we do not lose our judgments about the existence of 
things outside of us when they are bracketed in the phenomenological 
reduction, rather we exchange our naïve belief in the existence of 
these things for a phenomenologically grounded discovery that 
consciousness depends on things outside of it. In other words: ‘The 
phenomenologist, indeed, having put the world ‘in parentheses’, has 
39 ‘L’intentionnalité, telle est la structure essentielle de toute conscience. Il s’ensuit 
naturellement une distinction radicale entre la conscience et ce dont il y a conscience. 
L’objet de la conscience quel qu’il soit (sauf dans le cas de la conscience réflexive) 
est par principe hors de la conscience : il est transcendant. Cette distinction, sur 
laquelle Husserl revient sans se lasser, a pour but de combattre les erreurs d’un 
certain immanentisme qui veut constituer le monde avec des contenus de conscience 
(par exemple l’idéalisme de Berkeley). Sans doute il y a des contenus de conscience 
mais ces contenus ne sont pas l’objet de la conscience : à travers eux l intentionnalité 
vise l’objet qui, lui, est le corrélatif de la conscience mais n’est pas de la conscience 
(IMNF 144-145).’
40 ‘Husserl commence par mettre l’arbre hors de nous (IMNF 145)’.
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not lost it by doing so’ (IMN 136)41.
The main difference between Sartre’s description of intentionality in 
The Imagination and the one given earlier in “Intentionality” is that 
Sartre no longer claims that consciousness is empty. He claims in the 
quotation above that there are undoubtedly contents of consciousness 
through which consciousness aims at its object. The contents of 
consciousness Sartre is referring to are the hylē, the subjective matter 
of consciousness (IMN 130). The subjective matter which makes 
up my consciousness is analogous to the visual and tactile qualities 
of the object outside consciousness. Hence, an experience of a red 
object involves a “quasi-red” subjective impression through which 
consciousness aims at the actual red of the object outside. Hence the 
object of consciousness is not the content of consciousness, but the 
contents of consciousness aim at an object in the outside world. The 
only problem he seems to have with the notion is that it is not able 
to account for the difference between perception and imagination 
(IMN 136). 
Near the end of The Imagination, Sartre announces the project of 
creating a new phenomenological theory of images, which he would 
bring to fruition in The Imaginary. He states that for this project ‘it 
will be necessary to study the hylē proper to the mental image’ (IMN 
142)42.  Thus, it would seem that he himself has no problem with 
the notion, only with the role it plays in determining the difference 
between imagination and perception. In The Imaginary, however, 
the term is glaringly absent. It is not mentioned at all, save for a 
single note (IMY 142). Instead he treats intentionality as consisting 
only of the act and the object. Moreover, although the concept 
of intentionality still takes centre stage in the work, Sartre only 
mentions Husserl sporadically.
In the War Diaries, Sartre elaborates on the change that his views on 
Husserl underwent at this time. He recalls that for four years, starting 
in 1933, he was caught up in the project of Husserl’s philosophy. He 
stresses that The Imaginary was written under Husserl’s influence. 
He admits to being critical of Husserl, ‘but just insofar as a disciple 
can write against his master’ (WD 184)43. While he did his best 
to study Husserl faithfully, without his own prejudices clouding 
his understanding, it was his goal to exhaust Husserl’s philosophy. 
Sartre eventually found the blind alley:
41 ‘Le phénoménologue, en effet, ayant mis le monde « entre parenthèses », ne l’a pas 
perdu pour cela’ (IMNF 153).
42 ‘il faudra étudier la hylé propre de l’image mentale’ (IMNF 159). 
43 Sartre stresses that the last chapters were not inspired by Husserl. Interestingly, it is 
in these chapters where Sartre stresses his realism most profoundly (IMY 179-188).
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Gradually, however, without my fully realizing it, the 
difficulties were piling up and a deeper and deeper gulf 
was separating me from Husserl. His philosophy evolved 
ultimately towards idealism, which I could not accept. 
Above all, like every idealism or kindred doctrine, his 
philosophy had its passive matter - its hylē (WD 184)44.
By eliminating all content from consciousness, Sartre’s notion of 
intentionality is a radicalization of that of Husserl. Sartre has a realist 
version of the notion: because consciousness is empty, the object has 
to exist independently from consciousness. In his first text on the 
notion, he already presents a view that is more his own than that of 
Husserl. Although he does adhere to the idea that there are some 
contents of consciousness in The Imagination, he drops this idea in 
subsequent works, leaving intentional consciousness as empty as he 
originally envisioned it. Consciousness has only two elements: the 
conscious act, which is nothing but an activity, and that at which the 
act is directed: the object.
2. Real Objects
As we have noted earlier, the object of consciousness always 
transcends consciousness, but the object does not exist exactly 
as it appears to consciousness. If this were the case, we could not 
account for the fact that the same object can appear differently to 
different people. A colour-blind person sees the things around her 
in a different manner than someone whose vision is unimpaired. 
Furthermore, to use Sartre’s example, a Japanese mask may be 
frightful for one person, while funny to another. How does Sartre 
account for this without reducing these qualities to subjective 
experiences and thereby reincorporating them into consciousness?
In the passage from “Intentionality” quoted above, Sartre makes 
clear that the world as we experience it is relative to consciousness. 
Consciousness bestows meaning upon the world. In a certain sense, 
it is because there is conscious experience that there is this specific 
tree, which provides shade and shelter from the rain. Does this mean 
that Sartre reverts back to a kind of immanentism? No, because 
consciousness is itself empty and nothing but a movement towards 
its object, so there needs to be an object wholly independent from 
consciousness. If this object were indistinguishable from the object 
as experienced, then we could not account for the inconsistencies 
44 ‘Et puis peu à peu, sans trop que je m’en rendisse compte, les difficultés s’accumulaient, 
un fossé de plus en plus profond me séparait de Husserl : sa philosophie évoluait au 
fond vers l’idéalisme, ce que je ne pouvais admettre et surtout , comme tout idéalisme 
ou comme toute doctrine sympathisante, sa philosophie avait sa matière passive, sa « 
Hylé »’  (WDF 226).
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in the ways different people experience the world. If this object was 
something entirely different from the object we experience, then 
we would duplicate the object and the experienced object would 
exist only in consciousness. This would again lead to the digestive 
philosophy of the illusion of immanence.
Superfluousness 
In order to avoid these two pitfalls, Sartre needs to have an account 
of things as they are apart from experience. He aims to answer this 
question in Nausea, where he, as he put it later in the War Diaries, 
wants ‘to catch the secret smiles of things seen absolutely without 
men’, pushing ‘to the point of dehumanizing entirely the secret of 
things’ (WD 145-146)45. Sartre himself has always stressed the 
philosophical nature of the novel, and we will therefore discuss it 
as if it were a philosophical treatise. This means that we will treat 
the views professed by protagonist Roquentin as if they are Sartre’s, 
which Sartre has done himself on various occasions (WD 80, IPB 
70).46 This means that we will treat the views professed by protagonist 
Roquentin as if they are those of Sartre himself.
The name of Nausea is derived from a certain feeling or mood that 
overcomes the protagonist throughout the book, and it is this feeling 
that is key in understanding how Sartre moves beyond human 
reality. Nausea with a capital N is not the same as physical nausea. 
Sartre describes it as the ‘the existential grasping of our facticity’, 
the fact that we are thrown into a world and surrounded by things 
(WD 133)47. The most severe episode of Nausea occurs when the 
protagonist is looking at the root of a chestnut tree:
So I was in the municipal park just now. The root of the 
chestnut tree plunged into the ground just underneath 
my bench. I no longer remembered that it was a root. 
Words had disappeared, and with them the meaning of 
things, the methods of using them, the landmarks which 
men have traced on their surface. I was sitting, slightly 
bent, my head bowed, alone in front of that black, knotty 
mass, which was utterly crude and frightened me. And 
then I had this revelation.
It took my breath away. Never, until these last few days, 
45 ‘saisir les sourires secrets des choses vues absolument sans les hommes’ ‘déshumaniser 
complètement le secret des choses’ (WDF 182-183).
46  For a discussion of how the literary nature of the text relates to the philosophical side 
of it, see: (Gusman 2018b).
47 ‘la saisie existentielle de notre facticité’ (WDF 168).
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had I suspected what it meant to ‘exist’ (N 182)48.
The protagonist is confronted with the bare existence of things. 
Usually, the existence of things goes unnoticed. Of course, we 
implicitly assume that the things we encounter exist, but we never 
explicitly experience their existence itself: ‘usually existence hides 
itself. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can’t say a couple of 
words without speaking of it, but finally you can’t touch it’ (N 182).49 
A few sentences later he adds: ‘I picked them up in my hands, they 
served me as tools, I foresaw their resistance. But all that happened 
on the surface’ (N 183)50. When we normally use tools, we just use 
them without being fully aware of the fact that they exist. They 
are only experienced to the extent that they can be used by us. In 
contrast, in the experience of Nausea, we are suddenly aware of the 
existence that underlies how things appear to us. 
Of course, the possibility of an experience of Nausea is debatable at 
least: an experience that reveals things how they are when they are not 
experienced seems like a contradiction.51 From a phenomenological 
point of view, it seems a contradiction to uncover things as they are 
when they are not experienced. Sartre is aware of this methodological 
conundrum:
I understood it was necessary to present meaning still 
adhering to things, since it’s never entirely detached 
from them, and - in order to exhibit it - to show rapidly 
some of the objects that secrete it, and to make their 
equivalence felt (WD 145)52. 
48 ‘Donc j’étais tout à l’heure, au Jardin public. La racine du marronnier s’enfonçait 
dans la terre, juste au-dessous de mon banc. Je ne me rappelais plus que c’était une 
racine. Les mots s’étaient évanouis et, avec eux, la signification des choses, leurs 
modes d’emploi, les faibles repères que les hommes ont tracés à leur surface. J’étais 
assis, un peu voûté, la tête basse, seul en face de cette masse noire en noueuse, 
entièrement brute et qui me faisait peur. Et puis j’ai eu cette illumination. Ça m’a 
coupé le souffle. Jamais, avant ces derniers jour je n’avais pressenti ce que voulait 
dire « exister ». (NF 162).’
49 ‘à l’ordinaire l’existence se cache. Elle est là, autour de nous, en nous, elle est nous 
on ne peut pas dire deux mots sans parler d’elle et, finalement, on ne la touche pas’ 
(NF 162).
50 ‘Je les prenais dans mes mains, elles me servaient d’outils, je prévoyais leurs 
résistances. Mais tout ça se passait à la surface’ (NF 162).
51 Sartre himself is ambivalent about whether he himself ever had such an experience. 
He has stated that he never experienced nausea in the War Diaries (WD 62). 
However, he also states that he did experience nausea, and relates it to his encounter 
with mescaline (IG 79-81). 
52 ‘J’avais compris qu’il fallait présenter le sens encore adhérant aux choses, car il 
ne s’en détache jamais complètement et, pour le manifester, montrer rapidement 
quelques-uns des objets que le recèlent et faire sentir leur équivalence’ (WDF 183).
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It seems to me that Sartre does not mean that we fully grasp things, 
but, rather, that we realize that they can never be fully grasped. We 
experience the limit of our experience. We can only experience 
things endowed with the meaning we give them, and in Nausea we 
experience that this does not exhaust the object. This is stressed by 
Sartre in the claim that we cannot touch existence that was quoted 
above. Later on the protagonist says: ‘Existence is not something 
which allows itself to be thought of from a distance; it has to invade 
you suddenly’ (N 189)53. This implies something similar: we do not 
know existence, we can only experience that there is an unknowable 
dimension to things: ‘the world of explanations and reasons is not 
that of existence’ (N 185) 54. He further emphasizes this by saying 
that you cannot pass from the function of a root to its existence.
We encounter the limit of what we can experience within our 
ordinary understanding of things, within our framework of how 
we can utilize things and how we label them and put them into 
categories. When this is stripped away, existence remains. But what 
exactly is this ungraspable meaningless existence?
It [existence] had lost its harmless appearance as an 
abstract category: it was the very stuff of things, that root 
was steeped into existence. Or rather the root, the park 
gates, the bench, the sparse grass on the lawn, all that had 
vanished; the diversity of things, their individuality, were 
only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, 
leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder – naked, with 
a frightening, obscene nakedness (N 183)55.
This remark reveals something important about Sartre’s ideas about 
the existence of objects. Their diversity and individuality are also 
only aspects of how they appear to us. It is because of the categories 
we impose upon things that we make clear-cut distinctions 
between objects. The objects themselves, however, do not have these 
boundaries. This can be interpreted as meaning that beyond human 
experience there are no individual things, just a single “Being”. 
Consciousness fragments this being into different things, while in 
53 ‘L’existence n’est pas quelque chose qui se laisse penser de loin : il faut que ça vous 
envahisse brusquement, que ça s’arrête sur vous’ (NF 168).
54 ‘le monde des explications et des raisons n’est pas celui de l’existence’ (NF 165).
55 ‘Elle avait perdu son allure inoffensive de catégorie abstraite : c’était 
la pâte même des choses, cette racine était pétrie dans de l’existence. Ou 
plutôt la racine, les grilles du jardin, le banc, le gazon rare de la pelouse, 
tout ça s’était évanoui ; la diversité des choses, leur individualité n’étaient 
qu’une apparence, un vernis. CE vernis, avait fondu, il restait des masses 
monstrueuses et molles, en désordre–nues d’une effrayante et obscène 
nudité.’ (NF 163).
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reality, there is only one thing: pure Being. This notion of individuality 
has to do with the idea that consciousness introduces nothingness 
into reality. A demarcation requires nothingness in the form of a 
clear-cut line between what the object is and what is not. This would 
ultimately mean that objects only exist within human experience 
and not outside of it, which means that, his claims notwithstanding, 
Sartre’s philosophy is no realism.
This reading contradicts many other claims he makes, such as the 
aforementioned claims he makes about the intentions of realism. 
In the passage quoted above, he speaks about “masses, in disorder”, 
which implies heterogeneity. If Being were conceived as a single mass, 
then it would suggest order rather than disorder. It is true that our 
world emerges because our consciousness highlights certain beings, 
demarcates them from others and bestows them with meaning.56. It 
is important to understand “world” here not as objective reality per se 
but as this reality as it appears to subjectivity, that is, with meaning 
attached to it. Consciousness is only able to make a meaningful world 
appear by drawing on separate things. How this world arises has to 
do with our biological constitution, history, knowledge, etc. This also 
sheds new light on the remark in “Intentionality” that consciousness 
and the world are given in one stroke. Another important notion 
is that of situation: ‘I will call the different immediate modes of 
apprehension of the real as a world “situations”’ (IMY 185)57. Here 
Sartre seems to mean by situation a particular part of the (human) 
world in time and space. We will return to the notion of situation at 
length in the next chapter, where we will discuss the more elaborate 
definition Sartre gives to the situation in Being and Nothingness.
Let us return to the scene in the municipal park and see how it 
supports the realist reading of the monstrous masses of things. 
Overwhelmed by the experience of Nausea, the protagonist tries 
desperately to regain his grip on things.
Superfluous: that was the only connection I could 
establish between those trees, those gates, those pebbles. 
It was in vain that I tried to count the chestnut trees, 
to situate them in relation to the Velleda, to compare 
their height with the height of the plane trees: each of 
them escaped from the relationship in which I tried to 
enclose it, isolated itself, overflowed. I was aware of the 
56 Sartre develops the issue further in Being and Nothingness, where he introduces 
nothingness into this scheme: we can only say that a tree is a thing, while the root 
of the tree is only a part of the tree and hence not a thing on its own, because we 
introduce nothingness into being. We will return to this topic in the next chapter. 
57 ‘Nous appellerons « situations » les différents modes immédiats d’appréhension du 
réel comme monde’ (IMYF 355).
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arbitrary nature of these relationships, which I insisted 
on maintaining in order to delay the collapse of the 
human world of measures, of quantities, of hearings; 
they no longer had any grip on things. Superfluous, the 
chestnut tree, over there, opposite me, a little to the left. 
Superfluous, the Velleda... (N 184)58
In the same manner that functions and individuality are imposed 
upon things by us, all relations between objects are. We may perceive 
the root of a tree not as a separate thing but as a part of a tree, but 
this is a relation we impose upon it – it is demarcated as such in our 
world. Every object has a reality of its own which cannot be reduced to 
another thing. Also, everything we encounter is a thing: ‘Admittedly 
a movement was something different from a tree. But it was still an 
absolute. A thing’ (N 190)59. This statement is contrasted with the 
following idea: ‘Movements never quite exist, they are transitions, 
intermediaries between two existences’ (N 189)60. Sartre’s choice of 
the word “absolute” is noteworthy here: the thing as we experience 
it, is not an absolute. It is relative to the meaning we give to it. The 
thing that ‘secretes’ this meaning and which cannot be reduced to 
our experience is an absolute. 
The plenitude of things
We now arrive at the core of Sartre’s analysis. No tree can be reduced 
to the group it stands in; a movement of a tree cannot be reduced to 
the moving tree. No thing can be reduced to any other thing. Things 
are superfluous, which means that they are ‘too much’ to be enclosed 
in any relationship. They can neither be reduced to their parts nor to 
a larger whole, rather each and every one is an absolute. A brief gust 
of wind may not be regarded as a thing, but a tropical storm even 
gets a name. Neither of them is any less a thing than the other, but 
one of them has a bigger impact on our lifeworld. 
Not only is a thing irreducible to something else, it is also irreducible 
to itself. That is, it cannot be summed up in a definite set of 
58 ‘De trop : c’était le seul rapport que je pusse établir entre ces arbres, ces grilles, ces 
cailloux. En vain cherchais-je à compter les marronniers, à les situer par rapport à la 
Velléda, à comparer leur hauteur avec celle des platanes : chacun d’eux s’échappait 
des relations où je cherchais à l’enfermer, s’isolait, débordait. Ces relations (que je 
m’obstinais à maintenir pour retarder l’écroulement du monde humain, des mesures, 
des quantités, des directions) j’en sentais l’arbitraire ; elles ne mordaient plus sur les 
choses. De trop, le marronnier, là en face de moi un peu sur la gauche. De trop, la 
Velléda.’ (NF 163-164).
59 ‘Bien sûr, un mouvement c’était autre chose qu’un arbre. Mais c’était tout de même 
un absolu. Une chose’ (NF 169).
60 ‘les mouvements n’existent jamais tout à fait, ce sont des passages, des intermédiaires 
entre deux existences’ (NF 168). 
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characteristics – the absolute Sartre spoke of in “Intentionality”. 
This is what Sartre means when he says that an object overflows 
itself. This experiential inexhaustibility is not a trivial limitation of 
our consciousness, rather it is the existence of the object itself that 
causes it to have an infinite amount of qualities. This again reveals 
why the experience of Nausea is one of limitation: although existence 
is revealed, it is superfluous and therefore cannot be fully exhausted 
by our consciousness. If this were the case, the theory would revert 
back to naïve realism. Sartre stresses this by saying that things are 
superfluous for eternity (N 185). There is no point in time where we 
could have discovered everything about things and they would have 
ceased to be superfluous. Superfluousness is their very Being. 
This exposition on the superfluousness of things not only provides 
a foundation for the emptiness of intentional consciousness, it also 
shows the other leading theme of Sartre’s early thought: contingency. 
There is no larger order of things, no ultimate reason as to why 
things are what and how they are. There are only masses in disorder. 
All order is imposed upon reality by consciousness, but is therefore 
entirely relative to us and therefore contingent. Of course, reasons 
can be given as to why we perceive the world as we do. We have 
certain colour receptors in our eyes, which cause things to appear 
to us in a set variation of colours for example. We need to organize 
reality and impose order on it in order to function, but this does 
not make the specific order of reality necessary. Things could easily 
appear otherwise because of their superfluous nature.
3. Non-real Objects
A meaningful world is generated when consciousness encounters 
things, that is, real things. There are also objects of consciousness 
which are not real but imaginary. The topic of imagination is a general 
theme of Sartre’s work during this period. Having already criticized 
earlier theories and having suggested that Husserl provides a new 
way of thinking about mental images in The Imagination, Sartre sets 
about articulating his own theory of imagination in the first chapter 
of The Imaginary, where he provides a list of four characteristics of 
imagination.
The characteristics of imagination
The first characteristic is that ‘the image is a consciousness’ (IMY 
5)61. Sartre ended The Imagination with the idea that: ‘There are no 
and there couldn’t be any images in consciousness. But the image 
is a certain type of consciousness. The image is an act and not a thing. 
61 ‘L’image est une conscience’ (IMYF 17).
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The image is consciousness of something’ (IMN 144)62. Because of 
the intentional structure of consciousness, there can be no mental 
images inside of consciousness. There can only be a movement 
outward. Therefore, what we would ordinarily call a mental image is 
not a thing like a drawn image is. It is instead an act, a different way 
for consciousness to relate to its object than, say, an act of thinking 
or an act of perception. The objects of such conscious acts are called 
‘the imaginary’, after which the book is named.  
Sartre is here trying to distance himself from the view that, as we have 
mentioned before, he characterizes as the illusion of immanence. This 
is a position that holds that imagination is the same as perception, 
but that in imagination the object perceived is an inner, mental one. 
Thus, when I imagine my friend Pierre, I have a portrait of him in 
my mind, which is only connected to the real Pierre because it is he 
who is there depicted. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a reference 
to a real person does not change the fact that the object of my act 
of imagination is not Pierre but the inner portrait I have of him. 
Although Sartre thinks this view is wrong, he also acknowledges 
that it is widespread in both philosophy and everyday thinking 
(IMY 6). Sartre aims to show that this view is wrong by means of 
a thought experiment in which one looks at a chair and then closes 
one’s eyes in order to imagine that same chair. According to Sartre, 
the chair does not enter our consciousness when we perceive it, nor 
does it suddenly do so when we imagine it, not even as an imitation. 
It is the same object in both cases:
[W]hether I perceive or imagine this straw-bottomed 
chair on which I sit, it always remains outside of 
consciousness. In both cases it is there, in space, in that 
room, in front of the desk. […] [W]hether I perceive 
or imagine that chair, the object of my perception and 
that of my image are identical: it is that straw-bottomed 
chair on which I sit. It is simply that consciousness is 
related to this same chair in two different ways. In both 
cases, it aims at the chair in its concrete individuality, 
in its corporeality. Only, in one of the cases, the chair 
is ‘encountered’ by consciousness; in the other, it is not. 
But the chair is not in consciousness. Not even as an 
image (IMY 7)63.
62 ‘Il n’y a pas, il ne saurait y avoir d’images dans la conscience. Mais l’image est 
un certain type de conscience. L’image est un acte et non une chose. L’image est 
conscience de quelque chose’ (IMNF 162).
63 ‘que je perçoive ou que j’imagine cette chaise de paille sur laquelle je suis assis. Elle 
demeure toujours hors de la conscience. Dans les deux cas elle est là, dans l’espace, 
dans cette pièce, face au bureau. […] que je perçoive ou que j’imagine cette chaise, 
l’objet de ma perception et celui de mon image sont identiques : c’est cette chaise 
de paille sur laquelle je suis assis. Simplement la conscience se rapporte à cette 
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The first characteristic is that imagination is a different way for 
consciousness to relate to objects: ‘an image is nothing other than 
a relation’ (IMY 7)64. Sartre remains true to his initial project of 
banishing everything from consciousness, and that includes things 
which are traditionally regarded as contents of consciousness. This 
project does pose some problems, however, such as how we can 
distinguish between perception and imagination and how this could 
be said to hold for non-existent objects, for objects that simply do 
not exist in the outside world. Sartre will offer solutions to these 
problems with the third and fourth characteristics of imagination 
that he outlines.
The second characteristic is ‘the phenomenon of quasi-observation’ 
(IMY 8)65. This phenomenon is what separates imagination both 
from perception and from conceptual thought. In perception I 
always observe only one side of an object. If I see a cube, I can only 
see three faces at once, yet I only know it is a cube if I have seen all 
six faces. In order to know it is a cube, I must have experiences of 
it from multiple points of view. This is consistent with his claims 
concerning the superfluousness of real objects: the real objects we 
encounter in perception can never be exhausted by consciousness. 
When I think of something, it is not given from a certain angle. For 
example, when I merely think about a cube I do not think about 
just three sides of it, I think about all sides at the same time and 
apprehend the object in a single instant.
Imagination shares characteristics with both perception and 
imagination. As in perception, the object is given to us from a 
certain angle. We picture an object and in this act it is given from a 
certain point of view – as if it were perceived. Nevertheless, unlike 
perception and like thinking, Sartre claims that we cannot discover 
anything about this object. It is created in the very act of picturing, 
and thus we cannot find anything in it that we did not put there 
ourselves. If we rotate a cube in our mind’s eye, we cannot discover 
that it is not a cube. As in thinking, we already know all its aspects, 
but, as in perception, only one perspective is given at a time (IMY 
9). Therefore, it is only quasi-observed: the image only shares some 
of the characteristics of perception. 
même chaise deux manières différentes. Dans les deux cas elle vise la chaise dans son 
individualité concrète, dans sa corporéité. Seulement, dans un des cas, la chaise est « 
rencontrée » par la conscience ; dans l’autre, elle ne l’est pas. Mais la chaise n’est pas 
dans la conscience. Pas même en image.’ (IMYF 20-21).
64 ‘une image n’est rien autre qu’un rapport’ (IMYF 20-22).
65 ‘Le phénomène de quasi-observation’ (IMYF 20-22).
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Imagination and nothingness
The third characteristic is that ‘the imaging consciousness posits 
its object as a nothingness’ (IMY 11)66. Sartre says that whether 
an object exists or not is given in the way consciousness posits the 
object. In perception the object is posited as existing. By the very fact 
that perceived objects are encountered, it is given that they appear 
as existing. In contrast to perception, an image can posit its object 
in four ways, namely, as non-existent, absent, existing elsewhere, or 
as neutral to whether the object exists or not (IMY 12). The last one 
remains an act of positing in the form of the suspension of belief 
(IMY 12). This is still a form of negation, as the object is not posited 
as existing. This positing of absence or of non-existence can only 
occur in light of the second characteristic. In perception the object 
is encountered, and in thinking one is only concerned with ‘natures’, 
which ‘are indifferent to the “flesh and blood” existence of objects’ 
(IMY 13)67. Our relationship to such natures is always positive. 
Even when the absence or non-existence of an object is included in 
its nature, we are not confronted with it, because the object does not 
appear to us from a given perspective.
For example, I can think about Pierre as being my friend, which 
is a relation he has to me. I can also think about Pierre as living 
somewhere else than I am, but this constitutes a positive relation 
between him and that location. Absence can only be given on the 
basis of a sensory intuition. Only from my own point of view is 
Pierre’s presence in another place really an absence. His presence 
elsewhere means that although I imagine him as being at a 
perceivable distance, he is not. Otherwise he would not be absent. 
He is not first posited as present, rather his absence is part of the 
intuitive act. Hence, he is ‘intuitive-absent’, and Sartre adds: ‘In this 
sense, one can say that the image has wrapped within it a certain 
nothingness’ (IMY 14)68. 
Sartre’s reasoning concerning nothingness is directly related to his 
project of banishing all content from consciousness. Sartre revolts 
against the idea that because something does not exist in the world 
outside, it must either exist within the mind or in some kind of ideal 
realm. The idea that because something does not exist in one place 
it must exist in another place does not do justice to the fact that the 
object does not exist. It may not exist at all or may not exist in the 
given situation, but it remains a nothingness rather than a being. In 
The Imagination he already praises Husserl’s idea that non-existent 
objects are not mental: 
66 ‘natures’ ‘sont indifférents à l’existence « de chair et d’os des objets’ (IMYF 32).
67 ‘La conscience imageante pose son objet comme un néant’ (IMYF 30). 
68 ‘En ce sens, on peut dire que l’image enveloppe un certain néant’ (IMYF 34).
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The non-existence of the centaur or of the chimera thus 
does not give us the right to reduce them to mere psychic 
formations. […] Husserl restores to the centaur precisely 
its transcendence at the very heart of its nothingness. As 
much nothingness as one wants, but by this very token 
it is not in consciousness (IMN 132)69.
Although Sartre ultimately criticizes how Husserl handles 
nothingness, he is inspired by Husserl’s ideas about intentional 
consciousness.70 If the non-existent object consciousness experiences 
cannot be found inside of consciousness, then it must transcend 
consciousness. However, it would be a contradiction to say that it 
exists outside of consciousness, as it does not exist. Only by making 
nothingness a genuine part of the object can we do justice to the fact 
that it does not exist. This does not necessarily mean that nothingness 
is a quality of the object like its shape and colour are, but it does 
mean that it must be part of the way it is given to consciousness.
The fourth characteristic is simply called ‘spontaneity’ (IMY 14)71. 
The description of this characteristic is by far the least elaborate. In 
imagination the conscious act is aware of the fact that is creative, 
that is to say, that it creates its object. This is contrasted with the 
passive character of perception, in which the object is encountered 
in the world outside. Although one is not aware of the precise 
process through which the image comes to be, one knows that it 
does not come from the outside world but is instead conjured up 
spontaneously by consciousness. As Sartre further elaborates: ‘It is a 
kind of indefinable counterpart to the fact that the object gives itself 
as a nothingness’ (IMY 14)72. Because the object does not exist, it 
needs to originate from somewhere other than the real objects. In 
perception, the object is always presented to us by the world outside 
of us, while in imagination, it is the act of consciousness itself 
which presents the object. Of course, the object may exist in the 
outside world, but the way it is presented, its angle, is determined 
spontaneously by the act itself.
In the conclusion of The Imaginary, Sartre continues to discuss 
this topic and aims to answer the question of what consciousness 
must be in order to be able to imagine in the first place (IMY 179). 
69 ‘ainsi, le non-existence du centaure ou de la chimère ne nous donne pas le droit de 
les réduire à simples formations psychiques. […] précisément, Husserl restitue au 
centaure sa transcendance au sein même de son néant. Néant tant qu’on voudra : mais 
par cela même il n’est pas dans la conscience’ (IMNF 147).
70 For a detailed study of Sartre’s criticism of Husserl with regards to nothingness, see: 
(Gusman 2017)
71 ‘la spontanéité’ (IMYF 35).
72 ‘C’est une espèce de contrepartie indéfinissable du fait que l’objet se donne comme 
un néant’ (IMYF 35).
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Consciousness is able to do this because it can posit nothingness 
while still being consciousness of something (IMY 182-183). 
Because the imaginary object is posited as something which is not, 
and, for this reason it is a negation of reality. Since the image is 
a negation of the world, Sartre also refers to it as a ‘negation of 
the world from a particular point of view’, and this point of view is 
precisely the act of imagining (IMY 186)73. Thus:
For the centaur to arise as irreal, the world must be 
grasped precisely as world-where-the-centaur-is-not[.] 
[…] Likewise, for my friend Pierre to be given to me 
as absent, I must have been led to grasp the world as a 
whole such that Pierre cannot currently be present in it 
for me (IMY 186)74.
The real is the condition of the irreal or non-real. It is only because 
consciousness is intrinsically connected to reality that it can posit its 
object as not being part of reality. ‘We can then say that the essential 
condition for a consciousness to imagine is that it be “situated in 
the world”’ (IMY 186)75. Sartre’s theory of imagination thereby 
reinforces his realism. Non-existent objects do not exist within the 
mind but appear precisely as not existing in the world around us. We 
first need to grasp a situation in order to posit that something is not 
in that situation. Sartre stresses that this notion of non-real objects as 
transcendent nothingnesses violates the principle of intentionality: 
It is not a question of consciousness ceasing to be 
consciousness of something. It is in the very nature of 
consciousness to be intentional and a consciousness 
that ceased to be consciousness of something would 
thereby cease to exist. But consciousness must be able 
to form and posit objects affected by a certain character 
of nothingness in relation to the totality of reality (IMY 
183)76.
73 ‘négation du monde d’un point de vue particulier’ (IMYF 356).
74 ‘Pour que le centaure surgisse comme irréel il faut précisément que le monde soit saisi 
comme monde-où-le-centaure-n’est-pas[.] […] De même, pour que mon ami Pierre 
me soit donné comme absent, il faut que j’aie été amené à saisir le monde comme un 
ensemble tel que Pierre ne saurait y être actuellement et pour moi  présent.’ (IMYF 
355).
75 ‘Nous pourrons dire alors que la condition essentielle pour qu’une conscience 
imagine c’est qu’elle soit « en situation dans le monde »’ (IMYF 355).
76 ‘Il ne s’agit point pour la conscience de cesser d’être conscience de quelque chose. 
Il entre dans la nature même de la conscience d’être intentionnelle et une conscience 
qui cesserait d’être conscience de quelque chose cesserait par là même d’exister. 
Mais la conscience doit pouvoir former et poser des objets affectés d’un certain 
caractère de néant par rapport à la totalité du réel.’ (IMYF 351).
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Thus, Sartre’s project of banishing the contents from consciousness 
does not only concern real objects, it also concerns non-real objects. 
Although the latter do not exist without consciousness, consciousness 
posits them outside, in the world.
We can see that the imaging act is the inverse of the 
realizing act. If I want to imagine the hidden arabesques, 
I direct my attention towards them and I isolate them, 
just as I isolate on the ground of an undifferentiated 
universe the thing that I presently perceive (IMY 181)77.
The process of imagination is hence similar to that of ‘realizing’, the 
word Sartre uses here for the process of isolating and demarcating 
objects. Just as real objects are isolated against the background of 
undifferentiated things, imaginary objects are determined as such on 
the ground of real objects. Sartre thus concludes that ‘the imaginary 
represents at each moment the implicit sense of the real” (IMY 
188)78.
Another aspect of the imaginary process that is important to note 
appears in the conclusion of The Imaginary, where the notion of 
freedom enters the scene. The negation of the world in imagination 
is only possible if we are not fully bound to the world of objects but 
are able to escape from it: 
For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able 
to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be 
able to stand back from the world by its own efforts. In 
a word, it must be free. Thus the thesis of irreality has 
delivered us the possibility of negation as its condition. 
Now, the latter is possible only by the ‘nihilation’ of the 
world as totality and this nihilation is revealed to us as 
being the inverse of the very freedom of consciousness 
(IMY 184)79.
“Nihilation” is a term coined by Sartre that means, roughly, “to render 
as nothingness”. It is because we posit a world that has the ability 
to be negated that we are free: ‘So to posit reality as a synthetic 
77 ‘Si je veux imaginer les arabesques cachées, je dirige mon attention vers elles et je 
les isole, tout comme j’isole sur un fond d’univers indifférencié telle chose que je 
perçois présentement.’ (IMYF 347).
78 ‘Ainsi l’imaginaire représente à chaque instant le sens implicite du réel’ (IMYF 360).
79 ‘Pour qu’une conscience puisse imaginer il faut qu’elle échappe au monde par sa 
nature même. En un mot il faut qu’elle puisse tirer d’elle-même une position de recul 
par rapport au monde. En un mot il faut qu’elle soit libre. Ainsi la thèse d’irréalité 
nous a livré la possibilité de négation comme sa condition, or, celle-ci n’est possible 
que par la « néantisation » du monde comme totalité et cette néantisation s’est révélée 
à nous comme ‘étant l’envers de la liberté même de la conscience.’ (IMYF 353-354).
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whole is enough to posit oneself as free from it and this surpassing 
is freedom itself since it could not be effected were consciousness 
not free’ (IMY 184)80. It is because we are in the world that we are 
free to negate it. In other words, freedom does not exist in isolation, 
it is part of the intentional relationship of consciousness to reality. 
This exposition of freedom is rather short and relatively simple, but 
it foreshadows the bigger role it plays in Sartre’s later works, where 
he both continues and deviates from the views presented here.
Preliminary conclusion
Sartre’s ideas concerning imaginary objects enable us to form a clear 
picture of his conception of the interplay between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Intentionality means that consciousness is empty, and is 
nothing more than an orientation towards objects. If these objects 
are real, they are superfluous and can never be fully exhausted. A 
meaningful world is created by our consciousness because some 
objects are isolated. These isolated objects are the meaningful objects 
that together form situations and the world. While there is a reality 
wholly independent from consciousness, the world is a result of the 
interplay between consciousness and this reality. 
While there is nothing in consciousness, it is because there is a 
particular consciousness confronting reality that the world arises in 
a particular way. It is because of the physiological constitution of 
our eyes that we see colours; it is because of our cultural background 
and upbringing that we attach certain meanings to things; it is 
because of our own personal preferences and emotions that things 
appear in a certain way for us. This last claim is elaborated upon 
by Sartre in his Sketch for a Theory of Emotions. Emotions are not 
simply states of consciousness, rather ‘[e]motional consciousness is, 
at first, consciousness of the world’ (E 51)81. When we are afraid, it 
is the world or certain objects in the world that appear to us as scary. 
We have already mentioned the example of dreadfulness being a 
property of the Japanese mask in “Intentionality”.
It is important to note that this does not mean that every individual 
has his or her own world. First of all, as has been said, when Sartre talks 
about a consciousness he does not mean the stream of consciousness 
of a person, but a single conscious experience. We will return to the 
topic of the continuity of different conscious experiences in detail 
in the next section. Second, although the topic of intersubjectivity 
does not play as large a role in this period as it will in later ones, 
80 ‘Ainsi il suffit de pouvoir poser la réalité comme un ensemble synthétique pour se 
poser comme libre par rapport à elle et ce dépassement est la liberté même car il ne 
saurait s’effectuer si la conscience n’était libre’ (IMYF 354).
81 ‘La conscience émotionnelle es d’abord conscience du monde’ (EF 38-39).
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Sartre makes clear that he understands the world as a shared one. 
The passage at the end of “Intentionality” not only says that we find 
ourselves in the world, but that the idea of intentionality also makes 
us ‘a human among humans’ (I 5).82 One reason for doing away with 
the idea of the inside world is that this also gets rid of the problem 
of the existence of other minds. In the War Diaries, Sartre even says 
that the idea that different people perceive the same world was one 
of the reasons he came to realize that Husserl’s theory was an idealist 
one, which served to strengthened his own realist views (WD 184). 
Although Sartre does not address the topic, we can see why we 
share a world. People are a lot more alike than they are different 
when it comes to how they are constituted. The idea that a lot of the 
ways we see the world are determined by our background is also an 
argument that supports the idea of a single human world, insofar as 
our culture and upbringing all comes about by way of other people. 
To be sure, our individual dispositions mean that the world appears 
a bit differently to each of us, but not to such an extent that it is 
entirely different. 
82 ‘homme parmi les hommes’ (IF 89).
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Part II 
The Self in Hindsight
4. The Chain of Consciousness 
The question concerning self-consciousness, or how the stream of 
consciousness becomes aware of itself, is one of the central topics 
of The Transcendence of the Ego. The main thesis of this work is in 
line with Sartre’s project of banishing things from consciousness. If 
consciousness is empty, then there is also no room for any kind of 
Self inside of it. The first paragraph reveals Sartre’s goal immediately: 
For most philosophers, the Ego is an ‘inhabitant’ of 
consciousness. [..] We should like to show here that the 
Ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: 
it is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like 
the Ego of another (TE 1)83.
We have seen the same rhetoric in “Intentionality”: ‘everything 
is finally outside: everything, even ourselves’ (I 5)84. As for the 
terminology, in The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre uses the term 
‘Ego’ to refer to the combination of the Self as subject and the 
Self as object. The Self is not inside consciousness, for there can be 
nothing inside consciousness. With the notion of the inhabitant, 
Sartre takes aim at a traditional conception of selfhood, namely, that 
of the transcendental ego. This amounts to the idea that because our 
experiences are always changing, the unity of consciousness must 
be ensured by an unchanging Self underlying our experiences. This 
transcendental ego exists independently from individual experiences 
in the stream of consciousness. Such an account of the Self as subject 
is – according to Sartre, found in Husserl (TE 2). Sartre adopts the 
Jamesian terminology of the I and the Me that we have mentioned 
in the introductory chapter. He agrees with Husserl that the Me 
is an object in the world, which hence falls under the scope of the 
phenomenological reduction.85 For Sartre, however, this does not 
83 ‘Pour la plupart des philosophes l’Ego est un « habitant » de la conscience. […] 
Nous voudrions montrer ici que l’Ego n’est ni formellement ni matériellement dans 
la conscience: il est dehors , dans le monde ; c’est un être du monde, comme l’Ego 
d’autrui (TEF 93).’ 
84 ‘finalement tout est dehors, tout, jusqu’à nous-mêmes (IF 89)’.
85 It is important to note that Sartre’s choice of italics and capital letters when it comes 
to the I and the Me is very confusing. In the original French, he always writes ‘Je’ 
with a capital letter when he means the philosophical notion and in lowercase when 
he uses it in the ordinary sense. For the ‘Moi’ he also uses a capital letter when 
he means the philosophical concept. However, he refrains from doing so when he 
uses adjectives that make clear he is talking about the philosophical concept, such as 
‘moi psychique et psycho-physique’ (TEF 96). When he uses the word in the ordinary 
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mean that there needs to be an I in consciousness: ‘But the question 
we would like to raise is the following: is this psychical and psycho-
physical Me not sufficient? Do we need to add to it a transcendental 
I, as a structure of absolute consciousness?’ (TE 3)86. Sartre’s goal 
in the first part of the work is to show that these questions can be 
answered with a yes and a no respectively. As Sartre aims to show, 
there is no need for an I inside of consciousness to account for the 
unity of consciousness over time, on the one hand, or to separate it 
from the consciousness of other people, on the other. This renders 
consciousness impersonal (TE 3, 25).
Unity and individuality
So how does Sartre account for the unity and individuality of 
consciousness? According to him, the alternative to Husserl’s 
transcendental I can also be found in Husserl’s work, namely 
in his notion of intentionality and the related notion of “inner 
time-consciousness” (Husserl 1991). Through intentionality, 
consciousness ‘unifies itself by escaping itself ’ (TE 3-4)87. The unity 
of consciousness is constituted by the consistency of the objects that 
are experienced. The example Sartre uses here is that of counting. 
If objects did not appear to consciousness in a series, counting 
would be impossible, for we would have to start over again at every 
unit that is counted. The immediate past experiences need to be 
retained in the current experience for counting to be possible. This 
retention of our immediate past experiences is part of inner time-
consciousness. This does not mean that inner time-consciousness 
is, like the transcendental I, something that actively unifies our 
experiences. Rather, it is the process of ‘perpetual syntheses of past 
consciousnesses with the present consciousness’ (TE 4)88.89 This does 
not mean that all past experiences are retained, just the ones that play 
way, he puts it in italics. The English translation falls short in this regard not only 
because the pronoun ‘I’ must always be capitalized in English, but also because the 
translator changes the plural ‘nous’ which Sartre uses for the writer’s perspective 
into the singular ‘I’. The conventions for ‘Moi’ are abandoned completely. I have 
corrected the translation to match Sartre’s spelling and typography – except for the 
fact that I have taken the liberty of writing ‘me’ with a capital even when relevant 
adjectives are used. 
86 ‘Mais nous nous posons la question suivante: ce moi psychique et psycho-physique 
n’est-il pas suffisant? Faut-il le doubler d’un Je transcendantal, structure de la 
conscience absolue ?’ (TEF 96).
87 ‘elle s’unifie en s’échappant’ (TEF 97).
88 ‘synthèses perpétuelles des consciences passées et de la conscience présente’ (TEF 
97).
89 Sartre uses the term consciousness to denote a single experience, mimicking the 
German erlebnis (TE 93, IMN 129). Thus, “multiple consciousnesses” does not refer 
to the streams of consciousness of multiple people, but to different experiences in one 
stream.
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an active role in constituting the meaning of the things currently 
given to consciousness. The same goes for anticipated experiences 
in the direct future which are “protained”. This process of retention 
and protention is how Sartre understands the notion of inner time-
consciousness.
To better understand this process, we will use a metaphor of a linked 
chain. A linked chain is a unity, as all the individual links are united 
from one end to the other. Yet, not all links are directly linked to 
one another. Let us consider the stream of consciousness through 
time as a chain in which every link is an individual experience.90 
Every experience is directly linked to that of the immediate past 
and future, but not to every past and future experience. However, 
because every experience is linked to the adjacent ones, the chain of 
consciousness forms a proper unity. 
It is important to note that Sartre emphasizes the role of the 
object in his reasoning. Because every individual link in the chain 
of consciousness is nothing but a movement outside of itself 
towards an object, the inner time-consciousness is not merely a 
property of consciousness. It is not simply because we have inner 
time-consciousness that we can experience series. The unity of our 
consciousness does not create the continuity of the world. Rather, 
it works both ways: it is because things in the world appear to us 
as continuous that we have inner time-consciousness, but this is 
only possible because there is a consciousness to which it can appear 
as such. Consciousness is perpetually in a process of unification. 
Thus, when Sartre says that consciousness unifies itself by escaping 
itself, he is referring to this process. The things in the world do not 
form a series before they are encountered by consciousness, and 
consciousness is not a unity before it encounters continuous objects 
(TE 4). These two dimensions of experience emerge simultaneously 
and are intertwined In inner time-consciousness, the immediate past 
and future are not the object of consciousness, but they give meaning 
to the objects currently before consciousness. Sartre summarizes this 
as follows:
The object is transcendent to the consciousnesses that 
grasp it, and it is within the object that their unity is 
found. It will be objected that it is necessary for there to 
90 I do not want to suggest that this metaphor should replace that of the stream of 
consciousness. James, for example, criticizes the use of the metaphor of the chain 
because it suggests that consciousness is ‘chopped up in bits’ (James 1983, 234). 
By no means do I want to deny that experiences flow into one another or to suggest 
that they are chopped up. Rather, I would like to stress that the chains are linked to 
one another, but can still be distinguished from one another, both thematically and 
temporally. We need to keep in mind that it is only a metaphor, and that the borders 
between experiences are not always clear.
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be some principle of unity in duration if the continual 
stream of consciousnesses is able to posit transcendent 
objects outside itself. Consciousnesses must be perpetual 
syntheses of past consciousnesses with the present 
consciousness. And this is perfectly true. But it is typical 
of Husserl […] that he never resorted to any synthetic 
power of the I. It is consciousness that unifies itself, 
concretely, by an interplay of ‘transversal’ consciousnesses 
that are real, concrete retentions of past consciousnesses 
(TE 4)91.
The example of counting can now be understood more easily. 
Because I have inner time-consciousness, the things counted in 
the past are retained, and therefore the things in the present can 
appear as following the things in the past, thereby forming a series. 
This is not only true for a series of objects, but also for the series of 
manifestations in which individual objects appear. Sartre states that 
if I had no inner time-consciousness then it would be impossible for 
me to experience objects as a unity, instead of mere manifestations. 
I add two and two to make four, the transcendent object that 
appears to my consciousness is “two and two make four” (TE 4). 
In this example, the manifestations of the transcendent object are 
themselves objects. Yet the same goes for individual objects: the fact 
that the table before me is the same table throughout the different 
experiences I have of it can only be experienced if consciousness 
synthesizes the experiences through time. 
Sartre also claims that the notion of inner time-consciousness 
accounts for the fact that an individual’s consciousness exists 
separately from that of other people. Although he does not devote 
more than a few sentences to the elaboration of this claim, he 
does maintain that because consciousness unifies itself, it cannot 
be limited except by itself: ‘It therefore constitutes a synthetic, 
individual totality, completely isolated from other totalities of the 
same kind’ (TE 4)92.
Thus, the structure of consciousness itself, that is, its intentionality 
91 ‘L’objet est transcendant au consciences qui le saisissent et c’est en lui que se trouve 
leur unité. On dira que pourtant il faut u principe d’unité dans la durée pour que le 
flux continuel des consciences soit susceptible de poser des objets transcendants hors 
de lui. Il faut que les consciences soient des synthèses perpétuelles des consciences 
passées et de la conscience présente. C’est exact. Mais il est typique que Husserl 
[…] n’ait jamais eu recours à un pouvoir synthétique du Je. C’est la conscience qui 
s’unifie elle-même et concrètement par un jeu d’intentionnalités « transversales « qui 
sont des rétentions concrètes et réelles des consciences passées.’ (TEF 97).
92 ‘Elle constitue donc une totalité synthétique et individuelle entièrement isolée des 
autres totalités de même type’ (TEF 97).
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and inner time, accounts for the unity of the stream of consciousness.93 
No extra principle beneath or within the stream is needed. It is not 
necessary to conceive of a separate link that connects to every other 
link in order for the chain to be a unity. The structure of the chain 
itself makes it a unity, and the same is true for consciousness. This 
provides Sartre with an answer to the question posed earlier about 
whether the assumption of a transcendental I is necessary: 
We can thus unhesitatingly reply: the phenomenological 
conception of consciousness renders the unifying and 
individualizing role of the I completely useless. It is, on 
the contrary, consciousness that renders the unity and 
personality of my I possible. The transcendental I thus 
has no raison d’être.
Indeed, this superfluous I is actually a hindrance. If 
it existed, it would violently separate consciousness 
from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each 
consciousness like an opaque blade. The transcendental 
I is the death of consciousness (TE 4)94.
Sartre inverts the traditional order by stating that the unity of 
consciousness renders that of the I possible, and not the other way 
around.95 Not only is the I useless, it prevents the phenomenological 
conception of consciousness from being fully empty, and therefore 
fully transparent. Because consciousness is fully transparent it is 
an absolute: its existence does not depend on anything else. There 
cannot be anything inside of consciousness because this diminishes 
the absolute nature of consciousness. If consciousness were to 
lose its ontological absoluteness, we would fall into the dualistic 
scheme characteristic of the illusion of immanence. Hence, the 
transcendental I is the death of consciousness understood as an empty 
intentional activity. A transcendental I provides our consciousness 
with unity, but it is not something of which we can be conscious. 
Therefore, it would add something which is not purely conscious to 
consciousness, thereby creating division and destroying its absolute 
93 For a more elaborate exposition of Sartre’s arguments for this claim, see: (Tepley 
2016).
94 ‘Nous pouvons donc répondre sans hésiter: la conception phénoménologique de la 
conscience rend le rôle unifiant et individualisant du Je totalement inutile. C’est la 
conscience au contraire qui rend possible l’unité et la personnalité de mon Je. Le Je 
transcendantal n’a donc pas de raison d’être.
 Mais, en outre, ce Je superflu est nuisible. S’il existait il arracherait la conscience à 
elle-même, il la diviserait, il se glisserait dans chaque conscience comme une lame 
opaque. Le Je transcendantal, c’est la mort de la conscience.’ (TEF 97-98).
95 It is remarkable that Sartre uses the word personality rather than individuality in the 
second sentence. It makes sense however, if we consider Sartre’s alternative to the 
transcendental I, on which we will soon focus.
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nature: ‘If it [the I] existed, it would violently separate consciousness 
from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each consciousness 
like an opaque blade’ (TE 4)96. However, if we follow this line of 
reasoning, it also means that consciousness has to be conscious of 
itself: if consciousness is only conscious of its object, then it would 
need a second act of consciousness to gain consciousness of itself. 
But this would diminish the absolute nature of consciousness, for it 
would have a non-conscious element. Therefore, it needs to be both 
conscious of its object and conscious of itself.
The existence of consciousness, indeed, is an absolute, 
because consciousness is conscious of itself; in other 
words, the type of existence that consciousness has is that 
it is consciousness of itself. And it becomes conscious of 
itself insofar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object. 
Everything in consciousness is thus clear and lucid: 
the object lies opposite it, in its characteristic opacity, 
but consciousness, for its part, is purely and simply the 
consciousness of being consciousness of this object: such 
is the law of its existence (TE 4)97. 
In order to be fully transparent, in order to be wholly consciousness 
and nothing else, it also needs to be conscious of itself, otherwise 
there would be an opaque facet to consciousness. This notion of self-
consciousness, or rather reciprocity, is presented by Sartre as the very 
opposite of the transcendental I. A subjective Self in consciousness 
is the exact opposite of the kind of self-consciousness Sartre 
defends, whereas the former represents opacity, the latter represents 
translucency. It is because there is no Self in consciousness that the 
full translucency of self-consciousness is possible. He can be seen 
to anticipate what will become the ontological framework of Being 
and Nothingness, which we will discuss in detail in the next chapter, 
in his claim that ‘[p]ure consciousness is a ‘non-substantial absolute’ 
because it is conscious of itself (TE 5)98.
We can now see more clearly what Sartre’s non-egological view 
of consciousness entails. On the one hand, a subjective Self inside 
or behind consciousness is unnecessary because consciousness 
96 ‘S’il existait il arracherait la conscience à elle-même, il la diviserait, il se glisserait 
dans chaque conscience comme une lame opaque’ (TEF 98).
97 ‘En effet, l’existence de la conscience est un absolu parce que la conscience est 
consciente d’elle-même. C’est à-dire que le type d’existence de la conscience c’est 
d’être conscience de soi. Et elle prend conscience de soi en tant qu’elle est conscience 
d’un objet transcendant. Tout est donc clair et lucide dans la conscience: l’objet 
est en face d’elle avec son opacité caractéristique, mais elle, elle est purement et 
simplement conscience d’être conscience de cet objet, c’est la loi de son existence.’ 
(TEF 98).
98 ‘un absolu non substantiel’ (TEF 98).
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unifies itself in the process of encountering things in the world.99 
A Self inside of consciousness would diminish the translucency of 
consciousness, as it would introduce something into consciousness 
of which we are not conscious. This would mean that consciousness 
would be more than just intentionality, and we would fall back into a 
substantial subject-object dualism. In order to be fully consciousness 
and nothing else, every conscious act needs to be consciousness of 
itself. But this is far from the traditional understanding of self-
consciousness as consciousness of a Self, which Sartre has just shown 
to be incompatible with his theory of consciousness. Rather, every 
conscious act is conscious of itself. If we consider the metaphor of 
the chain, then we would have to say that every link is conscious of 
itself, rather than conscious of the entire chain.
The pseudo-cogito
If consciousness does not have an egological structure, then Sartre 
still needs some other way to account for the subjective side of 
selfhood. I do have some kind of sense of being the subject of my 
consciousness and the agent of my actions, regardless of the non-
egological structure of consciousness. If the I is not in or behind 
consciousness, however, it must be somewhere else: in front of 
consciousness. In other words, the I is not transcendental, it is 
transcendent.
Sartre begins the exposition of this alternative for the transcendental 
I with an analysis of the cogito. The cogito is the a classic instance 
of the discovery of the I as a necessary component of consciousness, 
as the thing that thinks, as the res cogitans. For Sartre, the egological 
nature of the cogito could not be clearer: ‘it is undeniable that the 
Cogito is personal. In the ‘I think’, there is an I which thinks’ (TE 5). 
Every time I grasp my own conscious experiences, such as thinking, 
I detect the I as the subject of that experience. 
Nevertheless, Sartre points out that this detection of the I 
always occurs in an act of reflection. ‘This Cogito is performed 
by a consciousness directed towards consciousness, which takes 
consciousness as its object.’ (TE 6)100 The conscious experience of 
thinking, doubting in the case of the Cartesian cogito, is the object 
of a second experience, namely the realization that there is an I in 
the act of thinking. This second experience has the first experience 
as its object. Sartre concludes: ‘Thus the consciousness that says ‘I 
think’ is precisely not the consciousness that thinks’ (TE 6)101. The 
100 ‘Ce Cogito est opéré par une conscience dirigée sur la conscience, qui prend la 
conscience comme objet’ (TEF 99).
101 ‘Ainsi la conscience qui dit « Je pense » n’est précisément pas celle qui pense’ (TEF 
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conscious experience that reflects is not the one it reflects upon.
If this is the case, who is to say that the I was there in the first place? 
Conscious acts seem to change upon reflection. Sartre therefore 
asks: ‘Might not the essential aspect of the change be the fact that 
the I appears?’ (TE 6)102. True to the phenomenological nature of 
his inquiry, Sartre thinks only a concrete example of the appearance 
of the I can settle the matter. He gives the example of being 
absorbed in reading. Although Sartre acknowledges the difficulty 
of remembering prereflective experiences without reflecting upon 
them, he deems it possible to do so. If I recall an episode of reading, I 
can relive it without altering it. Doing so, Sartre does not encounter 
an I: ‘while I was reading, there was a consciousness of the book, of 
the heroes of the book, but the I did not inhabit this consciousness, 
it was merely consciousness of the object and non-positional 
consciousness of itself ’ (TE 7)103. Thus, according to Sartre, the I 
is not only unnecessary from a theoretical point of view, it is also 
not to be found in concrete examples of experience (TE 7). Sartre 
concludes:
[W]e are forced to conclude: there is no I on the 
unreflected level. When I run after a tram, when I look at 
the time, when I become absorbed in the contemplation 
of a portrait, there is no I. There is a consciousness of the 
tram-needing-to-be-caught, etc., and a non-positional 
consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged 
into the world of objects, it is they which constitute the 
unity of my consciousnesses, which present themselves 
with values, attractive and repulsive values, but as for me, 
I have disappeared, I have annihilated myself. There is 
no place for me at this level, and this is not the result 
of some chance, some momentary failure of attention: 
it stems from the very structure of consciousness (TE 
7-8)104.
100).
102 ‘L’essentiel du changement ne serait-il pas l’apparition de Je ?’ (TEF 100).
103 ‘tandis que je lisais, il y avait conscience  du livre, des héros du roman, mails le 
Je n’habitait pas cette conscience, elle était seulement conscience de l’objet et 
conscience non positionnelle d’elle-même (TEF 101).’
104 ‘[I]l nous faut donc conclure : il n’y a pas de Je sur le plan irréfléchi. Quand je cours 
après u tramway, quand je regarde l’heure, quand je m’absorbe dans la contemplation 
d’un portrait, il n’y a pas de Je. Il y a conscience du tramway-devant-être-rejoint, 
etc., et conscience non-positionnelle de la conscience. En fait je suis alors plongé 
dans le monde des objets, ce sont eux qui constituent l ‘unité de mes consciences, 
qui se présentent ave des valeurs, des qualités attractives et répulsives, mais moi, 
j’ai disparu, je me suis anéanti. Il n’y a pas de place pour moi à ce niveau, et ceci ne 
provient pas d’un hasard, d’un défaut momentané d’attention, mais de la structure 
même de la conscience.’ (TEF 102).
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In our ordinary coping with the world, there is not any form of 
Self present in our experiential life. Pre-reflective consciousness is 
therefore impersonal. It is in reflection that the I is imposed upon 
those experiences, and that is why we always have the feeling of 
being the subject of our experiences and the agent of our actions 
upon consideration. 
The idea that the I is not present in consciousness before the act 
of reflection results in a criticism of the cogito. Because the I only 
appears in reflection it is always an object before consciousness. It is 
not the object of the reflective act, as this is the experience reflected 
upon. Nevertheless, it appears ‘through reflected consciousness’, as 
something which transcends that particular experience (TE 8)105. 
Just like the number 3 transcends all particular instances in which 
there are three objects, the I ‘affirms its permanence beyond that 
consciousness and all consciousnesses’ (TE 8)106. This means that 
although it is not the object of the reflecting act, it is still an object 
in the same sense that my specific experience of a table captures 
the table as a whole. Of course, Descartes did not realize that the 
I discovered in reflection was in fact an object and not part of the 
subjectivity of the thinking: ‘It is even evident that the reason why 
Descartes moved from the cogito to the idea of thinking substance 
is that he believed that I and ‘think’ are on the same level’ (TE 
8)107. Because the I is an object, it falls within the scope of the 
phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s terms, or is dubitable 
according to Descartes’ methodological doubt. The I thereby loses its 
apodictic status: ‘The Cogito affirms too much. The sure and certain 
content of the pseudo-“cogito” is not “I am conscious of this chair”, 
but “there is consciousness of this chair”’ (TE 9)108. This further 
shows pre-reflexive consciousness to be impersonal, as it is not the I 
that is doing the thinking, there is just a thinking experience that is 
not endowed with selfhood.109
105 ‘à travers la conscience réfléchie’ (TEF 103).
106 ‘affirme au contraire sa permanence par delà cette conscience et toutes les consciences’ 
(TEF 102).
107 ‘Il est même évident que c’est pour avoir cru que Je et pense sont sur le même plan 
que Descartes est passé du Cogito à l’idée de substance pensante’ (TEF 102).
108 ‘Le Cogito affirme trop. Le contenu certain du pseudo « Cogito » n ‘est pas « j’ai 
conscience de cette chais », mais « il y a conscience de cette chaise ».’ (TEF 104).
109 Sartre uses the term cogito in a less critical manner a few times throughout The 
Imaginary. At different moments throughout the book he uses the cogito, and 
sometimes even the Cartesian cogito to refer to the fact that consciousness 
and its object are inseparable (IMY 148, 156, 160, 186). I can perceive a tree 
and mistakenly think it is a person, but this does not alter the fact that in the 
moment, the object was appearing to me as being a tree. Furthermore, Sartre 
stresses the link between reflecting and reflected consciousness by alluding to 
Descartes (IMY 4). He stated that if I imagine something, and reflect upon 
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5. A Virtual Locus of Unity
The idea that the Self is only present in reflection raises the question 
of its ontological status. Is the Self created or discovered by reflection? 
Or, in other words, is it real or imaginary? Sartre seems to imply that 
the Self is imaginary to a certain degree. It does not feature some 
of the characteristics of the imaginary discussed above – it is, for 
example, not visible and therefore cannot be quasi-observed. Yet it 
is created by consciousness in an act of reflection and is not a part of 
reality without this conscious activity. One could even argue that it 
is posited as a nothingness, as the I was not there before reflection.
This line of reasoning is not, however, what Sartre has in mind. 
Reflection alters the conscious act, but after this alteration the I 
is truly present. It is a genuinely existing object that can only be 
discovered in reflected conscious acts. Reflected conscious acts 
retain their own object, the book or the tram, but a new object also 
becomes present (TE 9). The act of reflection is directed towards 
two objects, the reflected act and the I is revealed in that act.
If the I is really not part of subjectivity but an object, the reason 
for the distinction between subjective and objective selfhood 
seems to be lost. This is indeed what Sartre is getting at: ‘We are 
starting to glimpse how the I and the Me are in fact one’ (TE 12)110. 
Sartre wants to dissolve the distinction between the two facets of 
selfhood. On the subjective side, there is just consciousness that 
is non-egological and impersonal; on the objective side, there is a 
single Self that embodies all facets of selfhood, both those that are 
traditionally subjective and those that are objective. Hence, both the 
I and the Me are objects of attribution. Sartre emphasizes this by 
stating that: ‘The distinction drawn between these two aspects of a 
single reality strikes me as simply functional, not to say grammatical’ 
(TE 12)111. Both are transcendent, both appear before consciousness 
in acts of reflection, hence the title of the book: the Ego is wholly 
transcendent. 
Sartre touches upon the same theme in Nausea. When visiting a 
portrait gallery, the protagonist compares himself to the people there 
depicted. Because he does not have an important role in society, he 
starts to question the reality of his own existence: ‘My existence was 
the act of imagination, then I cannot be mistaken about the image. He does 
not elaborate on the I of the Cogito. He does state that the consciousness of 
the cogito ‘has a certain individual and temporal structure’, but he does not 
elaborate on this (IMY 160). 
110 ‘Nous commençons à entrevoir que le Je et le Moi ne font qu’un’ (TEF 107).
111 ‘La distinction qu’on établit entre ces deux aspects d’une même réalité nous paraît 
simplement fonctionnelle, pur ne pas dire grammaticale’ (TEF 107).
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beginning to cause me some concern. Was I a mere figment of the 
imagination?’112 Later in the book the answer to this question becomes 
clear. During the confrontation with superfluous existence in the 
park scene that was discussed above, the protagonist realizes that 
‘I – weak, languid, obscene, digesting, tossing about dismal thoughts 
– I too was superfluous’ (N 184)113. The first four characteristics are 
all facets of us that relate to the Me, and specifically to its bodily 
dimension. The last characteristic, thinking, is associated with the 
I, the thinker. The thinker is superfluous as well, however. There is 
only one Self, and this Self is superfluous. It is a thing, ‘an existent. 
It has a type of concrete existence, doubtless different from that 
of mathematical truths, meanings, or spatio-temporal beings, but 
just as real’ (TE 9).114 How then must we envision this concretely 
existing Self ? 
Actions, states and qualities
After criticizing the notion of subjective selfhood in the first part 
of The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre aims to show what remains of 
the Self in the second part. He aims to do justice to the difference 
between the subjective and objective dimensions of selfhood while 
incorporating them into the same object. In order to understand what 
this transcendent Self entails, we have to gain a better understanding 
of the process of reflection through which it appears.
When we reflect upon our own experiences, we seldom reflect on a 
single experience. In the chain of consciousness, it is often difficult 
to see where one experience ends and another begins. Moreover, 
meaningful events often consist of multiple experiences. I may 
reflect upon the fact that I am reading a book, but reading a book 
already consists of different experiences. I experience the story of 
the book, I feel the book in my hands and I turn its pages. Therefore, 
the reflected experience of reading a book in which the I appears is 
strictly speaking a collection of experiences. This further shows why 
the Self is not imaginary: The Self may not be present in experiences, 
but it is present in these collections of reflected experiences. It is not 
a true alteration of the object of the reflected experiences. Instead, 
a new object is apprehended in the process of reflection. Sartre 
distinguishes between three categories of such collections: actions, 
states and qualities.
112 ‘Mon existence commençait à m’étonner sérieusement. N’étais-je pas une simple 
apparence ?’ (TEF 114).
113 ‘moi – veule, alangui, obscène digérant, ballottant de mores pensées – moi aussi 
j’étais de trop’ (NF 164).
114 ‘un existant. Il a un type d’existence concrète, différent sans doute de celui des vérités 
mathématiques, des significations ou des êtres spatio-temporels, mais aussi réel’ (TEF 
104).
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Actions are the reflected conscious states in which the Self appears 
as active. Sartre gives the examples of playing the piano, driving 
a car and writing (TE 15). The Self appears here as the agent of 
these actions, as the one who is playing the piano et cetera. This 
category also entails mental processes such as doubting, reasoning, 
meditating and making a hypothesis (TE 15). Here the Self appears 
as the subject of these thoughts. All these actions consist of multiple 
experiences. Sartre calls it a transcendent unity of consciousnesses 
(TE 12). An episode of conscious life in which we drive a car consists 
of numerous experience that follow each other in rapid succession: 
seeing, hearing, steering, shifting gears. None of these experiences is 
the experience of driving a car; they are all part of it, yet no single one 
of them is identical with driving as such. As Sartre says: 
[I]t must not be forgotten that action requires time in 
which to be carried out. It has individual sections and 
moments. To these moments there correspond active, 
concrete consciousnesses, and the reflection 
that is aimed at the consciousnesses 
apprehends the total action in an intuition 
which displays it as the transcendent 
unity of active consciousnesses (TE 15)115.
The next category consists of the reflected experiences in which 
the Self appears as passive (TE 12). These are transcendent unites 
of conscious experience in which one overcomes something. The 
example Sartre gives is that of hatred. One might say that hate, or 
any other emotion, is an experience. This is simply a matter of words. 
Sartre intends something else. When I hate someone, I may have 
certain feelings of hatred or feelings associated with hatred, such 
as revulsion or anger, when I meet that person. However, when the 
person is not around anymore, my hatred for the person persists, 
even if it is not currently experienced:
[I]t [hatred] is given as continuing to be even when 
I am absorbed in other occupations and when no 
consciousness reveals it. This is enough, it seems to me, 
for one to be able to affirm that hatred is not a form 
of consciousness. It extends beyond the instantaneous 
moment of consciousness and it is not subject to the 
absolute law of consciousness for which there is no 
distinction possible between appearance and being. 
115 ‘Mais il ne faut pas oublier que l’action demande du temps pour s’accomplir. Elle 
a des articulations, des moments. A ces moments correspondent des consciences 
concrètes actives et la réflexion qui se dirige sur les consciences appréhende l ‘action 
totale dans une intuition qui la livre comme l’unité transcendante des consciences 
actives.’ (TEF 112).
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Hatred is thus a transcendent object (TE 13)116.
The hatred appears in the reflection of the conscious experiences of 
disgust, revulsion and anger that I feel at the moment of confrontation. 
Because this hatred persists between confrontations with its object, 
I am still in the state of hatred even if I may not actively feel it. 
This is why Sartre thinks states, unlike actions, are passive. Although 
he does not explicitly say that actions consist of an uninterrupted 
sequence of experiences, it is clear that for states the sequence can be 
interrupted. The state does not need to be experienced actively, and 
is therefore passive in nature. 
Another example, which Sartre himself does not give, is that of 
knowledge. Although I am not actively talking about or remembering 
the fact that I know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, I am still in 
the state of knowing this. Sartre’s example of hatred is ambiguous 
because the word could also be used to describe the experience 
rather than the state. However, the instances in which one calls the 
knowledge to mind actively seem to be rare. This is usually only 
presented in other experiences, such as answering a question or 
figuring out where to go on holiday.
Apart from actions and states, the Self can also appear in qualities. 
This is not another category of transcendent unities of reflected 
experiences, a quality is rather a transcendent unity of states or actions. 
Examples of this are ‘failings, virtues, tastes, talents, tendencies, 
instincts’ (TE 16)117. For example, if I hate many things, I may be a 
hateful person. I have the quality of hatefulness which remains even 
though I am not experiencing hatred in a specific encounter. The 
quality of hatefulness transcends the specific experience of hatred, 
just as hatred transcends the episodes of revulsion and anger. The 
same can be said for actions. If I perform the action of playing the 
piano a lot, it may be said that I have the quality of being a piano 
player. If I doubt a lot, then I am a doubting person. These qualities 
remain even when I am not performing the action they correspond 
to. Thus, even when the quality is the transcendent unity of actions, 
the Self appears as passive in qualities. These three categories of 
transcendent unities are themselves united in a transcendent pole of 
unity, which is the Self:
116 ‘elle se donne comme continuant d’être même lorsque je suis absorbé dans d’autres 
occupations et qu’aucune conscience ne la révèle. En voilà assez, ce semble, pour 
pouvoir affirmer que la haine n’est pas de la conscience. Elle déborde l’instantanéité 
de la conscience et elle ne se plie pas à la loi absolue de la conscience pour laquelle 
il n’y a pas de distinction possible entre l’apparence et l’être. La haine est donc un 
objet transcendant.’ (TEF 109).
117 ‘les défauts, les vertus, les goûts, les talents, les tendances, les instincts’ (TEF 113).
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The Ego is not directly the unity of reflected 
consciousnesses. There exists an immanent unity of these 
consciousnesses, namely the stream of consciousness 
constituting itself as the unity of itself—and a transcendent 
unity: states and actions. The Ego is the unity of states 
and actions—only optionally of qualities. It is the unity 
of transcendent unities, and itself transcendent. It is a 
transcendent pole of synthetic unity, like the object-pole 
of the unreflected attitude. But this pole appears only in 
the world of reflection (TE 12)118.
The Self is the transcendent unity of actions, states and qualities, 
just as these are themselves transcendent unities. It is the unity of 
all my actions, states and qualities, regardless of what kind they 
are. Sartre stresses that qualities are optional because the Self does 
appear in actions and states, and therefore the category of qualities 
is not necessary in order to discover the Self. It is inconceivable 
that someone never reflects upon experiences and groups them into 
actions and states. It is conceivable, however, that someone never 
really thinks about her qualities. 
The distinction between the I and the Me is retained to a certain 
degree by Sartre: ‘The I is the Ego as the unity of its actions. The me 
is the Ego as the unity of states and qualities’ (TE 12)119. Although 
both the I and the Me are objects of attribution, in the former case, 
the case of the I, being the subject of experiences and the agent 
of actions is attributed to it. Hence, the active nature of the I is 
retained. The Me as it appears to states and actions still has the same 
passive nature it always did. What is most important is that these are 
just two ways of looking at the same object, the Self that transcends 
reflected experiences. 
A pole of unity
We have seen that the Self is the transcendent unity of reflected 
experiences, but the question remains as to how exactly this object 
relates to these experiences. Although it is the Self which appears in 
every act of reflection, it cannot be reflected upon in isolation, that 
is, without it being given simultaneously with an action, state or 
118 ‘L’Ego n’est pas directement unité des consciences réfléchies. Il existe une unité 
immanente de ces consciences, c’est le flux de la Conscience se constituant lui-
même comme unité de lui-même – et une unité transcendante : les états les actions. 
L’Ego est unité des états et des actions, – facultativement des qualités. Il est unité 
d’unités transcendantes et transcendant lui-même. C’est un pôle transcendant 
d’unité synthétique, comme le pôle-objet de l’attitude irréfléchie. Seulement ce pôle 
n’apparait que dans le monde de la réflexion.’ (TEF 108).
119 ‘Le Je c’est l’Ego comme unité des actions. Le Moi c’est l’Ego comme unité des états 
et des qualités’ (TEF 107).
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quality. As we have already seen, the Self appears as an extra object 
upon reflection. It is nothing more than the transcendent unity of 
the reflected experiences. In this connection, it does not differ from 
actions and states, which are also incapable of being regarded apart 
from their content. One could not conceive of someone driving a 
car without this thought including the experiences that go along 
with this action. In the same manner, one cannot conceive of the 
Self on its own: ‘The Ego is nothing other than the concrete totality 
of states and actions that it supports’ (TE 17)120. Or, in other words:
It does not seem to us as if we could find a skeletal pole 
if we removed one by one all the qualities. If the Ego 
appears as lying beyond each quality or even beyond all 
of them, this is because it is opaque like an object: we 
would have to undertake an infinite stripping away if we 
were to remove all its potentialities. And, at the end of 
this stripping away, there would be nothing left, the Ego 
would have vanished (TE 19)121.
The Self is neither something that exists on its own nor the sum 
of reflected experiences. If it were the sum, then we would need to 
know all reflected experiences in order to discover it. Since there are 
in principle an infinite amount of reflected experiences, this would 
mean that we can never know it (TE 22). Instead, the term ‘pole’ 
implies some sort of axis: that around which the actions, states and 
qualities revolve. It is ‘the infinite totality of states and actions that 
never permits itself to be reduced to one action or one state’ (TE 
17)122. In other words, it is ‘a virtual locus of unity’: the virtual centre 
of actions, states and qualities  (TE 20)123. 
Because the Self is nothing but a virtual centre, it is characterized 
by a certain uncertainty (TE 22). I cannot study my Self in order 
to find out what my personality is, because it only appears when 
reflecting upon a specific aspect of my personality. The qualities I 
have may also change over time and in new moments of reflection. 
The Self is a transcendent object and as such it is as dubitable as any 
120 ‘L’Ego n’est rien en dehors de la totalité concrète des états et des actions qu’il 
supporte’ (TEF 115).
121 ‘Il ne nous parait pas que nous pourrions trouver u pôle squelettique si nous ôtions 
l’une après l’autre toutes les qualités. Si l’Ego apparaît comme au-delà de chaque 
qualité ou même de toutes, c’est qu’il est opaque comme un objet : il nous faudrait 
procéder à un dépouillement infini pour ôter toutes ses puissances. Et, au terme de ce 
dépouillement, il ne resterait plus rien, l’Ego se serait évanoui’ (TEF 117). Although 
Sartre talks about qualities here, the same reasoning can easily be applied to actions 
and states. 
122 ‘la totalité infinie des états et des actions qui ne se laisse jamais réduire à une action 
ou à un état’ (TEF 115).
123 ‘un foyer virtuel d’unité’ (TEF 118).
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other object. This is to say that I can be mistaken about my actions, 
states and qualities, especially in the case of more complex ones. The 
feeling I have may not be hatred at all, for example, but love that I 
am ashamed to admit. It is quite important that Sartre adds that this 
does not mean that there is a real Self about which we are mistaken, 
it is simply that in reflection we can misinterpret ourselves. The fact 
that the Self is an object to which I have the same access as other 
people do, bars any true self-knowledge:
‘[T]o know oneself well’ is inevitably to look at oneself 
from the point of view of someone else, in other words 
from a point of view that is necessarily false. And all 
those who have tried to know themselves will agree that 
this attempt at introspection appears, right from the 
start, as an effort to reconstitute, with detached pieces, 
with isolated fragments, what is originally given all at 
once, in a single surge. Thus the intuition of the Ego is a 
perpetually deceptive mirage, since, at one and the same 
time, it yields everything and it yields nothing. And how, 
indeed, could it be otherwise, since the Ego is not the 
real totality of consciousnesses (this totality would be 
self-contradictory, like any infinite totality actualized), 
but the ideal unity of all states and actions (TE 22)124. 
Since my Self is never given to consciousness except when it appears 
in an action, state or quality, I cannot focus our attention on it and 
truly come to know it (TE 23). The fact that he refers to the Self as 
a “mirage” here is also interesting in that it implies that the Self is 
imaginary. Nevertheless, it seems that Sartre here merely refers to the 
fact that the Self cannot be viewed apart from its constituents, as it is 
their abstract centre. The deceptive element in this equation is that 
if we aim to grasp ourselves, we cannot study the Self in isolation. 
Instead, we must paste together the bits and pieces given in our past 
actions. The idea that introspection can somehow reveal the Self as 
something asides from the virtual locus of unity is imaginary, but the 
Self as a virtual locus of unity is a real – yet abstract – entity. 
The fact that we can never truly know the Self does not make it 
hypothetical: if it is the nature of the Ego to be a dubious object, it 
124 ‘« bien se connaître », c’est fatalement prendre sur soi le point de vue d’autrui , c’est-
à-dire un point de vue forcément faux. Et, tous ceux qui ont essayé de se connaître 
en conviendront , cette tentative d’introspection se présente dès l’origine comme un 
effort pour reconstituer avec des pièces détachées, avec des fragments isolés, ce qui 
est donné originellement d’un coup, d’un seul jet. Aussi l ‘intuition de l ‘Ego est-elle 
u mirage perpétuellement décevant, car, à la fois, elle livre tout et elle ne livre rien. 
Comment pourrait-il en être autrement, d’ailleurs, puisque l’Ego n’est pas la totalité 
réelle des consciences (cette totalité serait contradictoire comme tout infini en acte), 
mais l ‘unité idéale de tous les états et les actions.’ (TEF 121-122). 
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does not follow that it is therefore hypothetical (TE 18).125 Although 
I can wonder whether I am hateful, I cannot wonder whether I 
have a Self or not. This is the case because the Self is necessary in 
order for actions, states and qualities to make sense to us. Although 
unreflected consciousness can function without a Self, we cannot 
reflect on our experiences without a Self appearing. The statement 
“there is consciousness of this chair” makes sense, but to say “there is 
hatefulness” without referring to something that is hateful, does not. 
In light of this, Sartre says that the Self “creates” actions, states and 
qualities. Although the Self is discovered in reflection, it is also what 
makes the object of reflection possible and it ‘is given as producing 
its states’ (TE 18)126. The relationship between the reflected 
experiences and the Self is therefore reciprocal: the Self is nothing 
more than the virtual centre of unity of the reflected experiences, but 
these actions, states and qualities are only possible because the Self 
appears through them (TE 19). The idea that the Self has creative 
power in the process of reflection gives us yet another reason to say 
that it is not itself created in this process, but discovered.
Another facet of the Self that stems from its transcendent nature 
is that I do not have an essentially different relationship to my own 
Self than I have to that of other people. Although I experience my 
own conscious experiences and others do not, when I reflect on them 
and they form actions, states and qualities, they have become objects 
and are thereby no longer subjective: 
The Me, as such, remains unknown to us. And that is easy 
to understand: it is given as an object. So the only method 
for getting to know it is observation, approximation, 
waiting, experience. But these procedures, which are 
perfectly suitable for the entire domain of the non-
intimate transcendent, are not suitable here, by virtue of 
the very intimacy of the Me. It is too present for one 
to look at it from a really external point of view. If we 
move away from it to gain the vantage of distance, it 
accompanies us in this withdrawal. It is infinitely close 
and I cannot circle round it. Am I lazy or hardworking? 
I will find out, no doubt, if I ask those who know me 
and if I ask them for their opinion. Or else, I can collect 
the facts that concern me and try to interpret them as 
objectively as if I were dealing with another person (TE 
22)127. 
125 ‘Mais, s’il est de la nature de l’Ego d ‘être un objet douteux, il ne s’ensuit pas qu’il 
soit hypothétique’ (TEF 116).
126 ‘est donné comme produisant ses états’ (TEF 116).
127 ‘Tel quel. le Moi nous reste inconnu. Et cela peut facilement se comprendre : il se 
donne comme un objet. Donc la seule méthode pour le connaître c’est l’observation, 
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Although I cannot know the inner life of other people, I can still 
reflect on how they behave and what they say, and thereby reflect 
on their actions, states and qualities through which their Selves 
are revealed. If we hold on to the dichotomy of a subjective I and 
an objective Me, then we can only know the Me of other people. 
However, in Sartre’s view the I is also an object, which results in 
the idea that ‘[m]y I, indeed, is no more certain for consciousness than 
the I of other men. It is simply more intimate’ (TE 29)128. It is more 
intimate because I have more information about myself, but this 
information is not different in nature from the things I know about 
other people. According to Sartre, this also leads to a refutation of 
solipsism (TE 29). If the I is not in consciousness, it cannot be the 
source of reality: 
[I]f the I becomes a transcendent, it participates in all 
the world’s vicissitudes. It is not an absolute, it did not 
create the universe, it falls like other existences under 
the epochē; and solipsism becomes unthinkable as soon 
as the I no longer has any privileged position (TE 29)129. 
Sartre does not develop this line of reasoning in much detail, 
but it is worth noting in light of the accusations discussed in the 
introductory chapter. In Sartre’s interpretation of the idea of inner-
time consciousness, the continuity of the stream of consciousness is 
only guaranteed by the continuity of things external to consciousness. 
If the continuing existence of these things were to depend upon the 
stream of consciousness, this would lead to a contradiction. If there 
were no continuous element in consciousness, then we could not 
account for the continuity of objects. Hence, it would be absurd to 
assume that these objects are lacking a reality outside of consciousness. 
Sartre also addressed the topic of the traditional subject, when he 
states that: ‘This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the I, 
l ‘approximation , l ‘attente, l ‘expérience. Mais ces procédés, qui conviennent 
parfaitement à tout le transcendant non-intime, ne conviennent pas ici , du fait de 
l’intimité même du Moi. Il est trop présent pour qu’on puisse prendre sur lui un 
point de vue vraiment extérieur. Si l’on se retire pour prendre du champ, il nous 
accompagne dans ce recul. Il est infiniment proche et je ne puis en faire le tour. Suis-
je paresseux ou travailleur ? J ‘en déciderai sans doute si je m’adresse à ceux qui 
me connaissent et si je leur demande leur avis. Ou bien encore je peux collectionner 
les faits qui me concernent et tenter de les interpréter aussi objectivement que s’il s 
‘agissait d’un autre.’ (TEF 121).
128 ‘Mon Je, en effet, n’est pas plus certain pour la conscience que le Je des autres 
hommes. Il est seulement plus intime’ (TEF 130).
129 ‘si le Je devient un transcendant, il participe à toutes les vicissitudes du monde. Il 
n’est pas un absolu, il n’a point créé l’univers, il tombe comme les autres existences 
sous le coup de l’ἐποχή ; et le solipsisme devient impensable dès lors que le Je n’a 
plus de position privilégiée.’ (TEF 130).
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is no longer in any way a subject’ (TE 29)130.  Furthermore, he states 
that the transcendence of the Self causes ‘the subject-object duality 
[…] to disappear definitively from philosophical preoccupations’ 
(TE 29)131. 
A question that remains is why we need a transcendent virtual locus 
of unity, if the stream of consciousness is itself individuated. Sartre 
touches upon this question in the conclusion of The Transcendence of 
the Ego (TE 26). 
Perhaps, indeed, the essential function of the Ego is 
not so much theoretical as practical. I have pointed 
out, after all, that it does not bind closely together the 
unity of phenomena, that it is limited 
to reflecting an ideal unity, whereas real, 
concrete unity has long been achieved. 
But perhaps its essential role is to mask 
from consciousness its own spontaneity (TE 27)132.
This spontaneity of the stream of consciousness is something we 
already touched upon when we discussed imagination in the third 
section. In the Imaginary Sartre says that the fact that consciousness 
produces its own objects is indicative of imagination. Here, Sartre 
alludes to a characteristic of consciousness that is not limited to 
imagining, namely, that consciousness ‘determines itself to exist at 
every instant, without us being able to conceive of anything before 
it’ (TE 27)133. The stream of consciousness is a stream precisely 
because experiences keep flowing, one after the other. We do not 
create these experiences ourselves, they overcome us. We have little 
influence over what we perceive or what we think. Often our train of 
thought carries us, rather than being, so to speak, driven by us. Sartre 
gives the examples of the fact that it is impossible to will oneself 
to fall asleep and trying not to think about something and thereby 
immediately thinking about it (TE 27). Experiences of willing are 
themselves part of the stream and do not exclude spontaneity.  ‘On 
130 ‘Cette conscience absolue, lorsqu’elle est purifiée du Je, n’a plus rien d’un sujet’ ‘la 
dualité sujet-objet […] disparaisse définitivement des préoccupations philosophiques’ 
(TEF 130).
131 ‘Cette conscience absolue, lorsqu’elle est purifiée du Je, n’a plus rien d’un sujet’ ‘la 
dualité sujet-objet […] disparaisse définitivement des préoccupations philosophiques’ 
(TEF 130).
132 ‘Peut-être, en effet, la fonction essentielle de l’Ego n’est-elle pas tant théorique que 
pratique. Nous avons marqué, en effet, qu’il ne resserre pas l’unité des phénomènes, 
qu’il s bore à refléter une unité idéale, alors que l’unité concrète et réelle est opérée 
depuis longtemps. Mais peut-être son rôle essentiel est-il de masquer à la conscience 
sa propre spontanéité.’ (TEF 128).
133 ‘se détermine à  ‘existence à chaque instant, sans qu’on puisse rien concevoir avant 
elle’ (TEF 127).
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this level, man has the impression of eluding himself ceaselessly, 
overflowing himself, surprising himself by a richness that is always 
unexpected’ (TE 27)134. 
This does not mean that we are not free: ‘Consciousness takes fright 
at its own spontaneity because it senses that it lies beyond freedom’ 
(TE 27)135. The stream of consciousness is neither autonomous 
nor determined, it is simply happening. The will exists only at the 
reflective level: ‘The will aims at states, feelings, or things, but it 
never turns back round on to consciousness’ (TE 27)136. Wanting 
to see an elephant does not refer to a singular experience of an 
elephant, it refers to a plurality of experiences, such as going to the 
zoo, walking around the elephant enclosure and watching them for a 
while. Such an action is a reflective grouping of experiences. On the 
reflective level, the Self appears and the action appears to “emanate” 
from the Self. Thus, the Self allows us to make a distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary experiences, on the reflective level: ‘it is, 
indeed, thanks to the Ego, that a distinction can be drawn between 
[…] what is willed and what is yielded to’ (TE 28)137.
Sartre can therefore be seen to have fulfilled the twofold goal of The 
Transcendence of the Ego that was mentioned earlier: he has shown 
that the Self is not in consciousness, and he has shown that it is a 
being in the world, like the Self of another (TE 1). He has expelled 
the inhabitant from consciousness and has driven it to the world 
outside. Although consciousness is devoid of Self at the unreflected 
level, there is a Self that appears in reflection. It is the virtual centre 
of unity of reflected experiences. It is neither the sum of these 
reflected experiences nor something that can be viewed in isolation. 
Both the I and the Me are facets of the same objective Self: the I 
as the transcendent unity of active experiences, the Me as that of 
passive experiences.
6. Adventures
Sartre’s theory of the Self as a virtual locus of unity explains how 
the Self as object is discovered. Although it allows for change over 
time at different moments of reflection, it only focuses on the static 
elements of selfhood. These static elements may change in relation 
to one another. For example, I may have once been hateful, but I am 
134 ‘Sur ce plan l’homme a l’impression de s’échapper sans cesse, de se déborder, de se 
surprendre par une richesse toujours inattendue’ (TEF 128).
135 ‘La conscience s’effraie de sa propre spontanéité parce qu’elle la sent au delà de la 
liberté’ (TEF 128).
136 ‘La volonté se dirige sur les états, sur les sentiments ou sur les choses, mais elle ne se 
retourne jamais sur la conscience’ (TEF 128).
137 ‘c’est grâce à l’Ego, en effet, qu’une distinction pourra s’effectuer entre […] le voulu 
et le subi’ (TEF 129). .
SUBJECTIVITY WITHOUT SELF
68 69
not so any more. This is a first step towards an account of selfhood 
over the course of a lifetime. It does not account for the fact that 
some reflected episodes are more important for our sense of Self 
than others. When I tell my life story, I am inclined to talk about 
experiences that somehow formed who I am. I may speak about 
where I grew up, what subjects I studied, or about a certain passion 
or hobby I have. It is extremely unlikely that I would talk about 
what I ate for breakfast or that I once took a train. How do different 
experiential episodes relate to one another? Of course, a lot of these 
things are simply trivial parts of our culture. We categorize people by 
where they grew up or what their profession is, and not by the fact 
that they may have seen a yellow car once. Although the reason why 
some experiences are important and others are not may be trivial, 
it does influence how we see our own lives and which episodes we 
incorporate in our life story. 
There are no adventures
The topic of narrative selfhood is addressed by Sartre in Nausea, 
where we find two important notions pertaining to how experiential 
episodes fit together: “adventures” and “perfect moments”.138 
At the beginning of the story, the protagonist is sure that he has 
experienced adventures during the course of this life (N 39). He 
gives the clichéd examples of voyaging at sea, trekking through the 
woods and getting into brawls. He reflects on where those adventures 
have led him, and he can only conclude that they have led him to the 
exact moment he is now in, thinking about them while sitting in a 
bar. This is a moment that does not seem to be important or special 
in any sense. His attention is soon diverted, but a little later, when 
another character asks about his adventures, he makes the following 
realization: 
I haven’t had any adventures. Things have happened 
to me, events, incidents, anything you like. But not 
adventures. It isn’t a matter of words. […] I have just 
learned, for no apparent reason, that I have been lying 
to myself for ten years. Adventures are in books. And 
naturally, everything they tell about in books can happen 
in real life, but not in the same way. It was to this way 
138 The name Nausea was not the name Sartre originally had in mind when he was 
writing the novel. His first choice was Melancholia, after an engraving by Dürer. 
One of the other names he considered was The Extraordinary Adventures of Antoine 
Roquentin, which would have been accompanied by a promotional banner with a 
citation from the book as its slogan: “There are no adventures”. Although rejected by 
the publisher, this would-be title reveals that adventure is one of the central notions 
of the book (Churchill & Reynolds).
Chapter 1
68 69
of happening that I attached so much importance (N 
58)139.
The protagonist did not experience adventures at all. While he did 
travel the world, his travels did not constitute real adventures. What, 
then, are adventures? First of all, an adventure needs to have a real 
beginning. This beginning could be anything, it does not matter how 
insignificant, as long as it feels like a beginning. You could just be 
walking across the street and have the feeling of that this event is the 
beginning of great things to come. 
Something begins in order to end: and adventure 
doesn’t let itself be extended; it achieves significance 
only through its death. Towards this death, which may 
also be my own, I am drawn irrevocably. Each moment 
appears only to bring on the moments after. To each 
moment I cling with all my heart: I know that it is 
unique, irreplaceable – and yet I would not lift a finger 
to prevent it from being annihilated (N 59)140.
From the outset, every moment that makes up the adventure leads 
towards the goal or end of the adventure.141 For example, we can 
easily imagine someone who travels to a faraway place in order 
to find herself. Everything that happens on the journey somehow 
contributes to the goal of the quest. If positive things happen, it can 
lead to new-found wisdom. If negative things happen, they can be 
seen as life lessons. Ordinary events may suddenly be meaningful 
in light of the “death” of the adventure. When the adventure is over, 
time returns to ‘its everyday slackness’, and moments do not have 
meaning in light of other moments anymore (N 60)142. Ordinary 
life is just a random sequence of events. Nevertheless, the idea of 
adventure, the idea that some sequences of events have significance 
in light of a goal, is illusory:
139 ‘Je n’ai pas eu d’aventures. Il m’est arrivé des histoires, des événements, des 
incidents, tout ce qu’on voudra. Mais pas des aventures. Ce n’est pas une question de 
mots[.] […] Je viens d’apprendre, brusquement, sans raison apparente, que je me suis 
menti pendant dix ans. Les aventures sont dans les livres. Et naturellement, tout ce 
qu’on raconte dans les livres peut arriver pour de vrai, mais pas de la même manière. 
C’est à cette manière d’arriver que je tenais si fort.’ (NF 56-57).
140 ‘Quelque chose commence pour finir : l’aventure ne se laisse pas mettre de rallonge ; 
elle n’a de sens que par sa mort. Vers cette mort, qui sera peut-être aussi la mienne, je 
suis entraîné sans retour. Chaque instant ne paraît que pour amener ceux qui suivent. 
A chaque instant je tiens de tout mon cœur : je sais qu’il est unique ; irremplaçable – 
et pourtant je ne ferais pas un geste pour l’empêcher de s’anéantir.’ (NF 57).
141 Although he never refers to it in this context, Sartre’s definition of adventure is very 
reminiscent of that given by Georg Simmel in his essay The Adventure (Simmel 
1997). For a comparison of the two theories, see: (Gusman 2018a, Roth 2015).
142 ‘sa mollesse quotidienne’ (NF 57).
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[F]or the most commonplace event to become an 
adventure, you must – and this is all that is necessary 
– start recounting it. This is what fools people: a man is 
always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories 
and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens 
to him through them; and he tries to live his life as if he 
were recounting it. 
But you have to choose: to live or to recount (N 61)143. 
We can only apply this structure of adventure to experiences in 
hindsight. We create adventures by recounting our life and thus 
structuring the events into a story, a plot. This is why the protagonist 
says that adventures are things that only exist in books. A written 
adventure usually has a plot, that is, the things that happen in the 
story happen for a reason and hence have a certain necessity to them. 
They drive the story forwards toward some kind of climax. Sartre 
states that his inspiration for this idea of the necessity of stories 
comes from cinema (OR 1661, 1698-1699).144 The more clichéd the 
movie plot, the more apparent it becomes that every scene is only 
there in order to move the plot forward. The events have a certain 
necessity, while the events in real life are contingent. The scenes 
gain their necessity from the end of the movie, which is known in 
advance. In this way, all scenes can be written as leading up to the 
conclusion of the story. We apply the same thinking to our own lives 
when we speak about them:
[W]hen you tell about life, everything changes; only 
it’s a change nobody notices: the proof of that is that 
people talk about true stories. As if there could possibly 
be such things as true stories; events take place way and 
we recount them the opposite way. You appear to begin 
at the beginning […] [a]nd in fact you have begun at the 
end which gives these few words the pomp and value 
of a beginning. […] [T]he story goes on in the reverse: 
the moments have stopped piling up on one another in 
a happy-go-lucky manner, they are caught by the end of 
the story which attracts them and each one of them in 
turn attracts the preceding moment[.] […] And we have 
143 ‘pour que l’événement le plus banal devienne une aventure, il faut et il suffit qu’on se 
mette à le raconter. C’est ce qui dupe les gens : un homme, c’est toujours un conteur 
d’histoires, il vit entouré de ses histoires et des histoires d’autrui, il voit tout ce qui 
lui arrive à travers elles ; et il cherche à vivre sa vie comme s’il la racontait.
 Mais il faut choisir : vivre ou raconter.’ (NF 58-59).
144 In the conversations between Sartre and De Beauvoir published in Adieux: A Farewell 
to Sartre, he recounts: ‘I saw films in which there was no contingency and then when 
I left the cinema there I found contingency. It was therefore the films’ necessity that 
made me feel that there was no necessity in the street when I went out’ (A 141).
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the impression that the hero has lived all the details […] 
like annunciations, promises, or even that he lived only 
those that were promises, blind and deaf to everything 
that did not herald adventure. We forget that the future 
was not yet there (N 62-63)145[.]
Because we are superfluous objects however, there is no inherent 
purpose to our endeavours. The meaning of the experiences that 
constitute our Self cannot be intrinsically derived from other 
experiences. This means that there is no natural order to them:
When you are living, nothing happens. The settings 
change, people come in and go out. That’s all. There 
are never any beginnings. Days are tacked on to days 
without rhyme or reason, it is an endless, monotonous 
addition. […] There isn’t any end either: you never leave 
a woman, a friend, a town in one go. […] Occasionally 
– not very often – you take your bearings, you realize 
that you’re living with a woman, mixed up in some dirty 
business. Just for an instant. After that, the procession 
starts again, you beginning adding up the hours and 
days once more (N 61-62)146.
The idea of the flow of time that Sartre presents here is reminiscent 
of the views he expresses in The Transcendence of the Ego. Normally, 
we are absorbed in our activities and only assign a certain meaning 
to them in hindsight, upon reflection. Just as the Self only appears 
upon reflection, the way different episodes in our life relate to 
others and have a certain meaning with regard to each other is also 
145 ‘quand on raconte la vie, tout change ; seulement c’est un changement que personne 
ne remarque : la preuve c’est qu’on parle d’histoires vraies. Comme s’il pouvait y 
avoir des histoires vraies ; les événements se produisent dans un sens et nous les 
racontons en sens inverse. On a l’air de débuter par le commencement […] [e]t en 
réalité c’est par la fin qu’on a commencé. Elle est là, invisible et présente, c’est elle 
qui donne à ces quelques mots la pompe et la valeur d’un commencement. […] [L]
e récit se poursuit à l’envers : les instants ont cessé de s’empiler au petit bonheur 
les uns sur les autres, ils sont happés par la fin de l’histoire qui les attire et chacun 
d’eux attire à son tour l’instant qui le précède[.] […] Et nous avons le sentiment que 
le héros a vécu tous les détails de cette nuit comme des annonciations, comme des 
promesses, ou même qu’il vivait seulement ceux qui étaient des promesses, aveugle 
et sourd pour tout ce qui n’annonçait pas l’aventure. Nous oublions que l’avenir 
n’était pas encore là’ (NF 59-60).
146 ‘Quand on vit, il n’arrive rien. Les décors changent, les gens entrent et sortent, voilà 
tout. Il n’y a jamais de commencements. Les jours s’ajoutent aux jours sans rime ni 
raison, c’est une addition interminable et monotone. […] Il n’y a pas de fin non plus 
: on ne quitte jamais une femme, un ami, une ville en une fois. […] Par moments - 
rarement - on fait le point, on s’aperçoit qu’on s’est collé avec une femme, engagé 
dans une sale histoire. Le temps d’un éclair. Après ça, le défilé recommence, on se 
remet à faire l’addition des heures et des jours.’ (NF 59).
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determined when we “take our bearings”. 
Because it is only in hindsight that we assign meaning to the way 
in which different episodes of our lives relate to each other, we can 
never live our lives as if they are adventures, that is, as if the things 
that are happening now are naturally leading towards something. We 
can, of course, have the feeling that we are currently experiencing an 
adventure, but this is an illusion. 
In the working notes for Nausea that were published posthumously, 
Sartre further links the notion of adventure to the structure of time: 
‘The feeling of a fatal connection from the past to the present and 
the future that entails knowledge of all three of them and their 
connection’147. The implication is that the past, present and future 
have the same structure. He also calls it a ‘feeling of a musical flow 
of time’, the idea that the individual moments of our lives form a 
melody148.
Even after realizing that adventures are illusory, the protagonist 
still experiences feelings of adventure throughout the book. This is 
the feeling that somehow the things that are happening are leading 
up to something meaningful. He clings to this illusory feeling, and 
proclaims that ‘[p]erhaps there is nothing in the world I value more 
than this feeling of adventure’ (N 84)149. Adventure has to do with a 
feeling of purpose, the feeling that a certain situation is leading up to 
something important. The reason that we fall prone to this illusion 
has to do with our consciousness, and more precisely our inner time-
consciousness: 
This feeling of adventure definitely doesn’t come from 
events: I have proved that. It’s rather the way in which 
moments are linked together. This, I think, is what 
happens: all of a sudden you feel that time is passing, 
that each moments leads to another moment, this one to 
yet another one, and so on; that each moment destroys 
itself and that it’s no use trying to hold back, etc., etc., 
and then you attribute this property to the vents which 
appear to you in the moments; you extend to the contents 
what appertains to the form (N 85)150. 
147 ‘sentiment d’une liaison fatale du passé au présent et à l’avenir impliquant 
connaissance simultanée des trois et de leur liaison’ (OR 1681).
148 ‘Sentiment d’un cours musical du temps’ (OR 1881).
149 ‘Ce sentiment d’aventure, il n’y a peut-être rien au monde à quoi je tienne tant’ (NF 
78).
150 ‘Ce sentiment d’aventure ne vient décidément pas des événements : la preuve en est 
faite. C’est plutôt la façon dont les instants s’enchaînent. Voilà, je pense, ce qui se 
passe : brusquement on sent que le temps s’écoule, que chaque instant conduit à un 
autre instant, celui-ci à un autre et ainsi de suite ; que chaque instant s’anéantit, que ce 
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The illusion of adventure stems from a confusion of the structure of 
consciousness with its content. As we discussed in the fourth section 
of this chapter, the structure of consciousness links individual 
experiences together through time, which makes it possible to 
see series of objects and to witness events that consist of multiple 
experiences. However, the problem occurs when we confuse the 
mere interlocking of experiences through time with an interlocking 
of the meaning of these events for us. We should not confuse this 
with the idea that the series allows us to give meaning to it: when 
we are counting, we also assign meanings to objects, for example an 
object being the first in a series of objects. However, it is only because 
of our activity of counting that the object gains this meaning, it is 
not inherent in the object. Each moment leads to other moments, 
but each event within those moment does not necessarily lead to a 
related event. Sartre gives the following example:
You see a woman, you think that one day she will be old, 
only you don’t see her grow old. But there are moments 
when you think you see her growing old and you see 
yourself growing old with her: that is the feeling of 
adventure (N 85)151.
As already noted, a notion related to the feeling of adventure is 
that of a “perfect moment”. A perfect moment can only occur in 
a “privileged situation”, which is an event that is more significant 
than others. These are the kinds of events that we write about in 
history books, such as the death of an important person (N 210). 
These situations make perfect moments possible: ‘First there are 
annunciatory signs. Then the privileged situation, slowly, majestically, 
comes into people’s lives. Then the question arises whether you want 
to make a perfect moment out of it’ (N 211)152. Transforming the 
privileged situation into a perfect moment has to do with the way a 
person reacts to a situation. If one performs the right actions, those 
suited to the situation, it becomes a perfect moment. The nature of 
the actions that must be performed depends on the situation. The 
only example that is given is that of a defeated king who weeps not 
when he sees his children in chains, but only when he sees a servant 
in chains. He had to be strong for his children and thereby acted 
in a manner suited to the situation. However, the capture of the 
n’est pas la peine d’essayer de le retenir, etc., etc. Et alors on attribue cette propriété 
aux événements qui vous apparaissent dans les instants ; ce qui appartient à la forme, 
on le reporte sur le contenu.’ (NF 79).
151 ‘On voit une femme, on pense qu’elle sera vieille, seulement on ne la voit pas vieillir. 
Mais, par moment, il semble qu’on la voie vieillir et qu’on se sente vieillir avec elle 
: c’est le sentiment d’aventure’ (NF 79).
152 ‘Il y a d’abord des signes annonciateurs. Puis la situation privilégiée, lentement, 
majestueusement, entre dans la vie des gens. Alors la question se pose de savoir si on 
veut en faire un moment parfait’ (NF 187).
SUBJECTIVITY WITHOUT SELF
74 75
lowly servant was not a privileged situation and therefore could not 
be transformed into a perfect moment. This meant that the king’s 
reaction was not important.
Privileged situations and perfect moments are illusions, just like 
adventures. We cannot know that a given event will have lasting 
impact upon the world when it is happening. We can guess, but the 
importance of an event is still only determined afterwards and cannot 
be directly intuited. Furthermore, the idea that there is an ideal way 
to react to a situation is illusory. As we have seen, situations only arise 
through our presence in contingent masses of things. Therefore, they 
do not carry within themselves any meaning and do not demand any 
actions from us. That is why the protagonist concludes that ‘[t]here 
are no adventures—there are no perfect moments’, near the end of 
the book (N 213)153. 
The biographical illusion
Although the notion of adventure concerns the recollection of specific 
episodes of our lives, we can easily transpose the reasoning behind it 
to our whole life story and with it to our narrative identity in general. 
When someone asks us who we are or to tell them something about 
ourselves, we tell a story in which some things that we have done in 
the past constitute our identity. Our education, jobs or hobbies may 
be part of this, but other experiences are not. For one thing, we do 
not include experiences that are the same for everybody: everyone 
eat, sleeps, washes and so forth. These experiences exist solely in the 
light of the more important experiences or, in Sartre’s words, as the 
annunciations and promises of those privileged situations. I only 
eat in order to stay alive to achieve a goal of some sort or another. 
Therefore, our narrative identity is a certain structure imposed upon 
past experiences, it is a collection of adventures.
The relation between adventures and life story becomes clearer in 
other texts. We find the first trace of it in a very early text, one that 
precedes his encounter with phenomenology. Written in 1926, the 
text “Empedoclé” is a fictive dialogue between the titular character 
and Narcissus. In it, they discuss melancholy, which reminds us of 
the original title of Nausea. Narcissus proclaims that he has felt the 
call to adventure: ‘She came to me, Adventure. At the corner of the 
street my Destiny suddenly appeared, and I sensed the colour of 
Adventure.’154 Now, he want to have adventures like in the books of 
Jules Vernes and Daniel DeFoe (EMP 36).155 Empedocles response 
153 ‘Il n’y a pas d’aventures – il n’y a pas de moments parfaits’ (NF 189).
154 ‘elle venait à moi, l’Aventure. Au détour de la rue surgissait mon Destin et je sentais 
la couleur de l’Aventure.’ 
155 In the working notes on Nausea, Sartre again mentions Jules Vernes as a typical 
Chapter 1
74 75
is noteworthy:
There are no adventures, he told me. There are only 
occupations. Whatever you do, you go and return, you 
touch the surface, you simply refuse to comprehend the 
truth: life has no meaning. […] There is no adventure, 
because the link between life in the present and life in 
the past is too weak.156
Here, Sartre makes the link more clear between adventures and 
contingency more explicit. Not only do certain sequences of events 
have no meaning, life in general has no meaning and therefore 
makes adventures impossible.157 In light of this, we can reinterpret 
the aforementioned statement in Nausea about the adventure being 
not only drawn towards its own death, but also to my death, which 
is to say, the closing chapter of my life story. In the War Diaries, 
Sartre also discusses the theme of the course of a life. He recounts 
how he had experienced the course of his own life up until that 
point. He had always wanted to be a writer and had interpreted his 
life accordingly. He had already envisioned his future greatness at a 
young age, and thought of himself as “the young Sartre”, in the sense 
that we speak about famous people before they become famous (WD 
74). This view of “life” entails that life as a whole somehow precedes 
the moments that comprise it and that these moments all add up 
to some larger meaning. Thus, each event only gains significance in 
light of the life they are a part of:
To me, an instant did not appear like some vague unit 
aggregated to other units of the same kind; it was a 
moment that rose against a background of life. I envisaged 
each present moment from the point of view of an 
accomplished life – or, to be precise, I should say: from 
the point of view of a biography. And I considered myself 
bound to account for that moment to this biography: I 
felt its full meaning could be deciphered only by placing 
oneself in the future, and I always sketched out for 
myself a vague future that would allow me to make my 
author for the kind of adventure stories he has in mind (OR 1680). 
156 ‘Il n’y a pas d’aventures, me dit-il. Il n’y a que des métiers. Tu as beau faire, tu 
tournes et retournes, tu effleures du doigt, tue refuses de prendre franchement cette 
vérité : la vie n’a pas de sens. […] Il n’y a pas d’aventure, parce que le lien est trop 
lâche qui unit dans la vie le présent au passé’ (EMP 36-37).
157 It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard is also discussed in this text. Sartre says of 
him that ‘plagued by melancholy, he became an individual without being a person’ 
(EMP 35). He is ultimately criticized for finding refuge in religion. This mention 
of Kierkegaard in the same context as adventure is reminiscent of Sartre’s lecture 
“Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal”, which we will discuss in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation.
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present yield up its whole significance (WD 79)158.
In order to do this, he sketched a path towards the goal of his life – 
to be a famous writer. He compares his faith in the future to religious 
devotion. Although he managed to achieve success as a writer, it was 
never enough. He came to the realization that he was living a lie by 
the time he wrote the War Diaries:
[I]t’s true enough that I’ve had all that my naive 
imagination desired. And it’s true that each time I’ve 
been disappointed. For I’d have wished every event to 
befall me as in a biography: in other words, as when the 
story’s end is already known. This is the disappointment 
I expressed with respect to adventure, in La Nausée. […] 
I was imbued to the very marrow with what I shall term 
the biographical illusion, which consists in believing that 
a lived life can resemble a recounted life (WD 80-81)159.
Sartre’s notion of the biographical illusion is similar to that of 
adventure, but whereas adventures refer to episodes in one’s life, the 
biographical illusion is a similar way of thinking about one’s life as 
a whole. Sartre foreshadowed it in Nausea when he said that the 
adventure is not only drawn to its own death, but also to my death, 
the closing chapter of my life story. Living towards the future and 
recounting the past are vastly different, and we cannot lead our life 
as if we already know our biography, as if we already know that we 
will become great or perhaps failed individuals. This mirrors the 
example of the life-changing journey I mentioned earlier. It does 
not make any sense to book a trip knowing you will have a life-
changing adventure. The unpredictability one seeks in adventure is 
incommensurable with the idea of each moment leading to the goal 
of the adventure. The same is of course true for the biographical 
illusion: if one lives every moment as if it is leading to something 
158 ‘Un instant ne m’apparaissait pas comme une unité vague s’ajoutant à d’autres unités 
de même espèce, c’était un moment qui s’enlevait sur fond de vie. […] j’envisageais 
chaque moment présent du point de vue d’une vie faite, pour être exact il faudrait dire 
: du point de vue d’une biographie, et je me considérais comme devant rende compte 
de ce moment à cette biographie, je sentais qu’on ne pouvait en déchiffrer le sens 
complet qu’en se plaçant dans l’avenir et j’esquissais toujours devant moi un avenir 
vague qui me permît de faire rendre à mon présent toute sa signification.’ (WDF 103-
104).
159 ‘il est assez vrai que j’ai eu tout ce que désirait mon imagination naïve. Et il est 
vrai qu’à chaque fis j’ai été déçu. C’est que j’aurais voulu que chaque événement 
me survînt comme dans une biographie, c’est-à-dire comme lorsqu’on connaît déjà 
la fin de l’histoire. C’est cette déception que j’ai exprimée à propos de l’aventure 
dans La Nausée’ ‘J’ai été jusqu’aux moelles pénétré de ce que j’appellerai l’illusion 
biographique, qui consiste à croire qu’une vie vécue peut ressembler à une vie 
racontée’ (WDF 104-106).
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great, then one will only be disappointed. 
Sartre mentions the notion of adventure later in the War Diaries, 
where he notes the following:
[T]he relation between my youthful ambitions and my 
mature years can exist, for example, for the Beaver. But 
not for me. Of the same type, I’d say, is the ‘adventure’ 
which always eludes the adventurer, amid the most 
extraordinary circumstances, and which is nevertheless 
an essential category of human action. I appeared to be 
saying, in La Nausée, that it didn’t exist. But that’s wrong. 
It’s better to say that it’s an unrealizable. Adventure is 
an existent, whose nature is to appear only in the past 
through the account one gives of it. (WD 192)160161
This is a simple but important nuance. We cannot live our lives 
as adventures, be we cannot recount it as if it were not one. There 
are adventures, but they are only created in hindsight. This means 
however that we cannot simply call it an illusion, it is a necessary 
part of interpreting one’s past. From the point of view of Nausea¸ if 
one wants to be honest one has to add a disclaimer to one’s life story: 
this is not how it really happened. In the view presented here, the 
adventurer gains a certain level of truth in retrospect. Again, when 
we put it in terms of our narrative identity, it is easy to see the appeal 
of Sartre’s adjustment. We cannot have an identity if it does not have 
some kind of structure, and how we interpret the events of our lives 
in retrospect does genuinely change them. 
It goes without saying that I don’t call ‘realizing an 
object’ the mere fact of visualizing that object with more 
or less intense feelings. One realizes an object when 
that object’s presence is given to us as a more or less 
essential modification of our being, and through that 
modification. To have an adventure isn’t to visualize 
oneself having an adventure, but to be-in the adventure 
- which, as I showed in La Nausée, is impossible (WD 
199)162.
160 ‘le rapport de mes ambitions de jeunesse à mon â mûr peut exister pour le Castor, 
par exemple. Mais pour moi non. Du même type, dirai-je, est cette « aventure » qui 
fit toujours l’aventurier au milieu des conjonctures les plus extraordinaires et qui 
est pourtant une catégorie essentielle de l’action humane. J’ai semblé dire, dans La 
Nausée, qu’elle n’existait pas. Mas c’est ma fait. Il vaut mieux dire que c’est un 
irréalisable. L’aventure est un existant dont la nature est de n’apparaître qu’au passé 
à travers le récit qu’on en fait.’ (WDF 244).
161 The Beaver is a nickname of De Beauvoir.
162 ‘Il va de soi que je n’appelle pas « réaliser un objet » le simple fait de se représenter 
cet objet avec des sentiments plus ou moins vifs. On réalise un objet lorsque 
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If adventures are true in retrospect, and our adventures make up 
our life story, a true biography is indeed possible – a least when the 
subject of the biography is dead. This is something he seems to deny 
in Nausea when he says that there are no true stories whatsoever. In 
Nausea, the life story is made in retrospect and is therefore imaginary, 
it is actively created by consciousness at the moment of narration. 
It is based on reality, on events that took place, but it creates an 
imaginary plot from these events. The position that Sartre defends 
in The Transcendence of the Ego is much closer to that of the War 
Diaries. Reflected experiences show us the transcendent Self, but 
only in reflection. Adventures are the structures of experience, but 
only in hindsight. A life lived and a life recounted are still two very 
different things, but the life story is not imaginary, it is something 
which genuinely exists. Sartre clarifies that not only are adventures 
solely characteristic of past events, but also that they only acquire 
this structure through our act of recounting them. This again stresses 
that adventures are indeed narratives.
Thus, Sartre, in the voice of Roquentin, denied the existence of 
adventures in Nausea because one cannot live one’s life as if one 
were recounting it. This is expanded upon by the notion of the 
biographical illusion, which adopts a broader perspective that links 
all the episodes of one’s life that are recounted in an adventure that 
encompasses one’s whole life. Nevertheless, Sartre does add that 
adventures become real in retrospect, which does not alter his views 
towards the future, but it does change how he views the past. Once 
experienced and recounted, we cannot but see a certain structure in 
our lives, to see episodes building up to other episodes, and to see 
events in the light of other events. 
In both cases, our life story is to a large extent contingent. If our 
life story is merely a fiction projected upon the past, this means that 
there is no necessary way in which the narrated events fit together. 
Even if we adhere to the view of the War Diaries, if we admit that 
the adventurous structure of the past is true for a specific moment of 
narration and that a certain structure is perceptible in the event, we 
must nevertheless admit that it can still change in the light of future 
events. Hence, a past event that could be considered life changing at 
a certain moment may lose its apparent significance in light of other 
events. In other words, the way in which past events fit together 
may be “true” at a certain moment, this is still not their necessary 
structure as it may still change. A final judgment about the way in 
which the moments of a life fit together in a life story can only be 
la présence de cet objet nous est donnée comme une modification plus ou moins 
essentielle de notre être et à travers cette modification. Avoir une aventure ce n’est 
pas se représenter qu’on a une aventure mais être-dans l’aventure - ce qui, je l’ai 
montré dans La Nausée, est impossible.’ (WDF 245).
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given after the death of a person. This fits with what is perhaps the 
main lesson to be drawn from Sartre’s thought concerning narrative 
selfhood: one can never live one’s life as if the end of the story is 
already known.
Conclusion
Sartre’s early theories of selfhood emerge from his general project 
of radicalizing the notion of intentionality and thereby eradicating 
all contents from consciousness. This also means that there is no 
Self in consciousness. Sartre’s first goal, which he sets out to achieve 
in The Transcendence of the Ego, is to show that consciousness can 
indeed function without a Self. It can do so because it makes itself 
an individuated unity through inner time-consciousness. What 
remains is an impersonal subjectivity, rather than a transcendental 
Subject. This leads Sartre to a criticism of the cogito: unreflected 
consciousness does not contain an I that does the thinking. Both 
the subjective and objective facets of selfhood are attributed to the 
objective Self, which is transcendent and only appears through 
reflection. Thus, there is no Self inside of consciousness, only outside 
of consciousness: it is an object that appears in the world.
This object is described by Sartre as the “virtual locus of unity” of 
reflected actions, states and qualities, which are themselves bundles 
of reflected experiences. When we reflect on experiences, a Self 
appears in hindsight as the ideal unity of those experiences, and it 
cannot be understood apart from them. It is an abstract centre of 
unity which only appears upon reflection, but it is nonetheless not a 
fiction: we cannot but look back upon our lives and see this Self as if 
it were behind our experiences, although it was not there at the time 
when these experiences happened. 
This discrepancy between looking back on one’s life in hindsight, on 
the one hand, and living it in the present, on the other, is the guiding 
thread of Sartre’s thought concerning narrative identity. When we 
look back upon our life and when we recount it, the events seem to 
have a certain “necessary” structure to them, with one event leading 
to another and thus gaining its significance only in light of the later 
event. Although our past may appear to us as such, we can never live 
our lives as if present events automatically lead up to other events. 
We simply do not know the outcome of our lives yet and therefore 
cannot live our lives as if they are going to unfold like an adventure. 
He provides more a more nuanced account of this view in his War 
Diaries, where it comes closer to that of The Transcendence of the Ego. 
Our life stories do have a plot, but it only comes into being when the 
past is recounted in the present. Thus, a life lived and a life reflected 
and recounted are not the same. The Self is something that only 
emerges in reflection and in the stories we tell about ourselves, but it 
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is not something that exists in the present or in the future: the Self 
only exists in hindsight. 
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Chapter 2 
The Fundamental Project
The second period of Sartre’s oeuvre contains his most famous 
philosophical works, the magnum opus Being and Nothingness and 
the lecture Existentialism is a Humanism. Because the latter lacks 
the philosophical substance of the former, we will focus mostly on 
Being and Nothingness. We will also make use of some other texts, 
primarily the War Diaries and the lecture entitled “Consciousness 
of Self and Knowledge of Self ”. This period of Sartre’s career 
represents a tumultuous time in his life, which greatly influenced 
his thinking about human beings. Having been drafted into the 
French army to serve as a meteorologist in the Second World War, 
he was subsequently captured and spent time as a prisoner of war. 
Upon his release, he started a resistance group. Moreover, the period 
after the war saw Sartre’s rise to prominence as one of the world’s 
most well-known public intellectuals.163 Sartre’s experiences in the 
Resistance, in particular, would lead him to focus on that idea for 
which he is perhaps best known: freedom (IT 33-34). This emphasis 
on freedom changes Sartre’s views on subjectivity and selfhood: 
while subjectivity becomes almost synonymous with freedom, his 
conception of selfhood comes to focus on the future rather than on 
the past, that is, on that which we are not yet, but strive to become 
through our choices.
The first part of the chapter will be devoted to subjectivity and 
objectivity, although this time we will start with objectivity, move 
to negativity and turn to subjectivity thereafter. We first discuss 
the “ontological proof ” that Sartre presents in the Introduction to 
Being and Nothingness. Although Sartre already provided a literary 
articulation of his main ideas about objecthood in Nausea, he gives 
a more rigorous, ontological argument for the superfluous Being 
of objects here. This forms the basis of Sartre’s phenomenological 
realism, which grounds the reality of objects outside of consciousness 
while studying them from a phenomenological point of view. In 
the second section, we will turn to nothingness. Although Sartre 
already discussed non-existent objects in the context of imagination 
in his earlier works, the topic of nothingness takes central stage in 
this period of Sartre’s works because of its close association with 
freedom. We will discuss Sartre’s notion of “negatity” and how this 
163 For more information about Sartre’s rise to fame, see: (Beart 2015).
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is related to the “for-itself ”, the Being of consciousness. In the third 
section, we will see how the interplay of these two conceptions of 
Being and his notion of nothingness creates a meaningful world. 
We will then focus on Sartre’s idea that every conscious experience 
is part of a free project.  
In the second part, we will again begin our investigation with an 
analysis of the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, but focusing 
this time on the ontological substantiation of the other kind of 
Being, the for-itself. Although this notion already plays a role in the 
first part of this chapter, it is here that Sartre touches upon the unity 
and individuality of the for-itself and with that subjective selfhood. 
The central notions are the prereflective cogito and “consciousness 
(of ) self ”. In light of the latter notion, in particular, we will also focus 
on “Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self ”. Afterwards, we 
will turn to the objective Self, focusing on the notion of ipseity as 
Sartre presents it in Being and Nothingness and the War Diaries. 
We will also devote some attention to the notions of bad faith 
and the gaze of the Other, as they act as a sort of counterpart to 
the objective Self that Sartre has in mind. Finally, we will turn to 
narrative identity, focusing on Sartre’s method of existential psycho-
analysis as presented near the end of Being and Nothingness. We will 
focus on the two central notions, the fundamental project and the 
original choice. Since this method is applied in Baudelaire and Saint 
Genet, we will also touch upon these works. We will also see how 
it relates to Sartre’s acclamation of humanism in Existentialism is a 
Humanism. 
Part I 
Phenomenological Ontology
1. The Search for Being
In order to fully understand Sartre’s position concerning subjectivity 
and objectivity in Being and Nothingness, we need to know 
something about the method of the book. In the Introduction 
to Being and Nothingness, Sartre commits himself to the task of 
grounding Being as it exists outside of consciousness, from the 
point of view of consciousness. The subtitle of the book, An Essay 
in Phenomenological Ontology, already promises this: a theory of how 
things are, an ontology, from the point of view of how they appear 
(to consciousness), a phenomenology. The method of the book has 
been characterized in different ways, such as literary (Leak 2011) 
and dialectical (Welten 2007).164 I will add a different interpretation 
164  The scholars who defend the literary interpretation downplay the phenomenological 
character of the book. Although the reader can of course be persuaded by a 
vivid description, there would be no reason for Sartre to make his arguments 
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of the methodology of the book to this list, namely a deductive 
one. To put it simply, Sartre starts from a general axiom, which he 
calls ‘the phenomenon’ and which corresponds to his conception of 
intentionality. From this principle, he deduces that there needs to 
be something which appears and something to which it appears. 
Hence, the two absolute forms of Being are deduced: being-in-
itself and being-for-itself.165 Once these have been established, the 
main task of the book becomes an inquiry into their relation to one 
another. As these two forms of Being designate the things in the 
world and the individual who is aware of them, the main questions 
of the book become: 
1. What is the synthetic relation that we are calling 
‘being-in-the-world’? 2. What must man and the world 
be, in order for this relation between them to be possible? 
In truth, each of these questions enters into the other,  
 
 
phenomenologically sound. Many of Sartre’s examples use the Husserlian toolbox, 
primarily the phenomenological reduction, thus indeed showing that they are not 
(mere) examples but analyses. 
 The fact that his method in Being and Nothingness is not dialectical can be easily 
ascertained by contrasting it with The Critique of Dialectical Reason, a manifestly 
dialectical work. As we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, Sartre 
defines dialectics as the idea that ‘a negation of a negation can be an affirmation’. 
This idea does not play a role in Being and Nothingness, at least not as a leading 
methodological principle (CDR 15). Sartre makes this clear in the interview with 
M. Rybalka & O. Puccian, where he claims that he discovered the dialectic after 
writing Being and Nothingness: ‘I had known what the dialectic was ever since the 
Ecole Normale, but I did not use it. There are passages that somewhat resemble the 
dialectic in L’Etre et le Néant, but the approach was not dialectical in name and I 
thought there was no dialectic in it’ (IRP 9). In a dialectical method, which, as we will 
see, Sartre deploys in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, oppositions are overcome 
in a synthesis. This means that the theory changes throughout its development, as 
positions that are overcome are no longer simply “true”. This is definitely not the 
case for Being and Nothingness, where all positions that are developed hold for the 
remainder of the book. This becomes especially clear when Sartre returns to the topic 
of the two modes of Being in the conclusion. They are not overcome dialectically, 
but are elaborated upon in the book. Although I do not agree with his statement that 
Sartre’s systematic approach is not deductive, a more elaborate exposition of the 
method of Being and Nothingness can be found in Catalano’s commentary on the 
work. See: (Catalano 1985, x-xii).
165 It is interesting to note that although Sartre does not deploy a dialectical method, 
he does add these Hegelian terms to his predominantly Husserlian terminology. 
Although the terms “in-itself” and “for-itself” come from Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit (Hegel 1977), Sartre would later state that he had never studied Hegel when 
writing Being and Nothingness: ‘I knew of him through seminars and lectures, but I 
didn’t study him until much later, around 1945’ (IRP 9). The seminars and lectures 
Sartre is referring to are those by Kojève, which were later published in English as 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Kojève 1980).
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and we cannot hope to answer them separately (BN 
34)166.
Apart from the phenomenological starting point of his ontological 
system, phenomenological analysis also plays another key role in 
the book. Whenever Sartre’s reasoning is at a crossroads where 
multiple options can be deduced from the position arrived at, a 
phenomenological analysis provides the next step. The two prime 
examples of this concern the two other main categories of Sartre’s 
system, which also correspond to two of his most well-known 
phenomenological analyses. The notion of nothingness is found at 
the first crossroads, where Sartre proves by the absence of Pierre 
that nothingness cannot be reduced to the two forms of Being. The 
other important juncture arises where Sartre asks the same question 
concerning the existence of others. The example of the person 
looking through a keyhole and getting caught proves that another 
category needs to be added to the system: ‘being-for-the-Other’ 
(BN 402)167. We will encounter both examples again in this chapter. 
For now, this methodological exposition allows us to delve deeper 
into Sartre’s ontological system. 
The being of the phenomenon
As has been said, Sartre takes the phenomenon as the starting point 
for his enquiry:
The phenomenon remains relative because its ‘appearing’ 
necessarily implies someone to whom it appears. […] It 
does not indicate, behind its shoulder some true being, a 
being that is itself the absolute. It is what it is absolutely, 
because it is disclosed as it is (BN 2)168.  
The phenomenological account of a phenomenon eliminates 
a dualism between a thing as it appears and the thing itself. If 
consciousness does not contain anything and is nothing but a 
relationship to the object, then it follows that the object as it 
appears is in fact the object and not something which exists within 
consciousness, a mental representation or something in that regard.
166 ‘1° Quel est le rapport synthétique que nous nommons l ‘être-dans-le-monde ? 2° 
Que doivent être l’homme et le monde pour que le rapport soit possible entre eux ? A 
vrai dire, les deux questions débordent l’une sur l’autre et nous ne pouvons espérer y 
répondre séparément.’ (BNF 38).
167 ‘l’être-pour-autrui’ (BNF 336).
168 ‘Relatif, le phénomène le demeure car le « paraître suppose par essence quelqu’un à 
qui paraître. […] Il n’indique pas, par-dessus son épaule, un être véritable qui serait, 
lui, l’absolu. Ce qu’il est, il l’est absolument, car il se dévoile comme il est. Le 
phénomène peut être étudié et décrit en tant que tel, car il est absolument indicatif de 
lui-même.’ (BNF 12).
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In a letter to De Beauvoir, Sartre calls his position ‘an absolute realism’ 
which ‘is very sensibly organized around the idea of Nothingness 
or pure event  at the core of being’ (QM 43)169. It ‘allows a true 
transcendence of realism and idealism’ (QM 30)170. Both of these 
other theories are rooted in the idea that things as we are aware of 
them only exist within consciousness.
This position leads to a new kind of dualism however, the dualism 
between ‘the finite and the infinite’ (BN 4)171. Although the 
phenomenon is an appearance of the object, it never reveals the 
object in full but always from a certain point of view. It gives us 
an “Abschattung” of the object. The example Sartre gives in The 
Imaginary of the dice is once again illuminating: when we see a six-
sided dice, we only ever see three of its sides at most. This means that 
each object can manifest itself in an infinite series of appearances. 
If the series was finite, it would mean that appearances could not 
reappear, or could all be given at once. Sartre considers both ideas 
to be absurd. We have an appearance that is finite, which refers to 
a series of appearances that is infinite. This series is ‘connected by a 
principle that does not depend on my whim’ (BN 4)172. The various 
profiles of the dice are not connected by me, but they somehow refer 
to one another in a series which is infinite. The principle of the series 
is itself an essence: every manifestation of the dice may be different, 
but they are all appearances of the same thing. This essence however, 
is also not something that is somehow behind the series: ‘an essence, 
understood as the principle of a series, is no more than the connection 
between appearances – which means it is itself an appearance’ (BN 
3)173. It is implied by the very fact that we can deduce an essence 
that it can appear to us. This does not mean that we actively join 
the different manifestations together, it is given in two appearances 
of the same object that it is the same object. When I walk around 
a table, I do not actively judge that the table is the same table, but 
this is itself manifested. The essence, regarded as the principle of the 
series, is therefore not the product of a synthesis of manifestations, 
but ‘that which permits me to join’ them (CS 120)174. This means 
that each thing has an individual essence and that the notion should 
not be understood in the universal manner of a genus or species, 
but in a specific manner. It is the appearance of the principle of the 
series of manifestations of an object, though it does not exhaust the 
169 ‘un néo-réalisme absolu’ ‘c’est ordonné très sagement autour de l’idée de Néant ou 
événement pur ai sein de l’être’ (QMF 56).
170 ‘elle permet de transcender pour de bon le réalisme et l’idéalisme’ (QMF 41).
171 ‘du fini et de l’infini’ (BNF 13).
172 ‘est liée par une raison qui ne dépend pas de mon bon plaisir’ (BNF 13).
173 ‘l’essence comme raison de la série n’est que le lien des apparitions, c’est-à-dire elle-
même une apparition’ (BNF 12).
174 ‘ce qui me permet de joindre’ (CSF 145).
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totality of the series, which would be impossible.
Thus, as the essence is also an appearance, instead of dividing an 
object into the appearance on the one hand and the true object 
on the other, the object is present both inside and outside of its 
appearance:
This new opposition, between the ‘finite and the infinite’ 
or, better still, ‘the infinite within the finite’, replaces 
the dualism of being and appearing: what appears is 
in effect only an aspect of the object, and the object is 
entirely within this aspect and entirely outside of it. 
Entirely inside, in so far as it manifests itself in this 
aspect: it is indicated as the structure of the appearance, 
which is at the same time the principle of the series. 
Entirely outside, because the series itself never appears, 
and cannot appear (BN 4)175. 
This means that there is nothing behind the series of appearances 
which supports its Being. The appearance or the series of appearances 
must hence have itself a kind of Being. Sartre adds that this ‘being of 
the phenomenon’ is something else than the ‘phenomenon of being’ 
as it is disclosed in experiences such as nausea (BN 5-6)176. If it 
is indeed true that through such fundamental experiences we can 
encounter Being as a whole, Being still appears to us and is hence 
itself a phenomenon. This again begs the question of the Being of 
this phenomenon. A phenomenological analysis of Being cannot 
answer the question, as it can only study Being in so far as it appears. 
Thus, we must instead search for its ‘transphenomenal foundation’ 
(BN 7)177. That does not mean that Being is behind the phenomena 
(we saw that the phenomenon cannot mask Being), nor that the 
phenomenon is an appearance that refers to a being distinct from 
it (the phenomenon has Being qua appearance, i.e. it indicates itself 
on the foundation of Being). The preceding considerations imply 
that, although the Being of the phenomenon is coextensive with the 
phenomenon, its appearing does not fully exhaust it. 
We have now arrived at the point where Sartre explicitly diverges from 
175 ‘Cette opposition nouvelle, le « fini et l’infini », ou mieux « l’infini dans le 
fini », remplace le dualisme de l’être et du paraître : ce qui paraît, en effet, 
c’est seulement un aspect de l’objet et l’objet est tout entier dans cet aspect 
et tout entier hors de lui. Tout entier dedans en ce qu’il se manifeste dans cet 
aspect : il s’indique lui-même comme la structure de l’apparition , qui est en 
même temps la raison de la série. Tout entier dehors, car la série elle-même 
n’apparaîtra jamais ni ne peut apparaître.’ (BNF 13).
176 ‘phénomène d’être’ ‘l’être du phénomène’ (BNF 14).
177 ‘un fondement qui soit transphénoménal’ (BNF 16).
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phenomenological analysis and turns towards speculative enquiry. 
He maintains that there are two options for the transphenomenal 
Being of appearance: either it is something on the side of subjectivity 
or it is something one the side of objectivity. Both are true as they 
ultimately correspond to the distinction between being ‘for itself’ and 
being ‘in itself’ (BN 27)178. In the remainder of this section, we will 
first explore how subjective transphenomenal Being is not enough 
to account for the Being of the phenomenon and then show how 
Sartre argues for an objective transphenomenal Being.
Up until this point in his reasoning, Sartre notes, he implicitly 
held to an ‘ontological realism that is wholly incompatible with the 
very idea of appearance’ (BN 8)179. Why not say that ‘the being of 
an appearance is its appearing?’ (BN 8)180. This position amounts 
to a form of idealism which is best captured in George Berkeley’s 
dictum, “esse est percipi” or “to be is to be perceived”. If we follow this 
path, we need to account for a transphenomenal Being on the side 
of consciousness.
We will not go into the full argument concerning this 
transphenomenal Being of consciousness here, because it concerns 
the prereflective cogito or consciousness (of ) self. As these are forms 
of self-consciousness, they will be discussed in the second part 
of this chapter when we examine subjective selfhood. A cursory 
overview shall suffice for the time being. Sartre again begins from 
his definition of intentionality: ‘all consciousness is consciousness of 
something. In other words, there is no [act of ] consciousness that 
does not posit a transcendent object or, if you prefer consciousness 
has no ‘content’ (BN 9)181. Although we experience a thing, we do 
not exhaust it fully as we can always discover new things aspects of 
it, or in other words ‘an infinite process would be required to make 
an inventory of the total content of a thing’ (BN 9)182. This means 
that if the object only existed in consciousness, then there would be 
something of which we are not conscious inside of consciousness, 
which would contradict the principle of intentionality. 
Nevertheless, if consciousness is only consciousness of its object, it 
would require a second act of consciousness to become aware of 
the first experience. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
178 ‘en soi’ ‘pour soi’ (BNF 32).
179 ‘ne manière de réalisme ontologique tout à fait incompatible avec la notion même 
d’apparition’ (BNF 16).
180 ‘l’être de l’apparition c’est son apparaître ?’ (BNF 16).
181 ‘Toute conscience […] est conscience de quelque chose. Cela signifie qu’il n’est pas 
de conscience qui ne soit position d’un objet transcendant, ou, si l’on préfère, que la 
conscience n’a pas de « contenu »’ (BNF 17).
182 ‘il faudrait un procès infini pour inventorier le contenu total d’une chose’ (BNF 17).
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this would lead to an infinite regress. Hence, consciousness is also 
conscious of itself. This self-consciousness is the transphenomenal 
Being of consciousness. In other words, consciousness exists for 
itself: ‘it is a pure “appearance”, where this means it exists only to the 
extent to which it appears’ and ‘it is precisely […] because of this 
identity within it between its appearance and its existence, that it 
can be considered as the absolute (BN 16)183. 
Although Sartre has encountered an absolute form of Being, this 
mode of Being is not enough to account for the Being of phenomena. 
If we wanted to reduce the Being of a table, for example, to a 
‘synthesis of subjective impressions’, we must still account for the 
fact that it appears as a table (BN 17)184. We cannot account for the 
fact that we group certain manifestations to one object and other 
ones to another. Although the principle of a series of manifestations 
can appear to consciousness as essence, the fact that a series is a 
series needs to be accounted for.  The reasons that the series cannot 
be reduced to consciousness has to do with ‘relativity and passivity’ 
(BN 18)185. Sartre states that ‘the mode of the percipi is passive’ (BN 
18)186. Although he does not really elaborate on this claim, it is not 
difficult to accept that things which are perceived are encountered 
and do not act upon consciousness. Something is passive, according 
to Sartre, when it undergoes modification of which it is not the 
origin. This is the case when something appears, because the way 
in which it appears is relative to consciousness: it is because I walk 
around a table that its other side is made manifest. It does not decide 
to show a certain profile. However, the relation of passivity is always 
relative to the being that acts upon it. It can only act on something 
if this being supports action and hence exists on its own. Thus, 
Sartre states: ‘From this it follows that passivity does not involve 
the very being of the passive existent: it is a relation between one 
being and another being’ (BN 18)187. The example Sartre gives of 
this is creation: I write a book, but once I have written it, it exists 
independently from me. I do not support its being once it has been 
created. The same is true for consciousness:
How much passivity should we attribute to perception, 
to knowledge? They are entirely active, entirely 
spontaneous. It is precisely because it is pure spontaneity, 
because nothing can bite into it, that consciousness 
183 ‘c’est une pure « apparence », en ce sens qu’elle n’existe que dans la mesure où elle 
s’apparaît’ ‘c’est à cause de cette identité en elle de l’apparence et de l’existence 
qu’elle peut être considérée comme l’absolu’ (BNF 23).
184 ‘la synthèse d’impressions subjectives’ (BNF 24).
185 ‘Relativité et passivité’ (BNF 24).
186 ‘le mode du percipi est le passif’ (BNF 24).
187 ‘elle est une relation d ‘un être à un autre être’ (BNF 25).
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cannot act on anything (BN 19)188. 
Consciousness is pure activity, it is not a thing which acts but itself 
an act. It does not, however, act on the thing it is conscious of. A table 
is not altered in any way when I perceive it. Consciousness, although 
active, is therefore also passive in its relation to the perceived thing. 
This is of course based on the premise that we are talking about 
conscious acts that have existing things as their object, and not 
non-existent objects. This is why Sartre mentions perception and 
knowledge, and not, for example, imagination. We will return to 
non-existent objects in the next section. For now, Sartre has shown 
that because of relativity and passivity, the ‘esse of the phenomenon 
cannot be its percipi’ or, in other words, that ‘[t]he transphenomenal 
being of consciousness cannot provide the foundation for the 
phenomenon’s transphenomenal being’ (BN 20)189.
Being-in-itself
We have now seen that the being of phenomena cannot be reduced 
to subjectivity. What Sartre has thereby shown is that there must be 
a being outside of consciousness, on the side of objects: 
Consciousness is consciousness of something: therefore 
transcendence is a constitutive structure of consciousness, 
which is to say that consciousness is born bearing on 
a being that it is not. Let us call this the ontological 
proof. […] Naturally, this being is nothing other than 
the transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a 
noumenal being hiding behind them. Consciousness 
implies the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, 
of the lamp and more generally, the being of the world. 
Consciousness requires simply that the being of that 
which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears 
(BN 22-23)190.
188 ‘Quelle est la part de passivité qu’on peut assigner à la perception, à la connaissance 
? Elles sont tout activité, tout spontanéité. C’est précisément parce qu’elle est 
spontanéité pure, parce que rien ne peut mordre sur elle, que la conscience ne peut 
agir sur rien.’ (BNF 25).
189 ‘L’être transphénoménal de la conscience ne saurait fonder l’être transphénoménal 
du phénomène’ (BNF 26).
190 ‘La conscience est conscience de quelque chose : cela signifie que la transcendance 
est structure constitutive de la conscience ; c’est-à-dire que la conscience naît portée 
sur un être qui n’est pas elle. C’est ce que nous appelons la preuve ontologique. […] Il 
est bien entendu que cet être n’est autre que l’être transphénoménal des phénomènes 
et non un être nouménal qui se cacherait derrière eux. C’est l’être de cette table, de 
ce paquet de tabac, de la lampe, plus généralement l’être du monde qui est impliqué 
par la conscience. Elle exige simplement que l’être de ce qui apparaît n’existe pas 
seulement en tant qu’il apparaît.’ (BNF 28-29).
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We now have proof that the being of the phenomenon lies beyond 
consciousness. Although we cannot describe this being in full – for 
we would then, once more, encounter the phenomenon of being 
rather than the being of the phenomenon – we can describe its 
meaning (BN 24). What does it mean for a thing to exist? 
Sartre gives three characteristics of the being of phenomena: being is 
itself, being is what it is and being is (BN 29). Although these sound 
similar and – especially in the case of the last one – obvious, Sartre is 
trying to convey something quite nuanced with these characteristics. 
The first one, the idea that being is itself, means that it is not created 
or otherwise rooted in something else (BN 26). If another being 
supported it, then this would itself need to exist, thus causing 
another infinite regress. It also follows that it is beyond passivity and 
activity, as we have seen that these are relational qualities and need 
to be supported by something existing. It is also beyond affirmation 
and negation, once again because something needs to exist prior to 
being affirmed. 
The second characteristic, being is what it is, entails that it is also 
not a relation to itself, but that it completely coincides with itself. 
Although “it is what it is” may sound like a patent tautology, this 
is not the case according to Sartre. It is not, because consciousness 
does not coincide with itself and can instead be described as ‘being 
what it is not and not being what it is’ (BN 27)191. This means that it 
is ‘massive’, it has no parts or secret aspects (BN 28)192. Furthermore, 
‘being is isolated in its being, and maintains no relationship with 
anything else’ (BN 28)193. Of course, things may have a relationship 
to one another, but this does not affect their being. The fact that a 
lamp may rest on a table does not mean that the being of the lamp 
rests on the being of the table. This also means that being in itself is 
‘full positivity’, it does not entail any alterity, ‘it never presents itself 
as other than some other being’ (BN 28)194. We may judge this to be 
the case, but it does not entail this relationship in itself. The same 
goes for its temporality: we may judge something to exist no longer 
or to have come into being. This does not affect being itself, or, in 
other words, the fact that something no longer exists does not affect 
what the way in which it existed when it did. As such, it escapes 
temporality. We will return to this topic later.
The third and final characteristic is that being is. This aspect has to 
do with necessity. Being never entails necessity, as this would require 
191 ‘il n’est pas et n’étant pas ce qu’il est’ (BNF 32).
192 ‘massif’ (BNF 32).
193 ‘l’être est isolé dans son être et qu’il n’entretient aucun rapport avec ce qui n’est pas 
lui’ (BNF 32).
194 ‘Il est pleine positivité’ ‘il ne se pose jamais comme autre qu’un autre être (BNF 33).
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that it is derived from something else. It simply is and is therefore 
fully contingent. This is also opposed to the possible, as something 
which is possible is not yet and is therefore no being at all. For this 
last characteristic Sartre employs a terminology similar to that of 
Nausea:
Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible; 
it is. Consciousness expresses this by saying – in 
anthropomorphic terms – that it is superfluous, which 
is to say that it is absolutely unable to derive it from 
anything, either from another being, or from something 
possible, or from a necessary law. Uncreated, without any 
reason for being or any relationship with another being, 
being-in-itself is superfluous for eternity (BN 28-29)195. 
Being is superfluous, it “overflows” any full explanation we try to 
give it. We cannot give a reason why being is what it is, because this 
would mean that we have to ground it on another being, which leads 
to the aforementioned infinite regress. Although we can describe 
some general characteristics of it, we cannot exhaust it, because it 
cannot in principle be demarcated.
These three characteristics of being-in-itself are prone to 
misinterpretation. Sartre’s argument is often taken to mean 
that, outside of consciousness, there is a single monolithic being-
in-itself. It is important to discuss this reading as it interprets 
Sartre’s position too idealistically, which does not do justice to the 
arguments he presents. One of the most glaring examples of this 
line of interpretation can be found in Hazel Barnes’ translator’s 
introduction to the first English edition of Being and Nothingness. 
She describes the being of phenomena in the following manner:
It is a fullness of existence, a plenitude which can not 
possibly isolate one part so as to contrast it with another, 
or posit a whole over against its parts, or conceive a 
“nothing” in opposition to which it is “everything.” It is 
simply undifferentiated, meaningless massivity. Without 
consciousness there would not be a world, mountains, 
rivers, tables, chairs, etc.; there would be only Being. 
In this sense there is no thing without consciousness, 
but there is not nothing. Consciousness causes there 
to be things because it is itself nothing. Only through 
195 ‘L’être-ensoi n’est jamais ni possible ni impossible, il est. C’est ce que la conscience 
exprimera – en termes anthropomorphiques – en disant qu’il est de trop, c’est-à-dire 
qu’elle ne peut absolument le dériver de rien, ni d’un autre être, ni d’un possible, ni 
d’une loi nécessaire. Incréé, sans raison d’être, sans rapport aucun avec un autre être, 
l’être-en-soi est de trop pour l’éternité.’ (BNF 33).
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consciousness is there differentiation, meaning, and 
plurality for Being (Barnes 1978, xx).
This interpretation clearly confuses the “being of the phenomenon” 
with the “phenomenon of being”.196 It is true that when we describe 
being-in-itself, it is massive, a plenum, undifferentiated, etc. However, 
if we take this to mean that outside of experience there is a single 
monolithic being, we clearly make the mistake of searching for a 
being behind the appearance. Being-in-itself is the mode of being of 
things. A more precise description of how being relates itself to the 
things that are can be found in Sartre’s “Consciousness of Self and 
Knowledge of Self ”. There he says:
[B]eing accompanies all the appearances of an object. 
It is not different in each of these appearances. The 
appearance does not disguise it, no more does it reveal it. 
If I cut this book into little pieces, if the fancy takes me, 
there will be as much being in each of the pieces as in 
the book. When I give it another form by burning it or 
in compiling from it, it will always have as much being 
in each of its manifestations. A division to infinity or a 
transformation will not reveal the book to me in a better 
way, nor will it hide it from me.
The being is something which I cannot grasp in its 
being, except as a phenomenon originating from the 
object which is presented. Being is that which makes the 
object appear. Each object is on a foundation of being. 
Each appearance has a being. But the being cannot in 
any case be reduced to appearance (CS 120)197.
Appearance does not reveal being, because being is inexhaustible, 
and it does not reveal it, because it is not itself something separate 
from the thing that is. The being of each thing is massive and 
196 Apart from the problematic interpretation of the being of the phenomenon, the idea 
that consciousness is itself nothing is also false. We will discuss this in the next 
section. 
197 ‘l’être accompagne toutes les apparitions d’un objet. Il n’est pas différent dans 
chacune de ces apparitions. L’apparition ne le masque pas, mais ne le révèle pas 
non plus. Que je coupe ce livre en petits morceaux si la fantaisie m’en prend, 
il y aura autant d’être dans chacun des morceaux qua dans le livre. Lorsque 
je lui donne une autre forme en le brûlant ou en le compilant, il y aura toujours 
autant d’être dans chacune de ces manifestations. Une division à l’infini ou une 
transformation ne me révélera pas davantage le livre ou ne me le masquera pas. 
L’être est quelque chose que je ne peux pas saisir dans son être , sauf comme 
phénomène à partir de l’objet qui est présenté. L’être est ce qui fait que l’objet paraît. 
Chaque objet est sur fondement d’être. Chaque apparaître a un être. Mais l’être en 
aucun cas ne peut se réduire à un apparaître.’ (CSF 145-146).
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undifferentiated, but to say that this amounts to a single being-
in-itself violates Sartre’s own reasoning throughout the whole 
introduction of Being and Nothingness. He explicitly states that we 
should not ‘understand being as one undifferentiated self-affirmation’ 
(BN 27)198. If being in-itself would be a single monolith, two of the 
arguments discussed above would not make any sense. The first is 
that the essence as the principle of the series does not depend on 
my whim, and the second is that a series is not a mere synthesis of 
subjective impressions, because we would have no reason to group 
certain impressions into a series. 
However, there is a reason that this interpretation is as prevalent 
as it is, which stems from the fact that at a conceptual level, it is 
true that consciousness is involved in the demarcation of objects. 
Sartre hints at this when he says that being ‘escapes temporality’ 
(BN 28)199. It is because there is a temporal consciousness present 
that it can be said that something was and that it is now no longer. 
This takes place at what can be described as the conceptual level 
or the level of meaning Barnes mentions. This is something Sartre 
discusses much later in Being and Nothingness, in a section called 
‘On Determination as Negation’ (BN 255)200. Here he states that ‘its 
[the for-itself ] presence is what makes it the case that there is a ‘this 
one’ rather than a ‘that one’’ (BN 255)201. We can compare things to 
each other and we can determine where one thing ends and another 
one begins at this level. Sartre describes this idea in a nutshell in 
“What is Literature?”: 
Each of our perceptions is accompanied by the 
consciousness that human reality is a ‘revealer’, that is, 
it is through human reality that ‘there is’ being, or, to 
put it differently, that man is the means by which things 
are manifested. It is our presence in the world which 
multiplies relations. It is we who set up a relationship 
between this tree and that bit of sky. Thanks to us, that 
star which has been dead for millennia, that quarter 
moon, and that dark river are disclosed in the unity of 
a landscape. It is the speed of our car and our aeroplane 
which organizes the great masses of the earth. With 
each of our acts, the world reveals to us a new face. But, 
if we know that we are directors of being, we also know 
that we are not its producers. If we turn away from this 
landscape, it will sink back into its dark permanence. At 
least, it will sink back; there is no one mad enough to 
198 ‘l’être est une affirmation de soi indifférenciée’ (BNF 32).
199 ‘il échappe à la temporalité’ (BNF 33).
200 ‘de la détermination comme négation’ (BNF 216).
201 ‘c’est sa présence qui fait qu’il y a un « celui-ci plutôt qu’un « celui-là »’ (BNF 216).
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think that it is going to be annihilated. It is we who shall 
be annihilated, and the earth will remain in its lethargy 
until another consciousness comes along to awaken it. 
Thus, to our inner certainty of being ‘revealers’ is added 
that of being inessential in relation to the thing revealed 
(WL 48)202. 
We distinguish things from one another, as is the case when we say 
that something is this rather than that; and we group things together, 
as is the case when we say that the moon and the river are part of 
the same landscape. If we take Sartre’s reasoning concerning the in-
itself into account, we cannot but conclude that this takes place at 
the conceptual rather than the ontological level. 
For example, it is through our presence that there are things which 
we consider trees that can be differentiated from their grouping as 
a forest or from the elements that constitute them, such as branches 
and leaves. However, this demarcation is contingent and takes place 
at the level of meaning. The best example of this is the one from 
Nausea that we discussed in the previous chapter, where Sartre 
distinguishes a tree, a root and the movement of a branch as different 
things. We determine that a tree is a thing, a branch is a part of 
this thing and a movement is something which a part this thing 
does. This has to do, however, with how we relate to the plenum of 
things, which consists of all these things. That which consciousness 
introduces into the world is the element that cannot be part of 
being-in-itself: nothingness. Saying that there is this, rather than 
that, is not merely a question of what there is, but also a question 
of what there is not. We will turn extensively to this topic in the 
next section. For the moment it suffices to say that the plenum of 
things is undifferentiated, but it is therefore not one, that is, it is not 
202 ‘Chacune de nos perceptions s’accompagne de la conscience que la réalité 
humaine est « dévoilante », c’est-à-dire que par elle « il y a » de l’être, ou 
encore que l’homme est le moyen par lequel les choses se manifestent ; c’est 
notre présence au monde qui multiplie les relations, c’est nous qui mettons 
en rapport cet arbre avec ce coin de ciel ; grâce à nous cette étoile, morte 
depuis des millénaires, ce quartier de lune et ce fleuve sombre se dévoilent 
dans l’unité d’un paysage ; c’est la vitesse de notre auto, de notre avion qui 
organise les grandes masses terrestres ; à chacun de nos actes le monde nous 
révèle un visage neuf. Mais si nous savons que nous sommes les détecteurs 
de l’être, nous savons aussi que nous n’en sommes pas les producteurs. 
Ce paysage, si nous nous en détournons, croupira sans témoins dans sa 
permanence obscure. Du moins croupira-t-il : il n’y a personne d’assez 
fou pour croire qu’il va s’anéantir. C’est nous qui nous anéantirons et la 
terre demeurera dans sa léthargie jusqu’à ce qu’une autre conscience vienne 
l’éveiller. Ainsi à notre certitude intérieure d’être « dévoilants » s’adjoint 
celle d’être inessentiels par rapport à la chose dévoilée.’ (WLF 90).
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a single monolithic Being. Outside of us is a sheer endless plurality 
of undifferentiated things. 
At this stage, there are two modes of Being: the for-itself of 
consciousness and the in-itself of things. As has been said, 
we will return to the “ontological proof ” of the first mode of 
Being in the second part of this chapter. For the moment, it is 
important to understand that Sartre’s neo-realism is rooted in his 
phenomenological ontology: starting from the phenomenological 
conception of phenomena, we can establish that there are two kinds 
of transphenomenal Being, one on the side of subjectivity, and one 
on the side of objectivity. Consciousness is relational in nature 
because of its intentional structure, and its mode of existence is 
therefore dependent on the primordial existence of the plurality of 
things which exist in-themselves. 
2. Nothingness
As the title of the book suggest, Sartre’s ontology is not just an 
enquiry into Being. A full account of reality should incorporate 
everything and therefore also nothing. The question of how the two 
forms of Being introduced by Sartre relate to one another is the first 
confrontation with nothingness (BN 33-37). The very fact that we 
can pose a question reveals to us that there is a nothingness: there is 
something for which there is no answer yet and there is a possibility 
that the answer will be negative. Hence, we need to account for 
those objects which do not exist, in other words, we have to account 
for nothingness.
Negatities
Sartre’s introduction of the theme of nothingness is a perfect 
example of his phenomenologico-ontological deductive method in 
action. We have arrived at a theoretical juncture. The question is 
whether the newly introduced element of the ontological system, 
nothingness, can be reduced to the elements introduced earlier, the 
two forms of Being. The option of reducing nothingness to being-
in-itself can be immediately eliminated insofar as it is ruled out by 
the very definition of this form of Being, which is as a fullness of 
Being (BN 37). The remaining option is whether it can be reduced 
to the for-itself, in the form of a negative judgment: 
I think there are fifteen hundred francs in my wallet and 
I find only thirteen hundred francs in it: that does not 
mean, we might be told, that experience has revealed the 
non-being of fifteen hundred francs but simply that I 
counted thirteen one-hundred franc notes. The negation, 
strictly speaking, should be imputed to me: it appears 
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only at the level of my act of judgment, through which 
I make a comparison between the result I anticipated 
and the result I obtained. In this way, negation is only a 
quality of judgment (BN 37)203[.]
If it is true that negation only exists in the form of a negative 
judgment of consciousness, it does not have a reality of its own 
and can be reduced to the for-itself. It can then be reduced to the 
Being of consciousness and has no proper non-being. Thus, we are 
tasked with the following question: ‘is negation, as the structure of a 
judicative proposition, the origin of nothingness or, on the contrary, 
is nothingness, as a structure of reality, the origin and foundation of 
negation?’ (BN 38)204. As already noted, when an important question 
like this is encountered in the text, its resolution is provided by means 
of a phenomenological analysis. It is at this point that we find one 
of Sartre’s most famous phenomenological analyses, the absence of 
Pierre in the café.
I am meeting Pierre at four o’clock. I arrive a quarter 
of an hour late: Pierre is always punctual; will he have 
waited for me? I look at the room, the customers, and 
I say ‘He is not here.’ Is there an intuition of Pierre’s 
absence or does negation only intervene alongside 
judgment? At first sight it seems absurd to talk here of 
‘intuition’, just because there cannot be an intuition of 
nothing, and Pierre’s absence is this nothing. Yet popular 
consciousness bears witness to this intuition. Do we not 
say, for example, ‘I saw right away that he was not there’? 
In this case is the negation simply displaced? Let us take 
a closer look.
Certainly, the café by itself, with its customers, its 
tables, its seats, its mirrors, its light, its smoke-filled 
atmosphere, and the sounds that fill it – of voices, saucers 
bumping against each other, footsteps – is a fullness of 
being. And all the particular intuitions I may have are 
fulfilled by these smells, these sounds, these colours, 
all of them phenomena that have a transphenomenal 
being. Similarly, Pierre’s current presence in a place I do 
not know is also a plenitude of being. We seem to have 
203 ‘Je pense qu’il y a quinze cents francs dans mon portefeuille et je n’en trouve plus que 
treize cents : cela ne signifie point, nous dira-t-on, que l’expérience m’ait découvert le 
non-être de quinze cents francs mais tout simplement que j’ai compté treize billets de 
cent francs. La négation proprement dite m’est imputable, elle apparaîtrait seulement 
au niveau d’un acte judicatoire’ (BNF 40).
204 ‘la négation comme structure de la proposition judicative est-elle à l’origine du néant 
– ou, au contraire, est-ce le néant, comme structure du réel, qui est l’origine et le 
fondement de la négation ?’ (BNF 41).
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found plenitude everywhere (BN 41)205.
One thing that is important in Sartre’s analysis is the difference 
between an intuition and a judgment. When we see a chair, we do 
not see something nondescript and judge that it is a chair. This would 
require two acts of consciousness, seeing and judging. This, however, 
is not the case. Even when we are mindlessly coping with the world 
around us, we experience things that have a certain meaning for us. 
Sartre continues to analyse the situation in the bar by discussing the 
difference between figure and background. When we perceive an 
object, this object is always either figure or ground, depending on 
the focus of my attention. For example, when I am in a café and I am 
looking for a free chair, all the other things become the ground for 
chairs. In the case of Pierre, when I look around the café searching 
for him, objects detach themselves from the ground only to quickly 
collapse back into it. This is especially the case for faces: when I see 
someone who vaguely looks like Pierre, my attention is grabbed and 
when I quickly realize that it is not Pierre, my attention shifts to 
someone else. This what Sartre calls the ‘first nihilation’, the process 
of intuitively realizing none of the figures is the one you are looking 
for (BN 42)206. Within the situation, he is not: no thing or face turns 
out to be Pierre. After the first nihilation comes the realization that 
he is really not there. 
[I]n fact Pierre is not there. That does not mean that I 
discover his absence in some precise part of the building. 
In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café: his absence 
freezes the café in its evanescence; the café remains 
as ground; it continues to present itself to my merely 
marginal attention as an undifferentiated totality; it slides 
away, in pursuit of its nihilation. Only it makes itself the 
205 ‘J’ai rendez-vous avec Pierre à quatre heures. J’arrive en retard d’un quart d’heure : 
Pierre est toujours exact ; m’aura-t-il attendu ? Je regarde la salle, les consommateurs 
et je dis : « Il n’est pas là. » Y a-t-il une intuition de l’absence de Pierre ou bien la 
négation n’intervient-elle qu’avec le jugement ? A première vue il semble absurde de 
parler ici d’intuition puisque justement il ne saurait y avoir intuition de rien et que 
l’absence de Pierre est ce rien. Pourtant la conscience populaire témoigne de cette 
intuition. Ne dit-on pas, par exemple : « J ‘ai tout de suite vu qu’il n’était pas là » ? 
S’agit-il d’un simple déplacement de la négation ? Regardons-y de plus près. 
 Il est certain que le café, par soi-même, avec ses consommateurs, ses tables, ses 
banquettes, ses glaces, sa lumière, son atmosphère enfumée, et les bruits de voix, 
de soucoupes heurtées, de pas qui le remplissent, est un plein d’être. Et toutes les 
intuitions de détail que je puis avoir sont remplies par ces odeurs, ces sons, ces 
couleurs, tous phénomènes qui ont un être transphénoménal. Pareillement la présence 
actuelle de Pierre en un lieu que je ne connais pas est aussi plénitude d’être. Il semble 
que nous trouvions le plein partout’ (BNF 43-44).
206 ‘première néantisation’ (BNF 44).
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ground for a specific figure, it bears it everywhere in front 
of it, it presents me with it everywhere and this figure, 
sliding constantly between my gaze and the real, solid 
objects of the café, is precisely a perpetual dissolution: 
it is Pierre, detaching himself as a nothingness against 
the ground of the nihilation of the café. What is given 
to intuition, therefore, is a flickering of nothingness: it 
is the nothingness of the ground, whose nihilation calls 
for, and requires, the appearance of the figure; and it is 
also the figure, a nothingness that slides in the guise of 
nothing across the surface of the ground. Therefore the 
foundation for the judgment ‘Pierre is not here’ is clearly 
my intuitive apprehension of a double nihilation (BN 
42)207. 
After the first nihilation a second nihilation arises: none of the 
figures that appear in the café are Pierre, this causes all the objects 
in the café to become the ground of a figure which is precisely the 
absence of Pierre as an object. This figure is in a certain sense an 
object that is present in the current situation, although what is 
present is the absence of Pierre: ‘his absence is an objective fact that 
I have discovered, and it presents itself as a synthetic relation between 
Pierre and the room in which I am looking for him: Pierre’s absence 
haunts this café’ (BN 42)208. 
There is a difference between Pierre’s absence, which I can intuitively 
grasp, and the absence of unrelated other people. It is evidently true 
that if I were to go to a café right now, Sartre would not be there. 
Yet I do not encounter this fact intuitively within the situation. It is 
precisely a judgment: the relationship between Sartre and the café in 
Nijmegen is ‘judged’ by me and ‘is merely thought’. It does not take 
place in the café. 
207 ‘justement Pierre n’est pas là. Cela ne veut point dire que je découvre son absence en 
quelque lieu précis de l’établissement. En fait Pierre est absent de tout le café ; son 
absence fige le café dans son évanescence, le café demeure fond, il persiste à s’offrir 
comme totalité indifférenciée à ma seule attention marginale, il glisse en arrière, il 
poursuit sa néantisation. Seulement il se fait fond pour une forme déterminée, il la 
porte partout au-devant de lui, il me la présente partout et cette forme qui se glisse 
constamment entre mon regard et les objets solides et réels du café, c’est précisément 
un évanouissement perpétuel, c’est Pierre s’enlevant comme néant sur le fond de 
néantisation du café. De sorte que ce qui est offert à l’intuition, c’est un papillotement 
de néant, c’est le néant du fond, dont la néantisation appelle, exige l’apparition de 
la forme, et c’est la forme – néant qui glisse comme un rien à la surface du fond. Ce 
qui sert de fondement au jugement : « Pierre n’est pas là », c’est donc bien la saisie 
intuitive d’une double néantisation.’ (BNF 44).
208 ‘l’absence de Pierre […] c’est un fait objectif, à présent, que cette absence, je l’ai 
découverte et elle se présente comme un rapport synthétique de Pierre à la pièce dans 
laquelle je le cherche : Pierre absent hante ce café’ (BNF 45).
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Yet, although non-being is directly encountered and can therefore 
not be reduced to being-for-itself, it does come into the world 
because of our expectations: ‘Evidently, non-being always appears 
within the limits of a human expectation. It is because I expect to find 
fifteen hundred francs that I find only thirteen hundred’ (BN 38)209. 
The peculiar thing is that the absence of Pierre in Sartre’s analysis 
is not a matter of subjective judgment, precisely because of Sartre’s 
subjective presence: ‘I was expecting to see Pierre, and my expectation 
has made Pierre’s absence happen as a real event concerning this 
café’ (BN 42)210. Negative objects ‘originate in a human being’s act, 
or expectation or project; all of them underline an aspect of being as 
it appears to a human being engaged within the world’ (BN 60)211. 
Sartre calls these negative objects which inhabit the world around 
us ‘negatities’ (BN 56)212. 
It is important to note that the category of negatities is broader 
than that of the imaginary that we discussed in the previous chapter. 
Imaginary objects are, as Sartre put it, a form of ‘nothingness’, but 
Sartre posited all imagined objects as a negation of the complete 
world. This is quite a difference from the view that Pierre’s absence 
takes place as an event within the setting of the café. The notion of 
negatities that haunt the world allows Sartre to expand upon his 
notion of nothingness. He lists the following examples: ‘absence, 
alteration, alterity, repulsion, regret, absent-mindedness, etc.’ (BN 
56)213. 
In any case, Sartre’s analysis of the intuitive apprehension of Pierre’s 
absence has shown that non-being cannot be reduced to Being: 
‘There is a transphenomenality of non-being, as of being’, and this 
transphenomenality is the nothingness that “haunts” the world 
in the form of negatities (BN 41)214. We now have a much more 
complete picture of the ontology Sartre defends in this period of 
his oeuvre. Up until this point in his reasoning, Sartre has shown 
that there are three transphenomenal grounds, namely two forms of 
Being and one form of nothingness. The question remains, how the 
latter relates to the former two.
209 ‘Il est évident que le non-être apparaît toujours dans les limites d’une attente humaine. 
C’est parce que je m’attends à trouver quinze cents francs que je n’en trouve que 
treize cents.’ (BNF 41).
210 ‘je m’attendais à voir’ Pierre et mon attente a fait arriver l’absence de Pierre comme 
un événement réel concernant ce café’ (BNF 45).
211 ‘Elles tirent leur origine d’un acte de l’être humain, ou d’une attente ou d’un projet, 
elles marquent toutes un aspect de l’être en tant qu’il apparaît à l’être humain qui 
s’engage dans le monde’ (BNF 58).
212 ‘négatités’ (BNF 56).
213 ‘l’absence, l’altération, l’altérité, la répulsion, le regret, la distraction’ (BNF 
55).
214 ‘Il y a une transphénoménalité du non-être comme de l’être’ (BNF 43).
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Self-presence
Although nothingness has its own place in the world, it is still 
related to Being. We already touched upon this when Sartre said 
that non-being only arises within the expectations of consciousness. 
Furthermore, a negatity is always a negation of a being. The fact that 
Pierre is absent requires Pierre to exist.
[B]eing can be conceived of without any need of 
nothingness, and we can exhaustively explore the notion 
of being without finding in it the slightest trace of 
nothingness. But, on the contrary, the nothingness that 
is not can have only a borrowed existence: it takes its 
being from being (BN 50)215[.]
Being-in-itself can function without nothingness. We saw in the 
definition of this mode of Being that this is the case. It is difficult 
to put into words, which is apparent from the fact that Sartre says 
that nothingness has existence. It would be more appropriate to say 
that nothingness’ place in reality and in the ontological system can 
only be derived from something which does really exist. We have 
thus arrived at a new question: if nothingness cannot be reduced to 
Being and cannot be derived from being-in-itself, then where does 
it come from? (BN 57-58).
At first glance, it seems that the answer to this question is already 
given in Sartre’s reasoning. It is consciousness that makes negatities 
possible through its expectations and which can negate existing 
objects: the question remains, however, how consciousness is able to 
do this. Being-for-itself has to have itself some kind of relationship 
to nothingness: ‘the being through which nothingness comes to 
the world cannot produce nothingness while remaining indifferent 
to this production’ (BN 58)216. Nothingness cannot come from ‘any 
fully positive being’, because there would be nothing that enables it 
to generate non-being. Thus, Sartre states:
The being through which nothingness arrives in the 
world is a being in which, in its being, the nothingness 
of its being is in question: the being through which 
215 ‘l’être n’a nul besoin de néant pour se concevoir et qu’on peut inspecter sa notion 
exhaustivement sans y trouver la moindre trace du néant. Mais au contraire le néant 
qui n’est pas ne saurait avoir qu’une existence empruntée : c’est de l’être qu’il prend 
son être’ (BNF 51).
216 ‘l’être par qui le néant vient au monde ne peut produire le néant en demeurant 
indifférent à cette production’ (BNF 57).
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nothingness comes to the world must be its own nothingness 
(BN 58-59)217. 
Being-for-itself can be neither a full positivity nor something which 
is negated as negatities are. The latter cannot be the case because 
negatities require something that is negated and therefore the 
question of where negation itself comes from recurs.
Where, then, does nothingness come from? The answer to this 
question is rooted in the structure of intentionality itself. If a 
conscious act is nothing but consciousness of its object, then this 
means that it does not coincide with its object, but is also not 
something entirely separate from it. In the previous chapter we have 
discussed the idea that, according to Sartre, all consciousness must 
also be conscious of itself if it is not to fall into infinite regress. We 
will return to how Sartre further develops this argument in detail in 
the second part of this chapter. 
Although Sartre uses the word “itself ” in the names of both modes of 
Being, the in-itself does not have a relationship with itself. Because 
it is a plenitude of Being, it fully coincides with itself: ‘at the limit 
of self-coincidence, the “itself ” vanishes, to make way for identical 
Being. The itself cannot be a property of being-in-itself ’ (BN 126)218. 
Truly having a relationship to oneself requires a certain distance 
without real separation from oneself. Only a subject is able to have 
this kind of relationship with himself:
[T]he subject cannot be himself because, as we have 
seen, where something coincides with itself, the ‘itself ’ 
disappears. But neither can he not be himself, since the 
‘himself ’ points to the subject himself. The ‘himself ’ 
represents therefore an ideal distance, within the 
subject’s immanence, in relation to himself, a way of not 
being his own coincidence, of escaping from identity even 
while positing it as unity – in short, a way of being in 
a constantly unstable equilibrium between identity as a 
state of absolute cohesion without any trace of diversity, 
and unity as the synthesis of a multiplicity. We may call 
this self-presence. The law of being of the for-itself as the 
ontological foundation of consciousness is to be itself in 
217 ‘L’être par qui le néant arrive dans le monde est un être en qui, dans son être, il est 
question du néant de son être : l’être par qui le néant vient au monde doit être son 
propre néant.’ (BNF 57).
218 ‘A la limite de la coïncidence avec soi, en effet, le soi s’évanouit pour laisser place à 
l’être identique. Le soi ne saurait être une propriété de l’être-en-soi’ (BNF 112).
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROJECT
102 103
the form of self-presence (BN 126)219.220
Within a single conscious experience, there is this self-presence. An 
example that Sartre gives of such a presence is believing: to have an 
experience of believing something and to be conscious of this belief 
at the moment I am having the experience are one and the same 
thing (BN 125). Yet, it is not fully one and the same thing in the 
sense that it coincides with itself: ‘About this table here, I can say 
purely and simply that it is this table. But if I am talking about my 
belief, I cannot confine myself to saying that it is a belief: my belief 
is a conscious (of ) belief ’ (BN 123)221. The conscious experience 
is both a belief and a presence to this belief. Sartre calls this the 
‘mirror-mirroring structure’ of consciousness (BN 125)222.
Thus, self-presence is the relationship consciousness has to itself. 
Yet, we cannot say that the two sides of consciousness are separated 
by something, as this would violate the principle of intentionality 
and the idea that consciousness is empty and fully translucent: 
The introduction of an external and qualified element 
from outside […] would break its unity and destroy its 
translucency; there would be something in consciousness 
that it was not conscious of, something that did not itself 
exist as consciousness. The separation that separates 
belief from itself cannot be grasped, or even conceived 
on its own (BN 127)223.
219 ‘le sujet ne peut être soi, car la coïncidence avec soi fait, nous l’avons vu, 
disparaître le soi . Mais il ne peut pas non plus ne pas être soi, puisque le soi 
est indication du sujet lui-même. Le soi représente donc une distance idéale 
dans l’immanence du sujet par rapport à lui-même, une façon de ne pas être sa 
propre coïncidence, d’échapper à l’identité tout en la posant comme unité, bref, 
d’être en équilibre perpétuellement instable entre l’identité comme cohésion 
absolue sans trace de diversité et l’unité comme synthèse d’une multiplicité. 
C’est ce que nous appellerons la présence à soi. La loi d’être du pour-soi, comme 
fondement ontologique de la conscience, c’est d’être lui-même sous la forme 
de présence à soi.’ (BNF 113).
220 Although Sartre uses the term subject here, he is not talking about the subject as 
something transcendental, but rather the subjective side of a single conscious 
experience.
221 ‘De cette table, je puis dire qu’elle est purement et simplement cette table. Mais 
de ma croyance je ne puis me borner à dire qu’elle est croyance : ma croyance est 
conscience (de) croyance’ (BNF 110).
222 ‘structure du reflet-reflétant’ (BNF 112).
223 ‘Introduire […] un élément qualifié extérieur […], ce serait en briser l’unité, en 
détruire la translucidité ; il y aurait alors dans la conscience quelque chose dont elle 
ne serait pas conscience, et qui n’existerait pas en soi-même
 comme conscience. La séparation qui sépare la croyance d’elle-même ne se laisse ni 
saisir ni même concevoir à part.’ (BNF 114).
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The fissure that is implied by self-presence cannot truly be something: 
‘if we now ask: what separates the subject from himself, we are forced 
to admit that it is nothing’ (BN 127)224. We now have an answer 
to Sartre’s question concerning the nature of nothingness: ‘the for-
itself must be its own nothingness. The being of consciousness, as 
consciousness, is to exist at a distance from itself, as self-presence, and 
this zero distance that being bears within its being is Nothingness’ 
(BN 128)225. Consciousness exists in such a way that it carries 
within itself its own nothingness. While the in-itself simply is, 
‘consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is’ (BN 117)226.227 
It does not coincide with itself: it is nothing but consciousness of 
an object, but it does not coincide with this object; it is conscious 
of itself but does not coincide with this self-consciousness. The fact 
that consciousness carries nothingness within itself is what allows it 
to nihilate Being and therefore cause negatities to arise. 
Not only is a single experience endowed with its own nothingness, 
the stream of consciousness also has this structure. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, inner time-consciousness links our experiences 
together through time. But what separates these experiences? The 
answer is once again nothing. If they were truly separated, we would 
no longer have a continuous stream of experiences; if they were not 
separated, there would be a single non-temporal experience (BN 
64).
We now have an even more complete picture of Sartre’s 
ontology: there are two transphenomenal modes of Being and a 
transphenomenal nothingness. This transphenomenal nothingness 
is an aspect of the transphenomenal Being of consciousness, namely 
its self-presence. An integral part of Sartre’s ontological system is 
nothingness. The world does not only consist of object which are 
but also objects which are not. These negatities haunt the world and 
are encountered as objective events yet can only exist because there 
are conscious beings with a certain disposition towards the world. 
This is possible because conscious beings carry within themselves 
their own nothingness, in the form of self-presence rather than self-
coincidence. 
224 ‘qu’est ce qui sépare le sujet de lui-même, nous sommes contraints d’avouer que ce 
n’est rien’ (BNF 113).
225  ‘L’être de la conscience, en tant que conscience, c’est d’exister à distance de soi 
comme présence à soi et cette distance nulle que l’être porte dans son être, c’est le 
Néant.’ (BNF 114).
226 ‘la conscience […] est ce qu’elle n’est pas et n’est pas ce qu’elle est’ (BNF 106).
227 This phrasing is found in Kojève’s reading of Hegel, who characterizes the I in the 
following manner: ‘not to be what it is (as static and given being, as natural being, 
as ‘‘innate character’’) and to be (that is, to become) what it is not’ (Kojève 1980, 5). 
See: (Van Haute 1989, 93-94).
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3. Freedom
We now know how Being and nothingness relate to each other, 
which allows us to see how the two forms of Being relate to each 
other. If subjectivity is nothing but an intentional relationship to 
the world, which is not even always aware of this fact, what can be 
said about the relationship between consciousness and the world? If 
human beings do not coincide with themselves, how do they relate 
to the world around them asides from merely being conscious of it? 
The answer to these questions is that because consciousness does not 
coincide with anything, it can be characterized as freedom: 
[F]reedom, as the condition required for nothingness’s 
nihilation, cannot be a property that belongs, along with 
others, to the essence of a human being. Moreover, we 
have already noted that, for man, the relation of existence 
to essence is not the same as for worldly things. Human 
freedom precedes man’s essence and makes it possible; 
the human being’s essence is in suspense in his freedom. 
It is therefore impossible to distinguish freedom, in the 
sense in which we refer to it, from human-reality’s being. 
Man does not exist first in order to be free later; rather, 
there is no difference between man’s being and his being-
free (BN 61)228.
As we have seen, consciousness does not coincide with itself, and, for 
that reason, it has no definitive set of characteristics. This means that 
it can change how it relates to the things around it, which entails 
that it is not fully determined by those things. Therefore, it is free.229 
As Sartre maintains, this does not mean that there is a human 
being who has freedom as a mental faculty, it means that conscious 
experience itself is freedom: the freedom to escape the rigidity and 
self-coincidence of the in-itself. 
This theme of freedom preceding essence is also where existentialism 
gets its name from. Although Sartre does not use the term anywhere 
228 ‘la liberté comme condition requise à la néantisation du néant n’est pas une propriété 
qui appartiendrait, entre autres, à l’essence de l’être humain. Nous avons déjà marqué 
d’ailleurs que le rapport de l’existence à l’essence n’est pas chez l’homme semblable 
à ce qu’il est pour les choses du monde. La liberté humaine précède l’essence de 
l’homme et la rend possible, l’essence de l’être humain est en suspens dans sa liberté. 
Ce que nous appelons liberté est donc impossible à distinguer de l’être de la réalité-
humaine. L’homme n’est point d’abord pour être libre ensuite, mais il n’y a pas de 
différence entre l’être de l’homme et son « être libre ».’ (BNF 59-60).
229 Sartre attributes this conception of freedom to Descartes and the Stoics (BN 61). In 
the essay “Cartesian Freedom”, originally published as a preface to a selection of 
texts by Descartes, he characterizes Descartes as a thinker of nothingness akin to 
Heidegger (CF 196-197). 
Chapter 2
104 105
in Being and Nothingness, in Existentialism is a Humanism, he would 
say that ‘existence precedes essence’ for a human being (EH 22)230. 
Existence here refers to the in-itself as free consciousness.
Actions and ends
In order to see what this freedom entails, Sartre asks the question 
‘What is it to act?’ (BN 566)231. We will know in what way 
consciousness is free when we see how it practically relates to the 
things in the world. ‘The point we should note at the outset is that 
an action is, by definition, intentional’ (BN 569)232. 
An action is a type of behaviour in which a person tries to achieve 
a certain goal. Someone who inadvertently does something has not 
acted. This does not mean, however, that we know the consequences 
of our actions, it means that we know the intended consequences 
(BN 569-570). In order to intend something, one must posit an end. 
For example, wanting to write a book entails positing the end of 
the finished book. The book does not exist at the moment however, 
which means that it is a non-being. This goes for every end: if one 
needs to act, it means that one somehow has to change the world as 
it is, in light of what it is not. Even the preservation of something is 
only possible in light of a future in which it is no longer, thus aiming 
to preserve something means positing a negative goal: a future in 
which the thing does not cease to exist. 
Therefore, ‘an action is a projection of the for-itself towards what 
is not, and nothing that is can ever determine by itself what is not’ 
(BN 572)233.234 Actions are by definition free because they involve a 
negative being: an end which implies a state of the world which is 
not:
There is no circumstance or way in which the past on its 
own can give rise to an act, i.e. the positing of an end, 
230 ‘l’existence précède l’essence’ (EHF 21).
231 ‘Qu’est-ce qu’agir?’ (BNF 471).
232 ‘Il convient, en effet, de remarquer d’abord qu’une action est par principe 
intentionnelle’ (BNF 477).
233 ‘Car un acte est une projection du pour-soi vers ce qui n’est pas et ce qui est ne peut 
aucunement déterminer par lui-même ce qui n’est pas’ (BNF 479-480).
234 The terms “project” and “projection”, which play key roles in Being and Nothingness, 
stem from Heidegger’s Being and Time (Heidegger 1996, 136). Sartre did not study 
Being and Time in detail until he was finished with Husserl, which roughly coincides 
with the time he started writing Being and Nothingness: ‘I could come to Heidegger 
only after I’d exhausted Husserl’ (WD 183). The influence of Heidegger on Being 
and Nothingness is essential which Sartre acknowledges in the War Diaries, when 
he says that Heidegger put him on the right track by showing him that ‘there was 
nothing beyond the project whereby human reality realized itself’ (WD 324).
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in whose light, thrown back on it, it is seen. […] In fact, 
once we attribute to consciousness this negative power in 
relation to the world and itself, once nihilation becomes 
an integral part of the positing of an end, we have to 
acknowledge – at the indispensable and fundamental 
condition of any action – the freedom of the being who 
acts (BN 573)235. 
Nevertheless, the idea that acting always involves breaking free from 
reality seems to contradict the idea that actions have reasons and 
motives. It may be the case that one freely posits a goal, but one has 
a reason for doing so and this reason is given by the circumstances 
one is in. However, we can only detect reasons in light of ends.
Sartre gives the example of a clumsy smoker who inadvertently 
blows up a powder keg and a worker charged with dynamiting a 
quarry (BN 568). In the first case, the person has not acted, according 
to Sartre’s definition of the term, because events simply happened 
without real reason. In the second case, the person has acted, and 
his reason for acting is that he was told by his supervisor to do so. 
We can only attribute this reason to his action because we know the 
result of his action and can work back from this to the reason. A 
reason ‘is the objective grasp of a determinate situation in so far as 
this situation is revealed in the light of a specific end as being able to 
be used as a means to achieve this end’ (BN 586)236. The projecting 
of ends precedes reasons, and not the other way around. As in the 
case of negatities, the presence of the for-itself changes the objective 
state of the world.
The counterpart of a reason is a motive, which is ‘a subjective fact’ 
(BN 586)237: ‘It is the collection of desires, emotions and passions 
that drive me to perform a certain act’ (BN 586)238. For example, 
the quarry worker has a motive for complying with his supervisor’s 
demand. He might want to get paid, he might be ambitious, 
wanting to be a better worker, or he might just like blowing things 
up. Whatever the objective reason, it seems there needs to be a 
subjective motive to answer the question why the reason is “obeyed” 
235 ‘En aucun cas et d’aucune manière, le passé par lui-même ne peut produire un acte, 
c’est-à-dire la position d’une fin qui se retourne sur lui pour l’éclairer. […] En effet, 
dès lors qu’on attribue à la conscience ce pouvoir négatif vis-à-vis du monde et 
d’elle-même, dès lors que la néantisation fait partie intégrante de la position d’une 
fin, il faut reconnaître que la condition indispensable et fondamentale de toute action 
c’est la liberté de l’être agissant.’ (BNF 480).
236 ‘la saisie objective d’une situation déterminée en tant que cette situation se révèle, à 
la lumière d’une certaine fin’ (BNF 491). 
237 ‘un fait subjectif’ (BNF 491).
238 ‘C’est l’ensemble des désirs, des émotions et des passions qui me poussent à 
accomplir un certain acte’ (BNF 491).
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and hence is the reason for the act. 
However, Sartre argues, the distinction between the two is based on a 
wrong conception of consciousness. If we conceive of consciousness 
as intentionality, we cannot conceive of pure desires, emotions and 
passions that drive us. They are always directed at an object: I desire 
a cup of coffee, for example. The quarry worker’s desire to get paid 
and his obedience cannot be seen apart from each other. Hence, 
‘the motive is […] nothing but the apprehension of the reason’ (BN 
589)239.
Thus, the question why we freely posit the ends that we do cannot be 
answered in a way that diminishes the free character of our actions: 
‘the reason, the motive and the end are the three indissoluble terms 
in the bursting forth of a living and free consciousness, projecting 
itself towards its possibilities’ (BN 589)240. 
Although we cannot identify the motives “behind” actions, this 
does not mean that we must conceive of ‘freedom as a series of 
unpredictable upheavals’ (BN 593)241. Sartre’s conception of freedom 
does not entail gratuitousness or the ability to choose literally 
anything: ‘each of my acts, even the smallest, is wholly free […]; 
but that does not mean that it can be anyhow, or even that it is 
unpredictable’ (BN 594)242. In order to explain this, Sartre gives the 
example of someone who is hiking: 
I have gone on an excursion with some friends. After 
several hours of walking, I am growing tired, and 
eventually my fatigue becomes oppressive. At first 
I resist and then suddenly I let myself go: I give in; I 
throw my bag down on the side of the road, and I drop 
down beside it. I will be reproached for my action, with 
the implication that I was free, which means not only 
that nothing and nobody determined my action, but also 
that I could have resisted my fatigue, done as my fellow-
travellers did, and waited for my rest until we reached 
our stop. I will defend myself by saying that I was too 
tired (BN 594-595)243. 
239 ‘le mobile n’est rien autre que la saisie du motif’ (BNF 493).
240 ‘le motif, le mobile et la fin sont les trois termes indissolubles du jaillissement d’une 
conscience vivante et libre qui se projette vers ses possibilités et se fait définir par ces 
possibilités’ (BNF 493).
241 ‘la liberté comme une série d’à-coups capricieux’ (BNF 497).
242 ‘chacun de mes actes, fût-ce le plus petit, est entièrement libre […] ; mais cela ne 
signifie pas qu’il puisse être quelconque, ni même qu’il soit imprévisible’ (BNF 498).
243 ‘Je suis parti en excursion avec des camarades. Au bout de plusieurs heures de 
marche ma fatigue croît, elle finit par devenir très pénible. Je résiste d’abord et puis, 
tout à coup, je me laisse aller, je cède, je jette mon sac sur le bord de la route et je me 
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Freely chosen ends do not exist in isolation, they exist in relation 
to other freely chosen ends. The fact that I am plagued with fatigue 
cannot by itself be used to explain why I sit down, as the others 
may be just as tired as I am. When I compare my fatigue to that 
of my companion, he says that he likes his fatigue as conquering it 
gives him a feeling of accomplishment (BN 596-597). ‘Thus’, Sartre 
concludes, ‘my companion lives his fatigue within a larger project 
that is a trusting surrender to nature’ (BN 597)244. My actions and 
their ends can only be explained in light of other ends, and in this 
case, I do not have a larger project of surrendering to nature. Sartre 
continues his analysis of the hike: 
There is no doubt that I could have done otherwise, but 
that is not the problem. We should instead formulate it 
like this: could I have done otherwise without markedly 
changing the organic totality of projects that I am, 
or would the fact of resisting my fatigue, rather than 
remaining a mere local and accidental modification of my 
behaviour, be possible only with a radical transformation 
of my being-in-the-world (BN 595)245[.]
While all our actions have their own projected ends, they form a 
totality which Sartre calls the ‘fundamental choice’ or ‘fundamental 
project’ (BN 604, 615)246. This choice is not a deliberate one – though 
deliberation can exist against the background of this choice – yet it 
is conscious (BN 604). The fundamental choice ‘is one and the same 
as the consciousness that we have of ourselves’ (BN 604)247. We can 
interpret this by saying that because our experiences of choosing are 
part of the same stream of consciousness, we also have awareness 
of the other choices that influence the situation we are in. This is 
what Sartre means by the organic totality of my projects: my choices 
cannot be reduced to external motives, nor can they be viewed as 
unpredictable, because phenomenological evidence shows us that 
laisse tomber à côté de lui. On me reprochera mon acte et l’on entendra par là que 
j’étais libre, c’est-à-dire non seulement que rien ni personne n’a déterminé mon acte, 
mais encore que j’aurais pu résister à ma fatigue, faire comme mes compagnons de 
route et attendre l’étape pour prendre du repos. Je me défendrai en disant que j’étais 
trop fatigué.’ (BNF 498). 
244 ‘Ainsi la fatigue de mon compagnon est vécue dans un projet plus vaste d’abandon 
confiant à la nature’ (BNF 500).
245 ‘Il ne fait pas de doute que j’eusse pu faire autrement, mais le problème n’est pas 
là. Il faudrait plutôt le formuler ainsi : pouvais-je faire autrement sans modifier 
sensiblement la totalité organique des projets que je suis, ou bien le fait de résister à 
ma fatigue, au lieu de demeurer une pure modification locale et accidentelle de mon 
comportement, ne peut-il se produire qu’à la faveur d’une transformation radicale de 
mon être-dans-le-monde’ (BNF 498).  
246 ‘choix fondamental’ ‘projet fondamental’ (BNF 506, 515).
247 ‘Il ne fait qu’un avec la conscience que nous avons de nous-même’ (BNF 506).
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they are not.
The precise way in which this fundamental choice is part of our 
identity is much more intricate. We will return to the question of 
how our choices relate to one another and how they relate to our 
identity in some detail in the next part of this chapter. For now, 
concerning the nature of consciousness, Sartre concludes that 
because our choices can only be explained by a fundamental choice, 
‘to choose, one has to be conscious and, to be conscious, one has to 
choose. Choice and consciousness are one and the same thing’ (BN 
605)248. We are free because our consciousness is self-presence and 
hence entails its own nothingness, which allows it to break away 
from the in-itself. This allows us to posit ends and act in light of 
these ends. The choices we subsequently make can be related to 
each other in the form of a fundamental choice. This works both 
ways, however: we act in light of our fundamental choice, and since 
every conscious experience contains nothingness within it, it is also 
a choice. Thus, every conscious act gives the world meaning in light 
of posited ends:
[T]he world necessarily appears to us as we are; indeed, 
it is by surpassing it towards ourselves that we make 
the world appear the way it is. We choose the world – 
not in its in-itself construction, but in its meaning – by 
choosing ourselves (BN 606)249.
The situation
Although every experience is a free choice, it is still bound to its 
circumstances. We have already seen that to posit ends one needs to 
access the world as it is in light of what it is not. Hence, freedom is 
always situated. ‘The situation [is] a joint project of the contingency 
of the in-itself and of freedom’ (BN 636)250. We have already touched 
upon the notion of the situation in the previous chapter, but in Being 
and Nothingness Sartre gives a much more detailed description of it. 
His description is found in his development of the example of rock 
climbing:
There I am at the foot of this rock, which seems to me 
to be ‘not climbable’. Therefore the rock appears to me 
248 ‘Choix et conscience sont une seule et même chose’ (BNF 506).
249 ‘le monde nous apparaît nécessairement comme nous sommes ; c’est en effet en 
le dépassant vers nous-mêmes que nous le faisons apparaître tel qu’il est. Nous 
choisissons le monde - non dans sa contexture en-soi, mais dans sa signification - en 
nous choisissant.’ (BNF 507-508).
250 ‘la situation, produit commun de la contingence de l’en-soi et de la liberté’ (BNF 
533).
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in the light of a projected rock-climbing – a secondary 
project whose meaning is given on the basis of an initial 
project which is my being-in-the-world. In this way the 
rock is outlined against the ground of the world as a 
result of the initial choice of my freedom. But, on the 
other hand, what my freedom is unable to decide is 
whether or not the rock ‘to be climbed’ will lend itself to 
my climbing. That forms part of the rock’s brute being. 
However, the rock can only manifest its resistance to the 
climbing if it is included by freedom within a ‘situation’ 
whose general theme is rock-climbing. For the walker 
who is simply passing by on the road, and whose free 
project is purely the aesthetic ordering of the landscape, 
the rock is encountered neither as climbable nor as not-
climbable: it only manifests itself as beautiful or ugly. 
Thus it is impossible to determine in each particular case 
what is due to freedom, and what is due to the brute 
being of the in-itself (BN 637)251.
Our projects give meaning to the world around us, but these 
meanings are given to the things that have a rigidity of their 
own. It is impossible to determine to what extent the world as we 
experience it is formed by us or by the things we encounter. The 
situation therefore ‘is an ambiguous phenomenon within which it is 
impossible for the for-itself to discern the contributions of freedom 
and the brute existent’ (BN 636)252. 
Situations do not arise out of nowhere, and they are determined by 
the facticity of the for-itself. Sartre provides details of the different 
factors that determine our place in the world, namely ‘my place, my 
past, my surroundings, my death and my fellow man’ (BN 711)253. 
251 Me voilà au pied de ce rocher qui m’apparaît comme « non escaladable ». Cela signifie 
que le rocher m’apparaît à la lumière d’une escalade projetée–projet secondaire qui 
trouve son sens à partir d’un projet initial qui est mon être-dans-le-monde. Ainsi, le 
rocher se découpe sur fond de monde par l’effet du choix initial de ma liberté. Mais, 
d’autre part, ce dont ma liberté ne peut décider, c’est si le rocher « à escalader » 
se prêtera ou non à l’escalade. Cela fait partie de l’être brut du rocher. Toutefois le 
rocher ne peut manifester sa résistance à l’escalade que s’il est intégré par la liberté 
dans une « situation » dont le thème général est l’escalade. Pour le simple promeneur 
qui passe sur la route et dont le libre projet est pure ordination esthétique du paysage, 
le rocher ne se découvre ni comme escaladable, ni comme non-escaladable : il se 
manifeste seulement comme beau ou laid. Ainsi est-il impossible de déterminer en 
chaque cas particulier ce qui revient à la liberté et ce qui revient à l’être brut du pour-
soi.’ (BNF 533). I have followed the translator’s advice presented in a footnote on 
the same page and assume that Sartre’s ‘for-itself’ was meant to be ‘in-itself’. I have 
changed the translation accordingly. 
252 ‘est un phénomène ambigu dans lequel il est impossible au pour-soi de discerner 
l’apport de la liberté et de l’existant brut’ (BNF 533).
253 ‘ma place, mon passé, mes entours, ma mort et mon prochain’ (BNF 593).
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We will not dwell on the specifics of these analyses but instead focus 
on the conclusions that Sartre draws from them. In the first place, 
Sartre concludes that ‘I am an existent in the midst of other existents. 
But I can only ‘actualize’ this existence in the midst of others, 
grasp the existents surrounding me as objects, and grasp myself as a 
surrounded existent, if I choose myself ’ (BN 711-712)254. He means 
that a situation cannot exist apart from the fundamental project of 
a for-itself, because the roles that the objects and other people play 
only get their meaning with regard to the goals and ends that are 
projected by the for-itself.
It follows that a situation cannot be comprehended from the 
outside, that is, from a point of view other than that of the people in 
it and their projected ends: the person wanting to climb the cliff or 
the person wanting to experience its beauty, these specific projects 
constitute the situation in question. Without a point of view from 
within the situation itself, the situation collapses into the in-itself. 
This causes the situation to have a peculiar relationship towards 
subjectivity and objectivity:
In consequence, we can describe the situation neither 
as objective nor as subjective, even though the partial 
structures of this situation (the cup I am using, the table 
on which I am leaning, etc.) may and must be strictly 
objective.
The situation cannot be subjective, because it is neither 
the sum nor the unity of the impressions that things 
make on us: it is the things themselves, and myself among 
things, because the only effect of my arising within the 
world as the pure nihilation of being is to make it the 
case that there are things, and it adds nothing. In this 
respect, the situation makes visible my facticity, which 
is to say the fact that things are there, simply as they are, 
without either the necessity or the possibility of being 
otherwise, and that I am there, among them. 
But it cannot be objective either, in the sense of a pure 
given which the subject could observe without being 
in any way committed within the system thereby 
constituted (BN 712)255.
254 ‘Je suis un existant au milieu d’autres existants. Mais je ne puis « réaliser » cette 
existence au milieu d’autres, je ne puis saisir les existants qui m’entourent comme 
objets ni me saisir moi-même comme existant entouré ni même donner un sens à 
cette notion d’ « au milieu » que si je me choisis moi-même’ (BNF 593).
255 ‘En conséquence, la situation ne saurait être dite ni objective ni subjective, encore 
que les structures partielles de cette situation (la tasse dont je me sers, la table sur 
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The situation is not subjective, because it is nothing more than 
how the subject relates to things, and it is not objective, because 
the meaning of these things only arises due to the presence of a 
subjective agent. Again, we should not understand Sartre’s phrasing 
that my arising in the world causes there to be things in an idealistic 
manner. First of all, the sentence seems to contradict itself in saying 
that it is because of our arising in the world that there are things, 
yet that we do not add anything. Sartre’s italics further emphasize 
that this is just a way of phrasing it: things as we encounter them only 
exist because we encounter them, and that is with meaning given to 
them by our projects. The situation is subjectivity ‘lighting things up 
through its very surpassing’ (BN 713)256. It is therefore not objective 
either, because we cannot comprehend it without subjectivity. An 
objective description of a situation would lose its meaning, and this 
meaning is what constitutes it. 
The idea of the situation is what makes Sartre’s conception of 
freedom such a radical one. The situation is neither freely chosen 
nor is it the constraint a free consciousness undergoes. Rather, ‘it 
is a product of the constraint’s illumination by the freedom that 
gives the constraint its meaning’ (BN 715)257. Hence, we cannot say 
that one freely chooses the situation, as freedom does not produce 
it but manifests itself therein, so that the two exist simultaneously. 
The same goes for the objective obstacles that freedom faces, which 
also arise simultaneously with the situation. This reasoning is even 
applicable to our own body: 
Even this disability that I suffer is something that, by 
the very fact of living it, I have taken up; I surpass it 
towards my own projects, I make of it the necessary 
obstacle for my being, and I cannot be disabled without 
choosing myself as disabled, which is to say choosing the 
way in which I constitute my disability (as ‘intolerable’, 
‘humiliating’, ‘to be concealed’, ‘to be revealed to 
laquelle je m’appuie, etc.) puissent et doivent être rigoureusement objectives.
 La situation ne saurait être subjective, car elle n’est ni la somme ni l’unité des 
impressions que nous font les choses : elle est les choses elles-mêmes et moi-même 
parmi les choses ; car mon surgissement dans le monde comme pure néantisation 
d’être n’a d’autre effet que de faire qu’il y ait des choses et n’y ajoute rien. Sous 
cet aspect, la situation trahit ma facticité, c’est-à-dire le fait que les choses sont là 
simplement comme elles sont, sans nécessité ni possibilité d’être autrement, et que je 
suis là parmi elles.
 Mais elle ne saurait non plus être objective, au sens où elle serait un pur donné que le 
sujet constaterait sans être nullement engagé dans le système ainsi constitué.’ (BNF 
593).
256 ‘éclairant les choses par son dépassement même’ (BNF 594).
257 ‘l’éclairement de la contrainte par la liberté qui lui donne son sens de contrainte’ 
(BNF 596).
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everyone’, ‘an object of pride’, ‘the justification of my 
failures’, etc.) (BN 440)258.
Every situation is as free as any other, or, in other words, no situation 
is any more or less free than any another (BN 713). ‘The slave in 
chains is free in order to break them; in other words, the very meaning 
of his chains will appear to him in the light of the end he has chosen: 
to remain a slave or to risk the worst in order to emancipate himself 
from slavery’ (BN 714)259. Sartre’s conclusion can be summarized as 
follows: if the free nihilating structure of our consciousness always 
puts us in a situation coloured by the ends we project, then there is 
no situation in which we are not free.260 
The situation helps us to further define the for-itself. Sartre has started 
from the idea of intentionality as an empty relationship towards an 
object and is now able to give a more precise characterization of 
what this entails. He states that ‘being-in-situation defines human-
reality, by accounting at the same time for its being-there and its 
being-beyond’ (BN 713)261. Consciousness is directed towards an 
objective outside of itself, and hence it is “there”, it exists within its 
surroundings. However, because it is a relationship and therefore 
does not coincide with itself, it is able to nihilate and transcend the 
situation. This constitutes its being-beyond the surroundings, which 
allows it to posit ends and thereby give meaning to the surroundings, 
which in turn can be transcended. 
Thus, Sartre’s conception of freedom is what allows him to bridge the 
gap between the for-itself and the in-itself.  This answers the main 
question of Being and Nothingness that we cited at the beginning 
of this chapter: what is being-in-the-world and what must man 
and world be in order for this to be possible? The answer is: human 
beings and world can only exist in a situation, which is made possible 
by the freedom of man: ‘there is freedom only in a situation, and 
258 ‘Même cette infirmité dont je souffre, du fait même que je vis, je l’ai assumée, je 
la dépasse vers mes propres projets, j’en fais l’obstacle nécessaire pour mon être et 
je ne puis être infirme sans me choisir infirme, c’est-à-dire choisir la façon dont je 
constitue mon infirmité (comme « intolérable », « humiliante », « à dissimuler », « à 
révéler à tous », « objet d’orgueil », « justification de mes échecs etc.)’ (BNF 368).
259 ‘L’esclave dans les chaînes est libre pour les briser ; cela signifie que le sens même 
de ses chaînes lui apparaîtra à la lumière de la fin qu’il aura choisie : rester esclave ou 
risquer le pis pour s’affranchir de la servitude’ (BNF 594).
260 Sartre’s radical conception of freedom was regarded by many to be highly problematic. 
He distanced himself from these views later: ‘I […] was truly scandalized. I had 
written: “Whatever the circumstances, and wherever the site, a man is always free to 
choose to be a traitor or not. …” When I read this, I said to myself: it’s incredible, I 
actually believed that!’ (IT 33-34). 
261 ‘l’être-en-situation définit la réalité-humaine, en rendant compte à la fois de son être-
là et de son être-par-delà’ (BNF 594).
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there is a situation only through freedom’ (BN 638)262. We can 
only understand objects in a meaningful way because subjectivity 
posits goals and thereby gives them meaning and we can understand 
subjectivity only in its relation to surrounding objects and other 
people. The latter will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.
Preliminary conclusion
In Being and Nothingness Sartre lays out an ontological system 
that is centred around the interplay of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Taking the conception of intentionality that he also propagated in 
his early works as his starting point, he grounds a system that entails 
two forms of Being and two forms of nothingness. Being falls 
into two modes. The in-itself is characterized by self-coincidence. 
Because consciousness is itself no container, yet can experience 
objects which transcend their manifestations in a series, there needs 
to be something outside of consciousness. This Being of things is 
irreducible to anything else but is the ground for all objects. The 
other mode of Being, the for-itself, is the Being of consciousness 
that is characterized by self-presence, which means that it does not 
coincide with itself.  The for-itself is conscious of its object and also 
conscious of itself, otherwise it would cease to be a fully transparent 
consciousness. 
Nothingness in turn is encountered as an object in the form of 
negatities, which are negative objects that we encounter in the world 
around us, such as absences and distances. These negatities make 
their appearance because of the predisposition of a subjective entity. 
The origin of these “nothingnesses” can be traced back to being-
for-itself: because it is self-presence and does not coincide with 
itself, it contains within itself its own nothingness. Hence, “it is not 
what it is, and it is what it is not”. As no being can exist within 
consciousness, the only thing that can separate consciousness from 
itself is nothingness. 
Because consciousness carries this nothingness with it, it can 
break itself away from the world as it is. This means that it must 
be understood as freedom. The ability to nihilate Being makes it 
possible to posit goals and ends which do not (yet) exist and which 
enable purposeful action. The ends projected by a free consciousness 
in turn give meaning to objects, which are always encountered within 
a situation coloured by the project posited by free consciousness. 
Thus, with regard to Being, the in-itself is the most fundamental 
mode in that it can exist without the for-itself. The for-itself, 
because it needs an object to be conscious of, can only exist because 
262 ‘il n’y a de liberté qu’en situation et il n’y a de situation que par la liberté’ (BNF 534).
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there is being-in-itself. With respect to nothingness, however, this 
relation is reversed: negatities, which are objective, can only exist 
because of the nihilating self-presence of the for-itself. In other 
words, for Being objectivity precedes subjectivity, for nothingness, 
subjectivity precedes objectivity. This is a purely formal description 
of how the modes of Being and nothingness are grounded; in reality, 
however, each one can only appear within situations in which it is 
fully entangled with the other. Objects arise only within the projects 
of consciousness, while consciousness can only project its ends on 
objects. 
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Part II 
Possibilities and Choices
4. Consciousness (of ) Self
The general descriptions of subjectivity and objectivity given in the 
first part of this chapter have revealed to us three major themes 
that also play a central role in his theories of selfhood from this 
period. The first one is apodicticity: the fact that his ideas are strictly 
derived from each other and the fact that he wants to find absolute 
elements that ground his ontological system. The second one is 
negativity: Sartre is much less interested in the “things themselves” 
than in things which are not. The third theme, related to the second, 
is freedom. Because consciousness is characterized by a freedom so 
fundamental that it makes every conscious act a choice, all actions 
ultimately concern choosing oneself.
As has been said at the beginning of this chapter, in order to proceed 
we have to take a step back and return to the Introduction to Being 
and Nothingness. It is in the “proof ” of the existence of the for-itself 
that we find the basis for Sartre’s theory of subjective selfhood. 
Although we have largely discussed the place of the for-itself 
in Sartre’s ontological system, we must take a closer look at this 
notion in order to turn to the topic of the unity and individuality 
of consciousness. The cornerstone of Sartre’s theory is, as already 
discussed, the notion of intentionality: 
As Husserl showed, all consciousness is consciousness 
of something. In other words, there is no [act of ] 
consciousness that does not posit a transcendent object 
or, if you prefer, consciousness has no ‘content’. […] A 
table is not in consciousness, not even as a representation. 
A table is in space, beside the window, etc. […] All 
consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself to 
reach an object, and it is exhausted by just this act of 
positing (BN 9-10)263. 
Sartre’s conception of intentionality has not changed since his 
early works. Consciousness is consciousness of an object outside of 
itself and nothing else. We have already discussed the nothingness 
263 ‘Toute conscience, Husserl l’a montré, est conscience de quelque chose. Cela signifie 
qu’il n’est pas de conscience qui ne soit position d’un objet transcendant, ou, si l’on 
préfère, que la conscience n’a pas de « contenu ». […] Une table n’est pas dans la 
conscience, même à titre de représentation. Une table est dans l’espace, à côté de la 
fenêtre, etc. […] Toute conscience est positionnelle en ce qu’elle se transcende pour 
atteindre un objet, et elle s’épuise dans cette position même[.]’ (BNF 17-18).
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of consciousness in the first part of this chapter. Let us now turn 
to the details of Sartre’s reasoning concerning this form of self-
consciousness and the conclusions that he draws from it.
The prereflective cogito
Apart from the more technical infinite regress argument for the 
idea that all consciousness is self-consciousness, Sartre gives a 
phenomenological description of what it entails to become self-
conscious. The example he uses is again that of counting: 
[A]ny positional consciousness of an object is at the 
same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. If I 
count the cigarettes which are in this case, my impression 
is that they are disclosing an objective property of this 
collection of cigarettes: they are twelve. This property 
appears to my consciousness as a property existing in 
the world. I may well have no positional consciousness 
at all of counting them. I do not ‘know myself as 
counting’. […] And yet, at the moment when these 
cigarettes disclose themselves to me as ‘twelve’, I am 
non-thetically conscious of my adding activity. Indeed, 
if I am questioned, if someone asks me: ‘What are you 
doing?’, I will reply immediately ‘I am counting’, and 
my reply does not aim only at the instantaneous [act of ] 
consciousness that I can reach through reflection, but 
also at those [acts of ] consciousness that have passed by 
without being reflected upon, which will forever remain 
unreflected in my immediate past (BN 11-12)264.  
If self-consciousness were reflective, it would be impossible to 
perform an action that spans more than one experience, such as 
counting in this example. Sartre points out that if I am absent-
mindedly counting, I do not have a positional experience of the act 
of counting or of a single moment of that act. If someone would ask 
me what I am doing, I would immediately reply that I am counting. 
264 ‘toute conscience positionnelle d’objet est en même temps conscience non 
positionnelle d’elle-même. Si je compte les cigarettes qui sont dans cet étui, j’ai 
l’impression du dévoilement d’une propriété objective de ce groupe de cigarettes 
: elles sont douze. Cette propriété apparaît à ma conscience comme une propriété 
existant dans le monde. Je puis fort bien n’avoir aucune conscience positionnelle de 
les compter. Je ne me « connais pas comptant ». […] Et pourtant, au moment où ces 
cigarettes se dévoilent à moi comme douze, j’ai une conscience non-thétique de mon 
activité additive. Si l’on m’interroge, en effet, si l’on me demande : « Que faites-vous 
là ? » je répondrai aussitôt: « Je compte », et cette réponse ne vise pas seulement la 
conscience instantanée que je puis atteindre par la réflexion, mais celles qui sont 
passées sans avoir été réfléchies, celles qui sont pour toujours irréfléchies dans mon 
passé immédiat.’ (BNF 19).
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I would know that I am counting, without the need of a separate act 
of reflection. Furthermore, as counting requires a series of conscious 
experiences over time, my reply not only pertains to the instant the 
question was asked, but the past experiences too. It is important 
to note that Sartre talks about experiences in the immediate past, 
which accords with the idea of inner time-consciousness. One is not 
conscious of all the experiences one has ever had, but of those that 
still play a role in the current situation.
Up to this point, Sartre’s reasoning has been very much in line with 
that of The Transcendence of the Ego. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, in his early works Sartre also adopted the idea of prereflective 
self-consciousness. The conclusion that Sartre draws from it now, 
however, seems – at first sight – to be a very different one:
Thus, reflection lacks any kind of primacy in relation to 
reflected consciousness: it is not by means of the former 
that the latter is revealed to itself. On the contrary, 
non-reflective consciousness is what makes reflection 
possible: there is a prereflective cogito, which is the 
condition of the Cartesian cogito (BN 12)265.
Sartre’s idea that the stream of consciousness unifies itself through 
inner time-consciousness was used in The Transcendence of the Ego 
as a criticism of the cogito. As we saw in the previous chapter, he 
held that there was no I in prereflective consciousness and hence 
no cogito. Now Sartre defends the very same view of prereflective 
self-consciousness and derives the existence of a prereflective cogito 
from this. What explains this change in his position? The answer can 
be found in “Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self ”, where 
he discusses the theme of the cogito in more detail. In this text he 
states:
[I]f we refuse to use the cogito as a first truth in the 
order of philosophical truths, it is necessary to take the 
whole of knowledge, matter, and form, as a guarantee of 
particular knowledge. In that case, the whole system is 
probable. The apodicticity disappears (CS 114)266.
Sartre’s return to the cogito must be seen in light of the project and 
265 ‘Ainsi n’y a-t-il aucune espèce de primat de la réflexion sur la conscience réfléchie 
: ce n’est pas celle-là qui révèle celle-ci à elle-même. Tout au contraire, c’est la 
conscience non-réflexive qui rend la réflexion possible : i l y a un cogito préréflexif 
qui est la condition du cogito cartésien.’ (BNF 19).
266 ‘si nous refusons d’utiliser le « Cogito » comme vérité première d’un ordre 
philosophique des vérités, il faut prendre la connaissance tout entière, matière et 
forme, comme garantie de la connaissance singulière. En ce cas, le système entier est 
probable, l’apodicticité disparaît.’ (CSF 136).
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methodology of Being and Nothingness, which aims at establishing 
a classical ontological system by means of phenomenology. Sartre 
introduces the notion as the transphenomenal Being of consciousness 
(BN 9). Thus, the reason he describes the prereflective cogito as a 
cogito concerns its status as a “first truth”. Just as Sartre grounds 
the Being of things in the absolute in-itself, so too does he ground 
the Being of consciousness in prereflective self-consciousness or, in 
other words, in the fact that it exists for-itself. This echoes Descartes 
experimental doubt, through which the cogito is discovered as the 
first truth. Without an apodictic fundament, systematic philosophy 
becomes impossible in Sartre’s view. In Existentialism is a Humanism, 
Sartre will say something similar:
[O]n the basis of a few wrongheaded notions, we are 
also charged with imprisoning man within his individual 
subjectivity. In this regard, too, we are exceedingly 
misunderstood. For strictly philosophical reasons, our 
point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the 
individual – not because we are bourgeois, but because 
we seek to base our doctrine on truth, not on comforting 
theories full of hope but without any real foundation. 
As our point of departure there can be no other truth 
than this: I think therefore I am. This is the absolute truth 
of consciousness confronting itself. Any theory that 
considers man outside of this moment of self-awareness 
is, at the outset, a theory that suppresses the truth, for 
outside of this Cartesian cogito, all objects are merely 
probable, and a doctrine of probabilities not rooted 
in any truth crumbles into nothing. In order to define 
the probable, one must possess what is true. Therefore, 
in order for any truth to exists, there must first be an 
absolute truth (EH 40)267.
267 ‘on nous reproche encore, à partir de ces quelques données, de murer l’homme dans 
sa subjectivité individuelle. Là encore on nous comprend fort mal. Notre point de 
départ est en effet la subjectivité de l’individu, et ceci pour des raisons strictement 
philosophiques. Non pas parce que nous sommes bourgeois, mais parce que nous 
voulons une doctrine basée sur la vérité, et non un ensemble de belles théories, 
pleines d’espoir mais sans fondements réels. Il ne peut pas y avoir de vérité autre, 
au point de départ, que celle-ci: je pense donc je suis, c’est là la vérité absolue de la 
conscience s’atteignant elle-même. Toute théorie qui prend l’homme en dehors de 
ce moment où il s’atteint lui-même est d’abord une théorie qui supprime la vérité, 
car, en dehors de ce cogito cartésien, tous les objets sont seulement probables, et 
une doctrine de probabilités, qui n’est pas suspendue à une vérité, s’effondre dans 
le néant ; pour définir le probable il faut posséder le vrai. Donc, pour qu’il y ait une 
vérité quelconque, il faut une vérité absolue’ (EHF 63-64)
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It must be noted that Sartre immediately adds that the cogito as 
he envisions it is not individual but intersubjective, something 
which we will discuss in the next section. Furthermore, Sartre does 
not introduce his own prereflective cogito here but instead aligns 
himself with the Cartesian one. We could argue that this is due to 
the fact that this text is a public lecture and that Sartre is therefore a 
bit less nuanced when it comes to the terminological details. What 
remains clear is that Sartre adheres to the cogito mainly because it 
provides him with an apodictic, absolute truth, further highlighting 
the idea that Sartre adheres to a deductive ontological methodology. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in the Introduction Sartre only 
mentions one of the two absolute grounds of Being and that he thus 
risks giving the reader of Being and Nothingness the impression that 
it is a much more subjective enterprise than is in fact the case.
The fact that the cogito is understood as a way of Being rather than 
a being itself indicates another difference between Sartre’s version of 
the cogito and that of Descartes:
[I]f we wish to avoid the error which consists in 
attributing to knowledge a substantial being analogous 
to that of a thing, it is necessary to return to the cogito and 
to examine it anew. The cogito is only the manifestation 
of consciousness. […] [I]f we consider consciousness 
as a mode of being, instead of attempting to confer a 
being upon it, perhaps we will be able to mitigate the 
imperfections of the cogito, as did Descartes and Husserl. 
Perhaps we will be able to discover in it the possibility 
even of escaping it, that is, of escaping instantaneity, 
idealism, and solipsism (CS 114)268.
The prereflective cogito does not imply a res cogitans, the thinking 
substance of Descartes. This would violate the principle of 
intentionality as it would mean that there is a thing in consciousness 
or that consciousness is a thing. He even reprimands Descartes for 
this:
268 ‘si nous voulons éviter l’erreur qui consisterait à attribuer à la connaissance un être 
substantiel analogue à celui de la chose, il fait revenir au cogito et l’examiner à 
nouveau. Le « cogito » n’est rien, en effet, que le manifestation de la conscience. 
[…] Si donc nous considérons la conscience comme mode d’être au lieu de chercher 
à lui conférer un être, peut-être pourrons-nous pallier les imperfections du Cogito, 
tel que l’ont pratiqué Descartes et Husserl ; peut-être pourrons-nous trouver en lui la 
possibilité même d’en sortir, c’est-à-dire de sortir de l’instantané, de l’idéalisme et du 
solipsisme.’ (CSF 136). 
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Of course, that thinking substance exists only in so far as 
it thinks […]. But it is. It retains the character of in-itself 
in its entirety, even though the for-itself is its attribute. 
This has been described as Descartes’s substantialist 
illusion (BN 135)269.
For Sartre, ‘the for-itself is in no way an autonomous substance’ (BN 
799)270. We should therefore understand the self-presence of the 
cogito ‘not in the manner of a thing but as an operative intention’ 
(BN 12)271. In other words, ‘[t]his being is not ‘the subject’ […], but 
subjectivity itself ’ (BN 16-17).272 This is how consciousness works, 
and we must assume it works this way in order for it to be wholly 
conscious, fully transparent, and hence nothing but intentionality. 
This is why it escapes instantaneity, for objects can only appear in a 
temporal manner. It likewise escapes idealism and solipsism, since it 
is only an operation that is part of the intentional process of being 
aware of something other than itself.
Because the cogito is a function and not a separate element in 
consciousness or another conscious act, Sartre adopts the term 
‘consciousness (of ) self ’, the brackets referring to the fact that the self 
is not the object of consciousness, but part of the subjective process 
(BN 13)273. Moreover, this separates this form of self-consciousness 
from reflective self-consciousness in which the Self is the object (CF 
123).
The circuit of ipseity
Strictly speaking, Sartre still holds to the view that the stream of 
consciousness unifies itself, but he largely changes the emphasis, 
shifting from the reflective to the prereflective level. He also still 
holds the view that the Ego appears in hindsight as a thing and refers 
to The Transcendence of the Ego (BN 159). Although the prereflective 
cogito is a function of consciousness and the choice of the term is 
largely reflective of its apodictic status, we cannot ignore the fact 
that cogito means ‘I think’. There is a dimension of subjectivity that 
acts as a sort of I that thinks, and, although it is not a thing, it is still 
that which makes consciousness personal:
269 ‘Certes la substance pensante n’existe qu’autant qu’elle pense […]. Mais elle est. 
Elle conserve le caractère d’en-soi dans son intégrité, bien que le pour-soi soit son 
attribut. C’est ce qu’on nomme l’illusion substantialiste de Descartes.’ (BNF 120).
270 ‘le pour-soi n’est aucunement une substance autonome’ (BNF 666).
271 ‘non comme une chose mais comme une intention opératoire’ (BNF 20).
272 ‘Ce n’est point le sujet, […] mais c’est la subjectivité même’ (BNF 23).
273 ‘conscience (de) soi’ (BNF 21).
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[W]e ascertain that there is no distinction of subject-
object in this consciousness. The fact of saying that it 
is not inhabited by an ego has essentially the following 
significance: an ego as an inhabitant of consciousness is 
an opacity in consciousness; in reality, if consciousness 
does not have an ego at the level of immediacy and 
nonreflexivity, it is nonetheless personal. It is personal 
because it is a return, in spite of everything, to itself (CF 
123)274.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre also states that self-presence is 
enough to make consciousness personal: ‘consciousness, from the 
moment it arises, makes itself personal through the pure nihilating 
movement of mirroring’ (BN 160)275. He does not develop this 
claim any further, but there is also another dimension of subjective 
selfhood introduced in Being and Nothingness, that of “ipseity”:
[T]he Ego appears to consciousness as a transcendent 
in-itself, as an existent of the human world and not as 
[something] of consciousness. But it would be a mistake 
to conclude that the for-itself is purely and simply an 
‘impersonal’ contemplation. It is simply that, far from 
the Ego being the personalizing pole of a consciousness 
that would, without it, remain at the impersonal stage, it 
is consciousness, on the contrary that, in its fundamental 
ipseity, enables the Ego to appear in certain conditions 
as the transcendent phenomenon of that ipseity. In 
fact, as we have seen, it is not possible to say, of the in-
itself, that it is itself. It is, quite simply. And similarly, we 
should say of the ‘I’ – which is quite incorrectly regarded 
as an inhabitant of consciousness – that it is the ‘Me’ of 
consciousness, but not that it is its own self or itself (BN 
159-160)276. 
274 ‘nous constaterons qu’il n’y a pas de distinction de sujet-objet dans cette conscience. 
Le fait de dire qu’elle n’est pas habitée par un « ego » a essentiellement la signification 
suivante : c’est qu’un « ego » comme habitant de la conscience est un opacité dans 
la conscience ; en réalité si la conscience n’a pas un ego au niveau de l’immédiat et 
de la non-réflexivité, elle n’en est pas moins personnelle. Elle est personnelle parce 
qu’elle est renvoi, malgré tout, à soi.’ (CSF 150).
275 ‘la conscience, par le pur mouvement néantisant de la réflexion, se fait personnelle’ 
(BNF 140).
276 ‘l’Ego apparaît à la conscience comme un en-soi transcendant, comme un existant 
du monde humain, non comme de la conscience. Mais il n’en faudrait pas conclure 
que le pour-soi est une pure et simple contemplation « impersonnelle ». Simplement, 
loin que l’Ego soit le pôle personnalisant d’une conscience qui, sans lui, demeurerait 
au stade impersonnel, c’est au contraire la conscience dans son ipséité fondamentale 
qui permet l’apparition de l’Ego, dans certaines conditions, comme le phénomène 
transcendant de cette ipséité. En effet, nous l’avons vu, il est impossible de dire de 
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The Ego or the I is not what makes consciousness personal, but the 
dimension of ipseity does make it personal and allows us to form an 
Ego on the level of reflection.277 The I does not correspond with the 
stream of consciousness, as it is a transcendent object.278
What then is this ipseity of consciousness? In order to understand 
this notion, we have to understand Sartre’s conception of possibilities. 
The example of Pierre in the café, which we have already discussed, 
shows that there is a difference between a genuine negatity and a 
negative conceptual judgment. The same reasoning can be applied 
to possibilities. There are those which are encountered and those 
that are merely thought. The latter can be anything one is capable 
of thinking, the former are possibilities that one actively wants to 
pursue in light of one’s projected ends. In the War Diaries, Sartre 
calls them ‘exigencies’, and they are said to ‘draw their transcendent 
objectivity from the matter through which they are grasped, which 
is precisely the present object to be modified’ (WD 39)279. As we 
have discussed, within a situation it is impossible to distinguish 
objects from the meanings that we project on them. Therefore, 
certain possibilities demand certain actions of us. This does not 
mean that we unwillingly submit to these demands, as it is our own 
free projects that cause the objects to demand something of us in the 
first place. For example, if I made the choice to go rock-climbing, 
a certain rock may “demand” to be climbed by me. That does not 
mean that I automatically succeed in climbing it. I may be hindered 
in some way or another, but if I am not, I know that I will succeed in 
climbing it. For merely judged possibilities, this is not the case and 
they always remain merely probable. 
My possibilities are also quite often embodied. Sartre for example 
l’en-soi qu’il est soi. Il est, tout simplement. Et, en ce sens, du Je dont on fait bien à 
tort l’habitant de la conscience, on dira qu’il est le « Moi » de la conscience, mais non 
qu’il est son propre soi.’ (BNF 140).
277 Sartre’s notion of ipseity is inspired by Heidegger’s notion of Selbstheit (BN 52). 
Zahavi equates the notion with Husserl’s Meinheit (Zahavi 2010, 58). He uses the 
term “mineness” to describe both terms, which he also equates with Heidegger’s 
notion of Jemeinigkeit (Zahavi 2007, 189). Sartre only mentions this notion indirectly, 
by mentioning the statement ‘Dasein ist je meines’ (BN 337). He does not mention 
the term ipseity in this context however. Although Selbstheit and Jemeinigkeit are 
related, they do not mean exactly the same thing. For a discussion of these notions, 
see: (Romano 2017).
278 Apart from de-emphasizing the reflective Self, Sartre is also more critical of the idea 
that reflected experiences are objects in the sense that actions, states and qualities 
are in The Transcendence of the Ego. He introduces a difference between pure and 
impure reflection (BN 230). Pure reflection is the for-itself becoming aware of itself 
as for-itself, whereas impure reflection is the for-itself becoming aware of itself as in-
itself. For a more elaborate discussion of this distinction, see: (Reisman 2007, 45-74).
279 ‘exigences’ ‘tirent leur objectivité transcendante de la matière à travers quoi elles 
sont saisies, qui est précisément l’objet présent à modifier’ (WDF 55). 
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says that my legs are ‘the possibility that I am of walking, of running 
or playing football’ and speaks about the body ‘as a living possibility 
of running, of dancing, etc.’ (BN 411)280. Moreover, he states that: 
‘It is in its entirety that being-for-itself has to be body, and in its 
entirety that it has to be consciousness: it cannot be joined to a body’ 
(BN 412)281. He distances himself explicitly from Descartes’ mind-
body dualism: 
It seems at first sight that our preceding observations are 
in conflict with the findings of the Cartesian cogito. ‘The 
soul is easier to know than the body,’ said Descartes. 
And by that he intended to draw a radical distinction 
between the facts of thought that are accessible to 
reflection, and the facts about the body, whose knowledge 
has to be guaranteed by divine goodness, and indeed, 
it seems at first that reflection does only disclose pure 
facts of consciousness to us. Of course we will encounter 
phenomena at this level that appear to include within 
themselves some connection with the body: ‘physical’ 
pain, discomfort, pleasure, etc. But these phenomena 
are not any less pure facts of consciousness. There is a 
tendency therefore to make them into signs, affections 
of consciousness on the occasion of the body, without 
realizing that in so doing we have irremediably chased 
the body out of consciousness and that no connection 
will any longer be able to reunite this body […] and 
the consciousness that, it is claimed, is its manifestation 
(BN 412-413)282.
Our bodies are part of the ‘structures of non-thetic consciousness 
(of ) self ’, but precisely because of this we cannot know our subjective 
280 ‘possibilité que je suis de marcher, de courir ou de jouer au football’ ‘tant que 
possibilité vivante de courir, de danser, etc.’ (BNF 344).
281 ‘C’est tout entier gue l’être-pour-soi doit être corps et tout entier qu’il doit être 
conscience : il ne saurait être uni à un corps.’ (BNF 344).
282 ‘Il semble, à première vue, que nos remarques précédentes vont à l’opposé des 
données de cogito cartésien. « L’âme est plus aisée à connaître que le corps », 
disait Descartes. Et par là il entendait faire une distinction radicale entre les faits de 
pensée accessibles à la réflexion et les faits du corps dont la connaissance doit être 
garantie par la bonté divine. Et, de fait, il semble d’abord que la réflexion ne nous 
découvre que de purs faits de conscience. Sans doute rencontre-t-on sur ce plan des 
phénomènes qui paraissent comprendre en eux-mêmes quelque liaison avec le corps : 
la douleur « physique », le désagréable, le plaisir, etc. Mais ces phénomènes n’en 
sont pas moins de purs faits de conscience ; on aura donc tendance à en faire des 
signes, des affections de la conscience à l’occasion du corps, sans se rendre compte 
qu’on vient ainsi de chasser irrémédiablement le corps de la conscience et qu’aucun 
lien ne pourra plus rejoindre ce corps […] et la conscience dont on prétend qu’elle 
manifeste.’ (BNF 345).
Chapter 2
124 125
body as an object (BN 442)283. It is ‘neglected, “passed over in silence”, 
and yet it is what consciousness is; it is even nothing but the body; the 
rest is nothingness and silence’ (BN 442)284.285 Our body determines 
our place in the world and thereby determines our possibilities, but 
we project these possibilities on the objects around us. Thus, being 
able to climb a rock is directly related to our body, but we do not 
thematize the body explicitly in assessing this possibility. We will 
return to the topic of the (objective) body briefly in the next section. 
The key point for the moment is how it reveals that exigencies are 
not judged but prereflectively experienced in our engagement with 
the world. 
As all actions are directed towards goals which demand to be fulfilled, 
exigencies ‘appear on the horizon of my actions, as their meaning’ 
(WD 40)286. Sartre concludes that ‘the meaning of our situation 
is given at every instant by these possibles/options, noematic 
correlatives of our will awaiting us in the future. And it is they that 
motivate and shape our perceptions’ (WD 40)287. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Sartre held the view in The 
Transcendence of the Ego that the stream of consciousness unifies itself 
through inner time-consciousness. It is able to do so because objects 
remain constant. This position assumes a much more simplistic 
division between subjects and objects: if I exist within a situation, 
in which subjectivity and objectivity are intertwined, and I perceive 
within it “possibles”, which refer to actions not yet performed, then 
we cannot say that the continuity of the stream of consciousness 
is solely found in objects. As Sartre claims: ‘the bond between 
consciousness and its possibles is as real and concrete a bond as that 
between consciousness and things perceived’ (WD 41)288. 
This adds another degree of nihilation to the structure of the 
self-presence of consciousness. Not only does consciousness not 
coincide with the objects it is intentionally related to, it is also 
always confronted with possibilities which refer to actions not yet 
performed:
283 ‘structures de la conscience non-thétique (de) soi’ (BNF 369).
284 ‘le négligé, le « passé sous silence »’ (BNF 369-370).
285 In order to get a better understanding of this idea of being “passed over in silence”, 
it is helpful to think of it in terms of “lived experience”, a central notion in Sartre’s 
later works which we will discuss at length in the next chapter.
286 ‘paraissent à l’horizon de mes actes comme leur sens’ (WDF 56).
287 ‘le sens de notre situation est donné à chaque instant par ces possibles-options, 
corrélatifs noématiques de notre vouloir et qui nous attendent dans l’avenir’ (WDF 
56).
288 ‘le lien de la conscience à ses possibles est un lien aussi réel, aussi concret que le lien 
de la conscience aux choses perçues’ (WDF 57).
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Within ipseity, my possible casts its reflection on to 
my consciousness and defines it as what it is. Ipseity 
represents a degree of nihilation that goes further than 
the pure self-presence of the prereflective cogito, in so far 
as the possible that I am is not a presence to the for-itself 
(in the way that the mirrored relates to the mirroring) 
but is a presence-absence (BN 160)289.
Ipseity refers to the fact that in perceiving possibles, one is always 
confronted with what one is not yet. Exigencies can only be perceived 
as my possibilities if I am the same person now as the person that I 
will be when I have performed the required action. Things can only 
be perceived as meaningful within my fundamental project, but this 
also means that I am the same person at this point in time as I will be 
when the goals of my projects are attained. Hence, if we extend the 
notion of inner time-consciousness so that it can account for our own 
possibilities, we cannot hold that it is only the continuity of objects 
that makes the unity of my stream of consciousness possible. We can 
only recognize our possibilities as our own if our consciousness has 
some degree of selfness through time, and this is what ipseity entails. 
Hence, Sartre claims that ‘[t]he world (is) mine because it is haunted 
by possibles, of which the possible [acts of ] consciousness (of ) self 
that I am are conscious, and it is these possible as such that give the 
world its unity and its meaning as a world’ (BN 161)290.
Thus, the dimension of ipseity refers to the fact that I perceive a 
world of possibilities, and these refer back to the fact that they 
are my possibilities. Therefore, we cannot say that the process of 
unification through inner time-consciousness is impersonal. Not 
only are things retained and protained, so is my own identity as it 
unfolds through actions. Of course, over time, as I perform actions 
and other possibles arise, the possibles themselves do not remain 
continuous. Nevertheless, they do all refer to me as the agent who 
performs them. This is also why Sartre calls the relation we have 
to our possibles the ‘circuit of ipseity’ (BN 159)291: it is a constant 
movement of perceiving possibilities, performing actions and 
perceiving new possibilities in light these actions. This circuit is of 
course only possible in light of the fact that our possibles reflect back 
upon ourselves as the one who needs to perform these actions.
289 ‘Dans l’ipséité mon possible se réfléchit sur ma conscience et la détermine comme 
ce qu’elle est. L’ipséité représente un degré de néantisation plus poussé que la pure 
présence à soi du cogito préréflexif, en ce sens que le possible que je suis n’est pas une 
présence au pour-soi comme le reflet au reflétant, mais qu’il est présence-absente.’ 
(BNF 140).
290 ‘Le monde (est) mien parce qu’il est hanté par des possibles dont sont consciences 
les consciences possibles (de) soi que je suis et ce sont ces possibles en tant que tels 
qui lui donnent son unité et son sens de monde’ (BNF 141).
291 ‘circuit de l’ipséité’ (BNF 139).
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To sum up, Sartre’s ideas concerning subjective selfhood in this 
period of his work are marked by two major developments. One is 
the change of emphasis from the reflective to the prereflective. The 
other is the introduction of the notion of ipseity, which is closely 
related to his conception of situated freedom. His systematic interest 
in apodicticity motivates the first change, and it is for this reason 
that the self-presence of consciousness is named the prereflective 
cogito. The second development is related to Sartre’s emphasis on 
consciousness as a free project which is only possible if it has a degree 
of self-identity that allows it to perceive its possibilities as belonging 
to their future Self. This renders the stream of consciousness 
definitively personal. 
5. The Unattainable Self
As in the case of subjective selfhood, Sartre’s account of objective 
selfhood places a strong emphasis on negativity. As we will see, this 
is the only period in Sartre’s work where the idea that the Self is a 
thing is something he actually denies. The idea still plays a major 
role in his theories, but in a critical guise: when we regard ourselves 
and others as things, we misrecognize our “real” Selves. Before we 
turn to this topic, however, we will first discuss how Sartre sees the 
negative objective Self.  
The Self beyond the world
In the circuit of ipseity, one continually recognizes one’s possibles. In 
the War Diaries Sartre states: ‘Let us note that they are my possibles 
in two senses: first, because they are my own options, as we have 
seen; then, because they are the objective and transcendent image 
of my being-in-the-world’ (WD 40)292. We project an image of 
ourselves into the situation opened up by our current possibilities. 
This future Self transcends my current Self, but I never truly become 
this future Self, because when I act, new possibilities appear, and I 
thereby project another future Self. Hence, the transcendent image 
of ourselves also transcends our possibilities. Therefore, it is always 
‘on the other side of the world’ (WD 40)293. This transcendent Self is 
therefore like the horizon, always in the distance but never something 
we can actually arrive at. We ‘throw ourselves once into the world 
through a gap of nothingness, and […] throw our human reality 
to the horizon of the existent as an ideal’ (WD 147)294. Because 
292 ‘Notons qu’ils sont mes possibles en deux sens : d’abord parce que ce sont mes 
options propres, comme nous l’avons vu – ensuite parce qu’ils sont l’image objective 
et transcendante de mon être-dans-le-monde’ (WDF 56).
293 ‘de l’autre côté du monde’ (WDF 56).
294 ‘de se jeter dans le monde une fois, par une trouée de néant, et de jeter à l’horizon de 
l’existant notre réalité humaine comme un idéal’ (WDF 185).
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this image of ourselves is projected but never grasped, he uses the 
metaphor of a shadow:
Options are the noematic correlative of projects that 
are realized through acts, and projected human reality is 
the synthetic unity of options. […] This is what we shall 
call the ipseity or shadow of consciousness beyond the 
world – which has nothing to do with the Me, unity of 
reflexive consciousnesses (WD 40-41)295.
The transcendent Self that Sartre describes here is the opposite of 
the one he described in The Transcendence of the Ego. The Ego as the 
unity of reflexive consciousnesses can, as has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, only be grasped in hindsight by an act of reflection. 
It is based on actions and states that have taken place in reality and 
have cemented themselves in this reality. Note that Sartre does not 
deny that this Ego exists, he simply does not regard it to be important 
for our existence at this point in his intellectual development. 
The Self beyond the world is not reflectively grasped, it is rather 
implied in the circuit of ipseity and hence plays an active role in 
our lives. It is something which we continually do by projecting our 
ends on the world. Furthermore, it transcends possibilities, things 
which are not. Although they may be fulfilled, they do not have 
to be. Hence, they transcend not things that are but nothingness. 
Although the image we project may take the guise of an object, it is 
really only a projected image, and, therefore, something which can 
never exist:
The characteristic of Nothingness is not just to nihilate 
being, but to nihilate itself towards the in-itself. That’s 
why the transcendence of consciousness consists in 
surpassing the world towards an ipseity which it wants 
as an in-itself. But that in-itself which it projects 
beyond the world holds in itself the essential features 
of consciousness. It’s an in-itself which is to itself its 
own foundation, just as consciousness is to itself its 
own motivation; an in-itself which enwraps facticity, 
surpasses it and retains it in its womb. An in-itself that to 
itself is a for-itself. This hybrid projection of the in-itself 
and the for-itself is the only way in which consciousness 
can give itself the in-itself as an end (WD 206)296.
295 ‘Les options sont le corrélatif noématique des projets qui se réalisent à travers les 
actes et la réalité humaine projetée est l’unité synthétique des options. […] C’est ce 
que nous appellerons l’ipséité ou ombre portée de la conscience au-delà du monde – 
qui n’a rien à faire avec le Moi, unité des consciences réflexives.’ (WDF 56-57).
296 ‘Le propre du Néant n’est pas seulement de néantiser l’être mais de se néantir soi-
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Thus, the projected Self is treated by us as if it were a thing. One 
could say that becoming a thing is the ultimate end of all our projects. 
This is however by definition unattainable. The only being which is 
at once in-itself and for-itself is God, and to become God can be 
considered our ultimate end: ‘But the idea of God is contradictory 
and we lose ourselves in vain; man is a useless Passion’ (BN 797)297. 
This statement once again conveys Sartre’s idea that the Self we 
project beyond the world is unattainable, that by positing ends and 
making choices we try to become that which will always elude us. 
Furthermore, Sartre also calls the projected Self the ‘ontological 
mirage of the Self ’ and says that we are ‘projecting ourselves, in vain, 
towards the Self ’ (BN 201, 202)298.
One could argue that because it is a projected image, it is more 
closely tied to imaginary objects than to real ones. However, we must 
realize that the Self beyond the world is not posited as the object of 
our acts, but is rather non-thetically implied in our projects. Hence, 
it is not a negatity, a definite non-existent object – indeed, it is not 
an object at all: 
[T]he being of self-consciousness is such that in its being 
its being is in question; therefore, it is pure interiority. It 
constantly refers to a self that it has to be. Its being is 
defined by this: that it is this being in the mode of being 
what it is not, and of not being what it is. Its being is, 
therefore, a radical exclusion of all objectivity: I am the 
one who cannot be an object for myself, and who cannot 
even conceive for himself of existence in the form of an 
object (BN 333)299[.] 
même vers l’en-soi. C’est pourquoi la transcendance de la conscience consiste à 
dépasser le monde vers une ipséité qu’elle veut comme un en-soi. Mais cet en-soi 
qu’elle projette par-delà le monde retient en lui-même les caractères essentiels de 
la conscience. C’est un en-soi qui est à soi-même son propre fondement, comme la 
conscience est à elle-même sa propre motivation, un en-soi qui enveloppe, dépasse 
et retient en ses flancs la facticité. Un en-soi qui est à lui-même un pour-soi. Cette 
projection hybride de l’en-soi et dur pour-soi est la seule manière dont la conscience 
puisse se donner à elle-même comme fin l’en-soi.’ (WDF 253).
297 ‘Mais l’idée de Dieu est contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain ; l’homme est 
une passion inutile’ (BNF 662).
298 ‘le mirage ontologique du Soi’, ‘se projeter vainement vers le Soi’ (BNF 172, 173). 
299 ‘l’être de la conscience de soi est tel qu’en son être il est question de son être, cela 
signifie qu’elle est pure intériorité. Elle est perpétuellement renvoi à un soi qu’elle a à 
être. Son être se définit par ceci qu’elle est cet être sur le mode d’être ce qu’elle n’est 
pas et de ne pas être ce qu’elle est. Son être est donc l’exclusion radicale de toute 
objectivité : je suis celui qui ne peut pas être objet pour moi-même, celui qui ne peut 
même pas concevoir pour soi l’existence sous forme d’objet’ (BNF 280).
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Just as a single conscious act does not coincide with an object, we 
never coincide with the image of ourselves we project beyond the 
world. Sartre abandons the idea that our Self is a thing, and instead 
makes it a nothingness, an unattainable ideal of a thing, which is 
itself the transcendent totality of mere possibilities, of actions not 
(yet) taken, of deeds left undone. Although this Self is at the limit 
of our conscious experiences, it is still no “inhabitant” of it. As Sartre 
says about his new theory: ‘Does that mean I’m going to allow the 
Me back in? No, certainly not. But though the ipseity or totality of 
the for-itself is not the Me, it’s nevertheless the person’ (WD 324-
325)300.301
The futile nature of this project is also a reason why people succumb 
to what Sartre calls “bad faith”. This is the idea that people can 
genuinely fool themselves into thinking that they are something 
which they are not. Bad faith reveals the individual as a ‘being that 
can adopt negative attitudes in relation to itself ’ (BN 87)302. Not 
only do we not coincide with ourselves, we do not coincide with the 
fact that we do no coincide with ourselves. Because of this, we can act as 
if we are in-itself, but we never really are. Sartre’s famous description 
of the waiter conveys this: 
Consider this café waiter. His movements are animated 
and intent, a bit too precise, a bit too quick; he approaches 
the customers with a bit too much animation; he leans 
forward a bit too attentively, his voice and his eyes 
expressing an interest in the customer’s order that is a 
bit too solicitous. Finally, here he is, on his way back, 
and attempting in his attitude to imitate the inflexible 
exactitude of some kind of automaton, while carrying his 
tray with the recklessness characteristic of a tightrope 
walker, holding it in a constantly unstable and constantly 
disrupted equilibrium, which he constantly restores with 
a light movement of his arm and hand. His behaviour 
throughout strikes us as an act. He concentrates on his 
successive movements as if they were mechanisms, each 
one of them governing the others; his facial expression 
and even his voice seem to be mechanical; he adopts the 
pitiless nimbleness and rapidity of things. He is playing, 
amusing himself. But what, then, is he playing at? One 
does not need to watch him for long to realize: he is 
300 ‘Est-ce à dire que je vais laisser rentrer le Moi ? Non, certes. Mais l’ipséité ou totalité 
du pour-soi n’est pas le Moi et pourtant elle est la personne’ (WDF 394). 
301 This idea is close to that of “personalization”, which we will discuss in the next 
chapter. 
302 ‘celui qui peut prendre des attitudes négatives vis-à-vis de soi’ (BNF 81).
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playing at being a café waiter (BN 102-103)303.
The café waiter tries to conform as much as possible to the 
stereotype of the waiter, to the essence of what it means to be a 
waiter. Since they are conscious beings, however, people do not 
coincide with themselves and thereby do not coincide with their 
activities, occupations or roles. When one tries to coincide, one 
appears unnatural, and it becomes clear that one is merely playing 
at being something rather than actually being that thing. Bad faith 
then consists in denying one’s fundamental indeterminacy: ‘bad 
faith’s most basic act is to flee from something it is impossible to flee 
from: to flee from what one is’ (BN 117)304.  
One could also define this as acting as if one were a thing. Another 
example Sartre gives of bad faith is a woman who is on a first date 
with a man and does not acknowledge his sexual advances:
Let us take, for example, this woman who has arrived 
at a first meeting. She knows full well the intentions 
entertained, in relation to her, by the man speaking to 
her. She also knows that sooner or later she will have 
to make a decision. But she does not want to feel its 
urgency: she takes account only of the respectful and 
discreet aspects of her partner’s attitude. She does not 
see his behaviour as an attempt to make the so-called 
‘opening moves’; in other words, she does not want to 
see the possibilities of development over time that his 
behaviour presents; she confines his activity to what is 
present, and has no wish to read, in the sentences he 
addresses to her, anything but their explicit meaning. 
[…] The man speaking to her appears to her as sincere 
and respectful, in the way a table is round or square, or 
a wall-hanging is blue or grey. And the properties she 
303 ‘Considérons ce garçon de café. II a le geste vif et appuyé, un peu trop précis, un 
peu trop rapide, il vient vers les consommateurs d’un pas un peu trop vif, il s’incline 
avec un peu trop d’empressement, sa voix, ses yeux expriment un intérêt un peu 
trop plein de sollicitude pour la commande du client, enfin le voilà qui revient, en 
essayant d’imiter dans sa démarche la rigueur inflexible d ‘on ne sait quel automate, 
tout en portant son plateau avec une sorte de témérité de funambule, en le mettant 
dans un équilibre perpétuellement instable et perpétuellement rompu, qu’il rétablit 
perpétuellement d’un mouvement léger du bras et de la main . Toute sa conduite nous 
semble un jeu. Il s’applique à enchaîner ses mouvements comme s’ils étaient des 
mécanismes se commandant les uns les autres, sa mimique et sa voix même semblent 
des mécanismes ; il se donne la prestesse et la rapidité impitoyable des choses. Il 
joue, il s’amuse. Mais à quoi donc joue-t-il ? Il ne faut pas l’observer longtemps pour 
s’en rendre compte : il joue à être garçon de café.’ (BNF 94).
304 ‘l’acte premier de mauvaise foi est pour fuir ce qu’on ne peut pas fuir, pour fuir ce 
qu’on est’ (BNF 105).
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hereby attaches to the person to whom she is listening 
are, therefore, frozen in a thing-like permanence – which 
is nothing but the projection, into the flow of time, of 
their strict present (BN 97)305.
This example can be understood in light of the circuit of ipseity and 
its projecting of possibilities. The woman has to decide between two 
possibilities of action: does she accept the advances of the man, or 
not. She denies, however, that she is a free project. She does this 
by denying that possibilities are projected towards the future and 
instead acts as if there is only the present situation. Thereby the 
situation gains a “thing-like” permanence: it is no longer regarded 
as the interplay between for-itself and in-itself, but merely as an 
objective state of affairs that does not change in light of her actions. 
Continuing his example, Sartre depicts how the man takes her hand 
and urges the woman to make an immediate decision. She finds a 
way to defer the decision, however: ‘We know what happens now: 
the young woman leaves her hand where it is but she does not notice 
she has left it there’ (BN 98)306. She continues to talk about her life, 
as if she were pure spirit: ‘And while she does this, the divorce of 
body from soul is accomplished: her hand rests there, inert between 
the hot hands of her partner, neither consenting nor resisting – a 
thing’ (BN 98)307. Hence, she not only makes the situation into a 
static one without possibilities, she turns her own body into a thing:
[S]he actualizes herself as not being her own body, and 
she contemplates it from a height as a passive object to 
which things might happen, but which can neither 
305 ‘Voici, par exemple, une femme qui s’est rendue à un premier rendez-vous. Elle 
sait fort bien les intentions que l’homme qui lui parle nourrit à son égard. Elle sait 
aussi qu’il lui faudra prendre tôt ou tard une décision. Mais elle n’en veut pas sentir 
l’urgence : elle s’attache seulement à ce qu’offre de respectueux et de discret l’attitude 
de son partenaire. Elle ne saisit pas cette conduite comme une tentative pour réaliser 
ce qu’on nomme « les première approches », c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne veut pas voir 
les possibilités de développement temporel que présente cette conduite : elle borne 
ce comportement à ce qu’il est dans le présent, elle ne veut pas lire dans les phrases 
qu’on lui adresse autre chose que leur sens explicite […] L’homme qui lui parle lui 
semble sincère et respectueux comme la table est ronde ou carrée, comme la tenture 
murale est bleue ou grise. Et les qualités ainsi attachées à la personne qu’elle écoute 
se sont ainsi figées dans une permanence chosiste qui n’est autre que la projection 
dans l ‘écoulement temporel de leur strict présent.’ (BNF 89-90). 
306 ‘On sait ce qui se produit alors : la jeune femme abandonne sa main, mais ne 
s’aperçoit pas qu’elle l’abandonne’ (BNF 90).
307 ‘Et pendant ce temps, le divorce du corps et de l’âme est accompli ; la main repose 
inerte entre les mains chaudes de son partenaire : ni consentante ni résistante – une 
chose’ (BNF 90).
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provoke them nor avoid them, because all possibles lie 
outside it (BN 98)308.
Of course, we exist within a world of things. Even our body in so 
far as it is a physical object is a thing. As we have seen in the first 
part of this chapter, however, only our projects give this meaning 
to the state of affairs in the world. If one treats oneself as a mere 
object, one still acts as if this is not the case. Our facticity and our 
transcendence are one, in the sense that they give meaning to one 
another, not in the sense that one can be reduced to the other. Thus, 
bad faith comes down to saying that “we are what we are”, we are 
what our circumstances have made of us. As we have seen, this is the 
mode of Being of things, and we are not what we are (and are what 
we are not). The woman in the example does exactly this by freezing 
time and hence denying the transcendence of the present. In other 
words, she acts as if the fact that we are situated amongst things 
that appear in light of our projects meant merely to be one object 
amongst others that fully determine the situation: 
We have […] seen the use our young woman was able 
to make of our being-in-the-midst-of-the-world – i.e. 
of our inert presence as a passive object among other 
objects – in order to unburden herself suddenly of the 
demands of her being-in-the- world, i.e. of the being 
that makes the world happen, by projecting itself beyond 
the world towards its possibilities (BN 101)309.
Of course, the things around us determine our projects, but they can 
only do so because we project ends upon them. Hence, one cannot 
isolate this element of human existence and act as if one were a 
passive object determined by the things in one’s environment, as if 
one is a thing. Furthermore, Sartre also distances himself from the 
views of The Transcendence of the Ego in this context. Because it is also 
a thing, if one considers the transcendent Ego that appears before 
reflection as all that one is, one is also in bad faith (BN 231). 
The opposite of bad faith is authenticity. Leaving aside his discussions 
of the related notion in Heidegger’s work, Sartre only refers to this 
notion once in Being and Nothingness. In a footnote at the end of the 
chapter on bad faith, he says that in order to truly escape bad faith, 
308 ‘elle se réalise comme n’étant pas son propre corps et elle le contemple de son haut 
comme un objet passif auquel des événements peuvent arriver, mais qui ne saurait ni 
les provoquer ni les éviter, parce que tous ses possibles sont hors de lui.’ (BNF 91).
309 ‘On a vu […] l’usage que notre jeune femme faisait de notre être-au-milieu-du-
monde, c’est-à-dire de notre présence inerte d’objet passif parmi d’autres objets, 
pour se décharger soudain des fonctions de son être-dans-le-monde, c’est-à-dire de 
l’être qui fait qu’il y a un monde en se projetant par delà le monde vers ses propres 
possibilités.’ (BNF 92).
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being-for-itself needs to reclaim itself (BN 117). In the Notebooks for 
an Ethics, he relates it to the Self:
Get rid of the I and the Me. In their place put subjectivity 
as a lived monadic totality that refers back to the self of 
consciousness by itself (laterally–cf. The Transcendence of 
the Ego) and the Ego (I reserve this name for the always 
open-ended Me which is referred to by the undertaking. 
Always open-ended, always deferred) (NE 417)310.
Although Sartre here explicitly uses the terms differently, referring 
to the Ego as the Self beyond the world and not the totality of 
the I and the Me, the message is clear: one should not see oneself 
as a determinate object, but as an open-ended undertaking. Still, 
the notion of authenticity is ultimately very difficult to understand 
because Sartre provides very few concrete examples of how one can 
act authentically.311 We can only give a negative definition: not to act 
in bad faith, as we have seen, amounts to not considering oneself as 
a thing. 
The notion of Self Sartre defends in Being and Nothingness and 
related texts is still closely related to objectivity, but negatively so. 
That is, Sartre vehemently denies that the Self is a thing, in stark 
contrast to his early works, while maintaining, at the same time, that 
in bad faith we continually act as if it were a thing.
Object-for-the-Other
Another way in which subjects can appear as objects is when 
they appear before another subject, before the Other. We will not 
go into all the details concerning Sartre’s ideas about alterity and 
intersubjectivity, but will instead focus on what Sartre’s theories 
concerning the Other can tell us about the question of selfhood.
Most philosophers who tried to tackle the problem of intersubjectivity 
or of the existence of other minds have tried to find a subjectivity 
behind the object-Other as it is encountered. Sartre compares this 
approach to the search for a true noumenal object behind the object 
as it appears to us (BN 348). As we have discussed in the first part 
of this chapter, Sartre does not think that there can be an object 
behind the series of appearances, and the same is true for the Other 
310 ‘Se débarrasser du Je et du Moi. En face mettre la subjectivité comme totalité 
monadique vécue avec renvoi à soi de la conscience par elle-même (latéralement, cf. 
Essai sur la transcendance de l’Ego) et l’Ego (je réserve ce nom à ce Moi toujours 
ouvert, qui est renvoyé par l’entreprise. Toujours ouvert, toujours en sursis).’ (NEF 
433).
311 For a discussion of Sartre’s notion of authenticity, see: (Webber 2013).
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as object. The most famous instance of such a search for a subject 
behind the Other which we encounter is perhaps Descartes, when he 
asks: ‘what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may 
cover automatic machines?’ (Descartes 1996, 56-57). This phrase is 
echoed by Sartre when he says that ‘it is infinitely probable that the 
passer-by whom I see is a man, and not a sophisticated robot’ (BN 
347)312. Probability is however not sufficient for the construction 
of a philosophical theory of the Other. Other people appear to us 
differently than inanimate objects do because we can perceive the 
intentional relationship they have towards their surroundings to 
a certain extent. Sartre gives the example of seeing a man who is 
walking on a lawn despite the presence of a sign prohibiting this:
[I]t is probable that this object is a man; further, even if 
it were certain that he is one, it remains merely probable 
that he sees the grass in the same moment as I see it: 
he might be dreaming of some enterprise without being 
fully conscious of his surroundings, he might be blind, 
etc. Nonetheless, this new relation between the man-
object and the grass-object has a particular character. 
It is given to me in its entirety, since it is there, in 
the world, as an object that I am able to know (and it 
really is an objective relation that I express when I say 
‘Pierre glanced at his watch’, ‘Jeanne looked through 
the window’, etc.), and at the same time it escapes me 
entirely (BN 350)313[.]
Although I perceive others as having meaningful relations with their 
surroundings, I can never fully grasp how they perceive them. These 
relations can appear to me in a certain manner, but I never really 
know whether I perceive them in the same way as the Other. Hence, 
when it comes to knowing the Other as a subject rather than an 
object, I can only attain the level of probability. 
In light of this, it is important to stress that the view of the Other 
found in The Transcendence of the Ego cannot sufficiently account for 
this subject-Other:
312 ‘il est infiniment probable que le passant que j’aperçois soit un homme et non un 
robot perfectionné’ (BNF 292).
313 ‘il est probable que cet objet soit un homme ; ensuite, fût-il certain qu’il en soit un, 
il reste seulement probable qu’il voie la pelouse au moment où je le perçois : il peut 
rêver à quelque entreprise sans prendre nettement conscience de ce qui l’environne, 
il peut être aveugle, etc. Pourtant, cette relation neuve de l’objet-homme à l’objet-
pelouse a un caractère particulier : elle m’est à la fois donnée tout entière, puisqu’elle 
est là, dans le monde, comme un objet que je puis connaître (c’est bien, en effet, une 
relation objective que j’exprime en disant : Pierre a jeté un coup d ‘œil sur sa montre, 
Jeanne a regardé par la fenêtre, etc.) et, à la fois, elle m’échappe tout entière’ (BNF 
294).
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I once believed that I could escape solipsism by denying 
Husserl the existence of his transcendental ‘Ego’. At 
the time it seems to me that, since I was emptying it of 
its subject, nothing would be left in my consciousness 
that could be privileged in relation to the Other. But 
in fact, even though I remain persuaded that the 
hypothesis of the transcendental subject is useless and 
harmful, abandoning it does not advance the question 
of the Other’s existence by a single step. Even if, outside 
the empirical Ego there was nothing other than […] a 
transcendental field without a subject – it would remain 
no less true that my assertion of the Other postulates 
and demands the existence, beyond the world, of a 
similar transcendental field and in consequence that, 
here too, the only way of escaping solipsism will be 
proving that my transcendental consciousness is, in its 
very being, affected by the extraworldly existence of 
other consciousnesses of the same type (BN 324-325)314. 
It is clear that Sartre considers the theory of the Other he provided in 
his previous work to be insufficient from the more general perspective 
of his theory of selfhood. Indeed, if the Self is a transcendent thing 
and the stream of consciousness is impersonal, then it would follow 
that if we wanted to know the Other in a meaningful way, we 
would only have to know this object. However, as we have seen, 
Sartre’s theory has changed. He still thinks we can prereflectively 
grasp the “ego” as a thing, but he does not seem to give this notion 
any existential weight. Our true Self lies in the circuit of ipseity 
and the transcendent Self beyond the world that arises from this. 
From the perspective of The Transcendence of the Ego, where the Self 
is understood as a thing, we have – as we have seen in the previous 
chapter – the same epistemological access to our own Selves as we 
have to that of Others. If our Self is the transcendent horizon of our 
possibilities, which only arise in the situation created by our projects, 
then we no longer have the same access to the Self of other people. 
The most fundamental dimension of selfhood no longer lies in the 
314 ‘J’avais cru, autrefois, pouvoir échapper au solipsisme en refusant à Husserl l’existence 
de son « Ego » transcendantal I. Il me semblait alors qu’il ne demeurait plus rien 
dans ma conscience qui fût privilégié par rapport à autrui, puisque je la vidais de 
son sujet. Mais, en fait, bien que je demeure persuadé que l’hypothèse d’un sujet 
transcendantal est inutile et néfaste, son abandon ne fait pas avancer d’un pas la 
question de l ‘existence d’autrui. Si même, en dehors de l’Ego empirique, il n’y avait 
rien d’autre que […]  un champ transcendantal sans sujet - il n’en demeurerait pas 
moins que mon affirmation d’autrui postule et réclame l’existence, par delà le monde, 
d ‘un semblable champ transcendantal ; et, par suite, la seule façon d’échapper au 
solipsisme serait, ici encore, de prouver que ma conscience transcendantale, dans 
son être même, est affectée par l’existence extra-mondaine d’autres consciences de 
même type.’ (BNF 274).
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objective but in the subjective dimension. 
Sartre’s theory of the Other as subject can be found in the notion of 
‘the look’ (BN 347)315. He develops this notion through the analysis 
of an example of someone who is spying on people:
Let us imagine that, through jealousy, curiosity or 
vice, I have come to stick my ear against a door or to 
look through a keyhole. I am alone and non-thetically 
conscious (of ) myself. That means in the first place that 
there is no me inhabiting consciousness. […] I am a pure 
consciousness of things, and the things caught within 
the circuit of ipseity, offer me their potentialities as a 
response to my non-thetic consciousness (of ) my own 
possibilities (BN 355)316. 
In this situation, I am not aware of myself but only of the spectacle 
that unfolds behind the closed door. Of course, the situation is 
generated by jealousy or some other interest in the things, which 
thereby become a spectacle. Nevertheless, my attitude is ‘nothing but 
the simple fact that there is a spectacle to be seen behind the door’ (BN 
356)317. In other words, there is a situation, which is an interplay 
between my projects and the things around me, but there is no 
explicit awareness of myself as someone who plays a part in creating 
the situation. The example continues: 
And now I hear footsteps in the corridor: someone 
is looking at me. What does this mean? That all of 
sudden I am touched in my being, and that essential 
modifications appear within my structures […].
In the first place, I exist now for my unreflected 
consciousness as my me. […] [W]hile we were 
considering the for-itself in its solitude, we were able to 
maintain that the unreflected consciousness could not 
be inhabited by a me: my me could only be given, as 
an object, to reflective consciousness. But now we see 
the me coming to haunt unreflected consciousness (BN 
356-357)318.
315 ‘le regard’ (BNF 292).
316 ‘Imaginons que j’en sois venu, par jalousie, par intérêt, par vice, à coller mon oreille 
contre une porte, à regarder par le trou d’une serrure. Je suis seul et sur le plan de la 
conscience non-thétique (de) moi. Cela signifie d’abord qu’il n’y a pas de moi pour 
habiter ma conscience. […] Je suis pure conscience des choses et les choses, prises 
dans le circuit de mon ipséité, m ‘offrent leurs potentialités comme réplique de ma 
conscience non-thétique (de) mes possibilités propres.’ (BNF 298).
317 ‘sinon le simple fait objectif qu’il y a un spectacle à voir derrière la porte’ (BNF 299).
318 ‘Or, voici que j’ai entendu des pas dans le corridor : on me regarde. Qu’est-ce que cela 
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROJECT
138 139
A dimension of selfhood we have not yet discussed is introduced 
here: I am aware of myself being an object in the eyes, or, more 
precisely, the look, of another person. According to Sartre, the 
moment I get caught by another person, I become aware of the fact 
that I have an outside. This does not require an act of reflection as 
I am immediately caught in the act. Instead, ‘I have my foundation 
outside myself. For myself, I am no more than a pure reference to 
the Other’ (BN 357)319. 
This does not mean that this me, the object the Other perceives, 
is merely something that this person perceives and that remains 
unrelated to me. In a certain sense, it is me, but I can never know 
myself in this manner. The reason is that I cannot be subject and object 
at the same time, because of the self-presence of consciousness. I do, 
however, feel the effects of having an outside in the form of feelings 
such as shame or pride: ‘shame is shame of oneself; it is recognition 
that I really am this object that is looked at and judged the Other’ 
(BN 358)320. Such emotions are again not a matter of judgment, I 
can feel them prereflectively. Thus, in the look of the Other, I truly 
am an object:
As a spatio-temporal object, as an essential structure 
of a spatio-temporal situation within the world, I am 
offered to the Other’s assessment. I grasp that, too, 
through the pure exercise of the cogito: to be looked at is 
to grasp oneself as the unknown object of unknowable 
assessments […]. But, to be precise, at the same time as 
I recognize – through shame or pride – the validity of 
these assessments, I do not cease to take them for what 
they are: a free surpassing of possibilities. […] In this 
way, being seen constitutes me as a defenceless being for 
a freedom that is not my freedom (BN 365)321.
veut dire ? C’est que je suis soudain atteint dans mon être et que des modifications 
essentielles apparaissent dans mes structures […]. 
 D’abord, voici que j’existe en tant que moi pour ma conscience irréfléchie. […] tant 
que nous avons considéré le pour-soi dans sa solitude, nous avons pu soutenir que 
la conscience irréfléchie ne pouvait être habitée par un moi : le moi ne se donnait, à 
titre d’objet, que pour la conscience réflexive. Mais voici que le moi vient hanter la 
conscience irréfléchie.’ (BNF 299).
319 ‘j’ai mon fondement hors de moi. Je ne suis pour moi que comme pur renvoi à autrui’ 
(BNF 300).
320 ‘la honte […] est honte de soi, elle est reconnaissance de ce que je suis bien cet objet 
qu’autrui regarde et juge’ (BNF 300).
321 ‘En tant qu’objet temporo-spatial du monde, en tant que structure essentielle d’une 
situation temporo-spatiale dans le monde, je m’offre aux appréciations d’autrui. Cela 
aussi, je le saisis par le pur exercice du cogito : être regardé, c’est se saisir comme 
objet inconnu d’appréciations inconnaissables […] Mais, précisément, en même 
temps que, par la honte ou la fierté, je reconnais le bien-fondé de ces appréciations, 
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In his analysis of getting caught Sartre has articulated a proof of 
the existence of the Other as a subject, a proof that is ‘produced 
entirely at the level of the cogito’ (BN 366)322. 323 In Existentialism is 
a Humanism, Sartre emphasizes the intersubjective nature of the 
cogito very explicitly:
The subjectivity that we thereby attain as a standard 
of truth is not strictly individual in nature, for we 
have demonstrated that it is not only oneself that one 
discovers in the cogito, but also the existence of others. 
Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, or of Kant, 
when we say “I think,” we each attain ourselves in the 
presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the 
other as we are of ourselves (EH 41)324.
Just as Sartre had earlier argued that the I would fall under the 
phenomenological reduction in The Transcendence of the Ego, he now 
argues that the Other cannot be reduced in such a way:
[T]he Other is given to me as a concrete and evident 
presence that I can in no way derive from myself and 
which cannot in any way be placed in doubt, be made 
the object of a phenomenological reduction, or any 
other ‘ἐποχή’ (BN 370)325.
This irreducible presence brings us to the third form of Being in 
Sartre’s ontological system. There is a set of beings which are neither 
truly in-itself nor for-itself. These are the outside of a for-itself, the 
je ne cesse pas de les prendre pour ce qu’elles sont : un dépassement libre du donné 
vers des possibilités. […] Ainsi, être vu me constitue comme un être sans défense 
pour une liberté qui n’est pas ma liberté.’ (BNF 306).
322 ‘a été faite tout entière sur le plan du cogito’ (BNF 307).
323 It is interesting to note the similarity here with Lacan’s idea of the mirror stage: the 
idea that small infants can recognize themselves in the mirror and hence recognize 
themselves as an object, rather than as a subject. Lacan thinks, however, that this 
idea is one that stands in opposition to the cogito: ‘The conception of the mirror stage 
[…] is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the 
Cogito’ (Lacan 2001, 1). Interestingly, Sartre would later say that his descriptions of 
Flaubert in The Family Idiot are close to Lacan’s description of the mirror stage (OTF 
117).
324 ‘la subjectivité que nous atteignons là à titre de vérité n’est pas une subjectivité 
rigoureusement individuelle, car nous avons démontré que dans le cogito, on 
ne se découvrait pas seulement soi-même, mais aussi les autres. Par le je pense, 
contrairement à la philosophie de Descartes, contrairement à la philosophie de Kant, 
nous nous atteignons nous-mêmes en face de l’autre, et l’autre est aussi certain pour 
nous que nous-mêmes’ (EHF 65-66).
325 ‘autrui se donne à moi comme une présence concrète et évidente que je ne puis 
aucunement tirer de moi et qui ne peut aucunement être mise en doute ni faire l’objet 
d’une réduction phénoménologique ou de toute autre « ἐποχή ».’ (BNF 310).
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way it appears to another for-itself: the being-for-the-Other:
[My] object-being or being-for-the-Other is radically 
different from my being-for-myself. […] The object 
is what is not my consciousness and, in consequence, 
something that does not have the characteristics of 
consciousness for me is the consciousness that is mine. 
Thus, the me-object-for-me is a me which is not me, i.e. 
me that does not have the characteristics of consciousness. 
It is a degraded consciousness: objectification is a radical 
metamorphosis and, even if I were able to see myself 
clearly and distinctly as an object, what I would see 
would not be an adequate representation of what I am 
(BN 372-373)326[.]
Thus, in a certain sense, I am an object rather than a subject, but I 
can never have any real relation towards this objectivity. It is radically 
different from my Being as a subjectivity. Only in the presence of 
another subject does this object-being truly appear: ‘the Other is for 
me in the first instance the being for whom I am an object, i.e. the 
being through whom I gain my objecthood’ (BN 369)327. We must 
keep in mind, however, that this object is a ‘deformed image’ of my 
true being as a subject, but it is still an image of me (BN 101)328. As 
we have seen, it is for this reason that we can experience feelings 
such as shame and pride. In the Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre relates 
this to the terminology of The Transcendence of the Ego, stating that 
‘the I and the Me’ are ‘forms of the Other’s ontological priority’ (NE 
418)329 The image that others create of us can be overwhelming. In 
these cases, as Sartre puts it in Saint Genet: ‘we are tempted to regard 
the information of our consciousness as dubious and obscure. This 
means that we have given primacy to the object which we are to 
Others over the subject we are to ourselves’ (SG 33)330.331
326 ‘mon être-objet ou être-pour-autrui est profondément différent de mon être-pour-
moi. […] L’objet c’est ce qui n’est pas ma conscience et, par suite, ce qui n’a pas les 
caractères de la conscience, puisque le seul existant qui a pour moi les caractères de 
la conscience, c’est la conscience qui est mienne. Ainsi, le moi-objet-pour-moi est un 
moi qui n’est pas moi, c’est-à-dire qui n’a pas les caractères de la conscience. Il est 
conscience dégradée ; l’objectivation est une métamorphose radicale et, si même je 
pouvais me voir clairement et distinctement comme objet, ce que je verrais ne serait 
pas la représentation adéquate de ce que je suis’ (BNF 312).
327 ‘autrui est d’abord pour moi l’être pour qui je suis objet, c’est-à-dire l’être par qui je 
gagne mon objectité’ (BNF 309).
328 ‘image déformée’ (BNF 92).
329 ‘le Je et le Moi’ ‘formes de la priorité ontologique de l’Autre’ (NEF 433).
330 ‘nous avons donné la primauté à l’objet que nous sommes pour Autrui sur le sujet que 
nous sommes pour nous-même’ (SGF 37).
331 Sartre’s theory of the Other in Being and Nothingness can be considered one of 
his most influential ideas, especially in philosophies that address social issues. He 
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As Sartre sees it, those instances in which I do perceive myself as an 
object only bring about a degraded object, in which I look at myself 
as if I were another person: ‘I cannot be an object for myself ’ and 
when I assume that I can, ‘I implicitly presuppose […] the Other’s 
existence’ (BN 369)332. The phenomenon of bad faith is rooted in 
this idea. Because it is given that in one’s experiential life one can 
always become an object in the eyes of another subject, one applies 
this way of looking to oneself. In (certain instances of ) bad faith, 
‘the for-itself escapes to the for-the Other, and the for-the-Other 
escapes to the for-itself ’ (BN 101)333.
It is also evident that the same confusion of Self and Other lies 
at the core of mind-body dualism. Methodologically speaking, this 
clarifies why Sartre discusses the body at such a late stage in the 
book. He first needs to develop his theory of the Other in order to 
properly tackle the problem of the body. When we see our bodies 
from an anatomical point of view, we already look at them as if they 
belonged to someone else: ‘the being that is in this way revealed to 
me is its being-for-the-Other’ (BN 411)334. There is no mind-body 
dualism, because the body-for-itself is entirely conscious and the 
body is at the same time entirely for-the-Other:
It is in its entirety that being-for-itself has to be body, 
and in its entirety that is has to be consciousness: it 
cannot be joined to a body. Similarly, being-for-the-
Other is entirety body; here there are no ‘psychological 
phenomena’ to be joined to the body; there is nothing 
behind the body (BN 412)335. 
One could say that the two facets of the body are two ways of 
looking at the same thing, but this description misses the point: one 
is the body as subject, which cannot be grasped as an object but is 
only experienced subjectively; the other is the body as an object, 
which can only be experienced from the point of view of another 
subject. Sartre claims to ‘fully embrace the view that each of these 
himself elaborated upon it in relation to anti-Semitism in Anti-Semite and Jew (ASJ), 
De Beauvoir has used aspects of Sartre’s theory in her feminist classic The Second 
Sex, and Fanon has used it to critically examine racism in Black Skin, White Masks 
(De Beauvoir 1953, Fanon 1986).
332 ‘Je ne puis être objet pour moi-même’ ‘je suppose implicitement […] l’existence 
d’autrui’ (BNF 309).
333 ‘évasion perpétuelle du pour-soi au pour-autrui et du pour-autrui au pour-soi’ (BNF 
92).
334 ‘l’être qui m’est ainsi révélé est son être-pour-autrui’ (BNF 344).
335 ‘C’est tout entier que l’être-pour-soi doit être corps et tout entier qu’il doit être 
conscience : il ne saurait être uni à un corps. Pareillement l’être-pour-autrui est corps 
tout entier ; il n’y a pas là de « phénomènes psychiques » à unir au corps ; il n’y a rien 
derrière le corps.’ (BNF 344-345).
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two aspects of the body, being at two different and incommunicable 
levels of being, is irreducible to the other’ (BN 412)336. Hence, he 
states: ‘Either it [the body] is a thing among things, or it is that 
through which things are disclosed to me. But it cannot be both 
(BN 410)337. We will not delve further into the details of Sartre’s 
theory of embodiment, as its role in selfhood is clear from what we 
have already discussed: either it is that which gives me a place in the 
world and which determines my possibilities for a large part, or it is 
that which the Other sees when she looks at me.338 
Thus, to sum up Sartre’s view of objective selfhood in this period 
of his work, we can say that his idea that the Self is a thing among 
things only has prominence in a negative sense at this stage. 
Although we continually  tend to view ourselves as objects, we do so 
in bad faith. We are never really objects for ourselves. Only the Other 
can view us as such, and hence if there is still some semblance of the 
idea that the Self is a thing among things, then it is so for-Others. 
The other part of Sartre’s theory of objective selfhood hinges on a 
negative object, a Self that is projected beyond the world as the limit 
of one’s possibilities. We are a free consciousness that posits ends 
and perceives possibilities, but in this project, we create an image of 
ourselves on the horizon of this process which we could refer to as 
a Self of some sort.
6. The Original Project
Having examined the subjective and objective sides of selfhood, let 
us turn now to narrativity. Sartre does not explicitly discuss the topic 
of narrative identity in this period. We have already discussed his 
approach to the topic in the War Diaries, but he was there mostly 
elaborating the ideas expressed in Nausea. Still, as we have also seen, 
he does link the topic of narrative identity to that of biography. In 
the chapter that precedes the Conclusion to Being and Nothingness, 
Sartre also touches upon this subject. He introduces the method 
of ‘existential psychoanalysis’, which is a way of understanding 
our fundamental projects at a conceptual level (BN 723)339. Such 
a method can also be employed to write biographies, and he 
makes known his intention to write one about Flaubert and one 
about Dostoyevsky (BN 746). He did go on to write a biography 
of Flaubert, which we will discuss in the next chapter, but by then 
his methodology had already changed. Nevertheless, he does write 
336 ‘nous nous pénétrerons de l’idée que ces deux aspects du corps, étant sur deux plans 
d’être différents et incommunicables, sont irréductibles l’un à l’autre’ (BNF 344).
337 ‘Ou bien il est chose parmi les choses, ou bien il est ce par quoi les choses se 
découvrent à moi. Mais il ne saurait être les deux en même temps.’ (BNF 343).
338 For more information on Sartre and the body, see: (Morris 2010).
339 ‘psychoanalyse existentielle’ (BNF 602).
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biographies of Baudelaire and Genet in the period presently under 
discussion. These enable us to discuss the method of existential 
psychoanalysis in light of the question of narrative identity: how 
does a lived life relate to a recounted one?
Existential psychoanalysis
Sartre’s characterization of human beings as projects calls for an 
investigation of how the different ends that constitute that project 
relate to each other: 
If, as we have tried to establish, it is true that human-
reality becomes acquainted with itself and defines 
itself through the ends it pursues, an investigation and 
classification of these ends becomes indispensable (BN 
723)340.
In the first part of this chapter, we discussed the fact that in order to 
account for the idea that every consciousness is free yet non-arbitrary, 
we need to assume the existence of a fundamental project that weaves 
the choices one continually makes together into a coherent whole. 
It is because of this fundamental project that we can account for the 
choices we make, as Sartre shows with the example of the group of 
hikers. Nevertheless, although our choices within a given situation 
can always be traced back to a fundamental project, this does not 
mean that all the choices we make during our life can be traced back 
to a single fundamental project. Nevertheless, it is possible, as we will 
see, for us to trace them back to a single original project. 
Before we examine this notion, let us first see how fundamental 
projects can change. As has been said, the choices we make within a 
given situation hang together in the form of a fundamental choice. 
This does not mean that this fundamental choice precedes my other 
choices. Rather, the fundamental choice is the very coherence of 
these choices:
[E]ach fundamental choice defines the direction of the 
pursued-pursuit at the same time as it temporalizes itself. 
That does not mean that it provides an initial impulse, 
or that there is anything already acquired, of which I 
might take advantage as long as I stay within the limits 
of this choice. On the contrary, the nihilation is pursued 
continuously and, in consequence, my free and 
340 ‘S’il est vrai que la réalité-humaine, comme nous avons tenté de l’établir, s’annonce 
et se définit par les fins qu’elle poursuit, une étude et une classification de ces fins 
devient indispensable’ (BNF 602).
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROJECT
144 145
continuous reclamation of this choice is indispensable 
(BN 611)341.
With every choice one makes, one determines one’s fundamental 
choice. This is a continuous process. Since every conscious act 
is a choice, we always seem to be in the process of making the 
fundamental choice. It is therefore difficult to grasp the moment in 
which this fundamental choice can change. As we have seen, ends 
projected upon things create situations. We cannot, therefore, say 
that from a change of situation, a change of fundamental choice 
follows. 
Most achieved goals do not imply that the overachieving 
fundamental project of which they are a part is also completed. If 
we take the example of rock climbing, one may see a rock that needs 
to be climbed as an obstacle that one must overcome despite being 
tired because of the overarching project of surrendering to nature. 
When one climbs a rock, the overarching project of surrendering to 
nature is not necessarily completed, as one may find new obstacles 
in nature to overcome.342
A change of fundamental choice can therefore only exist in those rare 
instances in which ‘the end of a project coincides with the beginning 
of another project’ (BN 610)343.344 Such an instance ‘will only exist 
therefore, if we are, in relation to ourselves, a beginning and an end 
within the unity of a single act. Now this is precisely what occurs in 
the case of a radical modification of our fundamental project’ (BN 
610).345 It is important to stress that we are our projects and that 
a modification of our fundamental projects implies an important 
341 ‘tout choix fondamental définit la direction de la poursuite-poursuivie en même 
temps qu’il se temporalise. Cela ne signifie pas qu’il donne un élan initial, ni qu’il y 
ait quelque chose comme de l’acquis dont je puisse profiter tant que je me tiens dans 
les limites de ce choix. La néantisation se poursuit continûment, au contraire, et par 
suite la reprise libre et continue du choix est indispensable.’ (BNF 512).
342 It is interesting to note that the example of rock climbing is also discussed by Merleau-
Ponty who uses it to critique Sartre’s conception of freedom (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 
512-514). For a comparison of the two thinkers on this issue, see: (Compton 1998).
343 ‘la fin d’un projet coïncide avec le commencement d’un autre projet’ (BNF 511).
344 The fundamental project seems to be similar to the notion of adventure discussed 
in the previous chapter, as it is a series of experiential episodes with a definitive 
beginning and end in which every episode gets its meaning from a certain goal. 
The main difference, however, is that in the fundamental project the goal is 
merely projected and not necessarily achieved. Sartre does use the term adventure 
sporadically in Being and Nothingness. A further discussion of such uses of the term 
is provided in the account of adventure in the last section of the next chapter of this 
dissertation. 
345 ‘n’existera donc que si nous sommes à nous-même commencement et fin dans 
l’unité d’un même acte. Or, c’est précisément ce qui se produit dans le cas d’une 
modification radicale de notre projet fondamental.’ (BNF 511).
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change in our identities. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre gives the 
example of religious conversion as an instance of such a change.346 
Religious conversion can change the way one sees oneself and the 
world in a fundamental manner. Other examples can be found in the 
aforementioned biographies, to which we will soon turn. 
A change in fundamental choice is not arbitrary: ‘it is not possible 
for this choice not to determine itself in connection with the past 
which is has to be’ (BN 610)347. Hence, someone who converts to a 
religion is always a former non-believer. The criminal who tries to 
better her life is never merely a law-abiding citizen, she will remain a 
former criminal: her current project is defined in relation to a former 
project. Thus, there needs to be some form of unity which transcends 
even the fundamental projects of the individual:
[W]e should be able to find within it [the Other] a 
unity (of which substance was only a caricature) , that 
must be a unity of responsibility, a unity that we can love 
or hate, blame or praise – in brief the unity of a person. 
This unity, the being of the man under consideration, is 
a free unification. And the unification cannot come after 
some diversity which it unifies. Rather, for Flaubert, as 
for any subject of a ‘biography’, to be is to unify oneself 
within the world. The irreducible unification that we 
need to encounter, which is Flaubert, and which we are 
asking the biographers to reveal to us, is therefore the 
unification of an original project, a unification that must 
be revealed to us in the form of a non-substantial absolute 
(BN 728-729)348.
The genuinely irreducible factor of a person’s projects is the original 
project (BN 727).349 Just  The fundamental project does not precede 
346 In the Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre also uses the term ‘conversion’ to refer to the 
conversion to authenticity (NE 506).
347 ‘il ne se peut pas que ce choix ne se détermine pas en liaison avec le passé qu’il a à 
être’ (BNF 511).
348 ‘on puisse découvrir en lui cette unité - dont la substance n’était qu’une caricature 
- et qui doit être unité de responsabilité, unité aimable ou haïssable, blâmable ou 
louable, bref personnelle. Cette unité qui est l’être de l’homme considéré est libre 
unification. Et l’unification ne saurait venir après une diversité qu’elle unifie. Mais 
être, pour Flaubert comme pour tout sujet de « biographie », c’est s’unifier dans le 
monde. L’unification irréductible que nous devons rencontrer, qui est Flaubert et que 
nous demandons aux biographes de nous révéler, c’est donc l’unification d’un projet 
originel, unification qui doit se révéler à nous comme un absolu non substantiel.’ 
(BNF 606).
349 We must be aware of the fact that Sartre is not always precise with his terminology, 
as he sometimes uses fundamental and original project interchangeably. See, for 
example: (BN 736). Nevertheless, he clearly defines the break between fundamental 
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the choices that comprise it, and the same is true of the original 
project, which does not precede the choices one makes during the 
course of one’s life. It is also not their sum, however, as it cannot unify 
them if it only exists afterwards. Rather, as with the fundamental 
project, one continually unifies oneself by existing. We can see the 
contrast here with the idea of substantial Self which Sartre rejects, 
which would exist first and only subsequently act.
In the above citation, Sartre also links the notion to biography. 
Although a person is their original project, we are usually not aware 
of this project. On the one hand, this is simply due to the fact that 
we do not know enough about most people to see what it is that 
binds all their actions together. Although a person ‘is expressed in its 
entirety – although from a different angle – in each inclination, each 
tendency’, we must know a person over a significantly long period of 
time to form such an image of them and hence know their original 
project (BN 731)350. A part from its biographical usage, the original 
project can also be understood as the proper object of psychology. 
The method of existential psychoanalysis which Sartre proposes 
aims precisely at uncovering this project:
The principle of this psychoanalysis is that man is a 
totality and not a collection. […]. 
The goal of psychoanalysis is to decipher man’s empirical 
behaviour, i.e. to place in full daylight the revelations each 
behaviour contains and to determine them conceptually. 
Its point of departure is experience; its reference point is the 
preontological and fundamental understanding of the 
human person possessed by man. […]
Its method is comparative: since in fact each instance of 
human behaviour symbolizes in its way the fundamental 
choice that needs to be uncovered and since, at the same 
time, this choice is concealed by in each instance by 
accidental characteristics and its historical juncture, it 
is by comparing these ways of behaving that we will be 
able to make the unique revelation, differently expressed 
in each one of them, come forth (BN 738)351.
projects, and he explicitly states that the person in their entirety is a single original 
project.
350 ‘en chaque inclination, en chaque tendance, elle s’exprime tout entière, quoique sous 
un angle différent’ (BNF 609).
351 ‘Le principe de cette psychanalyse est que l’homme est une totalité et non une 
collection […].
 Le but de la psychanalyse est de déchiffrer les comportements empiriques de 
l’homme, c’est-à-dire de mettre en pleine lumière les révélations que chacun d’eux 
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The original project is ultimately that which makes a human being 
into a coherent person and not a mere accidental series of choices. 
‘Existential psychoanalysis seeks to determine the original choice’, 
the choice which is ‘totalizing’ (BN 739)352. As with its fundamental 
choice and project, Sartre uses original project and original choice 
interchangeably. Because the point of departure is experience 
and experience is intentional, the existential psychoanalyst must 
investigate how the world appears to the subject of the investigation 
and therefore must aim at ‘a psychoanalysis of things’ (BN 777)353. 
The original project is something we can only truly grasp on a 
conceptual level. It ‘is fully lived by the subject and as such, fully 
conscious, [but] that does not at all mean that is must by the same 
token be known by him’ (BN 740)354. Thus, while we do have a 
preontological understanding of such a project, it is unclear whether 
Sartre means by this that we have an understanding of original 
projects in general or just of our own original project. In any case, 
this understanding is non-conceptual. Consequently, we do not have 
a different epistemological relationship towards it: 
[T]he projects that are uncovered by existential 
psychoanalysis, are apprehended from the Other’s point 
of view. Accordingly the object that is hereby brought 
to light will be articulated in terms of a transcended-
transcendence, i.e. its being will be being-for-the-Other 
even if, moreover, the psychoanalyst and the subject of 
the psychoanalysis are identical. Thus the project that 
[…] psychoanalysis brings to light can only be the 
person’s totality, the irreducible fact of transcendence, 
as they are in their being-for-the-other. What escapes 
forever from these investigative methods is the project as 
it is for itself, the complex in its own being. This project-
for-itself can only be enjoyed; there is an incompatibility 
contient et de les fixer conceptuellement.
 Son point de départ est l’expérience ; son point d’appui est la compréhension 
préontologique et fondamentale que l’homme a de la personne humaine. […]
 Sa méthode est comparative : puisque, en effet, chaque conduite humaine symbolise 
à sa manière le choix fondamental qu’il faut mettre au jour, et puisque, en même 
temps, chacune d’elles masque ce choix sous ses caractères occasionnels et son 
opportunité historique, c’est par la comparaison de ces conduites que nous ferons 
jaillir la révélation unique qu’elles expriment toutes de manière différente.’ (BNF 
614).
352 ‘La psychanalyse existentielle cherche à déterminer le choix originel’ ‘totalitaire’ 
(BNF 615).
353 ‘une psychanalyse des choses’ (BNF 646).
354 ‘est pleinement vécu par le sujet et, comme tel, totalement conscient, cela ne signifie 
nullement qu’il doive être du même coup connu par lui’ (BNF 616).
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between existence for itself and objective existence (BN 
741)355.
Thus, the original project is a fully-fledged conceptual assessment 
of the object I am for the Other, even when I assess myself. Sartre 
clearly distances it from reflection and hence from the objective Ego 
that it uncovers. We have a closer relation to the latter than others 
do, as we have already discussed in the last chapter.
Sartre’s description of existential psychoanalysis is relatively brief. 
‘This psychoanalysis has not yet found its Freud: at most we may be 
able to get a sense of it from especially accomplished biographies’ 
(BN 745-746)356. As already noted, Sartre’s own biographies make 
use of the method. Let us take a brief look at the biographies of 
Baudelaire and Genet, which were published in 1946 and 1952 
respectively. As both studies are very specific, we would stray too 
far from our general topic of selfhood if we attempted to provide a 
detailed overview of them. Hence, we will solely focus on the original 
choices uncovered in these texts in order to gain more insight into 
what Sartre has in mind.357 
In both cases, the original choice can be traced back to a specific 
moment in their respective childhoods.358 For Baudelaire it is 
occasioned by his mother’s remarriage: ‘The sudden break and the 
grief it caused forced him into a personal existence without any 
warning or preparation’ (B 17)359.  
355 ‘les projets décelés par la psychanalyse existentielle, seront appréhendés du point de 
vue d’autrui. Par suite, l’objet ainsi mis au jour sera articulé selon les structures de la 
transcendance-transcendée, c’est-à-dire que son être sera l’être-pour-autrui ; même 
si d’ailleurs le psychanalyste et le sujet de la psychanalyse ne font qu’un. Ainsi le 
projet mis au jour par […] psychanalyse ne pourra être que la totalité de la personne, 
l’irréductible de la transcendance tels qu’ils sont dans leur être-pour-l’autre. Ce qui 
échappe pour toujours à ces méthodes d’investigation, c’est le projet tel qu’il est pour 
soi, le complexe dans son être propre. Ce projet-pour-soi ne peut être que joui ; il y a 
incompatibilité entre l’existence pour soi et l’existence objective.’ (BNF 617).
356 ‘Cette psychanalyse n’a pas encore trouvé son Freud ; tout au plus peut-on en trouver 
le pressentiment dans certaines biographies particulièrement réussies’ (BNF 620). 
357 For a more detailed study of Sartre’s biographies, see: (Dobson 1993, 128-149; 
Howells 1988, 166-193) 
358 The idea that the original choice does not in fact transcend specific choices but is 
made in a specific moment is again stressed by Sartre in 1965: ‘“Original choice” 
is the term I use to describe what happens at the moment—a protracted 
moment, covering a certain span of time—in which one makes something of 
oneself, of that self which so far has been made by others’ (IPB 71).
359 ‘Cette brusque rupture et le chagrin qui en est résulté l’ont jeté sans transition dans 
l’existence personnelle’ (BF 19-20).
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This brings us to the point at which Baudelaire chose 
the sort of person he would be—that irrevocable choice 
by which each of us decides in a particular situation 
what he will be and what he is. When he found himself 
abandoned and rejected, Baudelaire chose solitude 
deliberately as an act of self-assertion, so that his  
solitude should not be something inflicted on him by 
other people (B 18)360.
The idea presented in Being and Nothingness that the choice is 
not made deliberately but throughout every choice seems difficult 
to reconcile with this account, insofar as Sartre now  claims that 
Baudelaire’s choice was a deliberate one. He concludes Baudelaire 
with the statement that ‘the free choice which a man makes of 
himself is completely identified with what is called his destiny’ (B 
192)361.362 This can be understood to mean that from a particular 
moment in childhood onwards we start revealing the original choice 
that gives shape to all our subsequent choices. We might infer from 
this that one is not born as a person and that personhood is something 
acquired at some point during childhood – yet Sartre does not say 
this explicitly.363
In Genet’s case, the original choice is much more related to the look 
of the Other, as it can be traced back to a moment when he is caught 
stealing: ‘[t]he gaze of the adults is a constituent power which has 
transformed him into a constituted nature’ (SG 49)364. However, ‘what 
is important is not what people make of us but what we ourselves 
make of what they have made of us’ (SG 49)365. 
So he has chosen the worst. He had no other choice. 
His life is all laid out: it will be a journey to the end of 
misfortune. He will later write: “I decided to be what 
crime made of me.” […] He wills his destiny; he will 
360 ‘Nous touchons ici au choix originel que Baudelaire a fait de lui-même, à cet 
engagement absolu par quoi chacun de nous décide dans une situation particulière de 
ce qu’il sera et de ce qu’il est.’ (BF 20).
361 ‘le choix libre que l’homme fait de soi-même s’identifie absolument avec ce qu’on 
appelle sa destinée’ (BF 224).
362 For a more in-depth comparison of the notions of original choice and destiny, see: 
(Simont 2013).
363 It should be noted that Sartre would later say that his study of Baudelaire was ‘[a] 
very inadequate, an extremely bad one’ (IT 42).
364 ‘le regard des adultes est un pouvoir constituant qui l’a transformé en nature 
constituée’ (SGF 55).
365 ‘l’important n’est pas ce qu’on fait de nous mais ce que nous faisons nous-même de 
ce qu’on a fait de nous’ (SGF 55).
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try to love it. […] I was a thief, I will be the Thief (SG 
49-50)366.
Thus, Genet submits to a life of crime: ‘his original choice [is] to do 
evil’ (SG 127)367. Nevertheless, his idea of being a thief and therefore 
evil is mainly something that has to do with how others perceive 
him. Hence, he steals for an imaginary audience that may catch 
him in the act. This turns Genet towards the imaginary, which is 
ultimately poetic. Leaving aside poetic and aesthetic considerations, 
what is interesting for our purposes is that we can see here how a 
fundamental project changes, while the original project remains the 
same:
For he immediately makes his second major decision: 
he will be the poet. Actually, this choice, which changes 
his life, involves nothing new: it is a reaffirmation of his 
original choice. He had decided to be what they had 
made of him; in striving to be a thief, he realized that he 
had become a dreamer; but his original will to assume 
himself entirely has not changed (SG 353)368.
Thus, being a thief in the eyes of others leads Genet to a poetic take 
on life. Later, he will once again change his fundamental project by 
becoming a writer, and more precisely, a writer who writes about 
thievery: ‘He becomes the person who manifests theft’ (SG 549)369. 
Thereby, he synthesizes his former fundamental projects into one 
that embodies all the former ones (SG 554).
Sartre concludes Saint Genet by saying that although other methods 
can go a long way in studying a person, his aim is ‘to demonstrate 
that freedom alone can account for a person in his totality’ (SG 
584)370. This is ultimately what the notion of the original project 
boils down to: Sartre has argued that a human being as a project is 
nothing but freedom. However, he also wants to account for a type 
personal identity that persists throughout one’s entire life. The only 
way he can do this within his own framework is to have a free choice 
366 ‘Donc il a choisi le pire : il n’avait pas d’autre choix. Sa vie est tout tracée : ce sera le 
voyage au bout de malheur. Il écrira plus tard : « J’ai décidé d’être ce que le crime a 
fait de moi. » […] Il veut son destin ; il tâchera de l’aimer. […] J’étais voleur, je serai 
le Voleur[.]’ (SGF 55-56).
367 ‘son choix originel de mal faire’ (SGF 124).
368 ‘Car il prend aussitôt sa deuxième décision capitale : il sera le poète. A vrai dire, ce 
choix, qui change sa vie, ne comporte rien de neuf : c’est une réaffirmation de son 
choix primitif. Il avait décidé d’être ce qu’on l’avait fait ; en s’efforçant d’être voleur, 
il s’est aperçu qu’il était devenu rêveur ; mais sa volonté originelle de s’assumer tout 
entier n’a pas changé.’ (SGF 327).
369 ‘Il devient celui qui manifeste le vol’ (SGF 505).
370 ‘que seule la liberté peut rendre compte d’une personne en sa totalité’ (SGF 536).
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that spans the course of one’s life. Nevertheless, although we seem 
to have some knowledge of our fundamental projects, we can only 
know this choice in hindsight and as an object-for-the-Other.
The notion of the original choice remains a problematic one. Sartre 
has to account for the coherence of a person while adhering to the 
idea that a person is totally free. It seems as though, at least if we 
follow the examples of Baudelaire and Genet, our original choice 
determines other choices and therefore diminishes how free these 
choices are.371 If we regard these examples as unfaithful to the theory 
presented in Being and Nothingness, where Sartre states that the choice 
is not made at a definite moment but continually, the explanatory 
power of the notion remains difficult to grasp. Sartre’s reasoning 
seems to be circular: there needs to be some sort of coherence to a 
person’s choices and hence we can retroactively deduce an original 
choice from them which is that which guarantees the coherence of 
our choices. This does not explain why our choices are coherent, it 
just seems to posit that they are. 
Humanism
The notion of the original project can not only account for the 
totality of a specific human being, but can do so for human beings in 
general. As has been said, we have a non-conceptual understanding 
of the original project, and Sartre is ambiguous about whether this 
understanding is about our own specific project or the original 
project as such. Apart from the fact that we can deduce an original 
project from a person’s fundamental projects, there is something else 
that can be discovered:
[A]n abstract and meaningful structure which is the 
desire to be in general, and which we must take to 
be human-reality in the person, which makes up his 
commonality with the others and allows us to claim 
that there is a truth about man, and not merely a set of 
incomparable individuals (BN 736)372.
As discussed in the previous section, this desire to be is the desire to 
371 Sartre’s screenplay The Chips are Down is interesting in this regard (CD). In the 
screenplay, two people are brought back from the dead because they had been 
destined to be lovers. They have a day to prove that they can begin their new life 
as a couple. However, they are too caught up in the projects of their previous lives 
and they fail. In an interview, Sartre said that the work should not be interpreted as 
existentialist, but instead as determinist (IJ 156).
372 ‘une structure abstraite et signifiante qui est le désir d’être en général et qui doit être 
considéré comme la réalité-humaine dans la personne, ce qui fait sa communauté 
avec autrui, ce qui permet d’affirmer qu’il y a une vérité de l’homme et non pas 
seulement des individualités incomparables’ (BNF 612).
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coincide with the Self beyond the world: ‘the project-for-itself of being 
in-itself-for-itself’ (BN 737)373. Although one cannot comprehend 
freedom apart from how it is manifested in choices, the abstract 
structure Sartre is describing here can be regarded as the ‘freedom’s 
truth, which is that it is freedom’s human meaning’ (BN 737)374. 
This is why Sartre’s ideas concerning existential psychoanalysis are 
applicable to every human being: we cannot conceive of someone 
who does not have – or who is not – an original project. Again, this 
original project can only be derived from concrete desires and does 
not precede them:
That does not mean that there are abstract desires that 
exist, common to all men, prior to any specification, 
but that there are structures to concrete desires which 
fall under the study of ontology because every desire 
expresses all of human-reality (BN 746)375.
The connection between the specific choices we make and what it 
means to be a human being in general is also one of the themes in 
Existentialism is a Humanism. Here, he also describes a fundamental 
or original choice – although he uses neither of the terms: ‘I may want 
to join a party, write a book, or get married – but all of that is only a 
manifestation of an earlier and more spontaneous choice than what 
is known as “will”’ (EH 23)376. Because we are in the first instance 
a free choice, we are fully responsible for ourselves. Nevertheless, 
our responsibility reaches even further: ‘when we say that man is 
responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only 
for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men’ (EH 
23)377. This idea is the root of Sartre’s humanism: 
When we say that man chooses himself, not only do we 
mean that each of us must choose himself, but also that 
in choosing himself, he is choosing for all men. In fact, 
in creating the man each of us wills ourselves to be, there 
is not a single one of our actions that does not at the 
373 ‘projet-pour-soi d’être en-soi-pour-soi’ (BNF 613).
374 ‘la vérité de la liberté, c’est-à-dire qu’elle est la signification humaine de la liberté’ 
(BNF 613).
375 ‘Cela signifie, non qu’il existe avant toute spécification des désirs abstraits et 
communs à tous les hommes, mais que les désirs concrets ont des structures qui 
ressortissent à l’étude de l’ontologie parce que chaque désir […] exprime toute la 
réalité humaine.’ (BNF 621).
376 ‘Je peux vouloir adhérer à un parti, écrire un livre, me marier, tout cela n’est qu’une 
manifestation d’un choix plus originel, plus spontané que ce qu’on appelle volonté’ 
(EHF 23-24).
377 ‘quand nous disons que l’homme est responsable de lui-même, nous ne voulons pas 
dire que l’homme est responsable de sa stricte individualité, mais qu’il est responsable 
de tous les hommes’ (EHF 24).
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same time create an image of man as we think he ought 
to be. […] If, moreover, existence precedes essence and 
we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, 
that image is valid for all and for our whole era. Our 
responsibility is thus much greater than we might have 
supposed, because it concerns all mankind. […] I am 
therefore responsible for myself and for everyone else, 
and I am fashioning a certain image of man as I choose  
him to be. In choosing myself, I choose man (EH 24-
25)378.
It seems that Sartre turns the descriptive account of how our desires 
express something about humanity in general into a normative 
account. In Being and Nothingness, every choice reveals something 
about humanity in general. In Existentialism is a Humanism, every 
choice creates (an image of ) humanity in general. In the latter text, 
moreover, it is unclear to what extent we are supposed to be aware 
of the fact that we are creating an image of man or what this image 
is. Sartre speaks about “man as we think he ought to be”, but does 
not explicate whether we are conceptually aware of this image or 
whether we merely have a preontological understanding of this 
choose, as is described in Being and Nothingness. He goes on to say 
that we should always ask ourselves what would happen if everyone 
does what I am doing, and that if we are not asking ourselves this 
question, then we are in bad faith (EH 25). 
In any case, there is a discrepancy between the two texts. In Being and 
Nothingness, the original choice – even when it concerns humanity 
in general – can only be conceived of in hindsight and as an object-
for-the-Other. Acting like one is merely such an object is an act of 
bad faith. In Existentialism is a Humanism, our choices all express an 
image of what man should be, and it seems that this is what binds 
them together. We can be aware of this while we act and not merely 
in hindsight. Furthermore, we could also identify this image with 
the Self beyond the world, which is also an image. Yet whereas in 
Being and Nothingness to identify with this image is to be in bad 
faith, in the lecture Sartre seems to say exactly the opposite. 
378 ‘Quand nous disons que l’homme se choisit, nous entendons que chacun d’entre nous 
se choisit, mais par là nous voulons dire aussi qu’en se choisissant il choisit tous 
les hommes. En effet, il n’est pas un de nos actes qui, en créant l’homme que nous 
voulons être, ne crée en même temps une image de l’homme tel que nous estimons 
qu’il doit être. […] Si l’existence, d’autre part, précède l’essence et que nous voulions 
exister en même temps que nous façonnons notre image, cette image est valable pour 
tous et pour notre époque tout entière. Ainsi, notre responsabilité est beaucoup plus 
grande que nous ne pourrions le supposer, car elle engage l’humanité entière. […] 
Ainsi je suis responsable pour moi-même et pour tous, et je crée une certaine image 
de l’homme que je choisis; en me choisissant, je choisis l’homme.’ (EHF 25-27).
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It does not seem, therefore, that we can reach any conclusive account 
of how Sartre’s brief description of his humanism in Existentialism 
is a Humanism can be mapped onto his broader theories of selfhood. 
At a general level, we can say that human beings as free projects all 
have something in common: the desire to be. Our original projects 
are, therefore, both what binds all the fundamental projects of 
throughout our life together and that which binds us all together as 
a single humanity. 
Conclusion
With regard to selfhood, the period of Sartre’s oeuvre that has been 
discussed in this chapter stands out as the one in which the idea of 
the Self as a thing among things is, by and large, regarded as false. 
Instead, selfhood is mainly understood in terms of nothingness, or, 
in other words: freedom.
With regard to subjective selfhood, the idea that all consciousness is 
self-consciousness – or rather consciousness (of ) Self – is the leading 
principle. Although Sartre also calls this idea the prereflective cogito, 
it does not entail a res cogitans or any other substantive subjective Self. 
As I have argued, Sartre’s appeal to the cogito should be understood 
as an apodictic claim: within his philosophical system, consciousness 
(of ) self is the ground for one of the two (initial) forms of Being. 
Apart from this new name, Sartre emphasizes prereflective selfhood 
much more than reflective selfhood. He argues that consciousness 
is personal because it is present to itself. Furthermore, it contains a 
dimension of selfhood that ties different moments of consciousness 
together throughout time: ipseity.
Ipseity is the idea that we can prereflectively perceive possibilities, 
which project a future Self. This idea is also the root of Sartre’s 
conception of objective selfhood. In the projection of ends, we 
project an image of ourselves “beyond the world”, one which we aim 
to be but which is in principle unattainable. Although Sartre does 
not adhere to the idea that the Self is ultimately a thing, he does 
spend a lot of time discussing ways in which we act as if it were one. 
There are two main categories of this form of misleading objective 
selfhood: bad faith and being-for-the-Other. In bad faith, one acts 
as if one were an object and therefore not free. In being-for-the-
Other, we appear in the look of another person as an object. This is 
inevitable and only becomes problematic if we reduce ourselves to 
being merely this object. Somehow, we are a free project that cannot 
be reduced to an object, and, at the same time, when viewed “from 
the outside” we are an object. A person is both for-itself and for-
the-Other.
The dimension of narrative selfhood is not developed as such in this 
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period. As has been argued, we can link the method of existential 
psychoanalysis and its object, the original project, to this topic 
because Sartre himself ties it to biography. In order to account for 
the fact that our choices comprise a coherent person, Sartre claims 
that they hang together in a fundamental project. Over time, we can 
have different fundamental projects, which in turn hang together 
as an original project. It is difficult to see what this original project 
entails specifically, as the examples Sartre gives in the biographies 
he wrote are problematic, as we have seen. What is clear, however, 
is that we can know an original project only in hindsight, when 
we describe our own lives or read the accounts other people have 
given of theirs. Hence, it does give us an answer to the question of 
narrative identity – how does a life lived relate to a life recounted: a 
life lived is always enjoyed, while a life recounted can also be known.
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Chapter 3 
The Force of Things
The third and last period of Sartre’s oeuvre can be characterized 
as a turn from a philosophy of consciousness to ‘the force of 
circumstances’ (IT 33)379. This phrase comes from the title of an 
autobiographical work by De Beauvoir. Sartre’s use of the phrase 
exemplifies the lasting influence these two thinkers had on each 
other.380 In the book, De Beauvoir describes how Sartre’s political 
activities had caused him to rethink his philosophical views on 
human beings: ‘All my political efforts are directed toward finding a 
group that will give a meaning to my transcendence[.] […] I must 
renounce the optimistic idea that one can be a man in any situation, 
an idea inspired by the Resistance: even under torture one could 
be a man.’ (De Beauvoir 1964, 148). Although Sartre had tackled 
social issues such as anti-Semitism and racism as early as the 1940s 
(ASJ, BO), the early periods of his thought are characterized by 
an emphasis on the individual. As the years went by his thought 
would become less individualistic as he became increasingly drawn 
towards a Marxist framework, which he sought to reconcile with 
his existential philosophy. As we have discussed in the introductory 
chapter, the Marxists were among the first to criticize existentialism 
for being idealist and lacking a positive socio-political dimension. 
Sartre’s project to reconcile the two can be understood both as an 
acknowledgment of this criticism as well as a defiant response that 
seeks to show that many of the tenets of his existential philosophy 
can in fact be integrated within a materialist framework that allows 
for a social and political action. 
Sartre’s increased emphasis on concrete circumstances in this period 
leads him to foreground two fundamental questions, which mirror 
each other: the question of how human beings create history and 
the question of how history creates human beings. Most of his 
philosophical texts of this period are somehow related to these 
questions. Sartre characterizes man as a ‘singular universal’ (F1 ix; 
SU 420), a singular instance of the universal epoch. Another way 
of phrasing the theme of human beings in light of history would be 
to ask how the singular creates the universal and how the universal 
379 ‘la force des choses’ (ITF 151).
380 For more information concerning the philosophical side of their relationship, see: 
(Daigle & Golomb 2009).
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creates the singular. When we consider this new emphasis within 
the context of his theories of selfhood, we encounter two peculiar 
movements in this period. On the issue of subjective and objective 
selfhood, Sartre’s later works seem to return to the positions he 
had maintained prior to Being and Nothingness, though they draw 
some important lessons from the latter work as well. On the issue of 
narrative identity, however, Sartre’s later position marks a complete 
reversal from his early dismissal of narrative structure.
As in the previous chapters, the first part of this chapter will be 
devoted to the triad of subjectivity, objectivity and negativity, focusing 
largely on the first volume of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. We 
will start with a discussion of Sartre’s methodology and the notion of 
praxis, which replaces consciousness as the main activity of subjective 
beings. We will then turn to the expanded notion of the world and 
the things in it, in the form of the practico-inert. Afterwards we 
will discuss Sartre’s ideas concerning group formation and how this 
ultimately leads to History.  
In the second part of the chapter, we will first discuss subjective 
selfhood. We will discuss the process Sartre calls “interiorisation” and 
the related notion of lived experience, which Sartre describes in the 
lecture “Marxism and Subjectivity”. Next, we will turn to objective 
selfhood and the process of personalisation, focusing largely on The 
Family Idiot and various interviews. We will end with a discussion of 
the notion of the singular universal as it is presented in “Kierkegaard: 
The Singular Universal” and The Family Idiot, and show why this 
notion can be understood as a form of narrative identity.
Part I 
From Praxis to History
1. Praxis and Totalisation
In order to understand the rationale behind Sartre’s new approach 
to subjectivity, we have to understand the problem he is facing. 
This problem has to do with dialectical thinking, the idea that 
the object studied has an internal logic that relates to opposing 
positions which are subsequently overcome. In Sartre’s own words, 
it is the idea that ‘a negation of a negation can be an affirmation’ 
(CDR 15)381. He is primarily interested in dialectical thinking 
concerning History, in which opposing forces clash and create 
new circumstances. History with a capital H is distinguished 
from history as the former is intended to encompass the entirety 
of human development. There can be multiple histories, but there 
can be only one History. Furthermore, there are ‘societies with no 
381 ‘une négation de négation peut être une affirmation’ (CDRF 115).
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history’ which are characterized by Sartre as ‘societies based on 
repetition’ (CDR 125)382. These are societies in which there are no 
meaningful technical and social changes. Another way of putting 
this is that History is the totalisation of all human development 
into a single process. The opposition between the state of totality 
and the process of totalisation is that ‘the totalisation differs from 
the totality in that the latter is totalized while the former totalizes 
itself ’ (CDR 53)383. A totality is an organized whole, a totalisation is 
in a perpetual process of retaining this state, which it therefore never 
fully achieves.384 In this sense, a work of art or another artefact may 
be viewed as a totality because its maker decides that it is finished. 
The progressive-regressive method
The problem Sartre faces within this field is that two opposing 
interpretations of the role of subjectivity in History fall short: 
Hegelian idealism and Marxist monism. Hegelian idealism, 
according to Sartre, involves the idea that History is shaped by ideas 
rather than material circumstances. This idealism should not be 
confused with the Berkeleyan idealism Sartre criticizes in his earlier 
works, although both are examples of a worldview in which the role 
subjectivity is overstated. Hegel considers his own position to be the 
end of History, that is to say, the position in which the process of 
ideas shaping History has come to an end (CDR 21). Sartre claims 
that, according to Hegel, History is the unfolding of ideas, which 
means that at the end of History all ideas have culminated in Truth. 
Thus, Hegel’s position is the Truth and every historical situation 
we describe from his point of view is necessarily true. Or, in other 
words, knowledge and truth are the same thing and all being can 
be reduced to knowledge (CDR 22-23). This position is regarded 
as false because the positing of an absolute point of view of History 
implies that there can be no more real changes. The world as it is, is 
absolute, and we cannot understand it better, nor can we (radically) 
change anything about it. 
The counterpart of this idealism, Marxist monism, is a monist 
historical materialism. Rather than make the subject the absolute force 
in History, this position makes the object, material circumstances, 
absolute. It is not the position of Marx himself (SM 86-87), but that 
of ‘modern Marxists’ whom Sartre does not name directly (CDR 
382 ‘des sociétés sans histoire, fondées sur la répétition’ (CDRF 203).
383 ‘la totalisation se distingue de la totalité parce que celle-ci est totalisée et que celle-là 
se totalise’ (CDRF 143).
384 Sartre claims that totalities can only be created by an act of imagination (CDR 45). 
Someone has to decide that something is finished, as is the case with a work of art. 
Once the decision has been made, the totality can persist. This idea of objects being 
totalities is reminiscent of the notion of ‘this’ as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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26)385. If this is the case, there is no role for subjectivity in history 
whatsoever: ‘There is no longer knowledge in the strict sense of the 
term; Being no longer manifests itself in any way whatsoever: it merely 
evolves according to its own laws’ (CDR 26)386. The problem with 
this position is that according to its own logic, it cannot prove itself. 
If human understanding is an epiphenomenon of material processes, 
then there is no reason to assume that our understanding is right. 
Hence, the position that our knowledge is completely irrelevant 
becomes itself a claim of absolute Truth, which cannot be proven.387 
Thus, ‘historical materialism has established everything except its 
own existence’ (CDR 19)388.
Thus, both positions suffer the same problem: they cannot prove 
themselves, they simply posit that there is a development in History. 
For idealism, the ideas that govern History are true because History 
follows ideas. For monist materialism, our understanding of History 
is a mere epiphenomenon because it is not part of the Historical 
process. Therefore, Sartre concludes: 
A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot 
establish, within human history, the primacy of material 
conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of 
particular men and as they impose themselves on it. 
In short, if there is to be any such thing as dialectical 
materialism, it must be a historical materialism, that is to 
say, a materialism from within; it must be one and the 
same thing to produce it and to have it imposed on one, 
to live it and to know it (CDR 33)389.
To understand History, we have to understand it from our own 
point of view within History. To live it and to know it are the same, 
meaning that in order to study History we have to begin studying our 
own lives within material circumstances. It is not enough to study 
general historical, sociological, and economical movements, rather 
385 ‘marxistes d’aujourd’hui’ (CDRF 123).
386 ‘Il n’y a plus à proprement parler de connaissance, l’Être ne se manifeste plus, de 
quelque manière que ce soit : il évolue selon ses lois propres’ (CDRF 123).
387 It is because of this impossibility it faces in justifying itself that Sartre also calls this 
form of materialism an idealism in Search for a Method: ‘There are two ways to fall 
into idealism: The one consists of dissolving the real in subjectivity; the other in 
denying all real subjectivity in the interests of objectivity’ (SM 33). 
388 ‘le matérialisme historique […] a tout fondé, sauf sa propre existence.’ (CDRF 118).
389 ‘Une dialectique matérialiste n ‘a de sens que si elle établit à l’intérieur de l’histoire 
humaine la primauté des conditions matérielles telles que la praxis des hommes situés 
les découvre et les subit. En un mot, s’il existe quelque chose comme un matérialisme 
dialectique ce doit être un matérialisme historique, c’est-à-dire un matérialisme du 
dedans : c’est tout un de le faire et de le subir, de le vivre et de le connaître.’ (CDRF 
129).
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we have to understand how our own individual lives constitute these 
processes. Therefore, if we locate dialectics not in our understanding, 
as idealism does, and not in the material circumstances, as monist 
materialism does, but in the relationship between the two, then 
the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity itself becomes 
dialectical. In this case, there is a true dialectic from within, rather 
than from without. Sartre’s goal in the Critique is showing that neither 
subjectivity nor objectivity is capable of carrying out the movement 
of History. Thus, Sartre aims to show how a subjective agent is 
able to understand History from within: ‘if we are to determine its 
[dialectical Reason’s] significance, then we must realize the situated 
experience of its apodicticity through ourselves’ (CDR 39)390.
[I]f we do not wish the dialectic to become a divine 
law again, a metaphysical fate, it must proceed from 
individuals and not from some kind of supra-individual 
ensemble. Thus we encounter a new contradiction: the 
dialectic is the law of totalisation which creates several 
collectivities, several societies, and one history - realities, 
that is, which impose themselves on individuals; but 
at the same time it must be woven out of millions of 
individual actions. We must show how it is possible for 
it to be both a resultant, though not a passive average, 
and a totalizing force, though not a transcendent fate 
(CDR 36)391[.]
This means that Sartre has found a starting point for his enquiry 
into dialectical reason: ‘our starting point is individual praxis’ (CDR 
65)392.393 The fact that praxis replaces consciousness as the central 
activity of subjective beings exemplifies the change between this 
period and the previous one. Sartre now thinks that Being and 
390 ‘si nous devons déterminer sa portée, il faut réaliser par nous-même l’expérience 
située de son apodictivité.’ (CDRF 134).
391 ‘si nous ne voulons pas que la dialectique redevienne une loi divine, une fatalité 
métaphysique, il faut qu’elle vienne des individus et non de je ne sais quels ensembles 
supra-individuels. Autrement dit, nous rencontrons cette nouvelle contradiction : la 
dialectique est la loi de totalisation qui fait qu’il y a des collectifs, des sociétés, une 
histoire, c’est-à-dire des réalités qui s’imposent aux individus ; mais en même temps, 
elle doit être tissée par des millions d ‘actes individuels. Il faudra établir comment 
elle peut être à la fois résultante sans être moyenne passive et force totalisante sans 
être fatalité transcendante’ (CDRF 131).
392 ‘nous partons de la praxis individuelle’ (CDRF 153).
393 Sartre attributes his discovery of praxis to Merleau-Ponty: ‘Merleau taught 
me that I would find it everywhere, in the most hidden aspect of my life as 
well as in the broad daylight of history, and that there is only one, which is the 
same for all of us: the event which makes us becoming action, action which 
unmakes us by becoming through us event, and which, since Marx and 
Hegel, we call praxis. […] The course of things made the last rampart of my 
individualism crumble’ (MPV 582).
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Nothingness is a ‘rationalist philosophy of consciousness’ (IT 41)394. 
While Sartre has a very broad conception of consciousness, the term 
is still associated with the contemplative and conceptual relationship 
we have to the world around us, whereas praxis stresses the practical 
nature of subjectivity. In this context, the term idealism is also used 
to refer to theories that only describe subjective beings at an abstract 
level. Although he does not distance himself from the views of Being 
and Nothingness, he does stress that it only describes human beings 
in an abstract manner:
F. – I think that the concept of individuality in Being 
and Nothingness is a totally different concept than that 
in the Critique of Dialectical Reason.
S. – Certainly, certainly, but that is perhaps because Being 
and Nothingness is a general point of view, a fundamental 
point of view. And the Critique of Dialectical Reason is a 
point of view that on the contrary is social and concrete. 
The one is abstract, studies general truths, and the other 
is not so concerned with that and places itself upon the 
plane of the concrete (IF 225).
The fact that Sartre regards the Critique to be on the plane of the 
concrete does not mean, however, that everything he describes in the 
work takes place on this level. This is due to the dialectical nature 
of the book, in which oppositions are overcome and brought to 
a new level. This means that not everything that Sartre describes 
can simply be considered true, as many aspects of his theory can 
be modified in a new dialectical movement. Catalano describes this 
well when he says that Sartre ‘always proceeds from the abstract to 
the concrete, but the concrete is already on the horizon awaiting 
critical examination’ (Catalano 1986, 14). Hence, the concrete is not 
Sartre’s starting point but the finish line of the first volume of the 
Critique. This is most evident when we consider that the starting 
point of individual praxis is a ‘fictitious abstract state’ based on the 
‘pure abstraction’ of a person taken only as an organism, and it is in 
reality a much more complex social phenomenon (CDR 197, 454)395. 
In a slightly different context – that of the relationship between 
collectives and groups – Sartre states that ‘the term ‘fundamental’ 
here does not imply temporal priority’ (CDR 348)396. We can easily 
transpose this statement to the theme of individual praxis. A single 
individual motivated by its own survival may never have existed. Yet, 
it must still be the starting point of the investigation as it is the most 
394 ‘une philosophie rationaliste de la conscience’ (ITF 112).
395 ‘état fictif d’abstrait’ ‘pure abstraction’ (CDRF  261, 466).
396 ‘le terme « fonda mental » ne saurait désigner ici une priorité temporelle’ (CDRF  383-
384).
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fundamental relation between subjectivity and objectivity. 
In the Search for a Method Sartre develops the methodology for 
his enquiry, which he terms ‘the progressive-regressive method’ 
(SM 85)397. As the name of the method suggests, it consists of two 
movements. Both start from a specific situation and the experience 
of the individuals within it. In order to fully understand the 
events or people in the situation, one has to understand both the 
determining factors which make the situation possible, as well as 
the intentions, goals and motivations of the people in it. In other 
words, from the situation one has to regress towards the origin of 
the situation and progress towards the point to which the situation 
is leading. The regressive movement can incorporate all kinds of 
scientific and historical research: ‘We demand of general history 
that it restore to us the structures of the contemporary society, its 
conflicts, its profound contradictions, and the over-all movement 
which these determine’ (SM 134)398. It is important to note that we 
should not confuse specific with concrete in this context: while the 
starting point of individual praxis is a specific situation, it is not a 
concrete situation that has ever existed. This abstract starting point 
is necessary to ‘place man in his proper framework’ (SM 134)399. In 
order to fully understand a situation, however, a purely regressive 
analysis is too abstract. One has to show how individuals act within 
this framework. This movement is progressive, as it focuses on 
the (temporal) progression within the situation. In general, this 
progressive movement corresponds with the method of existential 
psychoanalysis (SM 62, 148).400 One has to show how the situation 
appears to the individual within the situation, who may not be 
aware of the factors that created it, factors that are uncovered in the 
regressive movement.401 The fault of many of Sartre’s contemporary 
Marxists is that they confuse regression with progression, which 
397 ‘La méthode progressive-régressive’ (SMF 60). The chapter in which the method is 
explained places progressive before regressive, but in the text Sartre uses the term 
‘regressive-progressive’ (SM 148). 
398 ‘Nous demandons à l ‘histoire générale de nous restituer les structures de la 
société contemporaine, ses conflits, ses contradictions profondes et le mouvement 
d’ensemble que celles-ci déterminent.’ (SMF 86).
399 ‘replacer l’homme dans son cadre’ (SMF 86).
400 Sartre uses the biography of Flaubert as an example of progressive analysis, just like 
he did in Being and Nothingness when outlining existential psychoanalysis.
401 Phenomenology does not correspond to the progressive movement, as it does not 
focus on the experience of the individuals within the studied situation, but on that 
of the researcher. Hence, both regressive and progressive analyses are able to use 
phenomenological analysis to study the objects at hand. Phenomenology becomes 
one tool among others rather than an all-encompassing method. It is sometimes used 
in The Family Idiot. This does not seem radically different to the role played by 
phenomenological analysis in the ontological inquiry of Being and Nothingness, as 
has been outlined in the previous chapter.
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results in a crude positivism which takes the framework itself to be 
the active factor, rather than the human beings within the framework 
(SM 133). 
Although the Search for a Method is often printed alongside 
the Critique as its introduction, it actually serves as a thematic 
introduction to both this work and The Family Idiot. In the latter, 
Sartre moves quite freely between the regressive and progressive 
movements, focusing at times on the spirit of the age and the people 
around Flaubert and at other times on Flaubert’s own experience as 
he describes it in various written texts.402 In the Critique, however, 
the regressive and progressive movements are more strictly separated 
(CDR 39). The first part is entirely regressive and the unfinished 
and posthumously published second part serves as the progressive 
analysis. The regressive analysis is nevertheless sufficient to ‘establish 
dialectical rationality’ (CDR 39)403. 
We have now discussed the methodological background of this 
period of Sartre’s work, and we have seen that Sartre wants to reveal 
that praxis is dialectical. Let us now turn towards this notion itself. 
Praxis
Sartre’s analysis of individual praxis is not a study of a specific 
situation, person or event, but a more abstract analysis of praxis itself. 
It must be therefore understood that although this regressive analysis 
is about subjectivity, it does not take the subjective as subjective as its 
object:  
[T]he epistemological starting point must always be 
consciousness as apodictic certainty (of ) itself and as 
consciousness of such and such an object. But we are not 
concerned, at this point, with interrogating consciousness 
about itself: the object it must give itself is precisely the 
life, the objective being, of the investigator (CDR 51)404
Sartre is not concerned with the abstract relation of consciousness 
to its object, but with our practical relation to objects. This does 
not mean that Sartre is not interested in the subjective dimension 
of life per se, which we will discuss at length in the second part of 
this chapter, but that it simply cannot be the starting point of the 
402 See for example (F1 10, 40, 319; F4 42, 247). 
403 ‘de fonder la rationalité dialectique’ (CDRF 134).
404 ‘le point de départ épistémologique doit toujours être la conscience comme certitude 
apodictique (de) soi et comme conscience de tel ou tel objet. Mais il ne s’agit pas, 
ici, de questionner la conscience sur elle-même : l’objet qu’elle doit se donner est 
précisément la vie, c’est-à-dire l’être objectif du chercheur’ (CDRF 142).
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regressive enquiry into dialectical reason. It must first be shown that 
History is dialectical before it makes sense to answer the question of 
whether its dialectical nature is subjectively intelligible to the people 
in it. Sartre seems to make a distinction with regard to the researcher 
who studies History, in this case he himself or the reader of the 
Critique, on the one hand, and everyone who is part of the Historical 
process, on the other. The question of whether the dialectical nature 
of History is immanently intelligible to historical actors corresponds 
to this second perspective and is developed in the progressive part 
of the research, found in the second volume. We will further discuss 
this progressive analysis in the last section of this chapter. For now, 
we have the necessary information to delve into the details of Sartre’s 
inquiry into the dialectical nature of life: 
The experience of the dialectic is […] the very experience 
of living, since to live is to act and be acted on, and 
since the dialectic is the rationality of praxis. It must be 
regressive because it will set out from lived experience 
in order gradually to discover all the structures of praxis 
(CDR 39)405.
It must be possible to understand History as dialectical because the 
people that make History are dialectical. The people are dialectical 
because their most fundamental way of being in the world – their 
praxis – is. The question at hand is therefore: What is praxis? The 
answer to this question is rooted in the notion of need, which drives 
all life (CDR 80). 
Need is a negation of the negation in so far as it 
expresses itself as a lack within the organism; and need 
is a positivity in so far as the organic totality tends to 
preserve itself as such through it (CDR 80)406.
The first part of the definition of need is that it is a negation of the 
initial ‘negation’ between organic and inorganic. Sartre’s definition of 
the term “organic” is a bit narrower than its common connotation: 
for him it simply means living. The inorganic also includes ‘less 
organized elements’ or dead matter (CDR 80)407. Need negates 
the dichotomy because the organic lacks and therefore needs 
something which is not organic, such as food, shelter or warmth. 
405 ‘L’expérience de la dialectique est même de vivre, puisque vivre c’est agir et subir et 
puisque la dialectique est la rationalité de la praxis ; elle sera régressive puisqu’elle 
partira du vécu pour retrouver peu à peu toutes les structures de la praxis.’ (CDRF 
134).
406 ‘Le besoin est négation de négation dans la mesure où il se dénonce comme un 
manque à l’intérieur de l’organisme, il est positivité dans la mesure où par lui la 
totalité organique tend à se conserver comme telle.’ (CDRF 166).
407 ‘moins organisés’ (CDRF 166).
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This characterisation is also present in the second, positive, part of 
the definition of need, which is that through need the organism 
preserves itself. It is because a living being fulfils its needs that it 
keeps on living and therefore that it keeps existing as a living being. 
An organism is nothing but an organized whole. An organism 
ceases to be an organism in this sense upon death. Need is therefore 
not only the need to have something which is absent, it is also the 
positive need to preserve the living being as an organized whole. 
This simple interplay between organisms and beings already reveals 
a fundamental dialectical relationship: there is a negation between 
organic and inorganic which is resolved by the fact that organisms 
depend on the inorganic to sustain themselves.
We encounter yet another process of totalisation. What needs to be 
preserved is the organism in its totality. Since the organism is in a 
constant state of need for food, warmth, oxygen etc., however, the 
totality is never fully established because there are always new needs 
that arise. Hence, the organism is always in a process of becoming 
and sustaining itself as a totality, a process of totalisation. This means 
that ‘dialectical time came into being, in fact, with the organism; for 
the living being can survive only by renewing itself ’ (CDR 82)408. 
The organic totality is always present as a goal that needs to be 
attained, a virtual totality which is not yet – and will never be – a full 
totality. Sartre therefore calls it a ‘de-totalised totality’ (CDR 85)409. 
In this process of totalisation, the material environment is 
transformed into a totality. The process of totalisation, by aiming at 
a state of totality, transforms the environment into a ‘false organism’, 
an organisation which is only present because of the need of the 
organism (CDR 81)410. The material environment, on the other hand, 
makes the organism a ‘pure materiality’ (CDR 81)411. The organism 
can only act on the environment because it is itself a material body. 
In order to survive, it needs to make itself into a material tool for 
survival. In short, through need the subject and the object mirror 
each other: need inscribes certain aspects of the organic into the 
inorganic by making it a totality, and it inscribes certain aspects of 
the inorganic into the organic by making it a materiality. 
In order to preserve itself, the organism needs to act. The answer to 
the mere function of need is the action of praxis (CDR 82-3). Needs 
are almost never immediately satisfied. Although most human beings 
live in an oxygen rich environment, food, warmth and shelter need 
408 ‘avec l’organisme, en effet, le temps dialectique est entré dans l’être puisque l’être 
vivant ne peut persévérer qu’en se renouvelant’ (CDRF 167).
409 ‘totalité détotalisée’ (CDRF 169).
410 ‘faux organisme’ (CDRF 167).
411 ‘pure matérialité’ (CDRF 167).
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to be sought out as they are not immediately available. Thus, ‘the 
material environment […], by not containing what the organism 
seeks, transforms the totality as future reality into possibility’ (CDR 
83)412. Thus, ‘praxis, in the first instance, is nothing but the relation of 
the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a 
totality under threat; it is function exteriorized’ (CDR 83)413. While 
needs transform the environment into possibilities of satisfaction, 
praxis goes one step further and transforms the environment into the 
possibility of existing at all. It exteriorizes the function in the sense 
that it projects the organic function of need into the surroundings. 
An organism needs to do more than identify sources of nutrition, 
it also needs to identify when there are no such sources and the 
environment needs to be changed in order to satisfy its needs. That 
which is lacking is no longer registered as simply being within the 
organism, it is a lack in the world outside and thus exteriorized. 
Therefore, ‘it is through man that negation comes […] to matter’ 
(CDR 83)414.415
Although ‘praxis, born of need, is a totalisation whose movement 
towards its own end practically makes the environment into a 
totality’, it still needs to distinguish between different parts of the 
total material environment (CDR 85)416. Although survival is the 
main project of every human being, the material environment cannot 
simply be divided along the lines of its relevance or irrelevance for 
survival. It needs to be divided in more specific ways that account 
for the specific needs that can be fulfilled by it . Hence, ‘[m]an, who 
produces his life in the unity of the material field, is led by praxis 
itself to define zones, systems and privileged objects within this 
inert totality’ (CDR 89)417. Fertile land is distinguished from barren 
land, twigs suitable for making a fire are privileged in comparison 
with non-flammable stones. The material world remains a totality 
412 ‘de l’environnement matériel […] transforme — par l’absence de ce que l’organisme 
y cherche — la totalité comme réalité future en possibilité’ (CDRF 168).
413 ‘la praxis n’est d ‘abord rien d ‘autre que le rapport de l’organisme comme fin 
extérieure et future à l’organisme présent comme totalité menacée ; c’est la fonction 
extériorisée’ (CDRF 168).
414 ‘c’est par l’homme que la négation vient à […] la matière’ (CDRF 168).
415  Sartre adds to this that although matter does change, this does not entail a true 
negation: ‘There is no denying that matter passes from one state to another, and 
this means that change takes place. But a material change is neither an affirmation 
nor a negation; it cannot destroy anything, since nothing was constructed; it cannot 
overcome resistances, since the forces involved simply produced the result they had 
to’ (CDR 84).
416 ‘la praxis née du besoin est une totalisation dont le mouvement vers sa propre fin 
transforme pratiquement l’environnement en une totalité’. (CDRF 170).
417 ‘L’homme qui produit sa vie dans l’unité du champ matériel est amené par la praxis 
même à déterminer des zones, des systèmes, des objets privilégiés dans cette totalité 
inerte’ (CDRF 172-173).
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as the background against which these zones, systems and object 
can appear: ‘the hunter or fisherman lies in wait; the food-gatherer 
searches: the field has been unified so as to provide a basis on which 
the object sought may be more readily apprehended’ (CDR 90-91)418. 
Sartre considers labour, physical work, to be ‘the original praxis 
by which man produces and reproduces his life’ (CDR 90)419. In 
it, we can easily see the dialectical nature of praxis. The organism 
needs to survive, which takes the form of the project of “putting 
food on the table”. This project gives the material world a unity as 
the environment in which the labour needs to take place. In order 
to do the labour, the human needs to make itself inert. Sartre gives 
the example of using one’s body weight to press a lever (CDR 90). 
The lever, in turn, becomes a privileged object as that which needs 
to be turned in order to do one’s job, get paid and survive. The use of 
this object requires it being manipulated in relation to other objects. 
The lever operates machinery which in turn produces something. 
‘[T]he subsequent task of labour must be to put the created object 
back in contact with the other sectors within the whole and to unite 
them from a new point of view; it negates separation’ (CDR 89)420. 
We once again find a negation of a negation. The negation of the 
privileged object with regard to the material world in light of its 
practical use is negated by using it to manipulate the material world, 
and hence reintegrating the object in it. In light of this, the full 
definition of praxis becomes:
[P]raxis [is] an organising project which transcends 
material conditions towards an end and inscribes itself 
through labour, in inorganic matter as a rearrangement 
of the practical field and a reunification of means in the 
light of the end (CDR 734).421 
Thereby, Sartre has shown that praxis is itself dialectical. Living the 
dialectic and knowing the dialectic needs to be the same thing if 
there is such a thing as dialectical rationality. Sartre has shown that 
in our most fundamental relationship to the world, in terms of our 
needs as living organisms, we are dialectical. The initial negation is 
that between the subjective and the objective. There are subjective 
beings, which are organic, and there are material objects, which 
418 ‘on guette à la chasse, à la pêche ; on cherche à la cueillette. C’est-à-dire qu’on a 
réalisé l’unité du champ pour mieux saisir sur le fond l’objet quêté’ (CDRF 174).
419 ‘la praxis originelle par quoi il produit et reproduit sa vie’ (CDRF 174).
420 ‘la démarche ultérieure du travail doit être nécessairement la remise en contact de 
l’objet créé, à l’intérieur du tout, avec les autres secteurs et leur unification d’un point 
de vue neuf ; il nie la séparation’ (CDRF 173).
421 ‘la praxis comme projet organisateur dépassant des conditions matérielles vers une 
fin et s’inscrivant par le travail dans la matière inorganique comme remaniement du 
champ pratique et réunification des moyens en vue d’atteindre la fin’ (CDRF 687).
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are inorganic. Because the organism has needs, it lacks something 
inorganic. The first negation is negated because in order to exist and 
keep on existing, the organic needs the inorganic. The project of 
fulfilling needs transforms the material environment into a totality, 
mirroring the organized nature of the organism. The material 
environment, in order to be traversed by the organism, causes the 
organism to be thrown back to its own materiality, its body becoming 
a tool for survival. The initial negation of the environment as the 
place in which means of nutrition are not always abundant and thus 
lacking, is negated as some objects can be used to survive. Praxis is 
dialectical because every physical action is a negation of a negation 
(SM 92): an object is separated, hence negated, from the material 
world and is subsequently reintegrated in this world in light of a 
project with a certain goal.
In demonstrating the fundamentally dialectical nature of praxis, 
Sartre subsequently shows that ‘the project [of praxis] represents in 
itself the moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity’ (SM 97)422. The 
subjective organic needs to become inorganic in order to manipulate 
the material world, and the material objects are in turn structured by 
the projects of subjective enterprises.
2. The Practico-Inert
The question concerning the nature of the material environment is 
not about matter in itself or about the particles that constitute it 
(CDR 122, 188). Sartre is interested in matter as it is already unified 
by praxis. As praxis inscribes itself into the material circumstances, 
what becomes of this material totality, or ‘worked matter’ (CDR 
71)423? 
The first thing that must be noted is that an individual is of course 
never alone in the material world. We are surrounded by other 
human beings who constantly change the material environment 
through their praxis. Because all human praxis is essentially the same 
in its ultimate orientation, we always have a rough understanding of 
the acts of others. However, because of our needs and the scarcity of 
the environment in which they can be fulfilled, the praxis of others 
stands in an adversarial relation to our own. This opposition is due 
both to competition for food and other resources, and to the fact 
that the Other can kill us and thereby end our process of totalisation 
once and for all (CDR 131-132). 
422 ‘le projet […] représente en lui-même l’unité mouvante de la subjectivité et de 
l’objectivité’ (SMF 66).
423 ‘matière ouvrée’ (CDRF 158).
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Inertia
Apart from the others with whom we currently share the world, 
there are also those who came before us and whose actions are 
already inscribed into the material world. Praxis gives the material 
world a unity by inscribing itself in it, but once it has been inscribed 
it is retained in matter to an extent that far exceeds the project 
of praxis. Matter is inert, meaning that it retains the changes we 
make in it (CDR 161). In other words, it absorbs praxis or praxis is 
crystallized in it (CDR 161, 164). In this process, it is ‘enriched with 
new meaning […] to the extent it eludes the labourer’ (CDR 164)424. 
Thus, ‘[e]very thing maintains with all its inertia the particular unity 
which a long forgotten action imposed upon it’ (CDR 101)425.
While the person who acts may have certain intentions with the 
specific way in which he or she reorganized matter, the reorganisation 
may have certain unforeseen side effects or even a completely 
undesired effect. The example Sartre gives of this is deforestation 
(CDR 162-162). Clearing forested areas in order to turn them into 
farmland is a prime example of praxis: the matter of the forest is 
reorganized as trees are chopped down, the land is divided up into 
zones suitable for certain crops, and all this is done to produce food 
in order to survive. Nevertheless, the forest also has a protective 
function, as it retains sediment from mountains that will otherwise 
find its way to rivers. If the forest is taken down, the sediment 
ends up in the river, raising the riverbed and ultimately causing the 
river to overflow. Thus, deforestation causes floods which destroy 
crops, settlements and human life. The quest for survival that led 
to deforestation ultimately turns against this project in the form of 
deadly floods. In more abstract terms, what we see here is the ‘passive 
action which materiality as such exerts on man and his History in 
returning a stolen praxis to man in the form of a counter-finality’ 
(CDR 123)426. Flooding is passive because it is not instigated by 
materiality, it is instigated by human praxis. It is, however, also active 
because it does act on human beings and their environment without 
direct human interference. Hence, the praxis of deforestation leads 
to the finality of farmland and food, but also to the counter-finality 
of floods. Hence, ‘man has to struggle not only against nature, 
and against the social environment which has produced him, and 
against other men, but also against his own action as it becomes 
424 ‘s’enrichit de significations nouvelles dans la mesure même où il échappe au 
travailleur’ (CDRF 234).
425 ‘Chaque chose supporte de toute son inertie l’unité particulière qu’une action 
aujourd’hui disparue lui a imposée’ (CDRF 183).
426 ‘d’action passive qu’exerce la matérialité en tant que telle sur les hommes et sur 
leur Histoire en leur retournant une praxis volée sous la forme d’une contre-finalité’ 
(CDRF 202).
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other’ (CDR 124)427. At first it was the need of human beings which 
demanded something from the environment, but subsequently the 
environment demands something from human beings. They need 
to find a way to protect themselves from the flood. In other words:
Thus we can begin to see an actual state of labour 
[…] in which there is a constant transformation of 
man’s exigencies in relation to matter into exigencies 
of matter in relation to man. In this state, man’s needs 
for material products […] are homogeneous in relation 
to the exigencies of matter in so far as these express a 
crystallised, inverted human praxis (CDR 165)428.
Another example Sartre gives of the inverted praxis of matter is that 
of a house and its inhabitants. 
To preserve its reality as a dwelling a house must be 
inhabited, that is to say, looked after, heated, swept, 
repainted, etc.; otherwise it deteriorates. This vampire 
object constantly absorbs human action, lives on blood 
taken from man and finally lives in symbiosis with 
him. It derives all its physical properties, including 
temperature, from human action. For its inhabitants 
there is no difference between the passive activity which 
might be called ‘residence’ and the pure re-constituting 
praxis which protects the house against the Universe 
(CDR 169)429[.]
Building a house for shelter is a praxis, and once the house is built, 
it requires upkeep. This is not necessarily an example of a counter-
finality as most people who build a house expect the additional 
427 ‘l’Histoire est plus complexe que ne le croit un certain marxisme simpliste, et 
l’homme n’a pas à lutter seulement contre la Nature, contre le milieu social qui l’a 
engendré, contre d’autres hommes, mais aussi contre sa propre action en tant qu’elle 
devient autre’ (CDRF 202).
428 ‘Ainsi, nous commençons à entrevoir un état réel du travail […] dans lequel il y a 
une transformation perpétuelle de l’exigence de l’homme par rapport à la matière en 
exigence de la matière par rapport à l’homme et où l’exigence de l’homme, en tant 
qu’elle exprime son être, de produit matériel, est homogène […] à l’exigence de la 
matière en tant qu’une praxis humaine cristallisée et inversée s’exprime à travers 
elle.’ (CDRF 235).
429 ‘Pour conserver sa réalité de demeure, une maison doit être habitée, c’est-à-dire 
entretenue, chauffée, ramonée, ravalée, etc. ; sinon elle se dégrade ; cet objet-vampire 
absorbe sans cesse l’action humaine, se nourrit d’un sang emprunté à l’homme et 
finalement vit en symbiose avec lui. Tous ses caractères physiques, y compris sa 
température, lui viennent de l’action humaine et, pour ses habitants, il n’y a pas de 
différence entre l’activité passive qu’on pourrait nommer la « résidence » et la pure 
praxis reconstituante qui défend la maison contre l’Univers[.]’ (CDRF 238).
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requirement of its upkeep. Yet, it is still an example of exigencies: 
the needs and demands that worked matter exerts on us. While it 
is possible to abandon a house, if one wants to continue the initial 
project of survival it would be more obvious to do what the house 
demands of us. In most cases, this would be easier than finding other 
shelter. Hence, the house has power over us. It is an example of what 
Sartre calls ‘the human thing’ (CDR 170).430. Because of our praxis, 
material things acquire certain characteristics of human beings, such 
as the ability to demand and the ability to act – albeit in a passive 
manner. As Sartre says:
[T]hings can absorb the whole of human activity, and 
then materialise and return it: it could not be otherwise. 
Nothing happens to men or to objects except in their 
material being and through the materiality of Being. 
But man is precisely the material reality from which 
matter gets its human functions (CDR 182)431.
Once matter has been organized by praxis it can also act on other 
matter. Sartre calls this the ‘magical life’ of matter because it takes 
on a so-called ‘‘life of its own’’ (CDR 173)432. An example of this is 
how the invention of steam-engines changed the world as we knew 
it. For example, ‘steam initiated the tendency towards larger factories’ 
(CDR 191)433. One could argue that steam in itself cannot initiate 
anything as it consists of inert inorganic matter, but this argument 
has no value for Sartre because ‘we never make contact with anything 
but worked and socialised matter’ (CDR 189)434. Therefore, just as 
worked matter creates exigencies for human beings, so too can it 
exert them upon other objects:
[E]very object, in so far as it exists within a given 
economic, technical and social complex, will in its turn 
become exigency through the mode and relations of 
production, and give rise to other exigencies in other 
objects (CDR 189)435.
430 ‘la chose humaine’ (CDRF 238).
431 ‘Nous avons vu, dans l’exemple précité, la chose absorber toute l’activité humaine 
et la restituer en la matérialisant : il ne peut en être autrement. Rien n’arrive aux 
hommes et aux objets que dans leur être matériel et par la matérialité de l’Être. Mais 
l’homme est justement cette réalité matérielle par quoi la matière reçoit ses fonctions 
humaines.’ (CDRF 249).
432 ‘vie magique’, ‘« vie propre »’ (CDRF 241).
433 ‘la vapeur provoque la tendance aux grandes usines’ (CDRF 256).
434 ‘nous n’avons jamais affaire qu’à de la matière ouvrée et socialisée’ (CDRF 254).
435 ‘tout objet, en tant qu’il existe dans un complexe économique, technique et social 
quelconque, devient exigence à son tour, à travers le mode et les rapports de 
production, et suscite d’autres exigences en d’autres objets.’ (CDRF 255).
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This transference of exigencies always requires human activity. 
If steam power requires bigger factories, human beings need to 
design and build these structures. We are once more reminded that 
the actions of worked matter are passive. The human beings who 
heed the call of the exigencies of matter do not work according to 
their own goals, however, but to goals imposed on them by matter. 
The result of this is that we can understand the workings of matter 
without describing the actions of man: ‘this intelligibility requires 
precisely that the action of man should be constituted as inessential’ 
(CDR 189)436. It is inessential because the fact that the work is 
done by a human being does not contribute anything to the process. 
For example, it does not matter whether commands are given by a 
supervisor or by an automated system, as long as the workers follow 
the commands (CDR 191). This process can even be conceived of 
as a purely automated system in which the workers are replaced 
by machines. In other words, ‘it is by and through men that these 
exigencies arise, and they would disappear if men did. But still, […] 
the exigency of matter ends up by being extended to matter itself 
through men’ (CDR 191)437. The fact that matter not only demands 
the action of human beings but can also re-organize other matter, 
fundamentally changes the relationship of praxis and inert matter:
[T]he very praxis of individuals or groups is altered in so 
far as it ceases to be the free organisation of the practical 
field and becomes the re-organisation of one sector of 
inert materiality in accordance with the exigencies of 
another sector of materiality (CDR 191)438.
As a result, a new being appears which transcends both ‘the 
individual as an isolated agent and inorganic matter as an inert and 
sealed reality’ (CDR 191)439. This new being is what Sartre calls the 
practico-inert. The results of praxis working on inert matter turns 
back upon the individuals and now matter is re-organizing matter. 
Every person and all worked matter exist within the practico-inert 
field, and there is no escaping it:
436 ‘cette intelligibilité réclame justement que l’action de l’homme se constitue comme 
inessentielle’ (CDRF 255).
437 ‘c’est à travers les hommes et par eux que ces exigences apparaissent : elles 
disparaîtraient avec les hommes. Mais il n’en demeure pas moins […] que l’exigence 
de la matière finit par s’étendre à la matière à travers les hommes’ (CDRF 256).
438 ‘la praxis même de l’individu (ou du groupe) est altérée en ce qu’elle n’est plus 
la libre organisation du champ pratique mais la réorganisation d’un secteur de 
matérialité inerte en fonction des exigences d’un autre secteur de matérialité’ (CDRF 
256).
439 ‘l’individu comme agent solitaire et la matière inorganique comme réalité inerte et 
scellée’ (CDRF 256).
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There are no material objects which do not communicate 
among themselves through the mediation of men; 
and there is no man who is not born into a world of 
humanised materialities and materialised institutions 
(CDR 169)440[.]
Another way of describing it is to say that ‘the practico-inert field 
is the field of material exigencies, of counter-finalities and of inert 
meanings’ (CDR 399)441: it is everything humans inscribe into 
matter that transcends their original intentions and gains a life of 
its own.
Counter-finalities add a layer of complexity to the practico-inert, 
because they often become finalities in their own right (CDR 196). 
Let us take the factory as an example. If a bigger factory causes 
more noise as a counter-finality, then noise reduction may become 
a finality for people who suffer from the loud noises. If people are 
powerless to do anything about the counter-finality, it can become 
a ‘negative exigency’: not something that urges one to do something, 
but something that expresses the fact that one can do nothing (CDR 
196)442. Furthermore, to the extent that a counter-finality has “pros 
and cons”, it is always a finality ‘from the point of view of particular 
practico-inert ensembles’ (CDR 196)443.
The practico-inert field allows for the existence of new kinds of 
entities which cannot exist in the mere relationship of praxis to the 
material world. These are what Sartre calls ‘collectives’ (CDR 253)444. 
All social objects are collectives, and one can think of examples such 
as a company, a newspaper or money. A collective is rooted in seriality 
(CDR 255). A series of people includes all those who have the same 
practical relationship towards an object. The example Sartre gives is 
that of people waiting for a bus (CDR 256). All people who wait 
for the bus are oriented towards the same object, the bus, but do 
not do so together. The unity of the queue at the bus stop is partly 
accidental, as these people happen to wait for the bus at the same 
440 ‘pas de praxis qui ne soit dépassement unifiant et dévoilant de la matière, qui ne 
se cristallise dans la matérialité comme dépassement signifiant des anciennes 
actions déjà matérialisées, pas de matière qui ne conditionne la praxis humaine à 
travers l’unité passive de significations préfabriquées; pas d’objets matériels qui ne 
communiquent entre eux par la médiation des hommes, pas d’homme qui ne surgisse 
à l’intérieur d’un monde de matérialités humanisées, d’institutions matérialisées et 
qui ne se voie prescrire un avenir général au sein du mouvement historique.’ (CDRF 
238).
441 ‘le champ pratico-inerte est le champ des exigences matérielles, des contre-finalités 
et des significations inertes’ (CDRF 343).
442 ‘exigence négative’ (CDRF 260).
443 ‘pour certains ensembles pratico-inertes’ (CDRF 260).
444 ‘collectifs’ (CDRF 306).
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time and ‘partly by the real but transcendent unity of a practico-inert 
object’ (CDR 264)445.
There are serial behaviour, serial feelings and serial 
thoughts; in other words a series is a mode of being for 
individuals both in relation to one another and in relation 
to their common being (CDR 266)[.]446
This relation to one another is of a specific nature. The idea of public 
transportation is based on the fact that everyone could be waiting 
for the bus. Public transportation is dependent on the idea that other 
people could also use it, but those people are interchangeable and 
unspecific. Thus, ‘the formal, universal structure of alterity produces 
the formula of the series’ (CDR  264)447. The structure of alterity arises 
from the fact that the situation, a series of people waiting for the bus, 
can only exist because others can also use it. If there was only one 
person, or a designated group, the bus would cease to be a form of 
public transportation. Another example of a series that Sartre gives 
is that of the audience of a radio broadcast (CDR 270). A radio 
program can only exist because people listen to it. Someone may 
accidentally listen to it, but not feel addressed by the things said by 
radio host. This person is not the audience of the radio program. Yet, 
one can only distance oneself from this audience because it exists, 
as the Other who is not present. In any case, the listeners form a 
series through the object they are invested in. In other words, ‘the 
series represents the use of alterity as a bond between men under the 
passive action of an object’ (CDR 266)448. 
The relationship between the series and the object constitutes a 
collective, which Sartre defines as the two-way relation between a 
material, inorganic, worked object and a multiplicity which finds its 
unity of exteriority in it’ (CDR 269)449. It is a two-way relationship 
because the series depends on the object, but the object also depends 
on the series. A bus would not be part of the public transportation 
system if people were not going to use it, and people would not use 
it if there was no public transportation system. 
Furthermore, just as praxis demarcates certain zones, for example 
445 ‘en partie par l’unité réelle mais transcendante d’un objet pratico-inerte’ (CDRF 
315).
446 ‘Il y a des conduites sérielles, il y a des sentiments et des pensées sérielles ; autrement 
dit, la série est un mode d’être des individus les uns par rapport aux autres et par 
rapport à l’être commun’ (CDRF 316).
447 ‘la structure formelle et universelle d’altérité fera la Raison de la série’ (CDRF 314).
448 ‘la série représente l’emploi de l ‘altérité comme lien entre les hommes sous l’action 
passive de l’objet’ (CDRF 316-317).
449 ‘la relation à double sens d’un objet matériel, inorganique et ouvré à une multiplicité 
qui trouve en lui son unité d’extériorité’ (CDRF 319).
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farms and wilderness, so the practico-inert demarcates collectives 
of persons. A factory transforms people into owners and workers, 
a university transforms people into teachers and students. It is 
important to note that collectives which consist of persons are not 
the same as groups. A collective is passive, while a group is active. 
Although a collective is a fundamental structure of any group, a 
group is the negation of this collective (CDR 254). Sartre means 
by this that the group takes the collective as a starting point but 
overcomes it in light of a common aim. A group does not have the 
structure of alterity which a series and, ultimately, a collective has. 
Hence, a social class is the biggest example of what Sartre calls a 
“gathering”, but a political movement which aims to unite people 
within this class is a group. In other words: ‘the group is defined by 
its undertaking and by the constant movement of integration which 
tends to turn it into pure praxis by trying to eliminate all forms of 
inertia from it; the collective is defined by its being’ (CDR 255)450. 
Groups play a central role in Book II of the first volume of the 
Critique as they are what ultimately move History.451 
Being-outside-oneself
We have discussed how praxis results in the practico-inert field. As 
has been said, the account of individual praxis describes an abstract 
state which is not really how human beings exist within the world. 
We will now examine how individuals exist within the practico-
inert field.
Another characteristic of the practico-inert is ‘interest’ (CDR 
197)452. Although in the abstract state of individual praxis people are 
interested in survival, genuine interest can only exist within a social 
context: ‘Interest is a certain relation between man and thing in a 
social field’ (CDR 197)453. It is the concrete way in which the abstract 
relationship of humanity to its material environment manifests 
itself. In light of the practico-inert, the environment is no longer 
the abstract totality in which man seeks survival, rather it becomes 
‘this particular practico-inert set of worked materials’ (CDR 197)454. 
Thus, the definition of interest becomes:
450 ‘le groupe se définit par son entreprise et par ce mouvement constant d’intégration 
qui vise à en faire une praxis pure en tentant de-supprimer en lui toutes les formes de 
l’inertie ; le collectif se définit par son être’ (CDRF 307).
451 The full analysis of groups is too detailed to discuss at this point. We will return to it 
in the next section of this chapter.  
452 ‘intérêt’ (CDRF 261).
453 ‘L’intérêt est un certain rapport de l’homme à la chose dans un champ social’ (CDRF 
261).
454 ‘cet ensemble pratico-inerte de matériaux ouvrés’ (CDRF 261).
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As soon as an objective ensemble is posited in a given 
society as the definition of an individual in his personal 
particularity and when as such it requires this individual 
to act on the entire practical and social field, and to 
preserve it (as an organism preserves itself ) and develop 
it at the expense of the rest (as an organism feeds itself by 
drawing on its exterior milieu), the individual possesses 
an interest (CDR 199).455
As interest takes place within the practico-inert field, the individual 
mediates between the exigencies of matter, on the one hand, and 
its own exigencies, on the other. The factory owner may realize 
that in order to compete in a certain sector of the market, he must 
purchase certain machines. These machines in turn require him to 
expand his factory. It is in his interest to buy the machines, and he 
acts accordingly, but he also mediates between sectors of materiality, 
namely the demands of the market, he newly assembled machines 
and the size of the factory. Furthermore, in the same way that 
finalities cause counter-finalities and vice versa, the interest of some 
is the destiny of others: ‘the machine is also a determination of the 
practical field of the working population and […] it is destiny for 
the workers to precisely the extent that it is interest for the employer’ 
(CDR 206)456.457 The worker has no particular interest in the new 
machine, it does not matter for him which machine he works. Yet, 
it is his destiny in so far as the new machine comes with exigencies 
in light of which he needs to act. The idea of a person being wholly 
invested in objects is what Sartre calls ‘being-outside-oneself ’ (CDR 
202)458. In this regard, interest and destiny are the positive and 
negative sides to the same phenomenon. In other words, ‘destiny 
and interest are two contradictory statutes of being-outside-oneself ’ 
(CDR 219).459
Not only does the passive activity of the practico-inert field exert 
power on persons as free praxis, it also alters what they are. We 
already saw in our analysis of praxis that in order to act we need to 
455  ‘A partir du moment où, dans une société définie, un ensemble objectif se pose 
comme définissant un individu dans sa particularité personnelle et où il exige en 
tant que tel que cet individu en agissant sur l’ensemble du champ pratique et social 
le conserve (comme l’organisme se conserve) et le développe aux dépens du reste 
(comme l’organisme s’alimente en prélevant sur le milieu extérieur), cet individu 
possède un intérêt.’ (CDRF 263).
456  ‘la machine existe aussi comme détermination du champ pratique de la population 
ouvrière et qu’elle est destin pour les ouvriers dans l’exacte mesure où pour le patron 
elle est intérêt’ (CDRF 268).
457  Sartre calls the relationship between interest and destiny the third characteristic of 
the practico-inert, yet he never explicitly states what the first two are (CDR 206).
458  ‘l’être-hors-de-soi’ CDRF (265).
459  ‘destin et intérêt sont deux statuts contradictoires de l’être-hors-de-soi’ (CDRF 279).
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turn our body into a tool, and thus into a material object. The same 
is true for the practico-inert. In order for it to turn us into a tool that 
acts according to its exigencies, it needs to turn us into objects as 
well. This is the final characteristic of the practico-inert. It is central 
to Sartre’s argument, as is apparent from the fact that he emphasizes 
it many times throughout the Critique: 
[M]achines, by their structure and functions, determine 
the nature of their servants as the rigid and imperious 
future of undetermined individuals and, thereby, create 
men (CDR 159)460.
[T]he machine defines and produces the reality of its 
servant, that is to say, it makes of him a practico-inert 
Being who will be a machine in so far as the machine 
is human and a man in so far as it remains, in spite of 
everything, a tool to be used: in short, it becomes his 
exact complement as an inverted man (CDR 207)461.
The worker is socially constituted as a practico-inert 
object to the extent that he receives a wage: he becomes 
a machine that has to be maintained and fed (CDR 
238)462.
Within the practico-inert field, persons are things. They have the 
same characteristics as any other practico-inert object, a function 
and meaning inscribed in their materiality. The example of the 
worker which Sartre gives is a very striking one because the objects 
that give the worker an objective status are right in front of him. 
They function as a machine created and tasked with the operation of 
other machinery. Hence, they become part of sections of materiality 
exerting influence upon one another. The example does not imply 
that other people, especially people from other classes, are not 
practico-inert objects also. We already saw this in the example of 
interest and destiny. The machine makes the worker into a thing, 
but it does the same to the employer, the one tasked with assuring 
that the factory will keep making profits: ‘The worker who serves the 
machine has his being in it just as the employer does’ (CDR 206)463. 
460  ‘la machine, par sa structure et ses fonctions, détermine comme avenir rigide et subi 
d’individus indéterminés, le type de ses servants et, par là, crée des hommes’ (CDRF 
230).
461  ‘Elle définit donc et produit la réalité de son servant, c’est-à-dire qu’elle fait de lui un 
Être pratico-inerte qui sera machine dans la mesure où celle-ci est humaine et homme 
dans la mesure où elle reste malgré tout outil à diriger : bref, son exact complément 
à titre d’homme inversé.’ (CDRF 269).
462  ‘où un salaire lui est attribué, l’ouvrier est socialement constitué comme cet objet 
pratico-inerte : une machine qu’il faut entretenir et alimenter’ (CDRF 294).
463  ‘L’ouvrier qui sert la machine a son être en elle tout comme le patron’ (CDRF 268).
Chapter 3
178 179
We can easily apply the same logic to other occupations. Sartre gives 
the example of a bureaucrat or clerk: ‘manipulated by things (his 
office, as a collective, his boss as an Other), he is for other men a factor 
of alterity, of passivity and of counter-finality, as if he were a thing (a 
Spanish ducat) circulating through men’s hands’ (CDR 235)464. This 
does not mean that people become the mindless drones of material 
exigencies. It only means that in so far as they have position in the 
social field, the person ‘subordinates his praxis to his Being-outside-
himself ’ (CDR 190)465. This means that the praxis is altered: 
In so far as he is characterised by praxis, his praxis does 
not originate in need or in desire; it is not the process of 
realising his project, but, in so far as it is constituted so 
as to achieve an alien object, it is, in the agent himself, 
the praxis of another (CDR 188)466[.]
As was said before, everything within the practico-inert originates 
in human praxis, but this does not mean that every action by every 
individual is part of their own project. The possibilities of praxis are 
determined by practico-inert objects which originate in the praxis 
of others, even if the others in question cannot be localized and are 
nothing more than an abstract Other. Thus:
[I]t must be pointed out both that the practico-inert 
field exists, that it is real, and that free human activities 
are not thereby eliminated, that they are not even altered 
in their translucidity as projects in the process of being 
realised. The field exists: in short, it is what surrounds 
and conditions us. I need only glance out of the window: 
I will be able to see cars which are men and drivers who 
are cars, a policeman who is directing the traffic at the 
corner of the street and, a little further on, the same 
traffic being controlled by red and green lights: hundreds 
of exigencies rise up towards me: pedestrian crossings, 
notices, and prohibitions; collectives (a branch of the 
Credit Lyonnais, a cafe, a church, blocks of fats, and also 
a visible seriality: people queueing in front of a shop); 
and instruments (pavements, a thoroughfare, a taxi rank, 
a bus stop, etc., proclaiming with their frozen voices 
464 ‘manié par les choses (son bureau, comme collectif, son chef en tant qu’Autre) il est 
pour les autres hommes un facteur d’altérité, de passivité et de contre-finalité comme 
s’il était une chose (un ducat espagnol) circulant entre des mains d’hommes’ (CDRF 
363).
465 ‘subordonné sa praxis à son Être-hors-de-soi dans le monde’ (CDRF 255).
466 ‘la praxis, celle-ci ne prend pas sa source dans le besoin ou dans le désir, elle n 
‘est pas la réalisation en cours de son projet mais en tant qu’elle se constitue pour 
atteindre un objectif étranger, elle est, dans l’agent même, praxis d’un autre’ (CDRF 
253).
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how they are to be used). These beings – neither thing 
nor man, but practical unites made up of man and inert 
things – these appeals, and these exigencies do not yet 
concern me directly. Later, I will go down into the street 
and become their thing (CDR 324)[.]467
Sartre immediately adds in a footnote that ‘[i]t goes without saying 
that while I am in my flat I am the thing of other things (furniture, 
etc.)’ (CDR 324N)468. Just as need makes our body into a tool for 
survival and, hence, into an object, so too does the practico-inert 
make us into a thing. It does so not in the abstract sense of praxis, 
in which there is no difference between people because everyone’s 
body is a tool for survival, but in a specific sense. We are an object 
in the sense that we fit into the meaningful whole of the practico-
inert field. In a different example, that of Sartre himself looking out 
of the window while on holiday, he states: ‘the concept of man is an 
abstraction which never occurs in concrete intuition. It is in fact as 
a ‘holiday-maker’, confronting a gardener and road-mender, that I 
come to conceive myself ’ (CDR 101)469. The policeman who directs 
traffic has a different role than the person who is waiting in the 
car, and they are therefore different things. Furthermore, there is no 
essential difference anymore between a human who is also a thing 
and the things that are already human. Our praxis makes the world 
into a meaningful one and makes things human. The practico-inert 
makes humans into things that have a designated role and place in 
the world. Because of this, Sartre can state that, in the practico-inert, 
there is no essential difference between car and driver.
We now have a clear overview of the practico-inert and thereby of 
467 ‘il faut dire à la fois que le champ pratico-inerte est, qu’il est réel et que les libres 
activités humaines ne sont pas supprimées pour autant, pas même altérées dans leur 
translucidité de projet en cours de réalisation. Le champ existe : pour tout dire, c ‘est 
lui qui nous entoure et nous conditionne; je n’ai qu’à jeter un coup d’œil par la fenêtre 
: je verrai des autos qui sont des hommes et dont les conducteurs sont des autos, un 
sergent de ville qui règle la circu lation au coin de la rue et, plus loin, un réglage 
automatique de la même circulation par des feux rouges et verts, cent exigences 
qui montent de terre vers moi, passages cloutés, affiches impératives, interdits; des 
collectifs (succursale du Crédit Lyonnais, café, église, immeubles d’habitation et 
aussi une sérialité visible : des gens font la queue devant un magasin), des instruments 
(proclamant de leur voix figée la manière de se servir d’eux, trottoirs, chaussée, 
station de taxis, arrêt d’autobus, etc.). Tous ces êtres — ni choses ni homme, unités 
pratiques de l’homme et de la chose inerte — tous ces appels, toutes ces exigences ne 
me concernent pas encore directement. Tout à l’heure, je descendrai dans la rue et je 
serai leur chose’ (CDRF 362-363).
468 ‘Il va de soi que je suis dans mon appartement la chose d’autres choses (meubles, 
etc.)’ (CDRF 363).
469 ‘le concept d ‘homme est une abstraction qui ne se livre jamais dans l’intuition 
concrète : en fait je me saisis comme un « estivant » en face d’un jardinier et d’un 
cantonnier’ (CDRF 183).
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the theory of objects in this period of Sartre’s oeuvre. As praxis re-
arranges matter, meanings are inscribed in it, and counter-finalities 
give material objects a life of their own. This allows them to exert 
exigencies on human beings, who can thereby be made to manipulate 
other material objects through passive-activity. This turns persons 
into practico-inert objects themselves, which can manipulate and 
be manipulated by other material beings: ‘We put all of modern 
civilisation between us. Thus we ourselves become things’ (IPB 72).
This moment in Sartre’s investigation is still not fully concrete, 
however (CDR 324). In order to fully understand both subjectivity 
and objectivity, we must see how the interplay between praxis and the 
practico-inert works in its temporal dimension, and, consequently, 
how groups and History are shaped.
3. Groups and History 
We have seen that human beings manipulate the material world 
through their free individual praxis and that, in turn, the practico-
inert rebounds upon human beings and manipulates them. This 
gives rise to necessity as human beings are determined by the 
practico-inert. This, however, is not the full story of subjectivity and 
objectivity. A full analysis would have to include a level of reality 
which we briefly touched upon already, that of groups. Groups are 
not a kind of being, but a certain way in which the organic and 
inorganic, or freedom and necessity, are organized: ‘the group is not 
a metaphysical reality, but a definite practical relation of men to an 
objective and to each other’ (CDR 404)470. Or, in other words:
On the ontological plane, there are not three beings, 
or three statutes of being: class-being is practico-
inert, and defines itself as a determination of seriality, 
as we have seen. The two kinds of group (fused and 
pledged, organisational and institutional) have no inner 
group-being; their statute is that their being-outside-
themselves (the only group-being) lies in the series from 
which they have emerged and which sustains them (and 
which affects them even in their freedom) (CDR 686)471.
Sartre preliminarily describes groups as ‘the equivalence of freedom 
470 ‘le groupe n’est pas une réalité métaphysique mais un certain rapport pratique des 
hommes à un objectif et entre eux’ (CDRF 427f).
471 ‘Sur le plan ontologique, il n’y a pas trois êtres ni trois statuts d’être : l’être-de-classe 
est pratico-inerte, il se définit comme une détermination de sérialité, nous l’avons 
vu. Les deux groupes (fusion ou serment, organisation ou institution) n ‘ont pas d 
‘être-intérieur-de-groupe ; leur statut c’est d’avoir leur être-hors-de-soi (le seul être 
de groupe) dans la série dont ils émanent et qui les soutient (en même temps qu’elle 
les marque jusque dans leur liberté).’ (CDRF 649).
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as necessity and of necessity as freedom’ (CDR 345)472. This abstract 
definition is refined and made more precise throughout the greater 
part of Book II of the first volume of the Critique. We will not go 
into all the details of Sartre’s analysis here but give a relatively concise 
overview of his notion of groups and, more precisely, the question of 
what they are, of how they arise and of what kinds of groups there 
are. After this overview, we can show how groups lead to History.
Groups-in-fusion and the pledge
Groups arise from and collapse back into practico-inert collective 
gatherings in a circular fashion. Just like Sartre’s description of 
individual praxis¸ the description of groups is abstract. First of all, 
the genesis of groups which he describes is not temporal, but formal 
(CDR 348). The question how the first groups emerged from the 
practico-inert is unanswerable from our point of view: ‘In other 
words, the historical problem of the priority of the group over the 
gathering (or of the gathering over the group) is, in this context, a 
metaphysical problem, devoid of meaning’ (CDR 364)473. Second, the 
different stages in the process of the formation of groups and their 
disbandment is not absolute, that is, a group does not always go 
through the different stages in the given order: ‘any form can emerge 
either before or after any other’ (CDR 583)474. Or, in other words:
I will recall here that circularity is conditioned only by 
the movement of History and that, regardless of their 
statute, groups can either arise from the practico-inert 
field or be reabsorbed into it; and there is no formal 
law to compel them to pass through the succession of 
different states (CDR 676)475.
Even when a group does not enter a certain stage, it needs to comply 
to the formal requirements of these stages (CDR 676-677). Although 
the workings of these stages are intricate and many variants exist, 
there are roughly four: the group-in-fusion, the pledged group, the 
472 ‘L’ÉQUIVALENCE DE LA LIBERTÉ COMME NÉCESSITÉE ET DE LA 
NÉCESSITÉ COMME LIBERTÉ’ (CDRF 381). (The original French is capitalized 
and serves as the title for the first of two parts (A) of Book II of the first volume of the 
Critique. The English translation divides these two parts into eight chapters, and the 
original title is used as the subtitle for the first chapter, entitled ‘The Fused Group’.)
473 ‘Autrement dit, le problème historique de l’antériorité du groupe sur le rassemblement 
(ou du rassemblement sur le groupe) est dans les circonstances présentes un problème 
métaphysique et dénué de signification.’ (CDRF 396).
474 ‘toute forme peut toujours naître avant ou après toute autre’ (CDRF 367).
475 ‘Je rappelle ici que cette circularité n’est conditionnée que par le mouvement de 
l’Histoire et que les groupes peuvent surgir du champ pratico-inerte ou s’y résorber, 
quel que soit leur statut et sans qu’une loi quelconque et formelle les oblige à passer 
successivement par les différents statuts que nous avons décrits.’ (CDRF 641).
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organisation and the institution.476 
The first condition for a gathering, a collective of people, to make 
itself into a group is that the members are in some kind of mortal 
danger, which can only be overcome by grouping together.477 ‘[T]
he group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or common danger 
and defines itself by the common objective which determines its 
common praxis’ (CDR 350)478. As has been said, gatherings are 
passive and groups are active and are therefore characterized by 
praxis. Individual praxis arises from the need to survive, and the 
praxis of a group stems from the same need. 
The common objective of survival is not a sufficient condition, 
however. A gathering is also defined by its common objective. The 
second condition required for a gathering to become a group is that 
the threat comes from the actions of another already established 
group: ‘a collective derives its possibilities of self-determination into 
a group from its antagonistic relations with an already constituted 
group or with a person representing this group’ (CDR 362)479.480 This 
does not mean that the already constituted group creates the group in 
question. In that case, the gathering retains its passive nature. Rather, 
the action of the already constituted group is what allows the other 
group to become active. The group that acts threateningly does not 
have the objective of creating another group, rather its objective is to 
annihilate the gathering (CDR 360). Hence, the creation of another 
group is not the intended result of an action by an antecedent group 
but a reaction to their action, counteracting rather than furthering 
their objective. 
Although the newfound group has a common objective, the 
objective itself is not what binds the group together, it is the praxis 
476 The English translation translates groupe en fusion as fused group. In most scholarship 
it is translated as group-in-fusion and I will follow this translation. See for example: 
(Catalano 1986, 165). 
477 It should be noted that Sartre is giving a formal description of how groups arise from 
gatherings. Once this has been established, we could conceive of a society in which 
secondary groups are formed for other reasons. For example, a book-trading club is 
a group that is not born from a mortal threat (CDR 350f).
478 ‘le groupe se constitue à partir d’un besoin ou d ‘un danger commun et se définit par 
l’objectif commun qui détermine sa praxis commune’ (CDRF 385).
479 ‘les possibilités d’autodétermination en groupe viennent au collectif des relations 
antagonistiques qu’il entretient avec un groupe déjà constitué ou une personne 
comme représentant ce groupe’ (CDRF 394).
480 The fact that a group can only arise in light of another group directly ties in with 
Sartre’s theory of the look and thereby reveals an interesting continuity in his thought 
concerning intersubjectivity. In Black Orpheus, Sartre applies the theory of the look 
to groups: ‘For three thousand years, the white man has enjoyed the privilege of 
seeing without being seen; he was only a look […]. Today, these black men are 
looking at us’ (BO 291). 
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itself. In the group, the structure of alterity that characterized the 
series is dissolved. The praxis of the other people in the group is not 
merely a similar action directed at the same object, it is immediately 
recognized as mine (CDR 377-379):
I am now my own action in the praxis of the group in 
so far as its objectification belongs to me as a common 
result. A common result: it is new, but it is mine in so 
far as it is the multiple result of my action multiplied 
everywhere, and everywhere the same; at the same time, 
this multiplied action is a single praxis which overflows 
in everyone and into a totalising result (CDR 378-
379)481.
A group shares in the same praxis, and I see my personal praxis 
reflected in this common praxis. This does not mean that the freedom 
of praxis is limited. Rather, it is the ‘inversion of alienation’ (CDR 
378)482. When I am part of a group and someone shouts a command, 
it is not obeyed. Someone merely voices what everyone is thinking 
or what immediately furthers the goals of the group. For example, 
when there is a group fleeing from something and someone shouts, 
“Stop!”, it is immediately clear that it is not safe to retreat in that 
particular direction and that stopping furthers their common project 
(CDR 379-380). This also means that my freedom is not limited 
but expanded by the group, because not only do the others want the 
same as I do, we also have more possibilities. The example Sartre 
gives of this is an individual demonstrator attacking the police. A 
single individual is bound to fail, but a group can succeed: 
Thus when he tries to attack the police, he carries out 
an action which only the existence and practice of the 
group make possible; but, at the same time, he produces 
it as his free practical activity. Thus the action of the 
group as total praxis is not initially other action, in him, 
or alienation from the totality; it is the action of the 
whole in so far as it is freely itself (CDR 393)483[.]
Thus, the possibility of forming groups out of gatherings enables 
people to regain the freedom that was lost in the practico-inert field. 
481 ‘je suis ma propre action dans la praxis du groupe en tant que son objectivation 
m’appartient comme résultat commun. Résultat commun : il est neuf mais il est mien 
en tant qu’il est résultat multiple de mon action multipliée partout et partout la même 
; en même temps cette action multipliée est une seule praxis se débordant en tous et 
dans un résultat totalisant.’ (CDRF 407).
482  le renversement de l’aliénation’ (CDRF 407).
483 ‘Ainsi quand il tente de charger contre les agents, il accomplit une action que seules 
l’existence et la pratique du groupe rendent possible ; mais en même temps, il la 
produit comme sa libre activité pratique.’ (CDRF 418).
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We will return to Sartre’s notion of choice and freedom in the final 
paragraph of this chapter. For now, it suffices to say that this is only 
the first step of the group-forming process. What we have discussed 
thus far are groups-in-fusion, which are spontaneous groups in which 
the goal is immediate and clear, and everyone performs the exact 
same action. These groups are unorganized, and once organisation 
begins, the newfound freedom acquires a degree of inertia. The next 
stage in the process of group formation, which is marked by the 
slight return of inertia, is the ‘pledge’ (CDR 419)484.
The group is formed for reasons of survival, but the group itself as a 
unity and the totalisation of the praxis of its members also needs to 
survive if the group is to persist in its common praxis. Therefore, the 
group requires some kind of permanent element that transcends the 
immediate circumstances:
[T]he common praxis is freedom itself doing violence to 
necessity. But if circumstances demand the persistence 
of the group (as an organ of defence, of vigilance, etc.), 
while people’s hearts are untouched by any urgency or 
hostile violence, which might occasion common praxis; 
if its praxis, turning back upon itself, in the form of 
organisation and differentiation, demands the unity of 
its members as the pre-existing foundation of all its 
transformations, then this unity can exist only as an 
inert synthesis within freedom itself (CDR 418)485.
In face of falling back into the gathering and thereby full inertia, 
a small inert element has to be introduced. This permanent inert 
element needs to be posited as though it preceded the common 
praxis, and it takes the form of the pledge. The pledge itself can 
take different forms, for example the swearing of an oath or a rite 
of passage (CDR 419, 485, 606). It does not matter which form it 
takes, as long as it gives the members of the group something and 
alternative means of unification when the urgency of the common 
praxis becomes less apparent. It ‘always corresponds to a surviving 
group’s resistance to the divisive tendency of (spatio-temporal) 
distance and differentiation’ (CDR 419)486. A pledge cannot be the 
484 ‘serment’ (CDRF 439).
485 ‘la praxis commune est la liberté même faisant violence à la nécessité; mais quand 
les circonstances réclament la persistance du groupe (comme organe de défense, de 
vigilance, etc.) sans que l’urgence et la violence adverse viennent jusqu’au cœur de 
chacun susciter la praxis commune, quand sa praxis, se retournant sur lui-même, 
sous forme d’organisation et de différenciation, exige l’unité de ses membres comme 
fondement pré-existant de toutes ses transformations, il faut que cette imité soit 
comme une synthèse inerte au cœur de la liberté même.’ (CDRF 438).
486 ‘qu’il corresponde en tout cas à la résistance du groupe survivant contre l’action 
séparatrice de l’éloignement (spatio-temporel) et de la différenciation’ (CDRF 439).
THE FORCE OF THINGS
186 187
action of a single member, but needs to be the same for everyone. 
The pledge is not a subjective or merely verbal 
determination: it is a real modification of the group 
by my regulatory action. The inert negation of certain 
future possibilities is my bond of interiority with the 
sworn group to which I belong, in the sense that for 
everyone the same negation is conditioned by mine, in 
so far as it is his behaviour (CDR 422)487.
Although some doors are closed by pledging oneself to the group, 
others are opened. For example, membership of one group may 
exclude one from others. The pledge guarantees that one stays a 
member of the group even in uncertain circumstances and allows 
one to take part in further actions that are only possible as a group. 
Thus, ‘through a pledge, freedom gives itself a practical certainty 
for cases in which (because circumstances vary) future behaviour 
is unpredictable’ (CDR 425)488. The pledge gives them certainty in 
light of the vicissitudes of the future. The example Sartre gives is that 
of ‘lukewarm Catholics’ baptizing their children despite stating that 
the child is free to choose whether or not it wants to be a Catholic 
(CDR 485)489. ‘I thought that total indeterminacy was the true 
basis of choice. But from the point of view of the group […] the 
opposite is true: baptism is a way of creating freedom’ (CDR 486)490. 
Being baptized gives the child both the possibility of leading a full 
Catholic life and the possibility of ignoring the baptism and leaving 
the group. An unbaptized child would not have the first option. The 
parents do not know the personal preference of the child, but the 
pledge grants them the certainty that the child has the possibility 
of being part of the group even though their own preferences are 
uncertain.
Although the pledge is necessary for the survival of the group, it is 
also linked to the initial common praxis of the group. The pledge 
takes the form of an offer of services (CDR 427). For example, I may 
vow to give my life to achieve the common goal of the group. The 
pledge ‘defines everyone as a common individual, not only because it 
487 ‘Le serment n’est ni une détermination subjective ni une simple détermination 
du discours, c’est une modification réelle du groupe par mon action régulatrice. 
La négation inerte de certaines possibilités futures est mon lien d’intériorité avec 
le groupe assermenté dont je fais partie, en ce sens que chez chacun cette même 
négation en tant qu’elle est sa conduite est conditionnée par la mienne.’ (CDRF 441).
488 ‘par celui-ci, la liberté se donne une certitude pratique pour les cas où la conduite 
future (les circonstances variant) est imprévisible’ (CDRF 443).
489 ‘catholiques tièdes’ (CDRF 491f).
490 ‘Je pensais que l’indétermination totale était la véritable base du choix. Mais du point 
de vue du groupe […] c’est le contraire qui est vrai : le baptême est une façon de créer 
la liberté’ (CDRF 491f).
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concerns his being-in-the-group, but also because it is only through 
the mediation of all that it can take place in everyone’ (CDR 443-
444)491. Everyone is equal in light of the pledge because everyone 
pledges themselves, but pledging oneself is only possible because 
each member makes the same commitment. 
We have now seen two stages of group-formation, the group-in-
fusion in which the common praxis is immediate and the pledged 
group in which the absence of the immediate urgency of praxis is 
overcome by introducing a permanent element, the pledge, which 
turns all members into common individuals and thereby assures the 
persistence of the group. Even if the group is not currently engaging 
in its common praxis, the common individuals are still pledged to 
the objective in light of which the group was formed in the first 
place. 
Organisation and institution
The next stage is that of organisation. Once the group is united by a 
shared pledge and the members become common individuals, they 
can perform different actions while still being part of the same group. 
The univocal nature of the pledged is thereby transformed. Members 
are no longer essentially the same, they can now perform different 
functions. Although the pledge is supposed to counter immediate 
differentiation that leads to the immediate disbandment of the 
group, it paves the way for another kind of differentiation. This is 
most easily illustrated by the example of a sports team (CDR 450). 
A sports team is usually not a fused group, as it does not get formed 
spontaneously. The members are pledged in one way or another, 
but they are not common individuals as they do not contribute in 
the same way to the common praxis. A goalkeeper does something 
different than a striker, yet all their tasks contribute to the same goal: 
winning. With this distribution of tasks, the pledged group becomes 
an organisation: 
Organisation, then, is a distribution of tasks. And it 
is the common objective (common interest, common 
danger, common need assigning a common aim) 
which defines praxis negatively and lies at the origin 
of this differentiation. Organisation, then, is both the 
discovery of practical exigencies in the object and a 
distribution of tasks amongst individuals […]. In other 
words, the organising movement settles the relation 
between men on the basis of the fundamental relation 
491 ‘définit chacun comme individu commun non seulement parce qu’il concerne son 
être-dans-le-groupe mais encore parce qu’il ne peut avoir lieu en chacun que par la 
médiation de tous’ (CDRF 459).
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between group and thing (CDR 446)492.
In the case of a sports team the relationship of the group to the 
“thing” is simple. In a game of football, for example, winning requires 
both scoring goals and preventing the other team from scoring. 
Both have to do with manipulating the same material object, the 
ball. The goalkeeper tries to keep the ball from entering the goal, but 
will also pass the ball towards other players who will try to score at 
the opposing end. Each player has a different relation to the same 
ball, which in turn determines the relation between the players. In 
other words, in an organized group each player has a function (CDR 
447). This function is an inert limit of their freedom, it circumscribes 
the freedom of the individual in accordance with instructions that 
serve to further the freedom of the group (CDR 449). A function 
is closely tied to the capacity of an individual member (CDR 462). 
Someone who is good at certain tasks will often be chosen for a 
specific function. 
Not only can one become part of a group because one has specific 
capacities, one can also train to have a certain function regardless of 
the group in which the function will be performed. An example of 
this is that one can train to become a goalkeeper even if one is not 
yet part of a team (CDR 450). Thus, functions get a life of their own 
and, thereby, a degree of objectivity regardless of the specifics of the 
group, and can be compared to the inert human roles of the practico-
inert. It is important, however, to realize that they are not the same, 
because functions are never fully inert. This is the case because every 
member of an organized group is aware of the overarching goal of 
their function and how this contributes to the common praxis:
The unification of an organized group […] is always 
defined by its objective, which is concrete. The relations 
between common individuals must, therefore, be 
constantly created within the limits laid down by a 
concrete task and solely with a view to the successful 
completion of this task (CDR 467)493.
492 ‘L’organisation est donc répartition des tâches. Et c’est l’objectif commun (intérêt 
commun, danger commun, besoin commun assignant une fin commune) qui — 
en définissant négativement la praxis — est à l’origine de cette différenciation. 
L’organisation est donc à la fois découverte dans l’objet des exigences pratiques 
et division des tâches entre les individus […]. Ou, si l’on préfère, le mouvement 
organisateur décide du rapport entre les hommes en fonction de la relation 
fondamentale du groupe avec la chose.’ (CDRF 460).
493 ‘l’union du groupe organisé est toujours définie par son objectif et celui-ci est concret. 
Les rapports entre individus communs doivent donc être inventés sans cesse dans les 
limites prescrites par une tâche concrète et dans l’unique perspective de mener cette 
tâche à bien.’ (CDRF 477).
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If this were not the case, the role of an individual would cease to be 
a function and would be pure inertia. Therefore, Sartre states that 
‘[i]n the organised group, human relations involve their own freely 
accepted limits’ and that these inert limitations are still free because 
they are part of their freely chosen group praxis (CDR 467)494.
Nevertheless, the gap between the individual and common praxis 
widens within the organized group. In the group-in-fusion, the 
individual and common praxis are the same, and this is not altered by 
the pledge. The differentiation of functions within an organisation, 
however, creates a distinction between one’s own actions and that 
of other members. Even when the goal of the actions is clear, the 
results are not always immediate to the individual performing the 
action. In such cases the praxis becomes a process (CDR 547). The 
activity of the group actions is in what Sartre calls ‘the evanescent 
elsewhere’, making the individual action in the “here” more passive 
(CDR 549)495. Therefore, praxis as process adds another degree of 
inertia to the organized group.
The relations between the different functions within a group 
constitute what Sartre calls a structure (CDR 480). Sartre draws 
heavily on the work of his critic Lévi-Strauss, particularly the 
latter’s study of kinship, in developing this notion (CDR 479-
484).496 Although functions cannot exist apart from the praxis of the 
individuals who perform them, they can be studied in their objective 
form. ‘Function as lived praxis appears in the study of the group as 
objectivity in the objectified form of structure’ (CDR 480)497. Hence, 
structures are ‘contradictory tensions of freedom and inertia’, as they 
both organize actions and are organized by actions (CDR 480)498. 
Just like functions, structures cannot be regarded as purely practico-
inert, because they cannot be described without describing the 
actions of the individual functions. 
Thus, the organisation is often needed to bring the group closer to 
its goal. An organized group becomes more efficient in realizing its 
goals. The same paradox that we saw in the pledge becomes all the 
more apparent here, however: more possibilities and hence more 
freedom are the result of the newly introduced inertia, which takes 
the form of functions and structures. Now, ‘we shall find the organised 
group relapsing into the practico-inert field and dissolving into a 
494 ‘Dans le groupe organisé, la relation humaine comporte ses propres limites librement 
acceptées’ (CDRF 476).
495 ‘l’ailleurs évanescent’ (CDRF 541).
496 For more information concerning the relation between Sartre and Levi-Strauss, see: 
(Doran 2013).
497 ‘La fonction comme praxis vécue apparaît dans l ‘examen du groupe comme 
objectivité sous la forme objectivée de structure’ (CDRF 487).
498 ‘ces tensions contradictoires — liberté et inertie —’ (CDRF 487).
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new inertia’ (CDR 454)499. This new inertia is that of the institution, 
the final stage of the circle of group-development.
Organized groups are in danger of separation (CDR 587). Because 
of the division of functions, one may lose track of the functions of 
other members of the group. This results in a new form of seriality. 
The members of the group are still oriented towards the same 
objective, but now by differentiated means. Although the group arises 
out of a collective that is founded on seriality, the differentiation 
of functions necessitated by the organisation of the group risks the 
group’s disintegration and relapse to the practico-inert. Thereby, 
the collective is at risk of losing the freedom it gained by forming 
a group. This means that the group has to alter itself yet again ‘to 
combat a re-emergence of seriality’ (CDR 591)500. 
The group reacts to this permanent danger, appearing 
at the level of organisation, with new practices: it 
produces itself in the form of an institutionalised group; 
which means that ‘organs’, functions and powers are 
transformed into institutions; that, in the framework 
of institutions, the community tries to acquire a new 
type of unity by institutionalising sovereignty, and that 
the common individual transforms himself into an 
institutional individual (CDR 591)501.
The re-emergence of seriality would mean the dissolution and hence 
non-being of the group, hence ‘[t]he being of the institution, as the 
geometrical locus of intersections of the collective and the common, 
is the non-being of the group, produced as a bond between its 
members’ (CDR 604)502. To counter the disbandment of the group, 
some artificial measures are needed, namely two transformations. 
The first one is the institutionalisation or reification of functions, 
the second is the institutionalisation of powers, which produces a 
specific function: that of the sovereign. This, in turn, transforms the 
individuals of the group into institutional individuals. 
499 ‘nous verrons le groupe organisé retomber dans le champ pratico-inerte et se 
dissoudre en inertie nouvelle’ CDRF (467).
500 ‘à combattre une sérialité renaissante’ (CDRF 574).
501 ‘Contre ce danger permanent qui se découvre au niveau de l’organisation, le groupe 
réagit par des pratiques nouvelles : il se produit lui-même sous la forme d’un groupe 
institutionnalisé : cela signifie que les « organes », fonctions et pouvoir vont se 
transformer en institutions ; que, dans le cadre des institutions, la communauté 
tentera de se donner un nouveau type d’unité en institutionnalisant la souveraineté 
et que l’individu commun se transforme lui-même en individu institutionnel.’ (CDRF 
573).
502 ‘L’être de l’institution, comme lieu géométrique des intersections du collectif du 
commun, est le non-être du groupe se produisant comme lien entre ses membres’ 
(CDRF 583).
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The requirements for the first transformation are already present in 
the organisation. We have already seen that functions can get a life 
of their own, regardless of the group in question. We saw the first 
iteration of the reification of the function in the example of training 
to become a goalkeeper. There is a fine line between functions in 
an organisation and functions in an institution. In an organisation, 
the capacities of the individuals determine the functions, while 
in an institution the functions determine which individuals may 
become part of the group. As Sartre says, ‘function, positing itself 
for itself, and producing individuals who will perpetuate it, becomes 
an institution’ (CDR 600)503. The reification of the function is now 
complete. In an organisation, the capacity of the member precedes 
the function, while in an institution the function precedes the 
capacities of the member (CDR 607). This allows a group to retain 
its structure, and thereby its coherence, even when it is no longer 
clear to every member what that structure is. 
Sartre’s own example of a football team as an organisation is 
misleading in this regard, because a football team can be both an 
organisation and an institution. When a group of people decides that 
they want to play a game of football and determines the positions 
according to the capacities of the individuals involved, then it is an 
organisation, as the members precede the functions. A professional 
football team, in which a coach decides that he wants the team 
to play in a certain formation and hires players accordingly, is an 
institution. In this team, the functions precede the specific members.
The second transformation has to do with the aforementioned 
idea that in a group-in-fusion, every instigated action feels as if it 
were one’s own. Because of this, all actions are free. When a group 
becomes organized, this is no longer the case as not everyone 
performs the same action. Yet everyone knows each other’s function 
in an organisation, so the idea that everyone’s actions contribute to 
the objective still allows for a degree of freedom. The idea of an 
entirely common praxis is replaced by the idea of the reciprocal 
recognition of different functions, that is, the idea that I would do 
the same as my teammate if I had to perform her function. Yet, 
when seriality re-emerges, one loses this sense of shared freedom. To 
counter this, the freedom of the members of the group is transferred 
to a single member or sub-group: the sovereign (CDR 607). Here 
we see that the higher degree of inertia brings with it necessity, 
which diminishes the freedom of most members of the group. 
The sovereign is the one who holds all the freedom, is allowed to 
give commands to all members of the group, and ensures that all 
functions are performed. This last characteristic means that the two 
503 ‘la fonction ; celle-ci, en se posant pour elle-même, et en produisant les individus qui 
doivent la perpétuer, devient institution’ (CDRF 581).
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transformations of institutionalisation cannot be viewed separately. 
Once the function no longer stems from the individual, another 
individual has to choose who performs it. 
These two transformations make the common individual into an 
institutional individual, who no longer precedes her function and 
is no longer free. Being an institutional individual is therefore 
very close to being-outside-oneself in the practico-inert field. The 
institution itself however, although in the stage of group-formation 
closest to the practico-inert, is not yet fully inert: 
The important point is that – at least as long as it still 
has its finality – it [the group] can never be entirely 
assimilated to the practico-inert: its meaning is still that 
of an action undertaken in the light of a certain objective 
(CDR 603)504. 
In order for people to accept the organisational structure and the 
power of the sovereign, it is important that they identify themselves 
with their function and take pride in it: ‘The aim is, in effect, to create 
men who (as common individuals) will define themselves, in their 
own eyes and amongst themselves, by their fundamental relation 
[…] with institutions’ (CDR 606)505. If one’s sense of identity is 
rooted in one’s function within a group, one is more likely to accept 
the fact that the overarching goal of the group is no longer known. 
If one takes pride in service, one is more likely to accept orders from 
the sovereign. This brings the institutional individual again closer to 
the individual that is a thing within the practico-inert, reduced to a 
tool of the structure of the organisation.
The circle of group-formation is now complete. The first stage, the 
group-in-fusion, grants the members more freedom because as a 
group they have significantly more possibilities. In order to retain 
these possibilities in the future, a small inert element, the pledge, is 
introduced, bringing the group to the second stage. The third stage, 
that of organisation, makes the group more efficient and thereby 
better in attaining its free goals, but at the cost of more inertia and 
hence more necessity. In the fourth and final stage the group becomes 
almost fully inert, allowing for only a single element of freedom in 
the form of a sovereign. As has been noted before, Sartre’s account 
is purely formal: groups do not pass through the four stages in a 
504 ‘Ce qui importe c’est que — au moins tant que sa finalité demeure — elle n’est 
jamais assimilable tout à fait au pratico-inerte : son sens demeure celui d’une action 
entreprise en fonction d’un objectif’ (CDRF 583).
505 ‘Le but est, en effet, de créer des hommes tels (en tant qu’individus communs) qu’ils 
se définissent à leurs propres yeux et entre eux par leur rapport fondamental [..] aux 
institutions’ (CDRF 585).
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preordained fashion, and they can disband and fall back into the 
practico-inert field from which they arose at any time. A group can 
be constituted as an institution from the outset, but in such a case 
there would always also be a common objective stemming from an 
external threat, a pledge and functions, which all stem from the 
three other stages. 
Up to this point, we have only discussed groups from the point of 
view of their members. People who are not members also engage 
with groups. For these people, the group is not primarily seen in 
light of its own praxis, but appears as a ‘group-object, seen in relation 
to my own aim’ (CDR 371)506. Sartre gives the example of the postal 
service (CDR 566-567). When I bring a letter to the post office, 
I use it for my own aim: ‘The post office is my instrument, it is an 
extension of my arm, like a cane, a spade or a broom’ (CDR 568)507. 
From my perspective, the postal service appears as a group-object. 
I often have no insight into how the service works exactly or what 
the individual praxis of every member is. The only thing I know is 
that when I put a stamp on a letter and post it, the postal service will 
bring it to the address specified. Another way of saying this is that 
the group appears as a totality for the outsider, whereas from the 
inside it appears as a totalisation (CDR 574).
The group-object, like any other object, can also create new forms of 
seriality. For the postal service, the series are the customers (CDR 
566). Just like the people who wait for the bus, the people who wait 
at the post office are doing so in alterity. They do not use the service 
together, but each have their own letters to send. The only difference 
being that, in this case, the object is not a purely material object 
such as a bus, but a group, the postal service.  As we have seen, a 
seriality of people is one of the two prerequisites for forming groups. 
The other prerequisite is a threat posed by another group. The postal 
service does not pose a threat, but other group-objects may. We can 
now give a full account of the nature of group-formation. Groups are 
formed in the practico-inert and plunge back into it, but they may 
also cause other groups to arise, which may subsequently collapse 
back into full inertia and/or cause other new groups to arise. As 
Sartre puts it:
The group emerges from the more or less complete 
dissolution of collectives and in the unity of a common 
praxis. And the object of this praxis can be defined only 
in relation to other groups, which may or may not be 
mediated by series, or to an inert gathering, which may 
506 ‘groupe-objet, saisi en rapport avec ma fin’ (CDRF 402).
507 ‘La poste est mon instrument, elle allonge mon bras, comme une canne, une bêche ou 
un balai’ (CDRF 556).
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or may not be mediated by other groups, or to worked 
matter, which may or may not be mediated by series and 
groups (CDR 664)508.
This account of multiple groups allows us to grasp Sartre’s conception 
of History. History is ultimately class struggle, which is the struggle 
between the largest groups that make up a society. The theory of class 
struggle can be understood as the synthesis of everything Sartre has 
discussed in the Critique thus far. As is the case with praxis¸ the 
origin of class struggle is scarcity: ‘The origin of struggle always lies, 
in fact, in some concrete antagonism whose material condition is 
scarcity’ (CDR 113)509. Just as individual organisms have to compete 
with one another because there is scarcity, so too must concrete 
groups compete with each other.
As has been said already, classes are the largest regions of people 
within the practico-inert field. They are by definition the largest 
gatherings. If they were only gatherings, however, they would be 
passive and thus unable to act. This would also mean that they were 
timeless and unchanging, and that there would be no historical 
development. As we have seen, gatherings can become groups and 
thereby act upon the practico-inert field. ‘It is a genuine case of the 
class having two forms’ (CDR 680)510. Sartre does not mean by this 
that the whole class needs to become a group in order for societies 
to change:
[T]he transformation of a class into an actualized 
group has never actually occurred, even in revolutionary 
periods. But we have seen that seriality is always being 
eroded by action groups constituted at various levels and 
pursuing variable objectives (CDR 679)511.  
Such an action group is based on a gathering in which the members 
have their class-being in common. The specific objective of such a 
group may vary, but if they want to change the situation of their 
class, they always aim at diminishing the power, influence or status 
508 ‘Le groupe se produit sur la dissolution plus ou moins profonde des collectifs et dans 
l’unité d’une praxis commune. Et l’objet de cette praxis ne peut être défini qu’en 
fonction d’autres groupes médiés ou non par des séries, d’un rassemblement inerte, 
médié ou non par d’autres groupes, d’une matière ouvrée, médiée ou non par des 
séries et des groupes.’ (CDRF 632).
509 ‘En fait, la lutte a pour origine en chaque cas un antagonisme concret qui a la rareté’ 
(CDRF 192).
510 ‘Il s’agit bien de la classe sous deux formes’ (CDRF 644).
511 ‘la transformation de la classe en groupe actualisé ne s’est jamais réalisée nulle part, 
même en période révolutionnaire. Nous savons, en fait, que la sérialité demeure, 
perpétuellement rongée par des groupes d’action qui se constituent à des niveaux 
divers et poursuivent des objectifs variables.’ (CDRF 644).
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of another class. This class, threatened in its being by the action-
group, can only respond by forming action-groups of its own. One 
class can never move without provoking a reaction from another. 
This is what Sartre calls “antagonistic reciprocity”, and it is the 
driving factor of History: 
[T]he unity of two struggling classes is a fact of 
antagonistic reciprocity and […] this contradictory 
unity of each in the Other is occasioned by praxis and 
by praxis alone. In other words, it is conceivable – as a 
pure, formal, logical hypothesis – that there should be 
a Universe in which practical multiplicities would not 
form themselves into classes (for example, a Universe 
where scarcity would not be the basic relation between 
the practical agent and his environment). But if classes 
do exist, then it is necessary to make a choice: either they 
should be defined in inertia as strata of society with 
no more unity than the compact inertia revealed by 
geological sections; or their moving, changing, fleeting, 
ungraspable yet real unity comes to them from other 
classes in so far as each is bound to all the others by a 
practical reciprocity (CDR 794)512[.]513
This brings us to the conclusion of the first volume of the Critique 
and Sartre’s regressive inquiry into the dialectical foundation of 
History: 
The conclusion of this investigation is that the only 
possible intelligibility of human relations is dialectical 
and that this intelligibility, in a concrete history whose 
true foundation is scarcity, can be manifested only as an 
antagonistic reciprocity. […] Our History is intelligible 
to us because it is dialectical and it is dialectical because 
the class struggle produces us as transcending the inertia 
512 ‘l’unité de deux classes en lutte est un fait de réciprocité antagonistique et […] cette 
unité contradictoire de chacune en l’Autre est suscitée par la praxis et par elle seule. 
En d’autres termes, il est possible de concevoir comme pure hypothèse logique et 
formelle un Univers où les multiplicités pratiques ne se constitueraient pas en classes 
(par exemple, celui dont la rareté ne serait pas le rapport fondamental de l’agent 
pratique et de son environnement). Mais si les classes existent il faut choisir : ou 
bien on les définira dans l’inertie comme des strates de la société et sans autre unité 
que la compacte inertie que nous révèlent les coupes géologiques ; ou bien leur unité 
mouvante, changeante, fuyante, insaisissable et pourtant réelle, leur vient des autres 
classes en tant que chacune est liée à toutes les autres par une réciprocité pratique’ 
(CDRF 735-736). 
513 Sartre’s reference to geological sections is reminiscent of his criticism of Foucault 
(RTS 110), where the latter is accused of being a geologist rather than an archeologist 
because his philosophy cannot account for how historical periods change. 
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of the collective towards dialectical combat-groups 
(CDR 805)514.
The practico-inert produces collectives and the largest collectives, 
classes, only exist in a struggle, or, in other words, in antagonistic 
reciprocity. Because there is scarcity, individuals are always competing 
for their survival. The same is true of classes, which also compete 
with one another. In order to defend themselves from other classes, 
people have to unite themselves into a group. When one group that 
represents a class is formed, however, it cannot do anything but act 
against another class, which in turn needs to defend itself by forming 
other groups. This process is dialectical because class struggle is the 
negation of the inert classes, which are themselves negations of one 
another. Furthermore, the reciprocal relationship between classes 
means that History is a totalisation of all other histories because 
everything takes place within the practico-inert field and only class 
struggle can change this inertia. Everything is thereby part of the 
same general movement of History. This process never ends, hence 
the totality is never achieved. 
Sartre ends the critique by remarking that the findings of his inquiry 
can be tested. If History is truly dialectical, the totalisation should be 
intelligible within a concrete historical situation. Alas, Sartre never 
managed to complete his progressive inquiry into History, but some 
of the ideas presented in the posthumously published fragments 
of the second volume of the Critique will be discussed in the last 
section of this chapter, when we examine the Self in its temporal 
narrative dimension.
Preliminary conclusion
We have seen how Sartre rethinks the relationship of subjectivity 
and objectivity in the form of the organic and the inorganic. The 
praxis of organisms is oriented towards survival and becomes a 
project that re-arranges inorganic matter. In doing so, inorganic 
matter is created which in turn makes human beings into things 
and arranges them into gatherings. Gatherings can in turn become 
groups, which break free from inertia, only to become more inert 
over time. The process of classes turning into groups and competing 
with one another changes society and forms History.
In our inquiry into praxis, the practico-inert, groups and History, 
the topic of selfhood has already come to the surface, especially in 
514 ‘Nous conclurons de cette expérience que la seule intelligibilité possible des rapports 
humains est dialectique et que cette intelligibilité, dans une histoire concrète dont le 
véritable fondement est la rareté, ne peut se manifester que comme une réciprocité 
antagonistique’ (CDRF 744).
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the notions of praxis as project, being-outside-oneself and having 
a certain function within a group. However, we should note that 
the discussion of individuals has up until this point been formal. 
The praxis of an individual is the formal relationship of an organism 
to its environment: ‘there is no such thing as an isolated individual 
(unless isolation is treated as a special structure of sociality)’ (CDR 
677)515. In the second part of this chapter we will therefore turn to 
the concrete person and its selfhood within its historical situation. 
Part II 
The Processes of Selfhood
4. Interiorisation
We already touched on the theme of subjective selfhood when 
we discussed the notion of praxis. In the totalizing process of the 
organism that keeps itself alive, we see the outlines of a subjective 
process creating unity through time. Yet, as has been stated, this 
description is abstract. Sartre’s ideas concerning the concrete process 
of subjective selfhood are developed mostly in the 1961 lecture 
published as “Marxism and Subjectivity”. Although Sartre does not 
use the term Self or self-consciousness in this text, it is clear that the 
notion of subjectivity that he describes amounts to the process of 
subjective unity and individuality over time. The central notion that 
need to be elucidated in order to understand Sartre’s line of thought 
is that of “interiorisation”. Related to this notion is that of “lived 
experience”, which amounts to the way in which interiorisation 
takes place in a concrete moment.  
Lived experience
Sartre begins “Marxism and Subjectivity” with the familiar statement 
that subjectivity is an activity rather than a thing:
My topic is not subject and object, but rather subjectivity, 
or subjectivation, and objectivity or objectivation. The 
subject is a different, far more complex problem. When 
I speak of subjectivity, it is as a certain type of internal 
action, an interior system rather than the simple, 
immediate relationship of the subject to itself (MS 3)516.
515 ‘il n’y a pas d’individu isolé (à moins qu’on ne prenne la solitude comme une 
structure particulière de la socialité)’ (CDRF 642).
516 ‘nous n’allons pas, au début, parler du sujet et de l’objet, mais plutôt de l’objectivité, 
ou de l’objectivation, et de la subjectivité, ou de subjectivation. Le sujet c’est une 
autre problème, un problème plus complexe ; mais je voudrais que nous gardions 
à l’esprit cette idée que lorsqu’on parle de subjectivité on parle d’un certain type, 
qua nous allons voir, d’action interne, d’un certain type, que nous allons voir, 
d’action interne, d’un système, d’un système en intériorité, et non pas d’une relation 
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Although it is interesting that Sartre acknowledges the subject here, 
he does not seem to give a theory of it. Rather, he continues his 
line of thought concerning subjectivity, namely that it is solely an 
activity or process. In order to understand how subjectivity and, 
ultimately, subjective selfhood work, we have to understand praxis 
in its concrete circumstances. In Search for a Method, Sartre offers a 
definition of praxis in slightly different terms than the ones that we 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter:
Praxis, indeed, is a passage from objective to objective 
through internalisation. The project, as the subjective 
surpassing of objectivity toward objectivity, and stretched 
between the objective conditions of the environment 
and the objective structures of the field of possibles, 
represents in itself the moving unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity (SM 97)517[.]
The dual objectivity to which he here refers denotes the idea that the 
organism changes the current state of the material world in light of 
its project, thereby creating a new state of affairs, and hence a new 
objectivity. This process happens “through internalisation”. This refers 
to the fact that the material circumstances are interpreted in light of 
the project of the organism and subsequently manipulated. In other 
words, the current state of affairs is internalized by the organism. 
The possibilities for the organism are discovered and the organism 
acts accordingly. At the abstract level, if we see praxis solely in terms 
of the organism and its survival, the organism will manipulate its 
surroundings in such fashion that its chances of survival are higher. 
At the concrete level, the process becomes more complex. 
Apart from the surpassing of these states of material circumstances, 
we have also seen another meaning of dual objectivity in the form of 
the body. In order to manipulate the outside world, one also has to 
manipulate one’s own objectivity. Hence, the body is made into an 
object, a tool to physically alter the outside world. The concrete version 
of this abstract process that is found in the process of subjectivity 
involves the mediation between inner and outer objectivity. Another 
way to describe objectivity is exteriority: that which is outside. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to interpret the process as a return 
to an “inner world”, which, as we saw in the first chapter, Sartre 
criticized as the ‘illusion of immanence’. The objectivity inside is also 
immédiate au sujet.’ (MSF 29).
517 ‘La praxis, en effet, est un passage de l’objectif à l’objectif par l’intériorisation ; le 
projet comme dépassement subjectif de l’objectivité vers l’objectivité, tendu entre les 
conditions objectives du milieu et les structures objectives du champ des possibles 
représente en lui-même l’unité mouvante de la subjectivité et de l’objectivité’ (SMF 
66).
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exterior, meaning that it is not transparent to us. In the case of our 
physical body this is self-evident, as we have no specific knowledge 
about the biological processes going on inside us. We will return to 
the topic of transparency later. For now, let us turn to the definition 
of interiorisation as the mediation between two types of exteriority 
that Sartre provides in “Marxism and Subjectivity”: 
So, at the outset at least, we can then identify two 
types of exteriority: first, the exteriority of within or, 
if you prefer, ‘on this side’ or ‘before’; in other words, 
a type of exteriority whose crowning feature is organic 
status, from which death can return us to the inorganic. 
Second, the exteriority of ‘beyond’ which reflects what 
this organism finds in front of it as a work object, a need 
and the means to satisfy it, in order to maintain its status 
as organism. Thus, we have a dialectic with three terms. 
This requires us to describe interiorisation of the exterior 
by the organism, in order to understand its capacity to 
re-exteriorize in transcendent being, in carrying out an 
act of work or determining a need. So there is only one 
moment called interiority, which is a kind of mediation 
between two moments of transcendent being (MS 9)518.
Thus, subjectivity is the process of mediation between the object 
we encounter and the object that we are, and, in this mediation, we 
manipulate both objects: ‘it is at the level of this mediation, which 
is not itself mediated, that we encounter pure subjectivity’ (MS 
9-10)519. 
An important aspect of this process is self-knowledge. According 
to Sartre, ‘praxis [..] is knowledge and action together, action that 
engenders its own understanding’ (MS 10)520 This is the case because 
518 ‘On peut alors distinguer, au moins au départ, – et nous y reviendrons – deux types 
d’extériorité : l’extériorité du dedans, ou si l’on préfère d’en deçà, d’avant, c’est-
à-dire l’extériorité dont le statut est couronné par le statut organique, au-dessous 
donc de notre statut organique, et auquel la mort peut nous renvoyer, et l’extériorité 
d’au-delà, qui correspond à ce que cet organisme, pour maintenir son statut 
d’organisme, trouve en face de lui comme objet de travail, comme moyen du besoin 
et de l’assouvissement. Nous avons donc, et il ne faudra pas le perdre de vue, une 
dialectique à trois termes : ce qui impose de décrire l’intériorisation de l’extérieur par 
l’organisme afin de comprendre sa capacité à ré-extérioriser dans l’être transcendant, 
occasion d’un acte de travail ou d’une détermination du besoin. Il n’y a donc qu’un 
moment qui s’appelle l’intériorité, et qui est une sort de médiation, un médiation 
entre deux moments de l’être transcendant.’ (MSF 37-38).
519 ‘c’est au niveau de cette médiation, que n’est pas elle-même médiée, que nous 
rencontrons la subjectivité pure’ (MSF 38).
520 ‘praxis […] est connaissance en même temps qu’action, qui est action engendrant ses 
propres lumières’ (MSF 39).
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‘there is a practical surpassing of the situation towards a goal, which 
implies knowledge of the goal and of the means’ (MS 7)521. In the 
particular situation of using a tool such as a hammer, one knows 
that one should lift the hammer and bring it down with force on the 
nail. There are also numerous aspects of this action that are ‘beyond 
knowledge’, however, such as the exact positions we must adopt, 
and how our muscles, bones and nerves work. Moreover, knowledge 
sometimes causes the action to go awry. 
Let us take a well-known example: if, as you go 
downstairs, you become conscious of what you are doing 
and if consciousness emerges to determine what you do, 
to intervene in this action, you immediately stumble 
because the action no longer has the character it should 
(MS 8)522.
In this example, the explicit knowledge hinders the implicit “know-
how”. The act of reflection reveals the twofold nature of selfhood 
and gives us the subjectivity-object, that which we have called the 
objective Self and subjectivity itself (MS 14). Nevertheless, as Sartre 
makes clear, ‘subjectivity is in practice a non-object’ and therefore 
‘escapes knowledge’ (MS 10)523. Our bodily disposition, the 
“exteriority of within” interacts with the “exteriority of beyond”, that 
is, the stairs in the above example. If we turn our attention towards 
this activity, however, it ceases to be an activity and we are left with 
the objective Self – the exact nature of which we will discuss in the 
next section.
For now, let us take a closer look at this elusive subjectivity. Although 
Sartre does not use the term in “Marxism and Subjectivity”, it 
corresponds with “lived experience”, a notion he employs mostly in 
The Family Idiot. The most elaborate explanation is found in “The 
Itinerary of a Thought”: 
In my present book on Flaubert, I have replaced my 
earlier notion of consciousness (although I still use 
the word a lot), with what I call lived experience. I will 
try to describe in a moment what I mean by this term, 
which is neither the precautions of the preconscious, 
521 ‘il exige l’unité d’un dépassement pratique de la situation vers un fin ; cela suppose 
des connaissances : la connaissance de but et des moyens’ (MSF 35).
522 ‘Soit l’exemple connu : si, lorsque vous descendez un escalier, vous prenez 
connaissance de ce que vous êtes en train de faire et si la conscience apparaît à un 
certain moment pour déterminer ce que vous faites, pour agir par un certain moyen 
sur cette action, alors vous trébuchez, car l’action n’a pas la caractère qu’elle doit 
avoir.’ (MSF 36).
523 ‘la subjectivité est effectivement le non-objet’ ‘elle échappe comme telle à la 
connaissance’ (MSF 39).
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nor the unconscious, nor consciousness, but the terrain 
in which the individual is perpetually overflowed by 
himself and his riches and consciousness plays the trick 
of determining itself by forgetfulness (IT 39)524.
Lived experience is the dimension of experiential life of which we 
are, in a certain sense, unaware, a mindless coping with the world 
without explicit consciousness of this activity. It is difficult to describe 
by its very definition; putting things into words often transforms 
lived experience into consciousness (MS 15). In the example of 
the person descending the stairs, the individual is overflowing with 
capabilities for a huge range of actions – keeping one’s balance, 
guessing where the next step will be without looking, holding the 
railing etc. Conscious experiences “forgets” these things, however, so 
that it can focus on the practical goals, for example, the reason that 
the person is descending the stairs. The “forgotten” information is 
neither totally unconscious nor totally conscious. The person is not 
aware that these actions are taking place, but not totally unaware 
either. If the persons is fully aware, the person would not be able to 
become fully conscious and stumble.525 Sartre still thinks that the 
self-presence of the consciousness (of ) self, which we discussed in 
the previous chapter, is retained: 
[T]he notion of ‘lived experience’ represents an effort 
to preserve that presence to itself which seems to me 
indispensable for the existence of any psychic fact, while 
at the same time this presence is so opaque and blind 
before itself that it is also an absence from itself. Lived 
experience is always simultaneously present to itself and 
absent from itself (IT 42) 526.
The idea that all consciousness is conscious of itself is retained. Lived 
experience is still ‘necessarily accompanied by a non-positional 
consciousness of itself ’, but this consciousness is as non-conceptual 
524 ‘Dans le livre que j’écris sur Flaubert, j’ai remplacé mon ancienne notion de 
conscience – bien que j’utilise encore beaucoup le mot – par ce que j ‘appelle le vécu. 
J’essaierai tout à l’heure d’expliquer ce que j ‘entends par ce terme, qui ne désigne ni 
les refuges du préconscient, ni l’inconscient, ni le conscient, mais le terrain sur lequel 
1’individu est constamment submergé par lui-même, par ses propres richesses, et où 
la conscience a l’astuce de se déterminer elle même par l’oubli.’ (ITF 108).
525 This example is very similar to two that he mentions in The Transcendence of the 
Ego, being absorbed in an activity and absent-mindedly asking questions about what 
one is doing (TE 23). 
526 ‘L’introduction de la notion de vécu représente un effort pour conserver cette « 
présence à soi » qui me paraît indispensable à l’existence de tout fait psychique, 
présence en même temps si opaque, si aveugle à elle-même qu’elle est aussi « 
absence de soi ». Le vécu est toujours, simultanément, présent à soi et absent de soi.’ 
(ITF 112).
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as can be (F5 38)527. Hence, Sartre himself sees lived experience as a 
definite change from the theory presented in Being and Nothingness:
The conception of ‘lived experience’ marks my change 
since L’Etre et Le Néant. My early work was a rationalist 
philosophy of consciousness. It was all very well for me 
to dabble in apparently non-rational processes in the 
individual, the fact remains that L’Etre et Le Néant is 
a monument of rationality. But in the end it becomes 
an irrationalism, because it cannot account rationally 
for those processes which are ‘below’ consciousness and 
which are also rational, but lived as irrational. (IT 41-
42)528.
The last remark, that the processes of lived experience are rational 
but lived as irrational, is important with regard to the relation of lived 
experience to the two exteriorities. Lived experience is the process 
of interiorisation as it is experienced by someone. The abilities a 
person has are part of the externality of the inside but stem from 
the externality of the outside. We constantly pick up habits from 
our environment, we consciously learn things which become second 
nature to us. Our bodies have even evolved to increase our chances 
of survival in a hostile environment. Therefore, this externality is 
rational, it is in principle possible to give a rational explanation of 
its workings. This, however, is not how we experience it: remember 
the example of the muscles that move the hammer. We do not focus 
on how our muscles work, which might even obstruct the act of 
hammering, but that does not mean that an anatomist could not 
give a rational description of the process. 
Thus, lived experience is the process of interiorisation understood 
as the mediation between the exteriority inside and the exteriority 
outside. We have seen how this process works within a given 
situation. Let us now turn to the question of how it works over a 
longer period of time. 
527 ‘s’accompagne nécessairement d’une conscience non positionnelle d’elle-même’ 
(F5F 47).
528 ‘Cette conception du vécu est ce qui marque mon évolution depuis L’Être et le Néant. 
Dans mes premiers écrits, je cherchais à construire une philosophie rationaliste 
de la conscience. Je pouvais bien écrire des pages et des pages sur des processus 
apparemment non rationnels du comportement individuel, L’Être et le Néant n’en 
reste pas moins un monument de rationalité. Ce qui le fait tomber, finalement, dans 
l’irrationalisme, puisqu’il ne peut rendre compte rationnellement des processus 
intervenant « en dessous » de la conscience, processus également rationnels mais qui 
sont vécus comme irrationnels.’ (ITF 112).
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Repetition, inventiveness and projection
In order to see how interiorisation works over a longer period of time, 
we must first take a closer look at the exteriority within. An example 
Sartre gives in this context is that of an anti-Semite (MS 10-11). 
The person in question does not regard himself to be an anti-Semite, 
but openly mistrusts Jewish people nonetheless. Sartre would say 
that he is an anti-Semite, as he behaves as such, he just does not 
realize it yet. Just like the workings of his body, the workings of his 
moral attitudes lie beyond his rational grasp. Being anti-Semitic is 
part of his exteriority within. What then, apart from our body, must 
the exteriority within be in order for an attitude such as this to be a 
part of it?
First of all, an important part of our exteriority within is our 
‘character’ (SM 101)529. Character is the way in which we interiorize 
our social background. Sartre frequently refers to this background 
with the term ‘Objective Spirit’, which ‘is nothing more than 
culture as practico-inert’ (F5 35)530. The process of interiorizing the 
Objective Spirit takes place mostly during childhood. As Sartre puts 
in the Search for a Method: ‘[W]e must remember that we live our 
childhood as our future. Our childhood determines gestures and roles 
in the perspective of what is to come’ (SM 105)531. Sartre emphasizes 
gesture quite a lot in this regard. Although our physiological body 
changes, the way we move our body is more constant. Furthermore, 
gestures are also class specific, as we can distinguish between 
bourgeois and socialist ones (SM 101). The roles have to do with 
how one is expected to behave and thereby how one needs to act 
within the world. This relates to the example of the anti-Semite. Not 
only has he interiorized certain moral beliefs from his background, 
namely anti-Semitism, but he also has interiorized how he should 
behave accordingly: mistrust Jewish people, but never admit that 
you mistrust them because they are Jewish. Sartre gives a lengthier 
example of bourgeois respectability in the Critique (CDR 770-776). 
Here Sartre relates the stiff posture and distaste for physical bodies 
of the bourgeois to their relationship to the working class:
[H]e sees his class totalising itself in the form of culture 
and rejecting physical bodies from itself in the very 
movement by which it makes the workers keep their 
distance. And in any such attitude, he discovers and 
produces the following total determination: my body is 
simply one of my workers, and each of my workers is no 
529 ‘caractère’ (SMF 68).
530 ‘l’Esprit objectif’ ‘n’est autre qui la Culture comme pratico-inerte’. (F5F 44).
531 ‘nous vivons notre enfance comme notre futur. Elle détermine gestes et rôles dans 
une perspective à venir’ (SMF 71).
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more than a body (CDR 775)532.
The example is especially interesting because it shows that both the 
body and distaste for one’s body (and other bodies) can be part of 
the exteriority of within at the same time. As one is not aware of 
one’s character, contradictions within it do not matter as they too 
are unknown to us (unless an act of reflection makes them known). 
Although character stems from one’s social and cultural background, 
it is not the same for everyone, as our positions within this background 
can vary greatly. In the case of Flaubert, for example, his position as 
a “second son” is thought to have been detrimental for his character 
(F1 306-307). As Sartre states in The Family Idiot: ‘the structures of 
this family are interiorized as attitudes and re-exteriorized as actions 
by which the child makes himself into what others made him’ (F2 
3)533. It is important to note that the family structures also reflect the 
political structures of the time, as a family-unity is only one kind of 
subgroup and can only exist within the larger framework of class-
struggle, as we have discussed in the first part of this chapter.
It must be noted that Sartre also emphasizes that our character is 
not fully passive, it also entails our first attempts to break away from 
our social background: ‘At this level also are the traces left by our 
first revolts, our desperate attempts to go beyond a stifling reality, 
and the resulting deviations and distortions’ (SM 101)534. 
Thus, we interiorize our background and form a character 
accordingly. For this reason, Sartre states that ‘social subjectivity is 
the very definition of subjectivity’ (MS 73)535.  Subjectivity consists 
of different ways in which this interiorized background interacts 
with the world: ‘[f ]or human beings there are several dimensions 
to subjectivity—subjectivity itself being ultimately their totalisation’ 
(MS 25)536. Sartre ultimately distinguishes three dimensions in 
“Marxism and Subjectivity”: repetition, inventiveness and projection 
(MS 26). Repetition denotes the fact that if circumstances remain 
relatively identical, our actions will remain the same. We will 
keep on reacting in the same manner to the things that happen 
532 ‘il saisit sa classe comme se totalisant sous forme de culture et rejetant d’elle-même 
les corps dans le mouvement même qui tient à distance les ouvriers ; en chacune, il 
découvre et produit cette détermination totale : mon corps n’est rien que l’un de mes 
ouvriers, chacun de mes ouvriers n’est rien d’autre qu’un corps.’ (CDRF 720).
533 ‘les structures de cette famille sont intériorisées en attitudes et réextériorisées en 
pratiques par quoi l’enfant se fait être ce qu’on l’a fait’ (F2F 653).
534 ‘A ce niveau aussi, les traces qu’ont laissées nos premières révoltes, nos tentatives 
désespérées pour dépasser une réalité qui étouffe, et les déviations, les torsions qui 
en résultent’ (SMF 68).
535 ‘subjectivité sociale est la définition même de la subjectivité’ (MSF 120).
536 ‘Pour l’homme, il y a plusieurs dimensions de la subjectivité, celle-ci étant au fond la 
totalisation de ces dimensions’ (MSF 62).
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to us. If the circumstances change, we will need to adapt ourselves 
accordingly. This explains the dimension of inventiveness. We have 
to find new ways to relate our exteriority within to the exteriority 
beyond. Once again, the anti-Semite proves to be a good example. 
No longer surrounded by bourgeois people, his continued mistrust 
of Jews compels him to invent excuses, telling Jewish people that he 
“just does not like them” and other things in this vein. He finds new 
ways to express his anti-Semitic sentiments in a new environment, 
one in which anti-Semitism is frowned upon. Note that this is still 
a dimension of lived experience and it is thereby not known to the 
person himself. Once he is confronted and realizes that he is anti-
Semitic, his subjectivity becomes an object and ceases to be lived 
experience. When such reflection occurs, the exteriority within 
is altered, which is something different than finding new ways to 
express this exteriority. 
The last dimension of subjectivity also has to do with the way we 
view the world around us: ‘repetition-innovation within a particular, 
immediate relation, always transcendent to external being, is called 
projection’ (MS 26)537. As an example of projection, Sartre refers 
to the well-known Rorschach test, a psychological test in which 
the patient is presented with abstract ink shapes. Everyone sees 
something different depicted, thus “projecting” their own exteriority 
of within onto the pictures. This is another example of lived 
experience without knowledge, as we do not know, for instance, why 
one person see cabbage leaves while another sees human figures.538 
Although the test is fairly abstract, we can easily apply the same 
reasoning to the example of the anti-Semite: he says he “just does 
not like someone” because Jewish people appear in a negative way 
to him. 
To sum up, Sartre characterizes subjectivity as the mediation 
between a largely unknown exteriority within and the world. In 
the moment, this manifests itself as lived experience; over time, 
as repetition, innovation and projection. Sartre focuses less on the 
unity of subjective selfhood and more on individuality. The unity 
of the subjective process is based solely on the fact that it mediates 
between the same exteriorities. What is more important here is how 
our interiorized social background influences the way we perceive 
the world and how we act. In order to show that subjectivity is not a 
thing, but an activity or process, Sartre resorts to showing us how it 
works rather than what it is. 
537 ‘répétition-invention dans un rapport donné, immédiat, toujours transcendent à l’être 
d’extériorité, s’appelle la projection’ (MSF 64).
538 The example is reminiscent of Sartre’s own example of the ‘psychoanalysis of things’ 
and the analysis of viscosity in Being and Nothingness (BN 777, 781-797).
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5. Personalisation
The example of the anti-Semite teaches us about subjective 
selfhood, but also about the limits of subjectivity. Sartre continues 
the example to the point where the person is confronted with his 
behaviour. Once this happens, the unknown anti-Semitism becomes 
known and subjectivity loses its primary characteristic, namely 
non-knowledge. There is no longer a mere mediation between the 
exteriority within and the exteriority beyond, but a confrontation 
between the exteriority within and itself as an object. Yet this 
confrontation also alters the exteriority within. In so far as previously 
unknown aspects of oneself come to the surface, they are no longer 
unwittingly operative features of our character: ‘[s]o we can see that 
the appearance of the subjectivity-object to the subject himself lead 
to its transformation’ (MS 14)539. Over the course of a lifetime, such 
moments of reflection change the exteriority within. Another level 
of mediation between the two exteriorities is added, in which the 
exteriority within relates to itself as object: a ‘re-exteriorisation of 
the interiorized’ (F2 9)540. This process is what constitutes a full-
fledged ‘person, a permanent mediation between the subjective and 
the objective.’ (F2 9)541. However, as this is a process rather than a 
thing, it is better to speak of “personalisation”: 
[T]his totalisation which is endlessly detotalized and 
retotalized is personalisation. The person, in effect, is 
neither completely suffered nor completely constructed; 
furthermore, the person does not exist or, if you will, is 
always the surpassed result of the whole mass of totalizing 
operations by which we continually try to assimilate the 
nonassimilable – primarily our childhood – indicating 
that the person represents the abstract and endlessly 
retouched product of personalisation, the only real – 
that is, experienced activity – of the living being. In other 
words, it is experience itself conceived as unification and 
endlessly returning to the original determinations on 
the occasion of more recent ones in order to integrate 
what cannot be integrated (F2 6)542[.]
539 ‘Aussi voyons-nous que l’apparition de la subjectivité-objet entraîne pour la personne 
elle-même sa transformation’ (MSF 44).
540 ‘réextériorisation de l’intériorisé’ (F2F 659).
541 ‘la personne […] , médiation permanente entre le subjectif et l’objectif’ (F2F 659).
542 ‘cette totalisation sans cesse détotalisée et retotalisante c’est personnalisation. La 
personne, en effet, n’est ni tout à fait subie, ni tout à fait construite : au reste, elle 
n’est point ou, si l’on veut, elle n’est à chaque instant que le résultat dépassé de 
l’ensemble des procédés totalisateurs par lesquels nous tentons continuellement 
d’assimiler l’inassimilable, c’est-à-dire au premier chef notre enfance : ce qui signifie 
qu’elle représente le produit abstrait et sans cesse retouché de la personnalisation, 
seule activité réelle – c’est-à-dire vécue – du vivant. Ou plutôt c’est le vécu lui-même 
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Personalisation refers to the full process of selfhood, the subjective 
dimension, the occasional confrontation with the objective dimension 
and how this object is again interiorized into the subjective. As such, 
it is both the surpassing and preservation of our constitution: 
In any event, personalisation in the individual is nothing 
more than the surpassing and preservation (assumption 
and inner negation) at the core of a project to totalize 
what the world has – made and continues to make – of 
us (F2 7)543.
This process of personalisation is described in most detail in The 
Family Idiot. This work is very complex. Written in the form of a 
biography of Flaubert, Sartre has also said that ‘the study of Flaubert 
represents, to me, a sequel to one of my first books, L’Imaginaire’ 
and that it can be considered ‘a true novel’ (IT 46, 49)544. Moreover, 
it reflects on literature in general, and the fifth volume, in particular, 
could be considered a work of political analysis. For our purpose, 
however, it is interesting that the extremes of Flaubert’s life can help 
us to understand how the personalisation of most ordinary people 
operates. The case of Flaubert is a peculiar one in that his life does 
not exemplify a normal process of personalisation. As Sartre states:
[M]y ideal would be that the reader simultaneously 
feels, comprehends and knows the personality of 
Flaubert, totally as an individual and yet totally as an 
expression of his time. In other words, Flaubert can only 
be understood by his difference from his neighbours (IT 
43)545.
In light of our ends, we will reverse the strategy Sartre deploys 
in The Family Idiot. We will first discuss how Sartre describes 
personalisation and the “subjectivity-object” in ordinary cases and 
turn to Flaubert afterwards. 
conçu comme unification et revenant sans cesse surs les déterminations originelles 
à l’occasion de déterminations plus récentes pour intégrer l’inintégrable’ (F2F 656).
543 ‘De tout manière, la personnalisation n’est rien d’autre chez l’individu que le 
dépassement et la conservation (assomption et négation intime) au sein d’un projet 
totalisateur de ce que le monde a fait – et continue à faire – de lui.’ (F2F 657).
544 ‘l’étude de Flaubert représente, pour moi, une suite à l’un de mes premiers livres, 
L’Imaginaire’ ‘un vrai roman’ (ITF 118, 123).
545 ‘Mon idéal serait qu’il puisse tout à la fois sentir, comprendre et connaître la 
personnalité de Flaubert, comme totalement individuelle mais aussi comme 
totalement représentative de son époque. Autrement dit, Flaubert ne peut être compris 
que par ce qui le distingue de ses contemporains.’ (ITF 116).
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The quasi object
We have seen that the process of subjectivity is unhindered most 
of the time. At times, this process is interrupted and one becomes 
aware of one’s own exteriority within as a “subjectivity-object”. 
Nevertheless, this object does not correspond to the exteriority 
within in its entirety. The exteriority within is both one’s body and the 
physico-chemical processes that constitute it, and one’s upbringing 
and cultural background, although one never becomes aware of all of 
this. In the example of the person descending the stairs, one becomes 
aware of one’s bodily position and ability to walk, but not of one’s 
cultural background per se. In the example of the anti-Semite, it is 
the other way around: one becomes aware of certain facets of one’s 
cultural background but not of one’s body. The subjectivity-object is 
therefore not the exteriority within, but another object based upon 
aspects of the exteriority. This object is what Sartre identifies with 
the Self (or the ego):
You know how I conceive of the self – I haven’t 
changed – it is an object before us. That is to say, the self 
appears to our reflection when it unifies the reflected 
consciousnesses. Thus there is a pole of reflection that 
I call the self, the transcendent self, which is a quasi 
object. (OTF 117-118)546.
In non-reflexive thought, I never encounter the ego, 
my ego; I encounter that of others. Non-reflexive 
consciousness is absolutely rid of the ego, which appears 
only in reflexive consciousness—or rather in reflected 
consciousness, because reflected consciousness is already 
a quasi-object for reflexive consciousness. Behind 
reflected consciousness, like a sort of identity shared by 
all the states that have come after reflected consciousness, 
lies an object that we will call “ego” (IRP 11)547.
546 ‘Vous savez comment je conçois le moi – je n’ai pas changé : c’est un objet qui 
est devant nous. C’est à-dire que le moi apparaît à la réflexion quand elle unifie les 
consciences réfléchies : il y a alors un pôle de la réflexion que j’appelle le moi, le 
moi transcendant, et qui est un quasi-objet.’ (OTFF 100). It should be noted here that 
Sartre used the term ‘moi’ rather than ‘soi’ too refer to the Self. In the context of the 
interview, it does not seem that he is referring to the I/Me distinction. 
547 ‘Dans la pensée non réflexive, je ne rencontre jamais l’ego, le mien, je rencontre 
celui des autres. La conscience non réflexive est absolument débarrassée de l’ego qui 
n’apparaît que dans la conscience réflexive ou plutôt dans la conscience réfléchie, 
parce que la conscience réfléchie est déjà un quasi-objet pour la conscience réflexive. 
Derrière la conscience réfléchie, comme une sort d’identité commune à tous les états 
qui ont succédé à une conscience réfléchie, il y a cet objet que l’on appellera ego.’ 
(IRPF 42). 
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The idea that the act of reflection unifies the reflected consciousnesses 
means that the unity is given to the Self by the act of reflection 
and that it is therefore constituted by the act of reflection. The anti-
Semite has become aware of his lived attitude towards Jewish people, 
turns his gaze inwards and sees two aspects of his life: he is against 
bourgeois ideology, on the one hand, but expresses this ideology, on 
the other. He unites the two aspects into a single Self, which reveals 
the contradiction and evokes the need for a change in attitude. 
Sartre says that he has not changed his views on selfhood, which as 
we have seen contradicts other statements he has made concerning 
the evolution in his thought. We will return to this comparison in 
the conclusion of this work. What is clear, however, is that Sartre 
either still adheres to or has returned to his early view, that of The 
Transcendence of the Ego: the Self is a pole of reflection which only 
appears when it is reflected upon. It is in a certain sense created, as 
it only appears to reflection, yet it is not imagined. It is present to us 
as an abstraction based upon real experiences. Hence, it is a quasi-
object. In The Family Idiot, this return to the transcendent Ego of the 
early period becomes explicit:
[I]f we establish that this quasi-object is unique, whom 
does it designate? In what circumstances does one say 
“I” and “Me”? In principle, as I have shown elsewhere, 
the ego appears to the reflexive consciousness as pole 
X of the reflected, or, if you will, as the transcendent 
unity of feelings, states, and acts. The “I” does not set 
itself against the ego; on the contrary, it is part of it and 
binds itself more particularly to the ipseity, properly 
speaking, than to the diverse areas of praxis. The “I” and 
the “Me” have the same content since the question is 
one of different designations of the same ego. In fact, 
we are project, that is, the surpassing of what is suffered; 
as a consequence, according to the circumstances and 
our particular intentions, it is permissible to consider 
ourselves in our passivity (and in this case, the project 
itself reveals its passive mode: it is flight conditioned by a 
certain given) or in our activity […] In the first attitude 
the ego is revealed as “Me,” in the second as “I.” (F3 
186-187)548.
548 ‘pourtant nous établissons que ce quasi-objet est unique, qui désigne-t-il ? à quelle 
instance dira-t-on Je et Moi ? En principe, je l’ai montré ailleurs, l’Ego apparaît 
à la conscience réflexive comme le pôle X du réfléchi ou, si l’on préfère, comme 
l’unité transcendante des sentiments, des états et des actes. Le Je ne s’oppose pas à 
l’Ego, il en fait partie, au contraire, et se rapporte plus particulièrement à l’ipséité 
proprement dite ainsi qu’aux divers secteurs de la praxis. Le Je et le Moi ont le 
même contenu puisqu’il s’agit de désignations différentes du même Ego. De fait, 
nous sommes projet, c’est-à-dire dépassement du subi ; en conséquence, selon les 
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Here, Sartre also reverts to the terminology of The Transcendence 
of the Ego, referring to the objective Self as the ego and using the 
Jamesian I/Me distinction. Furthermore, he recapitulates two 
important ideas from the earlier work: the unity of different kinds 
of reflected experiences and the fact that the I and the Me are two 
sides of the same coin. What is peculiar, however, is that Sartre 
mentions ipseity here. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
notion of ipseity marks a departure from Sartre’s position in The 
Transcendence of the Ego, as it is related to the personal rather than 
impersonal nature of consciousness. As we have already discussed, 
ipseity amounts to the fact that we experience our possibilities as our 
own, thereby projecting ourselves into the future. In the quote about 
internalisation at the beginning of the previous section, Sartre also 
speaks about the “field of possibles”. He even explicitly states that 
ipseity is part of our lived experience: ‘ipseity, that is, lived experience 
as a perpetual return-to-the-self through time and space’ (F3 188)549. 
Indeed, any organism’s project for survival entails the recognition 
of possibilities as its own: it is possible for me to cross this river to 
find food, it is possible for me to climb this ledge, etc. Furthermore, 
it is important that the organism identifies itself with its future 
Self, because it is the future Self as a totality that is the goal of the 
totalisation that is the struggle for survival. Hence, the notion of 
ipseity fits seamlessly with the general ideas of Sartre’s later works. 
The phrasing in the previous quote contrasts ipseity with praxis, but 
this seems to be merely a restatement of the distinction between 
lived experience and praxis vis-à-vis knowledge. In praxis we are 
explicitly aware of both what our goal is and what the possibilities 
relating to this goal are. Ipseity, on the other hand, is the implicit 
and prereflective recognition of possibilities, and it is therefore a part 
of lived experience and, hence, not explicitly known. 
In another interview, however, Sartre also stresses a different 
dimension of ipseity, which is not explicitly addressed in Being and 
Nothingness or the War Diaries. Here he comments on his idea that 
the Self appears as a thing:
Not as a thing, but almost. It is just like a thing. It lies 
before consciousness. It does not at all lie behind it, 
as does the “ego” of Husserl for example. I think that 
an “ipseity” of consciousness exists, which is not identical 
circonstances et nos intentions particulières, il nous est loisible de nous considérer 
dans notre passivité (et dans ce cas, le projet lui-même révèle son passif : il est fuite 
conditionnée par un certain donné) ou dans notre activité […]. Dans la première 
attitude l’Ego se révèle comme Moi, dans la seconde comme Je.’ (F3F 1294).
549 ‘I’ipséité, c’est-à-dire le vécu comme perpétuel renvoi-à-soi, à travers le temps et 
l’espace’ (F3F 1295-1296).
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with the self, which is a relation to the self, a sort of “in-
itself ”-being, which brings it about that consciousness 
can recognize itself, can turn towards the past, etc. But 
the self – in the proper sense of the word – that lies 
outside (IF 230).
Just as there needs to be a “selfness” in order to account for the link 
between the present and future Self, there also needs to be such a 
link between the present and past Self. Because the Self is an object, 
we have in principle the same access to the Selves of other people. 
Yet, we do recognize our own Self when we reflect on it, not least 
because it is our own exteriority within bending backwards on itself. 
The idea – from The Transcendence of the Ego – that the Self appears 
as a Self of “another” is thereby altered, allowing Sartre to account for 
the fact that I can distinguish my own Self from that of others in the 
sense that I have a “more intimate” relation to it. Nevertheless, this 
distinction does not imply any epistemological difference, precisely 
because of the objective nature of the Self: ‘In fact, the known is an 
object: how, therefore, could one know oneself except as the object 
that one is for others?’ (F3 428)550. Although ipseity enables us to 
reflect upon ourselves in a technical sense, it is cultural learning that 
determines which aspects of ourselves we will tend to focus on in 
such reflection:  
In ever collectivity, individuals share a certain 
representation of the human character that is born of 
institutions, customs, and history and defines what they 
are by what they ought to be, and what they ought to be 
by what they are (F2 155)551. 
Although reflection is always triggered by changing circumstances, 
as we saw in the example of the anti-Semite, it is still the interiorized 
social background that reflects. This means that reflection is never 
pure, it is always learned. We learn to play our roles prereflectively 
and hence conform to this representation, but we also interiorize 
how we should see ourselves. It is for this reason that we can be 
shocked to discover who we are when circumstances change, as 
was seen in the example of the anti-Semite: the image we have 
interiorized of ourselves in the past does not correspond anymore 
to the Self we have become. Hence, we have a closer relation to the 
quasi-object compared to the position of The Transcendence of the Ego, 
550 ‘De fait, le connu est un objet : comment donc pourrait-on se connaître sinon comme 
l’objet qu’on est pour les autres’ (F3F 1542).
551 ‘Dans toute collectivité, les individus ont en commun une certaine représentation de 
la personne humaine qui naît des institutions, des mœurs et de l’histoire et qui définit 
ce qu’ils sont par ce qu’ils doivent être et ce qu’ils doivent être par ce qu’ils sont. ‘ 
(F2F 811). 
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as it is rooted in ipseity rather than impersonal consciousness. Yet, it 
can also considered to be less “intimate”, as reflection is something 
learned rather than simply being an innate ability of consciousness.
Derealisation and passive activity
The notion of the person as the abstract limit of personalisation bears 
resemblance to the Self that appears on the horizon of our choices, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter. It is an ideal, never fully 
attained in life, and, as an ideal totality, it is imaginary. The notion 
of person does not seem to play a large role in our lives and can be 
equated with a formal representation of a lifetime. As we have seen 
in previous examples, however, the Self as quasi-object does play a 
large role in life in the pivotal moments of reflection. Given that the 
idea of the Self as quasi-object is primarily rooted in Sartre’s own 
past theory as it is presented in The Transcendence of the Ego, we can 
assume that he will still also maintain, now as before, that the Self is 
real. Although it only appears as a result of reflection, it is rooted in 
the real aspects of our exteriority within.
The topic of real and imaginary identity plays a crucial role in The 
Family Idiot, as it is related to Flaubert’s main pathology. In the 
interview quoted above, Sartre states that ‘there is a pole of reflection 
that I call the self, the transcendent self, which is a quasi-object’, to 
which he immediately adds, ‘Flaubert wants his self to be imaginary’ 
(OTF 118)552. Most people would not want their Selves to be 
imaginary, and the different ways in which Flaubert tried to render 
his Self imaginary is the guiding principle of the biography. Sartre 
also calls the affliction ‘derealisation’ (F2 14)553. Sartre’s description of 
Flaubert’s condition is long and elaborate. It describes a long process 
that entails many “conversions” in order to render his Self more and 
more imaginary. This was a reaction to the fact that Flaubert had no 
“real” place in his family. As the second son of a bourgeois physician, 
he stood in the shadow of his elder brother. Although he could have 
pursued another respectable career, he was inhibited from doing so 
by the fact that he was seen as unintelligent by his father due to his 
difficulties learning to read. Hence Sartre’s title, The Family Idiot. 
Because he had no place in reality, he found escape in the imaginary, 
pursuing at first acting and, ultimately, different styles of writing. 
His pathological commitment to the imaginary would ultimately 
lead him to “invent” the idea of “art for art’s sake”, that is, art which 
is completely detached from reality – and hence fully imaginary 
(OTF 118-119). 
552 ‘il y a alors un pôle de la réflexion que j’appelle le moi, le moi transcendant, et qui est 
un quasi-objet’ ‘Flaubert, lui, veut que son moi soit imaginaire’ (OTFF 100).
553 ‘déréalisation’ (F2F 665).
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Although Sartre describes Flaubert’s story as the ‘failure of an entire 
life’, his writings did acquire modest success (OTF 112)554. The fact 
that Flaubert succeeds in spite of his failure is understood to be 
rooted in the political context of the time. In the fifth volume, Sartre 
zooms out to survey this political context. Flaubert’s success is rooted 
in the general failure of the revolution of 1848 for the bourgeoisie. 
In February of that year, the bourgeoisie together with the lower 
class revolted against the increasingly conservative government 
under which only landowners were allowed to vote. This revolt led 
to a provisional government largely led by the bourgeoisie, which 
instigated universal male voting rights and workshops that provided 
jobs for the many unemployed. However, in order to finance these 
workshops, new taxes where applied to land. The disenfranchised 
landowners would not pay these taxes, leading to the closure of 
the workshops. In June, this led to a second revolt of the working 
classes against the provisional government. Thus, in the eyes of the 
bourgeoise, the first revolt had failed. Although the product of his 
particular inability to conform to the norms of his milieu, Flaubert’s 
pessimistic view of man and History corresponded to the general 
pessimistic spirit of his peers:
Gustave and his reader were united by their pessimistic 
view of history; and this was a result not of their 
doctrinaire positions but of the fact that they lived their 
histories in profound unease, Gustave his anecdotal 
history, his reader the history of French society (F5 397-
398)555[.]
The subjective fact that Flaubert had no place in his class corresponds 
to the objective fact that this class had no place in society after 1848, 
which Sartre calls the objective neurosis of the members of this class. 
Thus, the subjective and the objective neurosis reflect one another:
[T]he purpose of Flaubert’s subjective neurosis is the 
same as that of the objective neurosis (demanded by the 
exigencies of the Objective Spirit). We can even say that 
the imperatives of the objective neurosis universalize 
and objectify what remained singular and subjective 
in him: the failure of the man (of his bourgeois self ) 
involves the denial of the real and naked bourgeoisie, 
and the creation of an imaginary consolidated man. He 
alone can conceive of art for art’s sake and realize a work 
554 ‘l’échec de toute une vie’ (OTFF 94).
555 ‘Gustave et son lecteur sont unis par leur vision pessimiste de l’Histoire : et cela ne 
vient pas, chez eux, de partis pris doctrinaires mais de ce qu’ils ont vécu, le premier 
son histoire anecdotique, le second celle de la société française dans un profond 
malaise’ (F5F 430).
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as its own end (F5 619)556. 
However, we should not understand the correspondence between 
these pessimistic worldviews to be coincidental. Rather, Flaubert’s 
failure to meet the expectations of his social milieu is representative 
of the failure of this milieu itself, and the two failures are dialectically 
related. We will discuss the relation between History in general and 
the lives of individuals in the next section.
For now, let us take a closer look at Flaubert’s derealisation. An 
important aspect of his condition is that of passive activity. When 
we discussed the notion of the practico-inert in the second section of 
the first part of this chapter, we already encountered this notion. In 
the Critique Sartre attributes it to practico-inert things which exert 
their power over humans, thus instigating actions that are carried 
out in fact by humans. Even though these humans are acting, they 
do not posit their own ends and are therefore also passive. Although 
this state of the practico-inert is definitely an aspect of human 
reality, we have also seen that human agency is later recovered in the 
dialectic of the Critique through the possibilities afforded by groups. 
Flaubert, however, has not recuperated his agency in this manner 
and remains a passive agent: ‘from early childhood Gustave can 
neither surface comfortably in the medium of human praxis nor let 
himself sink completely into the unconsciousness of the inanimate 
world’ (F1 38)557. This condition is a pathological inability to act: 
‘passive activity, a kind of nervous weakness in the depths of his 
physical organism that makes surrender easier’ (F1 35)558. Flaubert’s 
condition is related to the fact that the objective selfhood imposed 
on him by others in childhood does not allow him to ‘consent and 
revolt’ (F1 387)559. His tactic for dealing with his situation is to 
become a passive agent: 
It is a complex tactic by which he attempts to recover 
an impossible subjectivity by exaggerating the alienation 
that first makes him conscious of himself as object. 
In the present case the tactic consists of borrowing 
556 ‘le but de la névrose subjective de Flaubert est le même qui celui de la névrose 
objective (réclamée par les exigences de l’Esprit objectif). Tout au plus peut-on dire 
que les impératifs de celle-ci universalisent et objectivent ce qui demeurait singulier 
et subjectif chez lui : il s’agit par l’échec de l’homme (du bourgeois qu’il est) de 
refuser la bourgeoisie réelle et nue et de créer un homme imaginaire consolidé. C’est, 
en effet, celui-là, seul, qui peut concevoir l’Art pour l’Art et réaliser une œuvre étant 
sa propre fin.’ (F5F 663).
557 ‘que Gustave, dès la petite enfance, ne peut ni affleurer à la praxis humaine ni se 
laisser couler tout à fait dans l’inconscience de la chose inanimée’ (F1F 48).
558 ‘d’activité passive, dans la profondeur de l’organisme, une sorte de frayage nerveux 
qui rend l’abandon plus facile’ (F1F 46).
559 ‘le consentement et la révolte’ (F1F 399).
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the force of the other through passive obedience and 
turning it against him; by turning himself into the pure 
means of realizing the alien ends imposed on him, the 
resentful man lets them reveal their own inconsistency 
and, by their unavoidable consequences, their malignity 
(F1 387)560.
An important aspect of Flaubert’s passive activity is the hope 
that by channelling different ends imposed on him, he may reveal 
their inconsistencies. Thereby, he may revolt against them in a 
certain manner without actually having to revolt. Hence, he is not 
fully passive, as he still hopes to attain the goal of exposing the 
contradictory nature of the ends imposed on him. Thus, with regard 
to the things imposed on Flaubert, Sartre states: ‘All he could do 
was set them against one another and let them expose their own 
contradictions in the hope that they would destroy one another; this 
is the very essence of passive activity’ (F1 619)561. 
Like the example of the house in the Critique discussed above, Sartre 
compares Flaubert’s condition to a vampire, feeding on the ends 
imposed on him by others:  
A system of vampire-imperatives, nourished by his 
subjective life, bind him to the praxis of another, who 
condemns him and claims to endow him with relative-
being; the single result is the ipseity’s vampirization of 
its own occupant. It is fitting to dwell a while on this 
parasitic form of praxis because it defines Flaubert’s 
essential attitude (F1 394)562[.] 
Flaubert seems to lack his own real project and hence does not 
experience his own possibilities projected upon the world in his 
circuit of ipseity, but rather projects the ends of others on the world. 
560 ‘c’est une tactique complexe par laquelle il tente de récupérer l’impossible subjectivité 
en renchérissant sur l’aliénation que le dévoile d’abord à soi-même comme objet ; 
dans le cas présent c’est emprunter par l’obéissance passive la force de l’autre et 
la retourner contre lui : en se faisant le pur moyen de réaliser les fins étrangères 
qu’on lui impose, l’homme du ressentiment les laisse dévoiler par elles-mêmes 
leur inconsistance et, par les conséquences qu’elles ne manqueront pas d’avoir leur 
malignité.’ (F1F 399-400).
561 ‘Tout ce qu’il peut faire, c’est de les oppose pour qu’ils montrent d’eux-mêmes leurs 
contradictions et dans l’espoir qu’ils se détruiront les uns les autres : c’est le type 
même de l’activité passive’ (F1F 639).
562 ‘Un système d’impératifs-vampires, nourri de sa vie subjective, l’aliène à la praxis 
d’un autre que le condamne et prétend l’affecter d’un être-relatif : la seule issue 
pour l’ipséité, c’est de vampiriser son propre occupant. Il convient de s’arrêter un 
peu sur cette forme parasitaire de la praxis car elle définit l’attitude fondamentale de 
Flaubert’ (F1F 407).
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Again, this brings his attitude close to that of practico-inert objects, 
which are created by the praxis of human beings but channel this 
practice back upon the world which allows them to act passively.
Passive activity is also linked to the imaginary. As a child, Flaubert 
gave his derealisation form through acting: 
An imaginary actor, the child imagined–before the 
public performances–that his voice would make itself 
heard by the audience; he took their ears in order to 
listen to himself, he borrowed their eyes to see himself–
in short, imagination was governed by passive activity 
(F2 252)563.
Acting for Flaubert was a means of obtaining an imaginary identity, 
namely that of the roles he played. He would only acquire his 
identity through the roles he performed. As we have discussed in 
the first chapter, the imaginary needs to be constituted by an act of 
consciousness. Hence, he was in need of some other agency that could 
bring forth the imaginary, and he found it in others. His imaginary 
identity is constituted by other agents, namely the audience.
The same interplay of passive activity and the imaginary is also an 
important factor in Flaubert’s conception of literature: ‘literature 
from the outset seems to him a passive activity’ (F2 210)564. This 
is one of the reasons he invented art for art’s sake: the voice of the 
author himself did not properly exist before the work of art was 
realized: ‘Gustave thereby reveals a conception of Art more adapted 
to his constituted character: it is a passive activity. One must do 
nothing, want nothing, solicit nothing, be unaware even of this 
expectation, then it can happen’ (F4 301-302)565. Literature becomes 
fully imaginary because it is no longer the product of an author who 
invents it as an agent, but rather emerges from one who passively 
acts by channelling ideas that come from the world itself into words. 
Thus, Flaubert’s passive activity is ultimately what allows him to 
render himself imaginary.566
What is important about Flaubert’s condition of derealisation for 
the question of selfhood is that it further stresses that the Self 
563 ‘Acteur imaginaire, l’enfant imaginait – avant les représentations publiques – sa 
voix comme se faisant entendre aux spectateurs, il se donnait leurs oreilles pour 
s’écouter ; il empruntait leurs yeux pour se voir : bref l’imagination était commandée 
par l’activité passive.’ (F2F 912).
564 ‘la littérature lui apparaît, dès le départ, comme une activité passive’ (F2F 868).
565 ‘Par là, Gustave révèle une conception d’Art plus adaptée à son caractère constitué : 
c’est une activité passive. Il faut ne rien faire, ne rien vouloir, ne rien solliciter, 
ignorer jusqu’à cette attente, alors il se peut’ (F4F 2078).
566 For a more detailed account of passive activity see: (Dufourcq 2014). 
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is not an imaginary but a real – albeit quasi – object. One of the 
consequences of Flaubert’s condition, for instance, is that he loses 
the “intimacy” of selfhood, that is, he does not see the difference 
between his own Self and that of other people. At one point in his 
development, Flaubert sees his Self as no more than a role that he 
plays. Therefore, he does not feel that it is rooted in the very real 
aspects of one’s exteriority within. As has been said, the Self is an 
object which is in principle the same for me as it is for other people. 
Because Flaubert’s identity is rooted in the roles he plays for others, 
the balance shifts: ‘in the object he is for others he recognizes […] 
an ontological primacy over the subject he is for himself.’ (F2 21)567.
This is reminiscent of Sartre’s description of bad faith in Being and 
Nothingness. In bad faith, as has been seen in the previous chapter, 
there is also a primacy of the way others see us over the way we see 
ourselves, which leads us to mistake the Self for a thing. In Flaubert’s 
condition, however, it is the fact that he does not see himself as an 
object that causes him to regard the way others see him as primary. 
Hence, derealisation can be described as inverted bad faith: in bad 
faith one illegitimately regards oneself as a real object rather than 
as a project to be realized, in derealisation one regards oneself to be 
merely imaginary, instead of an object rooted in one’s body and one’s 
social and historical circumstances.
This does not mean however that bad faith loses its existential 
significance. Sartre describes Flaubert’s condition as ‘a desire to be 
radically an object’ (F2 189)568. If we consider the example of the anti-
Semite once again we can see what this entails. When the man is 
confronted with the fact of his anti-Semitism, it leads automatically 
to change. As has been said, first there was a person who did not 
know about his own moral stance towards Jewish people, then there 
is a person who knows. This knowledge creates a choice: one can 
either positively identify as an anti-Semite or change one’s attitude. 
It is precisely this choice that bad faith denies: I am anti-Semitic 
because of my social background and there is nothing I can do about 
that. To be radically a thing is to be radically passive and hence 
incapable of change and action. This is also the reason that Flaubert’s 
behaviour is often characterized as passive activity, which as we have 
seen is the way in which practico-inert objects act. They exert and 
obey exigencies, but true actions need to be carried out by organic 
agents. In the case of Flaubert, Sartre characterizes passive activity 
as ‘a kind of nervous weakness in the depths of his physical organism 
that makes surrender easier’ (F1 35)569. 
567 ‘à cet objet qu’il est pour les autres il reconnaît […] la primauté ontologique sur le 
sujet qu’il est pour soi’ (F2F 672).
568 ‘en désir d’être radicalement objet’ (F2F 846).
569 ‘dans la profondeur de l’organisme, une sorte de frayage nerveux qui rend l’abandon 
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Another way of describing bad faith would be to say that it 
is a condition wherein one mistakes the totalisation that is 
personalisation for a totality. Flaubert considers his Self to be 
imaginary and his personalisation to be a totality. One’s identity is 
a process that extends throughout one’s lifetime, and the Self which 
appears in reflection plays an integral part in this process. But the 
process is never completed in life, and the person as totality has no 
bearing on one’s existence because of this. It is the objective Self 
that is one’s identity at a specific moment, and its appearance makes 
change possible rather than fixing who one is for the future. In other 
words, selfhood is both a transcendent object and projective process 
of personalisation. One cannot exist without the other. 
To sum up, the Self in this period of Sartre’s oeuvre is in the first case 
an object, marking a definitive return to the position of his earliest 
works. The Self appears in a moment of reflection and consists of 
highlighted aspects of the exteriority within. There are, however, 
some elements from Being and Nothingness and the War Diaries 
that are also retained, the most prominent of which is the notion of 
ipseity. Furthermore, the looming Self of Being and Nothingness is 
retained in the notion of the person as the ideal limit of the process 
of personalisation. This notion plays no significant role in how we 
experience our own life, however. Thus, although the imaginary 
totality of the person remains, the objective Self that we consider 
someone to be marks a definitive return to the real. 
6. Predestination
We have seen how a person develops throughout their lifetime 
through a process of interiorisation and personalisation. We have 
discussed this mainly from the point of view of the person as they 
go through this process, that is, in the present. The question remains 
as to how this process is seen retrospectively, when it is recounted. 
The topic of narrative identity is mainly addressed by Sartre in the 
light of the question of History. How can a historian understand the 
actions of people? In order to understand Sartre’s ideas concerning 
narrative identity in this period, we have to understand the notion 
mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter: the singular 
universal. As Sartre states at the beginning of The Family Idiot: 
For a man is never an individual; it would be more fitting 
to call him a singular universal. Summed up and for this 
reason universalized by his epoch, he in turn resumes it 
by reproducing himself in it as singularity. Universal by 
the singular universality of human history, singular by 
plus facile’ (F1F 46).
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the universalizing singularity of his projects (F1 ix)570[.]
In order to understand historical epochs, we have to understand the 
people who live in them. In so far as people have interiorized the 
Objective Spirit of their age, however, we have to understand the 
epoch to understand the people. In other words, man is universal in 
the sense that he is an interiorisation of universal influences, but he 
is singular in so far as he interiorizes these in his own particular way 
and may act in ways which in turn influence the epoch itself. 
The question of how we can understand a man as singular universal 
runs through the many pages of The Family Idiot, but it is addressed 
in a more direct and concise fashion in a 1964 lecture in which 
the case study is not Flaubert, but Kierkegaard: “Kierkegaard: The 
Singular Universal”. In this lecture, Sartre does not aim to do justice 
to Kierkegaard from a biographical point of view, but uses his life as 
a case study for the more general question of how we can understand 
a life in retrospect. We will examine this lecture in order to see how 
the life story of a singular individual can be understood in light of 
the story of universal History. Related to this question is that of 
freedom and, more precisely, the tension between choices that are 
yet to be made and those that have been made, and, hence, how 
the free individual is to be understood in light of the necessity of 
History. 
The holes in History
Kierkegaard’s case is a peculiar one because he was a philosopher 
mostly known for his thought concerning subjectivity. When we 
try to understand him, however, we only know him as an object. 
On the one hand, this is inevitable because, as we have seen, we 
can never know subjectivity as such. This becomes even more 
problematic when the person is dead because we can no longer infer 
the subjective process from witnessing the person reporting on his 
lived experience or seeing the process of interiorisation in action. 
Hence, we only know Kierkegaard, ‘the knight of subjectivity’, as an 
object (SU 404)571. 
In principle, a historian can recount an epoch while bypassing 
subjectivity altogether. As subjectivity is nothing but the 
interiorisation of the two externalities which exist in objectivity, 
the historian can just describe these exteriorities. This would result, 
570 ‘C’est qu’un homme n’est jamais un individu ; il vaudrait mieux l’appeler un universel 
singulier : totalisé et, par là même, universalisé par son époque, il la retotalise en se 
reproduisant en elle comme singularité. Universel par l’universalité singulière de 
l’histoire humaine, singulier par la singularité universalisante de ses projets’ (F1F 7).
571 ‘chevalier de la subjectivité’ (SUF 153).
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however, in a description that cannot do justice to History as the 
dialectical development of groups, which consist of subjective 
members, as it cannot properly describe what praxis is. The clearest 
example of such an “exterior” description of history is found in 
Sartre’s discussion of science fiction in the second volume of the 
Critique (CDR2 319-322). Suppose an alien life form were to study 
humanity, how would they describe us?
The differences in our respective physiological 
constitutions, histories, levels of development, etc., 
assuredly do not prevent him from comprehending us 
in our practical reality as individuals who are making a 
history in common. But the particular goals we pursue 
will, in a whole number of cases, remain alien to him: 
our aesthetic pleasures, for example, if he has different 
senses from ours. So he will define our goals in exteriority, 
without stripping them of their character as goals, but 
without being able to share them. He will merely note 
that the inhabitants of this underdeveloped planet have 
certain behavioural patterns orientated towards certain 
objectives; and that certain systems of social options or 
values condition the hierarchy of our preferences. Being 
unable to share some particular goal, he will grasp our 
praxis in a given case as hexis (CDR2 320)572.
Although Sartre does not elaborate on what he means exactly by 
hexis in this context, the word is associated with habit or routine. 
This means that we do the things we do not because we have 
conscious projects, but simply because we are drawn towards our 
goals automatically. This is of course a very widespread idea in 
deterministic philosophies. What is very important here is that 
Sartre distinguishes two kinds of goals. A goal associated with a 
hexis can only be verified in positivity. In other words, we can only 
see the behaviour and what it results in. Hence, the alien could say 
that humans are drawn towards alcohol, but he can never understand 
that people drink to drown their sorrows, as this is not observable.573 
572 ‘Les différences des constitutions physiologiques, des histoires, du degré de 
développement, etc., n’empêchent certes pas qu’il nous comprenne dans notre 
réalité pratique comme des individus qui font en commun une histoire, mais les fins 
particulières que nous poursuivons en nombre de cas lui demeureront étrangères - nos 
plaisirs esthétiques, par exemple, s’il a des sens différents des nôtres. Ainsi définira-
t-il nos fins en extériorité sans leur ôter leur caractère de fins mais sans pouvoir les 
partager : il notera simplement que les habitants de cette planète sous-développée 
ont certaines conduits orientées vers certains objectifs et que certains systèmes 
d’options sociales ou de valeurs conditionnent la hiérarchie de nos préférences. Faute 
de partager telle fin particulière, il saisit notre praxis en tel ou tel cas comme exis’ 
(CDR2F 331).
573 The same theme can be found in Sartre’s play The Condemned of Altona. The character 
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The goals of praxis, however, are determined negatively. They are the 
things that could be attained, but are not yet in the given situation. 
Therefore, they cannot be described purely by what is empirically 
verifiable. In order to understand History, we have to understand these 
goals, because without such goals we cannot understand failure – and 
failure plays a key role in History. The example Sartre gives of this 
is the Battle of Waterloo (SU 413, CDR2 321). Napoleon’s general, 
Grouchy, failed to send his troops to the battle in time. This can only 
be described negatively: there was a goal which was not attained. 
Sartre stresses that this is not the same as other negative statements 
about History. The Battle of Waterloo was not lost because of a lack 
of fighter planes, but because the goals set by certain individuals in 
it were not attained.574 We are able to understand History because 
we can understand the goals of historical agents from the inside, 
as it were. Thus, Sartre concludes: ‘subjectivity constitutes nothing 
for objective knowledge since it is a non-knowledge, and yet 
failure demonstrates that it has an absolute existence’ (SU 413)575. 
Kierkegaard failed in uniting his theories about subjectivity with 
his religious beliefs (SU 412). Flaubert initially failed to meet the 
expectations of his family and social milieu (F1 4, OTF 112). 
Another interesting conclusion is drawn from the idea of failure. 
The fact that we can fail means that we have options in attaining 
our goals and can choose the wrong ones. Even having our goals 
obstructed by external factors can only be considered failure if we had 
had the option to somehow avoid these factors. Otherwise, it could 
only be considered bad luck, but not personal failure. Hence, Sartre 
states that ‘the foundation of History is freedom in each man’ (SU 
423)576.577 Although this freedom plays a key role in understanding 
human beings and understanding History, it is very minimal. In a 
slightly different context in the Critique, Sartre explains this notion 
Franz hallucinates that crabs from the future want to judge his epoch, but these 
creatures cannot experience nothingness. When he points a gun at another character, 
he says to the crabs: ‘You’ll see nothing but the blaze there, poor Crustaceans. You 
took our eyes to examine what exists, while we, living in man’s epoch, have seen 
with those same eyes what does not exist’ (CA 78).
574 The argument is similar to the one articulated in Being and Nothingness concerning 
the absence of famous writers (BN 42-43), which we have discussed in the previous 
chapter.
575 ‘la subjectivité n’est rien pour le savoir objectif puisqu’elle est non-savoir, et pourtant 
l’échec montre qu’elle existe absolument’ (SUF 166). 
576 ‘la liberté en chaque homme est fondement de l’Histoire’ (SUF 179).
577 Furthermore, Sartre says in the context of the practico-inert field: ‘It would be quite 
wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations, as the Stoics claimed. 
I mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the 
practico-inert field and in so far as this field is always conditioned by scarcity’ (CDR 
331). As we have discussed, however, this moment in the dialectical development of 
the book is still abstract and does not take group-formation and History sufficiently 
into account. 
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of choice: 
It would be completely wrong to give the word ‘choice’ 
here an existential interpretation. It is really a matter of 
the concrete choices which present themselves to, for 
example, an airline pilot trying to save the passengers in 
his plane, two of whose four engines are out of action, 
which is losing fuel, etc. It would be taking Pavlovian 
obstinacy to the point of total blindness if one denied 
the specificity and irreducibility of these choices. The 
part played by routine is undeniable, but in cases of 
danger it is not sufficient; it is necessary to innovate or 
to take risks (CDR 453)578.
The fact that we have choices relates to the fact that the practical 
environment holds different possibilities. The options that are 
available to us as such are conditioned by our cultural environment, 
and, in this manner, we are determined by Objective Spirit. Sartre 
articulates this quite explicitly in his description of Flaubert: 
‘Everything was played out in advance: options remained for 
Gustave, but they were conditional options’ (OTF 117)579. This does 
not mean that Sartre completely denies us our freedom, just that its 
power is greatly diminished:
I believe that a man can always make something out 
of what is made of him. This is the limit I would today 
accord to freedom: the small movement which makes of 
a totally conditioned social being someone who do not 
render back completely what his conditioning has given 
him (IT 35)580.
Choices are not existential in the sense that we can freely choose 
who we are, and yet Sartre still uses the term ‘fundamental choice’ 
(F1 359)581. For Flaubert, this choice is to become imaginary, and this 
578 ‘Qu’on n’aille surtout pas prendre ici le mot de « choix » dans sa signification 
existentielle. Il s’agit réellement des choix concrets qui se proposent, par exemple, 
au pilote de ligne qui veut sauver ses passagers dans un avion dont deux moteurs 
sur quatre ne tournent plus, dont l’essence fuit, etc. Il faudrait pousser l’obstination 
pavlovienne jusqu’à l’aveuglement total pour nier la spécificité et l’irréductibilité de 
ces choix. La part de la routine est indéniable mais en cas de danger elle ne suffit pas 
: il faut inventer ou oser la manœuvre.’ (CDRF 466).
579 ‘Tout est joué d’avance : il reste à Gustave des optons, mais des options conditionnées’ 
(OTFF 99)
580 ‘Je crois qu’un homme peut toujours faire quelque chose de ce qu’on a fait de lui. 
C’est la définition que je donnerais aujourd’hui de la liberté : ce petit mouvement qui 
fait d’un être social totalement conditionné une personne qui ne restitue pas la totalité 
de ce qu’elle a reçu de son conditionnement’ (ITF 101-102).
581 ‘choix fondamentale’ (F1F 371). 
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is a choice that is more fundamental and original in the sense that 
it determined other choices he would make. Yet it is not absolutely 
free: the choice to flee into the imaginary was determined by his 
social situation. Furthermore, as we saw in the example of riots 
earlier in this chapter, group-formation may allow us to enlarge the 
number of possibilities open to us. Nevertheless, more possibilities 
do not automatically mean that these are any less determined 
beforehand. This leads Sartre to formulate a position that is neither a 
total determinism in which choices can be described without taking 
subjectivity into account, nor one of radical freedom:
In a certain sense, all our lives are predestined from 
the moment we are born. We are destined for a certain 
type of action from the beginning by the situation of 
the family and the society at any given moment. […] 
Predestination is what replaces determinism for me. I 
believe we are not free – at least not these days, not for 
the moment – because we are all alienated. We are lost 
during childhood. Methods of education, the parent-
child relationship, and so on, are what create the self, but 
it’s a lost self. […] I do not mean to say that this sort of 
predestination precludes all choice, but one knows that 
in choosing, one will not attain what one has chosen 
(OTF 116)582.
Predestination is the idea that our possibilities are determined 
beforehand to a very large extent, but it allows for the idea that 
choices give meaning to situations. We should not understand this 
notion in the traditional sense of some kind of higher being having 
planned our future in advance, but rather that the circumstances 
themselves greatly limit the extent of our choices. We have already 
discussed the notion of destiny on the abstract level of the pure 
practico-inert, but it is retained on the concrete level by Sartre when 
he says that we are predestined to a limited set of choices.583 
582 ‘D’une certaine façon nous naissons tous prédestinés. Nous sommes voués à 
un certain type d’action dès l’origine par la situation où se trouvent la famille et 
la société à un moment donné. […] La prédestination, c’est ce qui remplace chez 
moi le déterminisme : je considère que nous ne sommes pas libres - tout au moins 
provisoirement, aujourd’hui  puisque nous sommes aliénés. On se perd toujours dans 
l’enfance : les méthodes d’éducation, le rapport parents-enfant, l’enseignement, 
etc., tout cela donne un moi, mais un, moi perdu. […] Cela ne veut pas dire que 
cette prédestination ne comporte aucun choix, mais on sait qu’en choisissant on ne 
réalisera pas ce qu’on a choisi’ (OTFF 99).
583 It must be noted that Sartre already hints at this idea of predestination in the War 
Diaries, for example when he says: ‘I can rediscover Heidegger’s assumption of his 
destiny as a German, in that wretched Germany of the postwar years, in order to help 
me assume my destiny as a Frenchman in the France of ‘40’ (WD 187). Furthermore, 
he uses the term “destiny” frequently in The Words, but seems to do so more in a 
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Thus, to sum up, Sartre’s statement that ‘History is full of holes’ can 
be understood in two ways (SU 403)584 On the one hand, we do not 
know everything that has happened, because we do not have access 
to the lived experience of the people who moved History, and, on 
the other hand, the access that we do have is due to the fact that we 
can understand the holes in History, that is, the negatities that play 
an integral part in its meaning.
Singular adventure
Because possibilities are to a large extent predetermined, it is possible 
for a historian to view a given unfolding of historical events as a 
necessity. We can study the historical circumstances and see why 
a person has chosen what she has chosen. Even if we cannot take 
freedom out of the equation in order to account for meaning, we 
can still describe the past as a series of necessary causes and effects. 
This does not, however, affect the cornerstone of Sartre’s thinking 
concerning narrative identity. Although a historian may write the 
story of my life in such a way after my death, I cannot live my life as 
a series of predetermined events. In order to describe this, Sartre uses 
a notion similar to that of the biographical illusion he introduced in 
the War Diaries, namely the notion of the “retrospective illusion”: 
Nothing is more specious than retrospective illusion. 
And one is all too inclined to conclude from the fact 
that Shakespeare wrote masterpieces that he was born 
to write them. In short, we read his life in reverse (F3 
482)585[.]
This was something Flaubert fell prey to, the idea that he would 
somehow know that he was writing a masterpiece while in the 
process of writing it. As with the biographical illusion that the young 
Sartre entertained, this only led to frustration.586 Masterpieces are 
only masterpieces because they are regarded as such in hindsight. 
We cannot live our lives as though we already know the future, and 
we cannot live our lives as though they are predetermined. Not only 
because we lack the knowledge, but because there is a dialectical 
relationship between our subjective freedom and the objectivity of 
our historical circumstances. Although they determine us, they can 
only do so because we give them meaning. In this sense, a similar 
literary than a systematical fashion.
584 ‘L’Histoire est trouée’ (SUF 153).
585 ‘Rien n’est plus spécieux que l’illusion rétrospective. Et de ce que Shakespeare a fait 
des chefs-d’œuvre, on incline vite à conclure qu’il était né pour en écrire. Bref, on lit 
sa vie à l’envers’ (F3F 1598).
586 In The Words, Sartre uses the term retrospective illusion to refer to his own 
biographical illusion of becoming a famous writer (W 199).  
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interplay between praxis and the practico-inert can be seen at the 
level of the individual. In order to describe the interplay between 
the universality of History and the particularity of individual lives, 
Sartre reinstates one of his earliest notions, namely that of adventure:
They discover themselves as a particular adventure, 
whose point of departure is a set of socioeconomic, 
cultural, moral, religious and other relations, which 
proceeds with whatever means are to hand, that is to say 
within the limits of these relations, and which gradually 
becomes inscribed in the same set (SU 416)587.
This reintroduced notion of adventure has similarities and 
differences to the original one used in Nausea. As we have discussed 
in the first chapter, Sartre’s original notion of adventure meant a 
series of events and experiences which have meaning in light of a 
certain goal. But he now sees life itself as a single adventure: ‘he is 
launched by his birth into a singular adventure that must end with 
death, an adventure whose style and form were fashioned by his 
earliest years’ (F3 401).588.589 We have argued in the first chapter that 
Sartre’s notion of adventure, expanded upon with the notion of the 
biographical illusion, can be applied to a whole lifetime. Therefore, 
the notion of adventure is similar to that of his early works: every 
event is meaningful. Through our meaningful singular adventures, 
we in turn give meaning to History:
History, universalized by things – the bearers of the 
seal of our action – becomes, through each new birth 
of man, a singular adventure within which it enfolds its 
universality (SU 429-430)590. 
As has been discussed, although History can be described at the 
level of the universal in an external empirical way, we lose its 
587 ‘Ils se découvrent comme une certaine aventure dont le point de départ est un 
ensemble de relations économico-sociales, culturelles, morales, religieuses, etc., 
qui se poursuivra avec les moyens du bord, c’est-à-dire en fonction de ces mêmes 
relations et qui s’inscrira progressivement dans ce même ensemble.’ (SUF 170).
588 ‘il est lancé par sa naissance dans une aventure singulière qui doit s’achever par le 
mort’ (F3F 1515).
589 Sartre uses the term adventure in a similar way once in Being and Nothingness: ‘The 
for-itself does not exist first in order to think the universal, and to determine itself 
according to concepts: it is its choice and its choice cannot be abstract; otherwise 
the for-itself’s very being would be abstract. The for-itself’s being is an individual 
adventure, and its choice must be the individual choice of a concrete being’ (BN 
775).
590 ‘l’Histoire, universalisée par les choses, porteuses du sceau de notre action, devient, 
par chaque nouvelle naissance de l’homme, aventure singulière et reploie en elle son 
universalité’ (SUF 188).
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meaning if we do not account for the fact that History is formed by 
people for whom Historical events have meaning. In this sense, the 
singular and the universal work in a manner similar to praxis and the 
practico-inert: although the practico-inert ultimately determines 
people and makes them into things, it can only do so because the 
material in question is the product of human labour in the first place. 
In the same way, the universal movements of History can only be 
understood if we see that they are formed by individuals who make 
History, even if their possibilities to do so are highly restricted by 
the historical circumstances in which they find themselves. In the 
case of Flaubert, Sartre wants to understand both his singularity and 
his universality, the latter of which he focuses on in the last of the 
published volumes:
The question is, therefore, to understand how Flaubert’s 
individual and protohistorical determinations can 
correspond to the practico-inert transformations of the 
objective spirit rigorously enough to allow his neurosis 
to be developed—without ceasing to be his singular 
adventure (F5 394)591. 
The idea that a person is both singular and universal in this regard 
allows us to understand the notion of narrative identity that comes 
with it: 
By virtue of the fact that the individual expresses the 
universal in singular terms, he singularizes the whole of 
History which becomes at once necessity, through the 
very way in which objective situations take charge of 
themselves, and adventure, because History is forever 
the general experienced and instituted as a particularity 
(SU 425)592[.]
The objective universal circumstances dictate the field of possibilities 
of an individual. Because everyone’s life is predestined by a limited 
range of options, there is a certain level of necessity involved in a 
lifetime. This allows us to see a life as a strictly necessary course 
of events in retrospect. We can certainly see why Flaubert, for 
instance, has chosen the things he has chosen within the particular 
591 ‘Il s’agit donc de comprendre comment les déterminations individuelles et 
préhistoriques ou protohistoriques de Flaubert peuvent correspondre aux 
transformations pratico-inertes de l’Esprit objectif assez rigoureusement pour que sa 
névrose se développe – sans cesser d’être son aventure singulière’ (F5F 426). 
592 ‘Parle fait qu’elle exprime singulièrement l’universel elle singularise l’Histoire 
entière qui devient à la fois nécessité – par la façon même dont les situations 
objectives se commandent – et aventure parce qu’elle est toujours le général ressenti 
et institué comme particularité’ (SUF 181).
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circumstances of his time.593 But, as has been said, before one has 
chosen, the situation still allows for a degree of freedom. Because we 
live in the present, we experience this freedom and experience our 
choices as meaningful. 
This means that the idea that a life lived and a life recounted differ 
greatly is retained by Sartre. Even when circumstances greatly limit 
our possibilities, we still have to live our life as a meaningful and 
free “adventure”. Although the notion does not have the same exact 
meaning as it does in the earliest works, the distinction between 
a lived and narrated life is retained. The reasoning behind this 
distinction has become vastly different, however: Sartre argues in 
his earliest works that adventures do not exist because life is not 
a pre-ordained course of events. In the period discussed here, life 
is, to a large extent, a predestined course of events, which have to 
be lived as if they are not. This does not mean that freedom is an 
illusion – as has been discussed, there is a minimal freedom of choice 
and this freedom is what gives meaning to History. It does mean, 
however, that although one may experience the choices one has to 
make within a given situation as difficult, in hindsight the path one 
has taken can appear more obvious and necessary.
Conclusion
The works from the last period of Sartre’s oeuvre deviate a lot from 
the prior periods in style and philosophical affiliation. He has traded 
much of his phenomenological framework for a more dialectical 
approach, and the emphasis on the radical freedom of people is 
replaced by a greater emphasis on the force that things exert upon 
them. 
Concerning selfhood, Sartre’s notions are mostly closely related to 
those of his earlier works. The most important new notion seems 
to be that of lived experience, which replaces consciousness. This 
notion focuses on the fact that we do not always know what is going 
on in our experience and that a lot of the ways we engage with 
the world exceed our own understanding. He retains his main idea 
concerning subjective selfhood, however, namely that subjectivity is 
a process rather than a thing, and he provides an even more extensive 
account of how this process works, namely as the interiorisation of 
two exteriorities. 
His thought concerning objective selfhood can be seen as a synthesis 
of the other two periods, though more emphasis is given to the 
earliest works. Thus, unlike his position in Being and Nothingness, 
Sartre re-adopts the view that the Self is a real – albeit quasi – object. 
593 For more information on Flaubert’s destiny, see: (Mueller 2014).
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However, in combining this notion with one of the central notions 
of Being and Nothingness, ipseity, he also takes the lessons of this 
work into account. These lessons are further reflected by the fact that 
he emphasizes the primacy of Others and deploys the related notion 
of bad faith in this period.
Concerning narrative identity, Sartre retains the main idea that a 
life lived and a life recounted differ fundamentally, but the reason 
he gives for this in his later work seems diametrically opposed to 
that of the earlier work. In his earliest works, he argued that it may 
seem as though there is a certain course in our lives, a certain way it 
develops towards certain goals, but that this is ultimately an illusion. 
In this last period, however, he argues that while life seems free to 
us, it unfolds in a predetermined manner, though we have to live it 
as a meaningful adventure nonetheless.
All of Sartre’s ideas concerning selfhood can be seen in light of his 
own turn towards the “force of circumstances”. Ultimately, people are 
singular universals: singular instances of a universal state of affairs. 
The notion of interiorisation as the mediation between an identity 
largely constructed during childhood and the everchanging world, 
the idea that the Self is an object rather than an ideal structure, and 
the idea that our choices are predestined, all refer back to the new 
emphasis he places on how the world shapes us, rather than how we 
shape the world. Sartre, however, remains a thinker of subjectivity, 
one who emphasizes that historical determination only takes place 
because we give history meaning through our activity both as an 
organism inscribing itself in matter through praxis and as an agent 
whose choices inscribe themselves in History through adventure.
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Conclusion
The main aim of this dissertation was to gain a better understanding 
of Sartre’s philosophy of subjectivity and selfhood. The choice of these 
related topics was not arbitrary: they are not only central to Sartre’s 
work but also – as became clear in the introductory chapter – central 
to the criticism and positive reception of his philosophy. As we have 
seen, subjectivity and selfhood do not exist in isolation, which is why 
we have also focused on the things that surround subjective being. 
Indeed, the main idea of our investigation is that the Self is a thing 
among things. This concluding chapter serves to map the ideas we have 
uncovered, compare them, and see how they relate to the reception 
of Sartre’s philosophy that we discussed in the  introductory chapter. 
 
We will begin this conclusion with a presentation of our findings 
concerning subjectivity and selfhood. A comparison of the ideas 
from each of the periods of Sartre’s oeuvre will enable us to draw 
some general conclusions about Sartre’s thought on these topics. 
This comparison will follow the bipartite structure of the chapters, 
which means we will first compare our findings on the themes of 
subjectivity, objectivity and negativity, and then do the same for the 
three types of selfhood that have been discussed. In a subsequent 
section, we will use our findings to shed light on the criticism of 
Sartre’s philosophy from within the continental tradition and his 
reception within analytic philosophy. This will be followed by a more 
general conclusion on subjectivity and selfhood.
1. Findings
As was made clear in the introductory chapter, the division of 
Sartre’s oeuvre into three periods mainly served as a heuristic device. 
There are no hard breaks in his thought, only developments. Our 
aim in the following comparisons is to make these evolutions in his 
thinking explicit, which will entail focusing on both those aspects 
that remain the same and those aspects that change.
Subjectivity, objectivity and negativity
Concerning the theme of subjectivity, the central notions for the 
three successive periods of Sartre’s oeuvre are intentionality, the for-
itself and praxis, respectively. The first two notions certainly overlap, 
as the for-itself is articulated as the ontological mode of Being 
of intentional consciousness. The third notion, praxis, is oriented 
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towards a more practical understanding of what it means to engage 
with the world. This, however, shows how all these notions are 
related to one another: all claim that subjectivity is in its most basic 
form a relation with things in the world. There is not first a Subject 
which subsequently enters into a relationship with an object, rather 
subjectivity is itself this relation. For the notion of intentionality, as 
Sartre develops it in his early period, this almost goes without saying. 
“All consciousness is consciousness of something” is his motto, 
and this captures exactly the fact that consciousness should not be 
understood as some kind of container. To understand it in such a 
way would be to commit to the digestive philosophy of immanence 
that Sartre argues against so fiercely. Things are not exhausted by 
intentionality, however, as they cannot be reduced to our relation to 
them. They are superfluous, perpetually overflowing the experiences 
we have of them. This means that they can always show themselves 
in different ways and that everything outside of us is an object. 
There is no essential difference between the kinds of real things that 
appear to us. Sartre so vividly captures this when he says that there 
is no difference between a park, a tree, a branch or a movement of 
a branch: all of them are equally things. The only real dichotomy of 
objects is that between real and non-real objects, between things and 
no-things. Sartre’s project of ejecting all contents from consciousness 
leads him to argue that not even “nothing” can reside there. Hence, 
he even argues that imaginary objects transcend consciousness. 
A lot of these ideas resurface in the two later periods. In the middle 
period, the for-itself is also understood as a relation to an in-itself. 
The basic scheme of subjectivity being a relation to an object which 
it can never fully exhaust is retained. Also, the role of negativity 
becomes even more prominent than it was in the early works. Sartre 
had argued in the early works that non-real objects are negations of 
the world in general and actively need to be posited by a consciousness 
in order to appear. The idea of nothingness being transcendent to 
consciousness is surpassed in the notion of negatitities, which are 
also non-existent objects, but ones that can be encountered in specific 
places in the world. These negatities are still dependent on the for-
itself, however, and they are grounded in the fact that the for-itself 
contains within itself its own nothingness. Thereby, Sartre not only 
expands his conception of nothingness on the side of objects, but 
also on the side of subjectivity. The for-itself is what it is not and is 
not what it is, it is presence to itself but does not coincide with itself. 
This fundamental indeterminateness is also what makes it radically 
free. While freedom did not play a big role in the early works, it now 
takes centre stage. The world gets its meaning only in light of the 
free projects of subjectivity, and, in concrete situations, it becomes 
impossible to disentangle the “intrinsic” properties of objects from 
the ones they gain because of the meaning we project on them. Thus, 
the middle period of Sartre’s work can be seen to retain the basic 
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scheme of the early works, but to expand the role of negativity and 
thereby articulate that radical freedom which is such a notorious 
part of Sartre’s existentialism.
The last period of Sartre’s work places a much greater emphasis on 
the force things exert on us. The main characterization of subjectivity, 
praxis, is still a relation we have to the things around us, but this 
pure practical relation only exists at an abstract level. Our actions 
crystallize in matter and become the practico-inert, which, as we 
have seen, is the field of reality in which the objects first given shape 
by human praxis turn on humans and exert power over them. In the 
practico-inert field, objects act by instrumentalizing human beings 
in order to manipulate other objects. Although human freedom 
seems completely diminished in the practico-inert field, it can be 
regained at the level of the group. It might seem that the individual 
human is in thrall to the practico-inert, but this is because the 
description of reality is still abstract. In reality, human beings are 
part of groups with different levels of agency. We have discussed 
at length Sartre’s stadial account of group formations, from the 
maximal freedom made possible by the group-in-fusion stage to 
the inertia that approximates the practico-inert that arises at the 
stage of the institution. The last period, put briefly, sees an increase 
in the power of things and a decrease in individual freedom. The 
basic understanding of subjectivity as a relation towards things is 
nevertheless retained, and the freedom denied at the level of the 
individual is largely regained at the level of the group, albeit never 
in the radical sense that Sartre claimed for it in the previous period.
Subjective, objective, and narrative selfhood
The topic of subjective selfhood is also driven by Sartre’s project 
of banishing all contents from consciousness. As the title of his 
quintessential book on this topic, The Transcendence of the Ego, 
suggests, he aims to show that the idea of a transcendental Self that 
inhabits consciousness, and therewith unifies and individuates it, is 
unnecessary. Instead, the stream unifies itself through a process of 
inner time-consciousness. We have explained this process by using 
the metaphor of a chain that consists of multiple interlocking links, 
where no single link connects all of them. Not only is the assumption 
of a Self within consciousness philosophically unnecessary, it is also 
phenomenologically unsound. By utilizing examples of someone 
being absorbed in activities, Sartre shows that consciousness is at its 
most basic level impersonal. This leads to a critique of the cogito, in 
which the “I” of the “I think” is dropped so that it becomes nothing 
more than the activity of thinking.
This idea of impersonal consciousness is not retained by Sartre in 
Being and Nothingness. Although he retains the idea that there is no 
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inhabitant of consciousness, his new conception of consciousness is 
not devoid of selfhood. It is characterized by what Sartre calls ipseity. 
The notion of ipseity denotes the fact that consciousness entails the 
experience of possibilities and that it thereby links its present Self 
to its future Self. The process in which the Self projects itself into 
the future is what Sartre calls the “circuit of ipseity”. It is not a thing 
that resides within consciousness that renders it personal, but this 
process of association with one’s future Self. Sartre also says that 
ipseity is what makes reflection possible, and it thereby fills a gap in 
the theory of The Transcendence of the Ego. This gap occurs because 
earlier account does not explain why my own Self is more intimate 
to me than that of others. My past experiences occurred in a field of 
possibilities created by my projects and may still affect my present 
possibilities. Although Sartre does not emphasize this dimension in 
Being and Nothingness, the dimension of ipseity does not only link 
my present to my future, but also my present to my past.
Sartre also revises his critique of the Cartesian cogito. Without the 
idea of impersonal consciousness, the force of his earlier criticism 
seems to be jeopardized. In his middle period, Sartre introduces the 
notion of a prereflective cogito, which is the idea that all conscious 
experiences are also conscious of themselves and hence transparent 
through and through. As we have seen, however, this idea is defended 
in his early works in connection with the looming infinite regress of 
self-consciousness. Hence, the prereflective cogito does not imply 
a break with his earlier theories of Self-consciousness, though it 
does imply a shift in emphasis. We have aimed to show that Sartre’s 
turn towards the cogito is rooted in his methodology, which seeks 
to emulate the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito. Sartre’s aim is to 
build an ontological system founded on transphenomenal grounds. 
The prereflective cogito is such a ground and thereby has a similar 
status to Descartes’ cogito, namely that of a “first truth”. For Sartre 
however, there is more than one of these absolute grounds, and this 
subjective one is supplemented by its objective counterpart: being-
in-itself. 
Sartre’s last period introduces the notion of lived experience. 
Although it is meant to replace consciousness as the focal point 
for the theory of subjectivity, we have discussed it in the context of 
subjective selfhood for various reasons. This is chiefly because it is 
closely tied to the process of interiorization over time and thereby has 
to do with the unity and individuality of a person over time. Lived 
experience is characterized by what Sartre calls “forgetfulness”. This 
denotes the fact that we experience the world in a certain manner, 
influenced our upbringing and socio-historical context, but are not 
aware of how this background influences our experience. Hence, 
our experience is not transparent to the degree that it is in Being 
and Nothingness. This should not be understood as a return to the 
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impersonal consciousness of The Transcendence of the Ego, however. 
Not only does Sartre retain the idea that all consciousness is self-
consciousness, he also, more importantly, retains the idea of ipseity, 
focusing again on the possibilities we perceive. It seems that the 
notion of lived experience is primarily intended to mark a departure 
from the idea of the fundamental project in Being and Nothingness. 
All our actions during a certain period in our life are grounded in 
such a project and this project is known by us. Sartre’s notion of 
lived experience departs from this, with it he claims that the way we 
perceive the world is not only governed by our freely chosen projects, 
but also by our background. We are not always aware of the way 
our social environment influences how we perceive the world, which 
was made clear by our extensive explication of Sartre’s illuminating 
example of the anti-Semite. 
What remains constant in Sartre’s thought concerning subjective 
identity is that there is never a Self inside of consciousness or, if 
you will, inside our experience Subjectivity is united through the 
temporal process”—i.e. that time itself is the process of unification. 
It is never in need of something inside of it to guarantee this unity. 
This does not mean, however, that there is no objective Self. When 
we reflect on ourselves, we do encounter an object which we may 
call our Self. This Self is, however, always transcendent and never 
immanent to consciousness. 
In the early works, more specifically The Transcendence of the Ego, 
Sartre defends the idea that this objective Self is something that 
appears in hindsight through reflection. Although our consciousness 
is impersonal in the present, reflection reveals a Self that appears 
to lie behind our actions. Although it is nothing but the virtual 
centre of unity of our reflected experiences, it is still a real object. As 
such, we have no fundamentally different relationship to it than we 
have to the Self of other people, as we may also reflect upon their 
experiences. 
Sartre deviates significantly from this view in Being and Nothingness. 
Here, the objective Self is not so much associated with our past 
experience as with our future possibilities. As we have already 
reiterated above, in the process of the circuit of ipseity we recognize 
our possibilities as our own, and they are thereby have a dimension 
of “selfness”. On the horizon of all these future moments is an ideal 
Self the Self we project as the ultimate result of our choices. This Self 
is not revealed to us in reflection per se, but is implicitly posited in all 
our choices. This is an ideal, however, which means it is in principle 
unattainable. Just as the Self of The Transcendence of the Ego is the 
transcendent pole of reflected experiences, the Self of the middle 
works is the transcendent pole of possibilities. There is an essential 
difference between these two: whereas reflected experiences concern 
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events that have happened, possibilities are events that have not yet 
happened. Hence, the Self is more closely tied to nothingness than 
it is to Being. It is not a merely abstract being, one could call it a 
fundamental not yet. Although Sartre’s position switches from a real 
objective Self to an unreal objective Self, the fact that we continually 
act as if the Self were a thing is the subject of much more discussion 
Being and Nothingness than the ideal Self is. In bad faith, we act as 
if the Self were a thing, but this attitude belies the kind of beings 
we really are. Bad faith is also closely related to the fact that we 
appear as an object in the eyes of the Other. In the eyes of another 
subjectivity an image is formed about what we are. The word image 
can be regarded misleading in this context, as our being-for-the-
Other is far from imaginary. Rather, the fact that we can appear as 
an object in the eyes of others is a real dimension of our Being and 
truly affects us. We too can take the perspective of the Other and 
turn this gaze towards ourselves, but to think that this is all we are 
would be symptomatic of bad faith. Hence, where Sartre argued that 
the relationship we have towards our own Self is not different than 
the one we have towards other Selves in the early works, he now 
argues that there is a fundamental difference: the Other appears as 
an object to me, or I appear as an object to the Other. My own 
ideal, unattainable Self is inaccessible to the Other, as they cannot 
experience the possibilities that appear in my circuit of ipseity, which 
only appear in light of my projected ends.
With regard to objective selfhood, the last period of Sartre’s work 
can be considered a return to the early period, albeit one that 
incorporates many of the insights of the middle period. The most 
important idea that Sartre returns to is that the Self is indeed a kind 
of thing. Explicitly referring to The Transcendence of the Ego multiple 
times throughout this period, he returns to the position that holds 
the Self to be a (quasi-)object that is revealed through reflection. 
The Self of the middle period also makes a return in his account of 
the process of personalization, but in the later period this has to do 
with a description of someone from an external point of view and 
is not something that plays a role in how we see our own lives. He 
also retains the idea of ipseity, which is closely tied to praxis: in order 
to act in a meaningful way, we have to recognize our possibilities as 
our possibilities. This also changes the role of the Other in selfhood: 
reflection is not simply something we do, it is a learned behaviour. We 
learn to form a certain image of ourselves, although this image may 
change when our circumstances change. Thus, although the image 
Other people have of us is detrimental for our self-understanding, 
we are still more closely tied to our own Selves than to that of others 
because the objective Self is tied to our circuit of ipseity. These 
points are further emphasized in Sartre’s examination of Flaubert, 
whose process of personalization is viewed as having been far from 
ordinary, but which nonetheless reveals what an ordinary process 
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would look like. Flaubert found it impossible to regard his Self as an 
actual thing, and he therefore fled into the imaginary. This process 
of derealization serves as the counterpart of bad faith: Sartre argued 
in Being and Nothingness that the Self is an unattainable ideal and 
hence a form of nothingness. We flee from this fact by acting as 
if the Self is a thing, and this is precisely bad faith. Derealization 
is premised on Sartre’s later conception of the Self as a real thing, 
but that certain individuals, such as Flaubert, flee from this fact by 
acting like it is imaginary, and hence a “nothingness”. 
The last dimension of selfhood that needs to be discussed is 
narrativity. Our objective Self gives us a bearing on who we are at a 
certain moment in time and accounts for the permanent aspects of 
our selfhood. The narrative dimension adds a more dynamic aspect, 
which takes the form of a life story. How did we become the person 
we are today? In the first period, Sartre’s thought concerning this 
topic is mostly revealed in Nausea through the idea that there is 
no such thing as an adventure. An adventure is characterized as an 
episode of life in which all events intrinsically lead to a certain goal. 
Although it is definitely possible to have the feeling of being on an 
adventure, a feeling that life is leading you towards such a goal, this 
is rooted in an illusion. Because we continually tell stories about 
our lives from a retrospective perspective, we project the plot-driven 
nature of storytelling onto our lives. However, this structure can only 
be applied in hindsight, when the end of the story is already known. 
Hence, narrative identity is misleading because a life lived and a life 
recounted do not have the same structure. When we live our lives as 
if a story was unfolding, we entertain a false teleological belief. Sartre 
expands on this notion in the War Diaries when he talks about the 
biographical illusion, which is a notion similar to that of adventure, 
but refers not to episodes in a life but to one’s life story as a whole. 
We cannot live our life as if it were a biography, which can only be 
written after the fact.
Although narrative identity is not as explicit a theme in the middle 
period of Sartre’s work as it is in the early works, we have identified 
Sartre’s thoughts concerning existential psychoanalysis as also 
involving a theory of narrative identity. This is mainly due to the 
fact that Sartre introduces it as a method that could be used to 
write biographies. The ideas concerning narrative selfhood from this 
period are problematic, however, mainly due to the fact that Sartre’s 
presentation of the theory in Being and Nothingness differs greatly 
from the actual use he would make of it in the biographies he went on 
to write later in this period. The main idea that guides the theory of 
existential psychoanalysis is that our fundamental projects are rooted 
in an original project which stays the same throughout the course 
of our lives. As we have discussed, our choices within a given period 
of our lives fit together to constitute a fundamental project, which 
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means that they are not gratuitous but coherent. This fundamental 
project itself is not chosen at a specific moment, but is the way our 
choices fit together. While we can only live a single fundamental 
project at a time, this project may change during the course of our 
lives. Sartre’s description of how fundamental projects change into 
one another is close to his description of adventure in Nausea. They 
have definite beginnings and endings, and one could say that every 
choice within the fundamental project gains its significance in light 
of the end of the project. However, there are at least three important 
differences with the theory of adventure described in Nausea. 
First of all, it is not explicitly stated by Sartre that the goal of the 
project must be attained, for it could also be abandoned in light of 
changing circumstances. Second, fundamental projects are always 
freely chosen, which is a claim he never makes about adventures. 
The illusion of adventure can come upon us, regardless of whether 
we choose to or not. Third, it is unclear whether we explicitly know 
the beginning and endings of our fundamental projects, and, hence, 
whether they are experienced as perfect moments, or whether it is 
only in hindsight that such moments are judged to be the end of one 
and the beginning of another fundamental project. Sartre does not go 
into too much detail concerning how exactly fundamental projects 
change, and, for that reason, we cannot adequately clarify this aspect 
of his account. What is clear, however, is that although we can have 
different fundamental projects in our lives, they are always variations 
of an even more fundamental project: the original project or choice. 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre is very clear about the fact that we 
can only know these projects in hindsight. Still, they do not seem to 
be projected onto the past as adventures are, but are rather uncovered 
as the “true” structure of events that have happened. Furthermore, 
we do not have privileged access to our own original project, but 
always approach it as if it were that of someone else. In Being and 
Nothingness, the original project relates to fundamental projects the 
same way that fundamental projects relate to ordinary projects. This 
means that they do not reflect a deliberate choice made at a definite 
moment but are nothing but the way our choices fit together over 
our lifetime. This is itself quite problematic. If our fundamental 
choices are nothing but the way our choices fit together, then what 
is the philosophical value of the notion of an original project? It 
does not seem that we can give a definite answer to this question 
based on the theory provided in Being and Nothingness. In the 
biographies of Baudelaire and Genet, the meaning of the notion 
shifts. In both cases the original choice refers to a specific moment 
in their respective childhoods. Fundamental projects then become 
periods in which a specific way in which the original choice is lived 
can be identified. It seems one cannot but see this idea as a kind of 
determinism of choice, where the original choice determines all the 
subsequent choices in a certain sense. Sartre even equates the notion 
with destiny, thus invoking a certain fatalism. We should keep in 
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mind, however, that although our choices may be determined by our 
original choice, we do not know what this choice is. In any case, a life 
is lived freely, and, therefore, the fundamental distinction between a 
life lived and life recounted is retained. 
The later period of Sartre’s oeuvre sees the return of the notion of 
adventure, although Sartre adopts a radically different stance towards 
it. The force of circumstances greatly diminishes the freedom of the 
individual. Sartre’s theory of radical freedom has been replaced by 
one he calls predestination. Our social circumstances determine the 
scope of our possibilities to such an extent that we cannot but say that 
our destinies are determined in advance. Yet, this does not mean that 
Sartre promotes a crude determinism that reduces our experience of 
freedom into a mere epiphenomenon and hence an illusion. Instead, 
while there are historical circumstances that determine our actions, 
these circumstances only acquire the meaning that they have because 
of the actions of individuals who experience those actions as free. 
Sartre illustrates this by turning to the practice of historiography, 
which provides a thematic link with narrative identity. From the 
point of view of the historian, all our choices are determined by 
our circumstances. Hence, we seem to be able to tell a life story 
without any appeal to human freedom. This would not do any justice 
to the meaning of History, however, because if we are to understand 
historical events properly, then we have to understand things that 
did not happen. The main aspect of this that Sartre highlights is 
historical failure, an example of which is an army failing to win a 
battle. This involves a subjective individual projecting a certain 
goal onto the world and not attaining the goal. A more positive 
description of history that ignores the subjective point of view could 
not account for this, as it could not account for nothingness. The 
same logic can be applied to life stories: one could think of Flaubert 
as someone who failed at being an ordinary bourgeois son. In short, 
although the possibilities are determined by our circumstances, these 
circumstances still get their meaning from our projected choices. 
While the idea that freedom is greatly diminished is a definitive 
break with the period that precedes this, the idea that meaning 
arises comes from our projects shows significant continuity. In Being 
and Nothingness Sartre also defended the idea that obstacles are only 
obstacles in light of our free projects. Yet, there he also defended the 
idea that we can always relate to our circumstances and are always 
free. Now, our choices are to a significant extent predetermined in 
advance, but we still have to experience them as free in order for 
this predestination to be possible. In other words, if we understand 
History in hindsight, we live our lives as a destiny, but when we 
make History, we live our lives as an adventure. Sartre’s later use of 
this notion differs slightly from its earlier deployment because, in his 
later work, events do not automatically lead to their goal, but instead 
greatly depend on our choices to do so. An adventure is still a series 
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of events that are meaningful with regard to one another, but they 
only have this meaning by being lived by a person.
Thus, to sum up, Sartre’s thought concerning narrative identity 
greatly shifts throughout his work. In the first period, he argues that 
our practice of telling stories about our life is misleading and gives 
us the false idea that life is directed towards goals as if it were a plot-
driven story. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre’s view becomes more 
nuanced: it is now said that we can identify life-stories retroactively 
through the idea of an original choice that binds all our choices 
together. The later works go a step further, seeing our whole life as 
predestined to turn out in a certain way. This does not mean, however, 
that we know our own destiny. Hence, Sartre’s thinking undergoes 
a complete reversal, shifting from the idea that life does not have a 
fixed narrative structure and only seems to have one after the fact, 
to the claim that, though it seems like we are free to “create our 
own story”, we are in truth predestined to play out a plot prescribed 
by History. What remains constant throughout all three periods, 
however, is the idea that a life lived and life recounted differ greatly. 
2. Sartre’s Criticism and Positive Reception Revisited 
Now that we have finished our investigation into Sartre’s philosophy 
and presented our findings, it is time to turn to the criticism and 
positive reception of his position that were discussed in the 
introduction. We will not discuss each critic individually but will 
instead focus on the major arguments made against Sartre. It is 
important to note, at the outset, that Sartre did heed some of his 
critics. For example, many of his critics argued that he failed to 
take History into account in Being and Nothingness, and this theme 
then becomes central to his arguments in the Critique. Hence, one 
could argue that such criticism led Sartre to revise, expand upon 
or sharpen his earlier ideas in the later period. We have also seen 
that the much-criticized humanism of Existentialism is a Humanism 
is only a very minor part of Sartre’s philosophy and by no means 
reflects his thought in general.
We have not focused on the historical development of Sartre’s 
philosophy, and thus we will only examine how his ideas in general 
relate to the criticism in general. As we have seen, most of the 
criticism he received centres around the idea that Sartre grants too 
big a role to subjectivity. As we have seen, this is true to a certain 
extent, but he nonetheless uses his own account of subjectivity to 
argue against a more tradition view of subjectivity – a view his critics 
seem to think he endorses.
Let us begin with the charge of idealism. Sartre never defends any 
form of epistemological or ontological idealism. At the core of his 
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account of intentionality is the idea that it puts us in contact with the 
real world. Sartre’s philosophy is thoroughly realist, in the sense that 
the things we experience exist independently from our experience 
of them. It is only their meaning that we contribute, whether it is 
the meaning given through projects in Being and Nothingness or 
the crystalized praxis of the practico-inert in the Critique. These 
meanings, however, are always ascribed to real things. The only kind 
of idealism Sartre can be accused of is the tendency to replace an 
analysis of concrete and complex situations with abstract idealized 
concepts. This is true to a certain extent of Being and Nothingness, as 
Sartre himself would later acknowledge. It has to be said, however, 
that the phenomenological analyses presented in the work do focus 
on concrete situations. Nevertheless, the conclusion he draws from 
these analyses are abstract due to their place within the broader 
ontological project of the work. This also relates to the criticism Sartre 
received for his radical notion of freedom, which he subsequently 
revised in his later works. 
The Cartesian nature of Sartre’s philosophy is much more intricate. 
Although he gives a clear argument against Descartes’ account 
of the cogito in his early works, his turn towards his own version 
of the cogito in Being and Nothingness is problematic. The notion 
of the prereflective cogito bears some structural resemblances to 
Descartes’ thinking substance. Both are rooted in the idea that self-
consciousness is the cornerstone of subjectivity. Nevertheless, for 
Sartre this cogito is merely functional, it describes how consciousness 
works. He never adopts the res cogitans as a thing that thinks, for 
this would undermine his relational account of subjectivity. Indeed, 
as we have discussed, he criticizes Descartes for this very move 
throughout Being and Nothingness. We have argued that despite 
his own criticism of Descartes, Sartre is drawn to a version of 
the cogito because it affords his system an apodictic basis. Just as 
Descartes bases his ontological position on the indubitability of the 
cogito, Sartre grounds his ontology on the transphenomenality of 
prereflective self-consciousness. 
This brings us to the criticism that Sartre is too metaphysical, which 
is most prominently articulated by Heidegger and Derrida. It is true 
that Sartre is concerned with a metaphysical quest for a unifying 
reason or ground. In contrast to most classical metaphysical positions, 
however, he never clearly identifies a singular ground. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre’s quest for the Being of the phenomenon leads 
him to identify two grounds that are irreducible to each other: 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself. It could be argued that later in 
the book he adds a third one, the being-for-the-Other. In so far as 
he embarks on the quest for a ground, however, he can be seen to 
adhere to a fairly classic metaphysical methodology. In the Critique 
this is not different: Sartre wants to ground dialectical thinking in 
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praxis. He wants to show that the most basic relationship between 
subjectivity and objectivity is dialectal in order to ground dialectical 
thought, thereby granting it apodicticity. In this regard, the Critique 
is just as Cartesian as Being and Nothingness: Sartre searches for an 
“indubitable” ground for his theories which he finds in something 
related to subjectivity. However, just as Sartre finds not one but 
multiple grounds in Being and Nothingness, he grounds his later 
system not in subjectivity per se, but in its relational nature, in the way 
it acts upon matter. Thus, although Sartre may adopt a traditional 
methodology, the outcome is not so traditional, as there is never just 
one ground. 
This, in turn, sheds an interesting light on the more recent criticism of 
Sartre from the speculative realists. As was noted in the introductory 
chapter, they regard their philosophy to be a return to a more 
traditional way of doing metaphysics – Harman calls it a ‘guerrilla 
metaphysics’ because of the general hostility to metaphysics in the 
current philosophical climate (Harman 2005, 1). Although their 
approach is in many regards very different to that of Sartre, the very 
fact that they are both proponents of systematic metaphysics shows 
that they may have more in common than is often presumed. For 
example, both Harman and Sartre root their respective accounts 
of objects in a criticism of Heidegger’s analysis of tools (Harman 
2002, IPB 70). We would stray too much off topic if we got into 
the details here. 594 It suffices to say that the way in which Sartre’s 
philosophy can both be considered a traditional metaphysics as well 
as a conception of metaphysics that is ahead of its time.
Sartre’s methodology is also significant in light of both the critiques 
of his position offered by subsequent generations of French 
philosophers and the claims of the “New Sartre”-school, who argue 
that Sartre is closer to these later thinkers than is often assumed. 
While his critics vehemently attacked the role of subjectivity in 
his work, defenders of the “New Sartre” claim that his account of 
subjectivity actually decentres the subject. Fox argued that there are 
two sides to Sartre, one that corresponds to the picture painted by 
his critics, and one that reveals Sartre’s philosophy to be closer to his 
post-structuralist adversaries. Our investigation allows us to see how 
these two sides are present in Sartre’s philosophy. Methodologically 
Sartre is very much a traditional philosopher of the subject who 
takes subjectivity as the starting point for his inquiry. The outcome of 
his method is less traditional, however, and goes against traditional 
accounts of the Subject. For this very reason, it is possible to object to 
Sartre’s subjective methodology while still adhering to the criticism 
of the Subject that results from this method. 
594  For a further comparison between Sartre and Harman, see: (Kleinherenbrink & 
Gusman 2018).
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The recent analytic reception of Sartre approaches Sartre in the 
opposite way: Sartre’s subjective methodology is appreciated while 
his critical approach towards traditional accounts of the Subject is 
seemingly ignored. These respective tendencies are most apparent in 
the work of Zahavi and in his notion of the experiential Self. The 
experiential Self is rooted in the consciousness (of ) self as Sartre 
defends it in Being and Nothingness. However, as we have seen, one 
of the most important themes in Sartre’s philosophy of selfhood is 
the idea that there is no Self in consciousness. If one isolates Sartre’s 
account of subjective selfhood from his accounts of objective and 
narrative selfhood, then one risks using notions from Sartre’s work 
in a way that contradicts the more general spirit of his work. If one 
takes ideas from Sartre that are meant to show that consciousness 
does not need a subjective Self and identifies them with an account 
of the (experiential) Self, one undermines the reason these ideas 
were developed in the first place. Again, our current focus does not 
allow us to delve too much into the details of this issue. It suffices 
to say that in the reception of Sartre in recent analytic philosophy 
of mind, only his account of subjective selfhood is used, while his 
accounts of objective and narrative selfhood are not. If these were 
taken into account, then Sartre’s philosophy would seem much closer 
to those philosophers associated with critique of subjectivity. The 
most prominent example of this is perhaps Ryle, with whom Sartre 
has been compared by some (Ricoeur 1981, Gusman 2016). In the 
philosophy of both Sartre and Ryle, the idea that subjectivity is not 
a place or a container of mental contents plays a prominent role. 
Other examples of thinkers in this category with whom Sartre has 
been compared include Wittgenstein (Wider 1991) and Dennett 
(Gusman 2015, 11).
3. Subjectivity and selfhood: a general conclusion
The preceding discussion of the development of Sartre’s ideas over 
the course of his career and of the criticisms these ideas faced allows 
us to see what the underlying tendencies of his philosophy are. As we 
proposed in the introduction, one might say that Sartre is a thinker 
of subjectivity who argues against traditional notions of the Subject 
“from the inside out”. 
Methodologically, Sartre always gives subjectivity centre stage. In 
the first two periods, this stems from his use of a phenomenological 
methodology. He makes use of descriptions of subjective experiences 
in order to show that it is not what philosophers have often thought 
it to be. The central idea in this regard is that subjectivity is neither a 
thing nor a place, it is nothing but a relation towards an object. Hence, 
it is not something that exists in isolation and then subsequently 
makes contact with something else. In the last period of his work, 
Sartre’s approach is less focused on subjectivity than it was before, 
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but he still thinks that one cannot think the regressive without the 
progressive, or, in other words, that one needs to take the subjective 
point of view into account in order to give a full account of reality. 
Moreover, the central argument in the Critique takes praxis as its 
starting point, a notion which he regards as the fundamental relation 
between the subjective and objective. In all these cases, Sartre starts 
from the point of view of subjectivity only to immediately break out 
of subjectivity, to show just how minimal it is and how it can only 
exist in relation to the things around it – whether this is as an empty 
intentional consciousness or as a practical relationship to matter. 
Sartre’s minimal account of subjectivity is intrinsically tied to his 
account of selfhood. The Self, as that which gives the subjective 
entity its unity and individuality, can no longer reside “inside” of 
consciousness. Hence, Sartre continually argues against the idea that 
the Self is an inhabitant of consciousness. This means that the Self 
must exist outside of consciousness. We have taken the following 
idea as our guiding thread: the Self is a thing among things. Not a 
res cogitans, a subjective thing, but a genuine object, existing in the 
world of objects. Although the exact nature of how Sartre sees this 
object changes throughout his work, the main idea of the Self as 
something transcendent rather than immanent is always defended. 
The thing-like nature of the Self also changes how we must think 
about it. The Self can no longer be conceived of as an unchanging 
thinking substance or an eternal soul. Instead, like other things in 
the world, it is subject to change, it is dubitable and it is resilient. 
This means that we may also have an effect on these changes 
ourselves. The existentialist motto “existence precedes essence” can be 
interpreted to mean just that: first there is the process of subjectivity 
and subsequently our Self is created. In the middle period, especially, 
Sartre does seem to uphold the autonomy ascribed to the traditional 
Subject. On the one hand, the radical conception of freedom that he 
defends in the middle period is highly problematic from a social and 
political perspective. On the other hand, however, we must stress 
that although he argues that we are free, this notion of freedom is not 
rooted in an autonomous Subject, it rather describes how subjectivity 
relates to the world as a process. We should also keep in mind that 
although Sartre is most famous for his work from this period, it 
represents a relatively small part of his oeuvre as a whole. In the last 
period of his work, Sartre provides a much more grounded theory 
of freedom, which avoids succumbing to a reductive determinism. 
Such a theory is still very much in line with his overall project of 
balancing subjectivity and objectivity.
The narrative dimension of Sartre’s theories of selfhood is an 
important reason that his philosophy should not be regarded as 
written off. As was noted in the introduction, the idea of narrative 
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selfhood is widespread amongst contemporary philosophers in 
many different fields and a serious contender for the title of a new 
“official doctrine” of selfhood. This dimension of Sartre’s thought is 
often understated, though it is all the more interesting in light of 
current debates.
Thus, if we were to put Sartre’s thought concerning subjectivity and 
selfhood in a nutshell, we could say that it dethrones the traditional 
account of the Subject, where it is seen as something isolated, unitary 
and autonomous, from the point of view of subjectivity itself. Much 
of the criticism and appreciation of Sartre is rooted in the dual 
nature of his philosophy: a philosophy which is grounded in human 
subjectivity and which is often methodologically rigid, on the one 
hand, but which also shows that the Self of a subjective entity is 
not in any way immanent to subjectivity, but transcends it and is 
part of the world of objects, on the other. Sartre’s philosophy lets 
subjectivity dethrone itself – and its Self. Hence, to come full circle 
and end where we began: 
We are delivered from […] the “internal life”: in vain 
would we seek the caresses and fondlings of our intimate 
selves, […] like a child who kisses his own shoulder, since 
everything is finally outside, everything, even ourselves. 
Outside, in the world, among others. It is not in some 
hiding-place that we will discover ourselves; it is on the 
road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a thing 
among things, a human among humans (I 5)595.
595  ‘Nous voilà délivrés de […] la « vie intérieure » : en vain chercherions-nous, 
[…] comme une enfant qui s’embrasse l’épaule, les caresses, les dorlotements de 
notre intimité, puisque tout est dehors, tout, jusqu’à nous-mêmes : dehors, dans le 
monde, parmi les autres. Ce n’est pas dans je ne sais quelle retraite que nous nous 
découvrirons : c’est sur la route, dans la ville, au milieu de la foule, chose parmi les 
choses, homme parmi les hommes’ (IF 89).
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Summary  
 
(in Dutch)
De Franse filosoof Jean-Paul Sartre geldt als één van de beroemdste 
en tegelijkertijd één van de meest bekritiseerde uit de 20ste eeuw. 
Buiten academisch filosofische kringen was hij vooral bekend 
vanwege zijn literaire werk en sociale engagement. Onder filosofen 
is de perceptie van zijn filosofie bijna uitsluitend negatief geweest. 
Vooral de grote rol die in zijn gedachtegoed is weggelegd voor 
menselijke subjectiviteit geldt als een steen des aanstoots voor 
andere filosofen in de continentale traditie. De algemene tendens in 
het denken van Sartres critici is dat juist het centraal stellen van de 
menselijke subjectiviteit gedateerd is en dat we eerder moeten kijken 
hoe de mens tot stand komt dan denken vanuit de mens zelf.
In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat in Sartres gedachtegoed juist deze 
twee vragen samenkomen. Hij probeert de vraag hoe de mens tot 
stand komt, juist te bekijken vanuit de menselijke ervaring zelf.
Die menselijke ervaring is gegrond in subjectiviteit die bestaat ten 
opzichte van objectiviteit. De wereld bestaat grotendeels uit dingen 
die los van onze ervaring ervan bestaan. Een steen, koffiekopje of 
vulkaan bestaat, ook als wij er niets mee te maken hebben. In die 
zin hebben ze een bepaalde mate van objectiviteit. Wij zeggen 
bijvoorbeeld dat een journalist objectief is als hij de werkelijkheid 
los van onze standpunten en meningen erover beschrijft . 
Daartegenover staat subjectiviteit. Een subjectief wezen is iemand 
met een perspectief op de objecten. Die objecten krijgen daardoor 
bepaalde betekenissen. Voor ons verschijnt een koffiekopje immers 
niet zomaar, maar met bepaalde betekenissen. Het is bijvoorbeeld 
het kopje dat van mijn oma geweest is, of waar ik net mijn mond 
aan heb verbrand. Dit zijn allemaal eigenschappen die niet louter 
objectief tot het kopje behoren maar tot stand komen in mijn 
subjectieve verhouding tot het kopje.
Deze spanning tussen subjectiviteit enerzijds en objectiviteit 
anderzijds brengt een hoop filosofische problemen met zich mee. 
In het uitdenken van deze relatie ligt het gevaar op de loer dat er 
wordt doorgeschoten naar twee uiterste posities. Eén daarvan is 
het wegcijferen van subjectiviteit. Dit wordt ook wel reductionisme 
genoemd: het reduceren van subjectiviteit tot de objectieve 
werkelijkheid. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is het reduceren van 
260 261
bewustzijn tot hersenactiviteit, zoals de stellingdat liefde een stofje 
in je hersenen is. Hoewel de ervaring van liefde gepaard gaat met 
activiteit in het brein, gaat dit feit compleet voorbij aan hoe het is 
om liefde te ervaren. Een louter objectieve beschrijving kan nooit 
recht doen aan dit soort fenomenen, die bestaan per gratie van de 
subjectieve beleving ervan.
Het tegenovergestelde uiterste is het overdrijven van subjectiviteit. 
Dit onnodig op een voetstuk plaatsen van subjectiviteit wordt 
wel Cartesianisme genoemd, naar de 17de-eeuwse filosoof René 
Descartes. Hij was op zoek naar een fundament voor kennis en 
stelde dat je overal aan kunt twijfelen behalve aan het twijfelen zelf. 
Aangezien twijfelen een soort van denken is, moet het denken zelf 
wel bestaan. ‘Ik denk, dus ik ben’ concludeerde hij. Zo maakte hij van 
het menselijke subject een denkend ding, dat het fundament is van 
alle kennis en los bestaat van de betwijfelbare dingen in de wereld. 
De brug tussen subjectiviteit en objectiviteit wordt daardoor bijna 
onoverbrugbaar en de mens wordt losgezongen van haar objectieve 
omstandigheden. Daardoor wordt het moeilijk om de invloed van 
deze omstandigheden op de mens te denken, en te spreken van een 
gedeelde objectieve wereld. Verder doorgevoerde varianten van dit 
subjectiviteitsdenken stellen zelfs dat er niets is buiten de menselijke 
ervaring.
Hieraan gerelateerd is het tweede thema van deze dissertatie, dat van 
het Zelf. Als we de menselijke subjectiviteit niet willen denken als 
een soort van denkend ding, dan moeten we op een andere manier 
recht doen aan de continuiteit, eenheid en individiualiteit van de 
subjectiviteit. Wat maakt een subjectief perspectief hetzelfde door 
de tijd heen? Waarin verschilt de subjectiviteit van de een van dat 
van de ander? Dit soort vragen komen neer op de vraag naar wat een 
persoon zichzelf maakt, oftewel naar wat het Zelf is. 
Ook het Zelf heeft een subjectieve en objectieve kant. De subjectieve 
kant van het Zelf ligt vooral in hoe wij onszelf ervaren. We ervaren 
op zekere hoogte dat we dezelfde persoon zijn door de tijd heen en 
de betekenissen die wij in de wereld om ons heen ervaren hangen 
samen met wie we zelf zijn door de tijd heen. Het koffiekopje kan 
bijvoorbeeld enkel ervaren worden als dat van mijn oma als ik een 
herinnering aan haar heb en het idee heb dat ik dezelfde persoon ben 
op het moment dat ik het koffiekopje kreeg. Kortom, het subjectieve 
Zelf gaat uit vanhet idee dat ik het ben die mijn subjectieve ervaring 
ervaart en mijn handelingen verricht.
Het objectieve Zelf daarentegen heeft niet zo zeer te maken met 
hoe wij onszelf ervaren, maar veeleer met de eigenschappen die wij 
aan onszelf en anderen toeschrijven als ware het een object. Ik ben op 
een bepaalde plek geboren, heb een bepaalde lengte, dit proefschrift 
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geschreven, et cetera. Al deze eigenschappen kunnen aan mij worden 
toegeschreven los van het feit of ik ze ervaar of niet. Ze hebben een 
bepaalde mate van objectiviteit. 
Deze tegenstelling tussen het subjectieve en objectieve Zelf kan 
worden aangevuld met een derde vorm, namelijk narratieve identiteit. 
Dit is een benadering van het vraagstuk die breed gedragen wordt 
door filosofen uit allerlei verschillende hoeken en behelst het idee 
(of veronderstelling) dat ons Zelf te maken heeft met de verhalen 
die wij over onszelf en anderen vertellen. Verhalen staan ergens 
tussen subjectiviteit en objectiviteit in: ze beschrijven in zekere zin 
onze objectieve omstandigheden, maar moeten door een subjectief 
wezen verteld worden. Toch kan een verhaal een eigen leven gaan 
leiden en bestaat het zo in zekere mate los van de vertellers ervan. 
Echter, als er niemand meer is die het verhaal kent en kan vertellen, 
houdthet weer op met bestaan. Kortom, de narratieve dimensie van 
onze identiteit valt tussen subjectiviteit en objectiviteit in.
De thematiek van subjectiviteit en het Zelf is inherent verbonden 
met het werk van Jean-Paul Sartre. Enerzijds is het zo dat hij sterk 
bekritiseerd is door zijn tijdgenoten omdat ze hem verwijten een 
Cartesiaan te zijn die te veel nadruk legt op subjectiviteit. Anderzijds 
blijkt dat vooral zijn denken over subjectiviteit en het subjectieve 
Zelf dat daarmee samenhangt juist de laatste jaren van grote waarde 
blijkt te zijn in debatten in de analytische filosofie. Hierin wordt het 
denken van Sartre en andere fenomenologen juist gebruikt om een 
tegenwicht te bieden aan bepaalde vormen van reductionisme. Zowel 
de kritiek op Sartre als de positieve receptie van zijn gedachtegoed 
vinden dus vooral plaats in discussies rond de thema’s die wij zojuist 
bespraken.
Tegen de achtergrond van deze receptie en door de drie fasen van zijn 
oeuvre heen, heb ik gedetailleerd gekeken naar hoe concepten van 
subjectiviteit en Het Zelf zich ontwikkelen. Ieder hoofdstuk bestaat 
uit twee delen; een deel over de driehoek subjectiviteit, objectiviteit 
en negativiteit en een deel over de driehoek van het subjectieve, 
objectieve en narratieve Zelf. De dimensie van negativiteit is 
specifiek aan het werk van Sartre. Behalve de dingen in de wereld 
en ons perspectief daarop legt hij de nadruk op hetgeen niet is. In 
onze beleving van de wereld spelen dingen die niet bestaan ook een 
cruciale rol. Het gaat daarbij bijvoorbeeld om verzinsels, afwezige 
vrienden en lege ruimtes. Ook kunnen wij onszelf beschouwen in 
termen van wat we niet zijn: zo kunnen we stellen dat we een bepaald 
levensdoel hebben dat we nog niet bereikt hebben, of in zekere zin 
niet meer dezelfde persoon zijn die we vroeger waren. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk gaat over de werken van Sartre tot aan  de 
tweede wereldoorlog. De centrale werken uit deze periode zijn de 
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twee werken over verbeelding, het artikel Het ik is een ding en de 
roman De walging. In deze periode is hij vooral bezig met het idee 
van intentionaliteit. Dit begrip houdt in dat bewustzijn niet zelf iets 
is dat vervolgens in relatie treedt met het object waar het bewust 
van is, maar zelf deze relatie is. Bewustzijn is een verhouding tot 
iets dat buiten het bewustzijn is, maar is zelf niet iets waar bepaalde 
eigenschappen in kunnen zitten. Onze subjectieve beleving wordt 
daar door compleet leeg. Sartre geeft het voorbeeld van iemand 
die een masker eng vindt. Het feit dat het masker aan die persoon 
verschijnt als angstaanjagend is een eigenschap van dat masker, 
en niet iets dat zich louter in ‘het hoofd’ van die persoon afspeelt. 
Dat betekent niet dat het masker aan iedereen als angstaanjagend 
verschijnt, maar dat deze eigenschap in de wisselwerking tussen 
het bewustzijn en het masker tot stand komt als eigenschap van het 
masker. Sartre legt zowel de subjectieve als objectieve eigenschappen 
van de dingen in die dingen zelf.
Dit betekent echter niet dat we de dingen in de wereld volledig 
kunnen reduceren tot hoe we ze ervaren. Als dat zo was, dan zouden 
ze zich juist in ons bewustzijn bevinden. Hoewel alle aspecten van 
een object aan het object toebehoren, toont het volledige object zich 
nooit aan onze ervaring. We kunnen immers altijd nieuwe aspecten 
van een object ontdekken. Als er niets in ons eigen bewustzijn zit, 
dan betekent dit dat deze aspecten in de dingen zelf zitten. Sartre 
noemt de dingen dan ook te veel. Ze zijn op een fundamentele 
manier ‘overtollig’, een onuitputtelijke bron van nieuwe manieren 
waarop ze aan ons kunnen verschijnen en daarmee nooit tot hun 
verschijnen terug te brengen.
Het project van Sartre om het bewustzijn leeg te maken en alle 
eigenschappen van dingen in de wereld onder te brengen wordt 
problematisch als we dingen die niet bestaan in ogenschouw nemen. 
Een wijdverbreide opvatting is dat de dingen die wij ons inbeelden 
‘in ons hoofd bestaan’. Als ik een paard zie, dan bestaat dat paard in 
de wereld buiten mij, maar als ik me vervolgens omdraai en me het 
paard inbeeld, dan ben ik me bewust van een idee in mijn hoofd. 
Tussen die ideeën in mijn hoofd kunnen ook dingen ontstaan die 
helemaal geen evenknie in de werkelijkheid hebben, zoals een centaur. 
Dit beeld strookt niet met Sartres opvatting: als het bewustzijn 
leeg is, kunnen er ook geen mentale beelden in bestaan. Daarom 
komt Sartre met een nieuwe theorie van verbeelding. Hoewel hij 
verschillende eigenschappen van mentale beelden geeft, is één idee 
het belangrijkst in het licht van zijn filosofie als geheel. Het idee dat 
mentale beelden in ons hoofd bestaan doet geen recht aan het feit dat 
de dingen die voorgesteld worden nou juist niet bestaan. Hier zien 
we de dimensie van negativiteit die zo belangrijk is in het denken 
van Sartre. Of ik nou denk aan iets dat op dit moment niet voor me 
is, of iets dat in zijn geheel niet bestaat, het zijn allemaal voorbeelden 
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van niet-zijnden. Mentale beelden zijn dus verhoudingen tot een 
bepaald ‘niets’, dat net als dingen buiten het bewustzijn plaatsvindt. 
Het lege bewustzijn is de hoeksteen van Sartres denken over het Zelf. 
In Het ik is een ding laat hij zien dat aan onze ervaring geen Zelf ten 
grondslag ligt. Dat wil zeggen, onze constante bewustzijnsstroom 
heeft niets nodig om een eenheid te zijn. Het maakt zichzelf tot 
eenheid door de manier waarop het betekenissen vormt door de tijd 
heen. Als ik bijvoorbeeld langs een laan met bomen fiets en deze tel, 
dan verschijnt iedere boom in het licht van de vorige als de volgende 
in de serie. Een boom kan alleen als de derde boom verschijnen in het 
licht van een eerdere ervaring van een tweede boom en wellicht in 
anticipatie op een vierde boom. Zo haken onze ervaringen in elkaar 
door de tijd heen, als ware het schakels van een ketting. Net zoals 
een schakelketting geen overkoepelende draad nodig heeft om een 
eenheid te vormen, heeft ook onze subjectieve bewustzijnsstroom 
geen Zelf nodig dat de eenheid garandeert. Bovendien, zo laat 
Sartre zien, ervaren we helemaal geen Zelf in onze ervaring. Als we 
op gaan in de dingen die we aan het doen zijn, dan zijn we ons alleen 
bewust van de dingen, en niet van onszelf. Dat gebeurt pas als we 
expliciet stil staan op wat we aan het doen zijn, als we reflecteren en 
stellen: ik ben het die dit boek aan het lezen ben, bijvoorbeeld.
Sartre ontkent dus het bestaan van een subjectief Zelf. Het Zelf zoals 
we dat ervaren als we reflecteren is dan ook niets anders dan ons 
objectieve Zelf. Het maakt niet uit of we objectieve eigenschappen 
aan onszelf toeschrijven of subjectieve eigenschappen, het Zelf blijft 
een object dat voor ons bewustzijn verschijnt en zelf geen deel is van 
dat bewustzijn. Als ik bijvoorbeeld reflecteer op het feit dat ik een 
boek aan het lezen ben, dan verschijnt mijn Zelf als ‘degene die aan 
het lezen is’.
Wat betreft narratieve identiteit maakt Sartre een belangrijk 
onderscheid tussen hoe we over onze levens vertellen en hoe we 
onze levens leven. Als we achteraf over onze levens vertellen, dan 
lijkt het alsof er een bepaalde structuur in zit. Dit komt doordat  we 
de afloop van een verhaal weten en daarom het verhaal zo kunnen 
vertellen dat alle gebeurtenissen leiden tot die afloop. Zo krijgen 
alle gebeurtenissen een betekenis. Een dergelijke structuur noemt 
Sartre een avontuur. Echter, volgens Sartre kunnen we helemaal 
geen avonturen beleven, omdat we de afloop van de gebeurtenissen 
in ons eigen leven niet kennen. Doordat we op een bepaalde manier 
over onze levens vertellen, krijgen we het idee dat onze levens ook 
automatisch naar een afloop toewerken, waarin uiteindelijk alles 
betekenisvol blijkt te zijn. Sartre ziet het narratieve Zelf dan ook 
vooral als iets misleidends, omdat het achteraf een structuur in onze 
levens aanbrengt die het leven van zichzelf niet heeft. 
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Sartres theorieën over het Zelf in zijn vroege werken komen dus 
voort uit zijn opvatting dat het bewustzijn geen inhoud heeft. Er is 
geen subjectief zelf, en het Zelf dat we ‘ontdekken’ als we reflecteren, 
verschijnt enkel achteraf als object van reflectie. Ook de narratieve 
structuren van onze levensverhalen kunnen we pas achteraf 
aanbrengen en zijn niet aanwezig in het moment van beleven zelf. 
De tweede periode van Sartres werk is die van de tweede wereldoorlog 
tot begin jaren ’50. Deze periode wordt gedomineerd door Sartres 
existentialistische filosofie en zijn hoofdwerk Het zijn en het niet. 
Vooral in dit werk heeft Sartre een sterk systematische ontologische 
inslag. Hij wil een ontologisch systeem opbouwen vanuit het 
eerdergenoemde idee dat bewustzijn niets anders is dan bewustzijn 
van iets anders. Uit dit idee leidt hij twee absolute vormen van 
bestaan af: het zijn op-zich en het zijn voor-zich, die respectievelijk 
het zijn van de dingen en het zijn van het bewustzijn behelzen.
Als wij een ding waarnemen,kunnen we een ontelbare hoeveelheid 
indrukken van het object hebben. We kunnen er omheen lopen 
om de achterkant te bekijken, het in een ander licht zien of op een 
ander moment. Toch blijft het verschijnen als hetzelfde object. Er 
moet dus iets zijn dat de verschillende indrukken van een object 
samenbrengt. Dit kan niet een ander ding zijn, een soort ‘echt’ ding 
achter het object zoals het verschijnt. Als dit zo zou zijn, dan zouden 
we de vraag enkel opschuiven en ons moeten afvragen hoe dit object 
dan bestaat. Dingen moeten dus los bestaan van hoe ze verschijnen 
om te verklaren dat ze als een eenheid verschijnen, maar er kan 
niet iets anders achter de schermen zitten. Daarom stelt Sartre dat 
dingen simpelweg op-zichzelf moeten bestaan – noch afhankelijk 
van onze waarneming, noch afhankelijk van een andere bron van 
bestaan. We kunnen verder weinig zeggen over dit bestaan, want 
als het zou verschijnen zou deze verschijning zelf weer een bestaan 
moeten hebben.
Het verschijnen van dingen impliceert ook iets waaraan het 
verschijnt. Het bewustzijn bestaat volgens Sartre als zelfbewustzijn: 
hoewel het niets anders is dan bewustzijn van een object, moet het 
ook impliciet van zichzelf bewust zijn. Als dit niet zo zou zijn, zou 
er een tweede staat van bewustzijn nodig zijn die de eerste als object 
zou hebben, en om daar bewust van te worden weer een derde, tot 
in het oneindige. Om deze regressie tegen te gaan moeten we een 
‘pre-reflectief zelfbewustzijn’ aannemen, en Sartre noemt dit ook wel 
het ‘pre-reflectieve cogito’. Dit ‘Ik denk’ is geen denkend ding, maar 
refereert naar de manier waarop bewustzijn werkt. Echter, net als het 
cogito van Descartes vormt het wel een uitgangspunt voor zekere 
kennis en daarmee vertoont het toch een belangrijke gelijkenis met 
het Cartesiaanse begrip. Het bewustzijn is zich dus altijd bewust van 
zichzelf en wordt vandaar ook het voor-zich genoemd. 
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Zo heeft Sartre de twee basismanieren van bestaan blootgelegd.
Om een compleet beeld van de realiteit te geven is er ook Niets. 
Sartre laat zien dat in onze wereld ook een hoop objecten zijn die 
geen bestaande dingen zijn, maar niet-bestaande ‘negatiteiten’. 
Hij beschrijft dit in een uitvoerige analyse van een vriend die niet 
aanwezig is in een café terwijl je met hem afgesproken hebt. Hoewel 
de afwezigheid van de persoon alleen maar kan plaatsvinden 
in het licht van het feit dat je verwacht dat hij er zou zijn, is zijn 
afwezigheid niet te reduceren tot een louter subjectief oordeel. Er is 
een verschil tussen een afwezigheid die plaatsvindt in de wereld om 
je heen, en eentje die louter bedacht is. Ik kan bijvoorbeeld stellen 
dat Rutger Hauer niet in het café is, maar dat is een louter subjectief 
oordeel aangezien er niets in de objectieve werkelijkheid is dat het 
waarschijnlijk zou maken dat hij er zou zijn. Als ik afgesproken 
heb, zorgt mijn subjectieve dispositie er echter voor dat er objectief 
iets gebeurt in het café. Het Niets is daarom een categorie van de 
werkelijkheid die een objectieve component kent in de vorm van 
dergelijke negatiteiten.
Echter, zo vraagt Sartre zich af, hoe komt het dat het bewustzijn 
deze negatiteiten kan voortbrengen? Dat komt omdat het voor-
zich een manier van bestaan is die haar eigen Niets in zich draagt. 
Een ding dat op-zich bestaat valt met zichzelf samen. Een steen is 
simpelweg een steen. Bewustzijn van een steen echter, dat op-zich 
bestaat, valt niet met zichzelf samen. Dat wil zeggen, het is niets 
ander dan bewustzijn van de steen en kan niet los van haar object 
bestaan, maar toch is het ook niet te reduceren tot de steen zelf. 
Omdat het bewustzijn dus niet met zichzelf samenvalt kan het een 
bron van Niets zijn. 
Omdat bewustzijn niet samenvalt met de dingen in de wereld, wordt 
het ook niet volledig bepaald door deze wereld, maar is het op een 
fundamentele manier vrij. Dat wil zeggen, het vindt altijd plaats in 
de wereld maar kan zich op verschillende manieren tot deze wereld 
verhouden. Iedere handeling die wij als bewuste wezens uitvoeren 
wordt dan ook een vrije handeling: ze worden altijd bepaald aan de 
hand van doelen die wij onszelf stellen. Doordat wij doelen op de 
werkelijkheid projecteren overstijgen we de werkelijkheid zoals deze 
is en werken we toe naar een werkelijkheid zoals deze nog niet is. 
De dingen in de wereld verschijnen vervolgens in het licht van deze 
doelen. Onze vrijheid resulteert daarmee in wat Sartre ‘de situatie’ 
noemt: de vervlechting van subjectiviteit en objectiviteit waarin het 
bewustzijn doelen projecteert aan de hand van de dingen, en de 
dingen vervolgens verschijnen in het licht van die doelen.
Tot zover de manier waarop subjectiviteit, objectiviteit en negativiteit 
in deze periode samenhangen. Sartres ideeën over het Zelf zijn op 
dezelfde leest gestoeld. Wat betreft subjectieve identiteit wijkt hij 
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af van de ideeën die hij in zijn vroeger werken naar voren heeft 
gebracht. Waar hij eerder stelde dat het bewustzijn in eerste instantie 
onpersoonlijk is en er pas op een moment van reflectie een Zelf 
in verschijnt, stelt hij nu dat bewustzijn een dimensie van ‘zelfheid’ 
heeft. Dit hangt samen met zijn opvattingen over vrijheid. Als wij 
inderdaad altijd doelen projecteren in de werkelijkheid, dan nemen 
wij continu mogelijkheden waar. Deze mogelijkheden moeten ons 
pre-reflectief toeschijnen als onze mogelijkheden en we moeten 
dus een continuïteit ervaren in degene die we zijn. We anticiperen 
niet alleen op dingen in de volgende momenten, maar in de vorm 
van deze mogelijkheden ook dingen die er nog niet zijn. Daarom 
ervaren we de volgende momenten in de schakel als momenten 
die samenhangen met onze identiteit. Dit continu projecteren van 
mogelijkheden op ieder moment in de tijd noemt Sartre de ‘cirkel 
van zelfheid’ en deze cirkel is wat ons bewustzijn persoonlijk maakt. 
Hoewel hij dus wel vasthoudt aan een functioneel cogito is dit cogito 
niet gelijk aan een subjectief Zelf dat een soort eenheid is. Er is nog 
steeds geen ‘inwoner’ van het bewustzijn, maar subjectieve zelfheid 
is eerder een proces dat wij doorleven.
Met dit proces komt er ook een nieuwe vorm van het objectieve 
Zelf om de hoek kijken. Omdat we altijd doelen projecteren en 
daarmee zelf een project zijn, projecteren we altijd een Zelf aan de 
horizon van alle komende momenten. Dit is een ideëel Zelf dat we 
nooit echt kunnen verwezenlijken: aangezien we een projecterend 
wezen zijn kunnen we niet zeggen dat ons project ooit ‘af ’ is, dan 
zouden we ophouden met bestaan. Waar Sartre dus in zijn vroege 
werk vooral beargumenteerde dat we achteraf een Zelf in onze 
handelingen kunnen opmerken, zet hij nu in op een Zelf dat altijd 
in de toekomst ligt. 
Hoewel ons objectieve Zelf dus een niet te bereiken punt in de 
toekomst is, en daarmee een soort ‘niets’, doen we toch vaak alsof we 
wel een vaststaande identiteit hebben. Dit fenomeen noemt Sartre 
‘kwade trouw’. Kwade trouw is het ontkennen van onze vrijheid. Als 
we zeggen dat we de dingen doen omdat we niet anders kunnen, 
dan maken we ons eraan schuldig. Bijvoorbeeld iemand die eigenlijk 
vroeg op wil staan om een productieve dag te hebben en diekeer op 
keer in bed blijft liggen, kan zeggen: ‘Ik ben nou eenmaal lui’. Dan 
doet zo iemand volgens Sartre alsof hij een ding is met de eigenschap 
luiheid. Hoewel we dus eigenlijk geen vaststaande identiteit hebben, 
doen we vaak van wel. 
Een andere dimensie van ons objectief Zelf heeft te maken met hoe 
anderen ons ervaren. Hoewel we vrije projecten zijn, kunnen andere 
mensen ons wel als objecten ervaren. Als ik een ander persoon denk 
te zien, dan is het waarschijnlijk dat diegene ook een vrij project is 
en niet bijvoorbeeld een geavanceerde robot. Dit is een eeuwenoud 
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filosofisch probleem: hoe weet ik nou echt dat een ander subjectief 
wezen ook een subjectief wezen is, terwijl ik nooit volledig toegang 
heb tot de subjectieve belevingswereld van diegene? Sartre heeft hier 
een oplossing voor. Hij zoekt dit in de omgekeerde situatie, namelijk 
als de Ander naar mij kijkt. Als ik bijvoorbeeld ergens naar sta te 
gluren en ik wordt plotseling betrapt, dan doet dit iets met me. In 
de ogen van de ander ben ik opeens een soort ding, een ‘gluurder’. Ik 
besef dat ik niet alleen ‘voor-zich’ besta, maar ook ‘voor-de-Ander’. 
Dat wil zeggen, ik heb een soort buitenkant, een manier waarop ik 
bekeken kan worden. Ik val er niet volledig mee samen, maar het 
gaat me toch aan. Onze objectieve identiteit zit dus zowel in het 
ideële Zelf dat we projecteren en de buitenkant die we zijn in de 
ogen van de ander. 
De dimensie van narratieve identiteit wordt minder expliciet 
behandeld door Sartre in deze periode, maar kan desalniettemin 
gevonden worden in de theorie die hij ‘existentiële psychoanalyse’ 
noemt. Deze theorie heeft vooral te maken met de manier waarop 
onze keuzes samenhangen. Hoewel al onze handelingen vrij zijn, 
zijn we niet altijd onze keuzes aan het overwegen. De meeste 
handelingen komen voort uit bredere projecten die weer voortkomen 
uit bredere keuzes. Ik kies er niet voor om mijn been vooruit te 
zetten, maar ik kies er bijvoorbeeld wel voor om een bepaalde studie 
te gaan doen. Andere handelingen stromen dan voort uit deze keuze, 
maar zijn daarom niet minder vrij. Onze handelingen zijn ook niet 
willekeurig: ik doe niet zomaar het ene moment het ene, en het 
andere moment het andere. Daarom stelt Sartre dat we op ieder 
moment een fundamentele keuze zijn. Deze fundamentele keuze 
is niet een keuze is die we op een bepaald moment bewust maken 
maar de samenhang tussen onze keuzes. Hoewel deze fundamentele 
keuze door ons leven heen wel kan veranderen, zijn ook de 
veranderingen niet willekeurig maar hangen samen met plotseling 
veranderende omstandigheden. Volgens Sartre moet het zo zijn dat 
ook deze fundamentele keuzes weer met elkaar samenhangen door 
ons leven heen. Er is daarom ook sprake van een ‘originele keuze’, 
een keuze die we niet op een bepaald moment maken maar die de 
samenhang door al onze andere keuzes heen garandeert. Doormiddel 
van existentiële psychoanalyse kunnen we de keuzes die iemand 
gemaakt heeft, vergelijken en zo de originele keuze achterhalen. 
Hoewel dit in eerste instantie niet zo zeer te maken lijkt te hebben 
met narratieve identiteit stelt Sartre dat deze methode bij uitstek 
geschikt is voor het schrijven van biografieën. Hij heeft de methode 
dan ook zelf toegepast in studies naar Baudelaire en Genet. 
Deze existentiële psychoanalyse hangt ook samen met Sartres 
vermaarde humanisme, zoals hij dat verdedigt in de lezing 
Existentialisme is een humanisme. In Het zijn en het niet stelt Sartre 
dat existentiële psychoanalyse mogelijk is omdat we zelf allemaal 
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weten hoe het is om een mens te zijn, en daarmee hoe het is om een 
originele keuze te hebben. Hoewel dit idee hier louter descriptief is, 
maakt hij het in de eerdergenoemde lezing normatief: hij stelt dat 
wij in al onze handelingen een voorbeeld stellen voor hoe iedereen 
zou moeten handelen en daarmee een soort essentie van de mens 
poneren.
Hiermee zijn we aan het einde gekomen van deze periode van Sartres 
werk, die zich kenmerkt door een grote nadruk op vrijheid. Waar 
Sartre eerst nog vooral bezig was met het afbreken van het Zelf 
door te laten zien dat het enkel achteraf kan bestaan, stelt hij er hier 
ideeën voor in de plaats die in plaats van een robuust Zelf te maken 
hebben met het vrije project dat we zijn. Dat is voor subjectieve 
identiteit de ‘cirkel van zelfheid’, voor objectieve identiteit het 
ideële Zelf aan de horizon van onze handelingen en voor narratieve 
identiteit de originele keuze die onze keuzes samenbrengt tot een 
kloppend verhaal.
De laatste periode van Sartres werk kenmerkt zich door een 
minder grote nadruk op vrijheid, maar een grotere nadruk op de 
druk die onze omstandigheden op ons uitoefenen. Zijn politieke 
engagement en grotere interesse in het Marxisme zorgen er voor dat 
hij zijn eerdere existentiële ideeën combineert met materialistische 
ideeën over onze omstandigheden. Zijn hoofdwerk uit deze periode 
is de Kritiek van de Dialectische Rede. Hoewel hij nog steeds af en 
toe gebruik maakt van de term bewustzijn, wordt de focus van 
subjectiviteit praxis: de praktische manier waarop wij ons tot onze 
omstandigheden verhouden. Omdat we in de kern organismen zijn 
die willen overleven zijn we altijd op zoek naar manieren om onszelf 
in leven te houden, zoals voedsel, veiligheid en warmte. Om dit te 
doen delen we de wereld om ons heen in in bepaalde zones: we 
maken van een veld landbouwgrond en we maken van stenen een 
huis. De wereld zo indelen in bepaalde gebieden die het voor ons 
het makkelijkst maken om te overleven, is de kern van onze praxis.
Echter, omdat alle mensen deze praxis uitvoeren zijn er vaak 
onvoorziene gevolgen. Een voorbeeld hiervan is ontbossing: als 
iemand een paar bomen omhakt om een huis te maken, dan zal 
deze persoon makkelijker overleven. Echter, als een grote groep 
mensen de bomen omhakt, kan er erosie optreden die vervolgens 
leidt tot overstroming en de huizen wegspoelt. De onvoorziene 
gevolgen van praxis sedimenteren zo zelf in de materie. Dit noemt 
Sartre het ‘practico-inerte’, de centrale term om Sartres denken 
over objectiviteit in deze periode te begrijpen. De practico-inerte 
laag van de werkelijkheid wordt gevormd door menselijke praxis 
maar gaat vervolgens een eigen leven leiden. Als we bijvoorbeeld 
een huis bouwen, dan gaat een huis ook dingen van ons verwachten 
zoals onderhoud. Zo manipuleren wij het huis en het huis op zijn 
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beurt weer ons. Als we dit doortrekken dan kunnen we zien hoe 
verschillende delen van het practico-inerte elkaar beïnvloeden door 
mensen te gebruiken. Stoomenergie heeft er bijvoorbeeld voor 
gezorgd dat wij grote fabriekshallen voor treinen moesten gaan 
bouwen. Tot slot doet het practico-inerte ook wat wij met onze 
omstandigheden doen: ons indelen in zones. Zodra er fabriekshallen 
zijn, zijn er arbeiders en eigenaren. Zo worden we ingedeeld in wat 
Sartre collectieven noemt. 
Er is echter een manier om onze vrijheid terug te winnen ten opzichte 
van de practico-inerte werkelijkheid en dat is groepsvorming. Waar 
een collectief altijd gecreëerd wordt door de dingen, ontstaat een 
groep altijd door gedeelde doelen van de leden van een groep. 
Zodra een groep mensen door omstandigheden een gezamenlijk 
doel krijgt, worden ze wat Sartre een groep-in-fusie noemt. Een 
dergelijke groep kan een enorme impact maken. Hij gebruikt zelf de 
bestorming van de Bastille tijdens de Franse revolutie als voorbeeld: 
een collectief van onderdrukte mensen wordt een groep door samen 
een gebouw te bestormen en zo ontketenen ze een revolutie. 
Een groep-in-fusie bestaat echter maar voor een tijdje. Wil een groep 
langer bestaan dan moeten ze een deel van hun spontaniteit opgeven 
en weer een inert element inbrengen. Het volgende stadium van 
groepsvorming is de ‘bezworen groep’. Hierbij worden leden op wat 
voor manier dan ook tot de groep toegelaten door een symbolische 
handeling zoals een eed. Iemand kan in principe nog steeds bij het 
project van de groep horen als diegene bezworen is.
Daarna komen nog twee stadia die beide een nog grotere mate van 
inertie hebben: de organisatie en de institutie. Bij een organisatie 
krijgen individuele leden bepaalde taken. Het is niet meer zo 
dat iedereen precies hetzelfde project deelt, maar dat er een 
overkoepelend project is waarin iedereen een eigen functie heeft. 
Een goed voorbeeld is een vriendengroep die gaat voetballen en 
besluit dat één iemand de keeper is en iemand anders de spits, omdat 
dat past bij waar ze goed in zijn. Een organisatie draait de volgorde 
om: hier worden eerst functies bepaald en worden daarna leden van 
de groep in deze functies benoemd (of gezet). Een voorbeeld is een 
bedrijf waarbij eerst een functie bestaat waar daarna een vacature 
voor wordt uitgeschreven.
Collectieven die de verschillende vormen van groepen vormen zijn 
uiteindelijk de motor van de geschiedenis. De grootste collectieven 
van een samenleving, de klassen, zijn continu in beweging door het 
vormen van groepen. Zo wordt de geschiedenis een klassenstrijd. 
Door deze nadruk op groepsvorming brengt Sartre een extra dimensie 
aan in zijn denken over subjectiviteit en objectiviteit. Subjectieve 
handelingen sedimenteren in de objectieve werkelijkheid, maar de 
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subjectieve wezens worden door deze objectieve werkelijkheid weer 
tot objecten gemaakt. Door groepsvorming kunnen subjectieve 
wezens hun handelingsmogelijkheden terug krijgen, maar moeten 
deze weer opgeven als de groepen langer moeten kunnen bestaan.
Dit is echter een vrij abstracte beschrijving van de werkelijkheid. 
Wij worden allemaal geboren in een wereld waarin al talloze 
collectieven en groepen bestaan. Sartres denken over het Zelf hangt 
dan ook vooral samen met hoe wijzelf gevormd worden binnen deze 
geschiedenis. 
Subjectieve identiteit wordt beschreven door wat Sartre het proces 
van interiorisatie noemt, vooral beschreven in de lezing Marxisme en 
Subjectivitieit. Het onderscheid tussen een subjectieve binnenwereld 
en een objectieve buitenwereld, waar Sartre al vanaf zijn vroegste 
werken tegen ageert, wordt ditmaal op een andere manier op losse 
schroeven gezet. Waar Sartre eerst benadrukte dat bewustzijn leeg is 
en niets kan bevatten en alles in de objectieve buitenwereld plaatst, 
maakt hij nu een drieledig onderscheid. Subjectiviteit is zelf nog 
steeds geen wereld, maar de mediatie tussen de binnenwereld en 
de buitenwereld. Deze binnenwereld is echter niet subjectief maar 
objectief: het is bijvoorbeeld ons lichaam, onze gewoonten, onze 
overtuigingen: alle dingen die wij zijn zonder ons daar per se altijd 
bewust van te zijn. Subjectiviteit bemiddelt tussen deze binnenwereld 
en de buitenwereld door te reageren op omstandigheden zoals de 
binnenwereld dat voorschrijft om elementen van de buitenwereld 
tot zich te nemen. We zijn ons echter niet altijd bewust van hoe 
dit gebeurt. Een voorbeeld dat Sartre hiervan geeft is traplopen: de 
meesten van ons kunnen gedachteloos een trap aflopen, maar als 
we op een gegeven moment hier bewust van worden  en bewust 
onze voeten op een bepaalde manier neerzetten dan wordt het 
opeens moelijker. Dit type ervaring, die niet per se onbewust is 
maar ook niet volledig bewust, noemt Sartre ‘geleefde ervaring’ en 
deze geleefde ervaring is dan ook hoe wij in een gegeven situatie 
bemiddelen tussen onze binnen- en buitenwereld.
De momenten waarbij we wel expliciet bij onze binnenwereld 
stilstaan, vormen de basis voor objectieve identiteit, in een proces dat 
Sartre personalisatie noemt. Hoewel het voorbeeld van het traplopen 
vrij onschuldig is, kunnen we andere voorbeelden bedenken waarbij 
we gedwongen worden stil te staan bij hoe we eigenlijk in elkaar 
steken. Sartre geeft het voorbeeld van iemand die pretendeert niet 
antisemitisch te zijn, maar toch continu zijn afkeer voor Joden 
laat blijken. Op een gegeven moment wordt die persoon met dit 
gedrag geconfronteerd en beseft hij zich dat zijn gedachten over 
Joden in hem zijn geslopen door zijn sociale milieu. Doordat hij 
gedwongen wordt hierover na te denken kan hij zijn gedachtegoed 
echt veranderen. In dit soort momenten verschijnt ons Zelf als een 
SUMMARY
270 271
object en Sartre grijpt dan ook expliciet terug op zijn eerdere werken 
waarin ook de reflectieve aard van het Zelf beschreven wordt. Door 
ons leven heen hebben we een aantal van dit soort momenten die 
ons Zelf als object doen verschijnen en uiteindelijk vormgeven.
Narratieve identiteit wordtdoor Sartre vooral behandeld in het 
licht van geschiedschrijving. Zijn vrijheidsdenken maakt plaats 
voor een bepaalde vorm van voorbestemmingsdenken: ons milieu 
vormt onze binnenwereld en bepaalt het aantal mogelijkheden 
waar we uit kunnen kiezen. Omdat dit veld van mogelijkheden veel 
kleiner is, kunnen we achteraf onze levens beschrijven alsof al onze 
handelingen bepaald worden door onze omstandigheden. Echter, 
als we de geschiedenis volledig willen begrijpen, dan kunnen we 
het subjectieve perspectief niet uitsluiten. Dit komt omdat wij door 
onze keuzes de geschiedenis van betekenis voorzien. We kunnen 
bijvoorbeeld een verloren veldslag alleen begrijpen als er mensen 
zijn die als doel hadden gesteld om de veldslag te winnen en daarin 
gefaald hebben. Dit veronderstelt negativiteit en die bestaat alleen 
per gratie van subjectiviteit. Een louter objectieve beschrijving van 
de geschiedenis schiet daarom fundamenteel tekort. Sartre grijpt 
hierin terug op het vocabulaire uit zijn eerste werken. Hij stelt dat 
onze levens achteraf altijd noodzakelijk zo verlopen lijken te zijn, 
maar geleefd moeten worden als avonturen, waarin al onze keuzes 
wel als vrij ervaren worden en toewerken naar onze doelen. Waar hij 
dus eerst uiteenzette dat avonturen alleen retrospectief bestaan en 
onze levens nooit zo geleefd kunnen worden, zegt hij nu dat juist 
onze levens als avonturen geleefd moeten worden.
Sartres denken over het Zelf in deze laatste periode heeft dus 
vooral te maken met de manier waarop omstandigheden ons vorm 
geven. Hij verliest echter nooit uit het oog dat subjectiviteit hier 
een belangrijke rol in speelt en dat we zonder subjectiviteit deze 
objectieve omstandigheden nooit kunnen begrijpen.
We zien zo dat Sartre door zijn werk heen verandert in zijn denken 
over subjectiviteit en het Zelf, maar tevens dat een aantal tendensen 
hetzelfde blijven. Een van die tendensen is het afbreken van het 
subjectieve Zelf als gegeven eenheid door te benadrukken dat 
subjectieve identiteit altijd een proces is dat alleen in de objectieve 
wereld plaats kan vinden. Ons daadwerkelijke Zelf is altijd een ding 
onder dingen, iets dat niet in ons zit, maar iets dat aan ons verschijnt. 
In de eerste en laatste periode is het echt een ding en in de middelste 
periode is het veeleer een niet te bereiken ideaal en daarmee een 
niets. Toch is het Zelf nooit een subjectief ding zoals de traditionele 
Cartesiaanse opvatting behelst. Wat betreft narratieve identiteit is 
Sartres denken minder continu. In zijn vroege werk zegt hij dat we 
continu over ons leven vertellen maar dat ons leven geen narratieve 
structuur heeft. In het middelste werk zegt hij dat ons leven wel een 
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structuur heeft die we in een biografie kunnen vastleggen, maar dat 
we deze enkel achteraf kunnen bepalen doormiddel van existentiële 
psychoanalyse. Wat hier belangrijk bij is, is dat deze structuur 
vormgegeven wordt door onze keuzes. In de laatste periode zegt 
hij dat de narratieve structuur van onze levens van te voren vastligt, 
maar dat we ons leven desalniettemin niet kunnen leven alsof het 
verhaal al geschreven is. Een belangrijk element van Sartres denken 
over narrativiteit blijft behouden: een geleefd leven en een verteld 
leven verschillen fundamenteel van elkaar.
Zo heb ik laten zien hoe Sartres denken over subjectiviteit en het 
Zelf inderdaad bestaat uit het minimaliseren van subjectiviteit 
ten faveure van objectiviteit, maar dat hij dit altijd doet door onze 
subjectieve beleving op de voorgrond te zetten. Daarmee bewandelt 
Sartre een bijzonder pad tussen de gevaren Cartesianisme en 
reductionisme, waarin hij  zo veel mogelijk recht probeert te doen 
aan zowel de subjectieve als objectieve laag van de werkelijkheid – 
en de subjectieve en objectieve laag van onszelf. 
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